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5Introduction
Foreign banks have assumed an increasingly important role in transition coun-
tries. This is especially true for the region of South East Europe. Although of 
different kind and structure in every country the forces of change shaping the 
banking and ﬁnancial system in South East Europe like market liberalization and
market based reforms are fundamental for the process. A crucial role among 
them has to be devoted to opening of the banking systems to foreign bank entry. 
The host countries need foreign capital to align the local banking system to 
the international best practices. On the other hand, this openness is match-
ing with the interest of foreign banks, which have chosen to develop abroad as 
their business expansion strategy. The intense competitive pressure on banking 
institutions from EU countries with well established ﬁnancial systems has gen-
erated an interest to expand to SEE looking for higher proﬁtability. The impact
of these strategic changes was beneﬁcial for the emerging banking systems in
SEE, while initiating the process of integration with the global economy. 
Reforms are having lasting effects on the entire structure of domestic banking 
systems in SEE. These changes are reﬂecting not only the dynamics in growth,
but also its implications on the management, proﬁtability and efﬁciency of banks.
The phenomenal growth proﬁle of banking industries in the host countries is
to be signiﬁcantly associated with the transfer of know-how, best practices in
managing these institutions efﬁciently and broadening the diversity of the banks’
operations. There is evidence of the beneﬁts of foreign bank penetration for SEE,
especially by fostering competition and improving of the domestic banking culture. 
However, foreign owned banks show to a large extent also high proﬁtability.
The international research team is aimed at conducting cross-country analysis to 
investigate the effects of foreign bank entry on domestic banking systems in the 
following South East European countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR Mace-
donia, Romania and Serbia. The research work is concentrated on the extensive 
knowledge base already developed for FDI in banking. The further research car-
ried out by the team is integrating those insights with ﬁndings stemming from the
speciﬁcity patterns of banking sectors in SEE in the context of the concerns and
beneﬁts for the host country. The studies are based on available macroeconomic
and bank balance sheet data for each country. To test the research progress and 
6review preliminary results three workshops have been organized and hosted by 
the Economic Policy Institute in Soﬁa . The research activities within the project
were generously supported by the Austrian National Bank.
The importance of foreign bank subsidiaries in the banking sectors of the tar-
geted countries has increased considerably in the recent ten years. This is evi-
dence is reﬂected by the research period chosen and covered by the individual
cross-country studies. 
Particular emphasis in the studies has been put on: banking sector develop-
ment and economic growth; characteristics of foreign banks penetration; legal 
aspects of foreign bank entry; performance of banking institutions (efﬁciency of
ﬁnancial services, proﬁtability; and management quality). The research results
show evidence on increasing competition and stability in the banking sectors, 
enhancing efﬁciency, introducing new management and information technolo-
gies in the provision of banking services, and improving prudential and regula-
tory standards. There are points, where the individual studies reveal differences 
in the assessments of the FDI impact, as well as the actions addressing the par-
ticular challenges to management practices in the banking sectors of targeted 
countries. These outcomes reﬂect the heterogeneity of banking sectors devel-
opments and in most cases they are associated with the stage of institutional 
relations of the individual country with the EU.
Evidence on the basic research topics provides a better base for debate and 
perhaps policy attention.
Prof. Dr. Wilfried Altzinger    Dr. Ivanka Petkova
7CHAPTER I
BANKING SECTORS AND GROWTH
Financial Sector Development 
and Economic Growth – 
Evidence for Southeastern Europe
Bettina Hagmayr, Peter R. Haiss 1
Introduction
The role of ﬁnancial sector development for economic growth has become a ma-
jor topic in empirical research. Most of the earlier studies come to the conclusion 
that there is a rather positive relationship between ﬁnancial development and
growth. Recent research differentiates stronger between different time periods, 
levels of development (industrialized, emerging and developing) and across ﬁ-
nancial sectors.2 Inquiries into the ﬁnance-growth nexus of the emerging econo-
mies in Southeast Europe (SEE) are scarce and hardly take sectoral effects into 
consideration. We try to ﬁll this gap.
We use a production function approach to investigate the impact of ﬁnancial
markets on economic growth during 1995 and 2005 of four emerging markets in 
Southeast Europe.3 We rely on a panel data approach and follow the standard 
approach by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), who use physical capital stock, 
labor and human capital. We run our regressions in adding two aggregate meas-
ures of ﬁnancial variables covering credit, bond and stock markets, as well as
testing with single ﬁnancial variables (domestic credit, private credit, bonds out-
1 Peter Haiss (peter.haiss@wu-wien.a.c.at) lectures at the EuropaInstitute, Vienna University of Economics and Business Admin-
istration and is with Bank Austria Creditanstalt, Vienna, member of UniCredit group; Bettina Hagmayr (Bettina.Hagmayr@gmx.net; 
corresponding author) is a graduate student at the Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration, Vienna, Austria. 
The opinions expressed are the authors’ personal views and not necessarily those of the institutions the authors are afﬁliated with.
The authors are indebted to helpfulT comments by Gerhard Fink and the Finance-Growth/Integration Nexus-Team at WU-Wien 
(http://fgr.wu-wien.a.c.at/institut/ef/nexus.html)
.2 Rousseau and Wachtel 2005; Fink, Haiss and Vuksic 2004
3 The sample includes Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Turkey
8standing and stock market capitalization). We ﬁnd that bond markets had the
most signiﬁcant and positive impact on growth in our sample among the ﬁnancial
variables. As for the other variables real capital stock growth proved to be impor-
tant for economic development during transition.
The empirical analysis focuses on the Southeast European countries Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Romania and on EU Candidate Country Turkey. We use Greece as a 
reference point in some tables, because it is a neighbor, because Greek banks 
are heavily involved in SEE and due to the fact that it also shares some develop-
ment similarities, as it is a cohesion country. The article is organized as follows: 
First we provide a review of empirical studies showing the link between ﬁnancial
sector development and economic growth. Second, we discuss and state our 
econometric model. Then we analyze summary statistics of data and give an 
overview of the econometric results. A summary concludes the article.
1. Financial Sector Development and Economic Growth
 – Earlier Results
An impressive number of empirical studies relying on large country samples 
show that ﬁnancial sector development can have an economically important
impact on growth.4 Recent studies suggest that the relationship varies with the 
level of economic development for example between emerging and industrial-
ized market economies.5 Many of the empirical studies are based on the seminal 
work of King and Levine (1993a, 1993b).6 Using cross-section methodology, 
Levine and Zervos (1998) found that bank sector development and stock market 
development is positively correlated with contemporaneous and future rates of 
economic growth, productivity growth and capital accumulation in less devel-
oped countries. Evans, Green and Murinde (2002) argued that human capital 
and the bank sector are complements and suggested that the productivity en-
hancing potential of human capital can be exploited best in the presence of 
a developed banking system. Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) and Beck and 
4 For recent reviews, see Blum et al 2002 or Wachtel 2003. Lead effects of ﬁnancial markets on economic growth were identiﬁed in
several countries with Granger causality tests by Fink, Haiss and Hristoforova 2005. For a critique, see Rousseau and Wachtel 2005.
5 Rousseau and Wachtel 1998; Fink, Haiss and Vuksic 2004
6 See in the following: Fink, G., Haiss, P. and von Varendorff, M. 2005, Foreign Bank Market Entry and Economic Development: 
The Case of Serbia, in: Chadraba, P. and Springer, R. (eds), Proceedings of the 13th Annual Conference on Marketing and Business 
Strategies for Central and Eastern Europe, Vienna.
9Levine (2001) complemented ﬁndings by estimating the effect of banking sector
and stock market development, using panel data techniques. Both bank sec-
tor and stock market showed an independent, signiﬁcant and positive effect on
economic growth. Khan and Senhadji (2000) constructed a comprehensive ﬁ-
nancial sector development indicator comprising the bank sector, stock markets 
and also bond markets. Again a positive ﬁnance-growth link was found. Hon-
droyiannis, Lolos and Papapetrou (2005) tested the relationship of stock market 
capitalization and bank credit to the private sector and economic performance 
for the Greek case using data for the period 1986-1999. Their ﬁndings suggest
a bi-directional causality in the long run. The contribution of stock markets to 
economic growth, however, is smaller than that of banks.
Apart from sectoral issues, followers of the law-and-ﬁnance-view (e.g. La Porta
et al 1998 and Levine, Loayza and Beck 2000) emphasize the important role of 
legal and accounting status and reform for economic growth. A related strand 
of literature, e.g. Baele et al (2004) and Giannetti et al (2002), provide evidence 
that ﬁnancial deepening and integration can boost economic output. Given the
growing level of integration via foreign banks from the EU in the transition econo-
mies, this aspect should also be of relevance here.
A growing part of the recent literature has applied the ﬁnance-growth framework
to emerging economies, and a few empirical studies were already conducted in 
the context of European transition economies. In transition countries in Central 
Eastern Europe (CEE) in general and especially in SEE, ﬁnancial markets are
substantially smaller than in established market economies, as measured by the 
ﬁnancial intermediation ratio (credit to private enterprises to GDP).7 Although 
small ﬁnancial sectors prevail in transition economies, effects on growth could
be expected if regulations were appropriately set.8 In particular, short-run effects 
could be expected.9 Based on 1996 data, Fink and Haiss (1999) found some 
early evidence of a positive impact of bank sector development in the 10 EU 
Candidate Countries from CEE. Using a broader sample of 23 transition econo-
mies, Jaffee and Levonian (2001) could show that bank efﬁciency is signiﬁcantly
and positively related to economic output. Koivu (2002) further reﬁned the picture
by exploiting the time series component of a panel of 25 transition economies. 
7 Bonin and Wachtel 2003; Breuss, Fink and Haiss 2004
8 La Porta et al 1998; Bolton 2002
9 Fink, Haiss and Mantler 2005
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Bank efﬁciency (measured by the net interest margin) showed a signiﬁcantly
positive and causal impact on growth, while this was not the case for credit 
volume. The latter ﬁnding can be attributed to the inclusion of laggard reformers
from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Drakos (2003) provided 
an alternative explanation by arguing that high bank market concentration is 
negatively associated with economic growth in transition economies. For SEE, 
the empirical ﬁndings of Mehl and Winkler (2003) fail to support the hypothesis
of positive and causal link between ﬁnancial development and economic growth.
They explain this as a failure of the reforms in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s in SEE
to prevent inﬂationary ﬁnance and ﬁnancial crises.10 In some of these SEE coun-
tries the ﬁnancial development, by introducing new reform steps, has just started
so that the banking sector could not yet contribute to economic growth.11 
For EU Candidate Country Turkey two recent studies also show a link between ﬁ-
nancial development and economic growth. Kar and Pentecost (2000) investigated 
the direction of causality between ﬁnancial development and economic growth for
the period 1963-1995. Their ﬁndings suggest that in the Turkish case the relationship
between ﬁnance and growth depends upon the measures of ﬁnancial development.
Employing proxies for bank deposits, private sector credit and domestic credit the 
demand-leading hypothesis that economic growth causes ﬁnancial development is
supported. Results of a related study by Ünalmis (2002) for the period 1970-2001 
support the supply-leading hypothesis in the short run, while in the long run mutual 
causality between ﬁnancial development and economic growth is indicated.
With increasing level of development, bond markets and at later stages also 
qualiﬁed labor should become additional important factors of growth.12 Overall, 
when considering growth effects in general, also stock market segments could 
be expected to contribute to growth in the long run.13 In rather early stages of 
transition, stock markets were not signiﬁcantly related to growth in CEE in stud-
ies conducted by Fink and Haiss (1999) and Kominek (2002). 
The application of the ﬁnance-growth nexus to the transition economies sug-
gests some caution. Due to rather short time series available and difﬁculties to
10 For a deeper discussion of transition-speciﬁc effects in analyzing the ﬁnance-growth nexus, see Mehl and Winkler (2003: 4)
11 Mehl and Winkler 2003
12 Fink, Haiss and Vuksic 2004
13 Platek 2002
14 Mehl and Winkler 2003
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model the evolution of output in transition economies, these ﬁndings should be
treated as rather preliminary.14 The possible impact of inﬂation, of bad loans
and the possible association of fast credit growth with ﬁnancial distress are
worth mentioning in this context. The inclusion of inﬂation as conditioning vari-
able may be of special relevance during the early stages of economic transition, 
which are usually characterized by high inﬂation.15 Mamatzakis, Staikouras and 
Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki (2005) and Cottarelli, Dell´Arricia and Vladkova-Hollar 
(2005) thus control for the inﬂation rate in their investigation of banking con-
centration and ﬁnancial deepening in transition economies.
Bank asset and credit data may similarly be distorted by high and volatile bad 
loans and their removal from the bank’s books to state consolidation agencies. 
Cottarelli, Dell´Arricia and Vladkova-Hollar (2005) and Fink, Haiss and Mantler 
(2005) reﬂect this in their application of the ﬁnance-growth model to transition
economies. Given the fast credit growth in some transition economies, whether 
this credit growth reﬂects a structural deepening conducive to the real economy
or a credit bubble possibly detrimental to medium-term economic growth is of 
special importance in this context. For Croatia, Kraft and Jankov (2005) ﬁnd
that rapid loan growth did indeed increase the probability of credit quality de-
terioration. Still, from the empirical evidence on the frontrunners to economic 
reform in NMS it can be derived that a sound banking sector seemingly is the 
ﬁrst sector, which could contribute to growth.
15 Khan and Senhadji (2000) and Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) provide related evidence on threshold effects in the relationship 
between inﬂation and growth
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Author 
(year) Sample
Theoretical 
framework
Research 
method
Financial 
segments 
included
Growth 
effect
OE    TC    
Key ﬁndings
Fink
and 
Haiss 
(1999)
10 
transition 
countries 
(CEE)
production 
function style 
regression
cross-section 
analysis
bank sector
stock market  
bond market
+
0 
0
Positive link between 
bank sector development 
and economic growth.
Jaffe 
and 
Levo-
nian 
(2001)
23 
transition 
econo-
mies
“Barro”-
regression
cross-section 
analysis
bank sector + Signiﬁcant and positive
relationship between 
bank sector development, 
bank sector reforms and 
economic growth.
Koivu 
(2002)
25 
transition 
econo-
mies (CEE 
+ CIS)
“Barro”-
regression
panel analysis bank sector + Results indicate that the 
interest rate margin is 
signiﬁcantly and nega-
tively related to economic 
growth. On the other 
hand a rise in the amount 
of credit does not seem 
to accelerate economic 
growth.
Drakos 
(2002)
21 
transition 
econo-
mies
“Barro”-
regression
cross-section 
analysis and 
panel analysis
bank sector + A positive effect of bank-
ing sector competition on 
economic growth is docu-
mented. The lower the 
imperfections in market 
structure the higher real 
GDP growth.
Platek 
(2002)
26 
transition 
econo-
mies (CEE 
+ CIS)
“Barro”-
regression
cross-section 
analysis
bank sector  
stock market
+
+
Bank sector development 
and stock market devel-
opment is signiﬁcantly
and positively correlated 
with economic growth.
Fink, 
Haiss 
and 
Vuksic 
(2004)
9 
transition 
econo-
mies 
(CEE)
growth 
accounting 
regression
cross-section 
analysis and 
panel analysis
aggregate 
indicator
(bank sector, 
stock market, 
bond market)
bank sector
stock market  
bond market
+           +/0
0
+
Bank sector develop-
ment and bond markets 
stimulate growth in 
transition countries. Up to 
now, stock markets seem 
not to have played an 
important role.
Mehl, 
and 
Winkler 
(2003)
8 
transition 
econo-
mies 
(SEE)
growth 
accounting 
regression
panel analysis bank sector + Financial depth did 
not have a signiﬁcant
impact on Southeast 
European (SEE) countries 
growth performance 
over 1993-2003. The 
ﬁnancial development is
not growth-supportive 
when the institutional and 
legal framework given to 
market participants is not 
appropriate.
Table 1: Empirical evidence on ﬁnancial sector development and growth – emerging markets and transi-
tion countries
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Fink, 
Haiss 
and 
Mantler 
(2005)
22 market 
econo-
mies 
and 11 
transition 
econo-
mies 
(CEE)
growth 
accounting 
regression
panel analysis bank sector, 
stock and 
bond market
+ The ﬁnancial sector
induces positive growth 
effects but not with the 
same strength across 
countries. It is weaker 
in market economies 
comparing to transition 
countries. Financial sec-
tor development supports 
economic growth in the 
short run rather that in 
the long run. Financial 
structure plays also an 
important role in the 
measurement of this 
impact.
Kar and 
Pen-
tecost 
(2000)
Turkey Granger 
causality test
VECM bank sector + When ﬁnancial develop-
ment is measured by the 
money to income ratio the 
direction of causality runs 
from ﬁnancial develop-
ment to economic growth 
but when the bank de-
posits, private credit and 
domestic credit ratios are 
alternatively used to proxy 
ﬁnancial development,
growth is found to lead 
ﬁnancial development.
Ünalmis 
(2002)
Turkey Granger 
causality test
VAR, VECM bank sector + Financial development 
signiﬁcantly causes
economic growth in the 
short run. In the long run, 
there is a bi-directional 
relationship between 
ﬁnancial development and
economic growth. 
Adapted from Fink, Haiss and Mantler (2005). Notes: production function style = based on a neoclassical 
production function substituting physical capital for ﬁnancial capital, “Barro”-regression = speciﬁcation
following Barro (1991), growth accounting regression = speciﬁcation following Benhabib and Spiegel
(1994), OE = overall growth effect, TC = growth effect running through the technological channel
2. Methodology and the model
Two of the most popular methods among researchers investigating economic 
growth are cross-country regressions and panel data techniques. We included 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Turkey for our empirical estimation. Our sample 
is still small and therefore we rely on a panel data approach.16 Advantages of 
panel data methods are, according to Temple (1999), that “they allow one to 
control for omitted variables that are persistent over time” and including lags of 
regressors may alleviate measurement error and endogeneity bias.
16 For a discussion of different approaches to measure economic growth see for example Temple 1999.
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 denotes real output per capita in country i at time t and  stands 
for  . The dependent variable  is real output growth 
per capita in percent. As for the explanatory variables,  is real capital 
stock per capita in country i at time t and  stands for . Thus, 
 stands for real growth rate of per capita capital stock. Change in 
labor participation rate ( ) is deﬁned as a percentage change of the
ratio of the number of employed persons to total population.  stands for 
a constructed indicator for educational attainment and  is . 
Thus,  denotes change in educational attainment and is used 
to describe the quality of human capital. FI stands for the different ﬁnancial
intermediation variables, which are expressed in relationship to GDP. The 
following data section, as well as the Appendix provides more detailed deﬁni-
tions of variables and data sources. Subscript i stands for cross-section units, 
i.e. countries (i = 1…4), while t denotes time i.e. years (t = 1995…2005). 
We present the results of the pooled data regression with common intercepts. In 
the second and third speciﬁcations, the ﬁnancial intermediation variables enter the
regression with a one-year and two-year lag. This is done in order to alleviate 
the potential simultaneityттhoice of method for dealing with potential simultaneity 
problem is not crucial. Using instrumental variables or lagged values for ﬁnancial
variables yields remarkably similar results. 
We follow the study by Fink, Haiss and Vuksic 2005, who apply the produc-
tion function approach to nine transition countries in Europe. They augment the 
model of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), who use capital stock, labor, and hu-
man capital as explanatory variables by different ﬁnancial variables.
For the regressions, we use the following model speciﬁcations:
(1)
(2)
(3)
15
17 Data for Albania, FYR Macedonia and Serbia is not available for all our variables, therefore we could not include them in our 
empirical analysis.
3. Data
We collected data for the SEE Accession Countries and Greece (for means of 
comparison).17 The time period considered is between 1995 and 2005. We use 
data on real per capita output growth, real growth of capital stock per capita, 
change of labor participation rate, change in educational attainment as a proxy 
for the quality of human capital and six different indicators for ﬁnancial develop-
ment, these are: two measures of total ﬁnancial intermediation, domestic credit,
private credit, stock market capitalization and domestic bonds outstanding. The 
ﬁrst measure of total ﬁnancial intermediation (TFI 1) is a sum of domestic credit,
stock market capitalization and domestic bonds outstanding, the second meas-
ure (TFI 2) uses private credit instead of domestic credit. For exact deﬁnitions of
variables please see the Appendix.
Table 2 presents summary statistics on all variables. For the Accession Coun-
tries (AC) from SEE we see relatively high volatility of output growth. For ex-
ample, maximal value of output growth for Bulgaria is 6.46% and the lowest 
value amounts to –8.61%.
The standard deviation of capital stock, labor participation and educational at-
tainment was low. Except from capital stock in Bulgaria, where the standard 
deviation is 3.25%. In contrast the variability of all ﬁnancial variables, except
from stock market capitalization is high in the AC. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics – annual data 1995-2005 (in %)
Output Capital stock Labor
Educa-
tion TFI 1 TFI 2
Domes-
tic credit
Private 
credit
Stock 
markets Bonds
Bulgaria
Mean 2.9577 3.3302 0.3663 0.3772 94.5146 84.5789 36.3846 26.4489 1.5226 56.6074
Median 4.7804 3.5153 0.3876 0.3772 64.5004 65.1083 23.6781 19.7840 0.9210 45.6643
Max. 6.4636 8.5965 2.6469 0.3844 302.7094 256.9909 108.6919 62.9735 5.1164 193.8618
Min. -8.6126 -1.6399 -1.2655 0.3702 60.1122 56.2180 15.3018 9.3304 0.1096 22.2110
Std. dev. 4.9723 3.2497 1.1132 0.0047 71.8799 58.5458 28.7470 17.5232 1.6144 47.6615
Obs. 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
Croatia
Mean 3.9179 4.6778 0.4323 0.2476 103.8655 92.5660 54.5545 43.2550 1.5226 30.5010
Median 4.0188 4.7798 0.4549 0.2476 91.3483 81.5224 48.7655 41.1702 0.9210 29.5658
Max. 7.5831 5.9354 0.6698 0.2507 164.1482 151.4045 73.5394 60.7957 5.1164 55.3619
Min. 0.0362 3.4828 0.1691 0.2446 73.9982 57.3490 44.8828 29.2661 0.1096 11.7118
Std. dev. 1.9812 0.8813 0.2070 0.0020 30.3863 30.7007 10.0318 10.2948 1.6144 15.0128
Obs. 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
Romania
Mean 3.1736 2.8964 -0.4867 0.5101 30.8511 22.1146 18.1173 9.3808 5.0508 7.6830
Median 4.5299 2.9496 -0.2714 0.5110 29.6803 20.4285 17.8273 9.1091 2.0046 9.5513
Max. 8.8258 5.2904 1.1193 0.5217 48.2306 40.4444 28.8484 11.5518 19.8247 12.9282
Min. -5.5520 0.5972 -2.0245 0.4983 22.8050 10.5831 12.2213 7.1692 0.2119 0.0517
Std. dev. 4.7407 1.2622 0.9338 0.0075 7.1975 9.1426 5.0503 1.6111 6.3798 4.5815
Obs. 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
Turkey
Mean 2,9080 2,3493 -0,2677 0,7813 121,0051 93,7130 48,6817 21,3896 34,4566 37,8667
Median 5,3126 2,5919 -0,0361 0,7935 129,8181 91,0390 50,8798 22,4625 30,5849 30,0718
Max. 7,4722 6,3158 0,6159 0,8263 178,5495 131,3615 71,2531 26,3005 78,8272 68,8440
Min. -8,7175 -1,7387 -1,4141 0,6236 60,2282 50,8158 27,8985 14,7936 15,9619 16,3678
Std. dev. 5,3942 2,7815 0,6860 0,0554 37,1828 26,5258 12,6251 3,7163 17,7535 17,9691
Obs. 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
Greece
Mean 3.1440 3.6081 0.1344 0.1905 243.8294 199.5793 98.9683 54.7183 61.4426 83.4185
Median 3.4060 4.0513 -0.0740 0.1903 245.3865 211.0236 98.8180 51.4647 53.1517 80.8252
Max. 4.4985 5.5908 1.2397 0.1922 339.2992 291.8215 113.6514 84.8438 168.6354 99.4835
Min. 1.1787 1.3472 -0.4304 0.1889 185.3551 123.3505 84.6585 33.6220 14.3797 74.9129
Std. dev. 1.0337 1.5692 0.5601 0.0010 44.4015 50.6708 9.2746 18.5018 42.4822 8.1840
Obs. 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
We observe higher levels of ﬁnancial variables in Greece compared to Acces-
sion Countries. Figure 1 presents a graphical demonstration of this observation.18 
Compared to Greece, especially stock market capitalization shows very low lev-
els in AC. The deﬂection in 1996 for Bulgarian domestic credit, private credit,
bonds outstanding, and therefore total ﬁnancial intermediation 1 and 2 is most
probably due to the economic and ﬁnancial crisis that hit Bulgaria in 1996.
18 Data for domestic and private credit in Albania, FYR Macedonia and Serbia was available. Therefore, they are included in 
the graphs.
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Figure 1: Financial sectors in Accession Countries and Greece
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4. Results
This section presents the results of our panel data regressions. Looking at table 
3 and 4, we see that capital stock growth had the strongest positive and signiﬁ-
cant effect on economic development. This is true for all model speciﬁcations of
ﬁnancial intermediation. In addition, we ﬁnd that total ﬁnancial intermediation had
a negative effect in the model speciﬁcation with no lag and turns positive entering
the regression with a one-year (for total ﬁnancial intermediation 1) and two-year
(for both measures) lag.
Table 3: Results - Total ﬁnancial intermediation 1
Dependent variable 
is output growth
   
 Financial variable with
2 year lag
Financial variable with
1 year lag
Financial variable with
no lag
Constant -0.009777     (0.022920) -0.009439    (0.025530) 0.026569      (0.021658)
Capital stock growth 0.928727**  (0.348064) 1.040737**  (0.395931) 0.618296**   (0.264689)
Change in labor participation 0.259073      (0.822955) 0.085142     (0.949656) 0.538849      (0.841358)
Change in educational attain-
ment
-0.039902     (3.836891) 0.665631    (3.550301) 1.777135      (3.239166)
Total ﬁnancial intermediation 1 0.011872       (0.011092) 0.001286    (0.011746) -0.026537**  (0.012158)
adj. R2 0.148827 0.194983 0.201554
Observations 36 40 44
Dependent variable
is output growth
   
 Financial variable with  
2 year lag
Financial variable with   
1 year lag
Financial variable with 
no lag
Constant -0.006430     (0.024040) -0.007365     (0.025694) 0.027461      (0.022006)
Capital stock growth 0.877767**   (0.333151) 1.025214**    (0.394622) 0.665977**   (0.274521)
Change in labor participation 0.317979      (0.804594) 0.088918       (0.958556) 0.534376      (0.844209)
Change in educational attain-
ment
0.168226      (3.953369) 0.655292       (3.627247) 1.073427      (3.299289)
Total ﬁnancial intermediation
2
0.010728       (0.013979) -0.000545      (0.013238) -0.030495** (0.014203)
adj. R2 0.141031 0.194783 0.198311
Observations 36 40 44
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses, *** signiﬁcant at 1% level, ** signiﬁcant at
5% level and * signiﬁcant at 10% level.
Table 4: Results - Total ﬁnancial intermediation 2
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses, *** signiﬁcant at 1% level, ** signiﬁcant at
5% level and * signiﬁcant at 10% level.
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Table 5 and 6 show the estimation results using domestic and private credit as 
ﬁnancial variable. Again capital stock growth had the strongest positive effect on
economic growth. Private credit shows a negative effect entering the regression 
with no lag and with a one-year lag.
Table 5: Results - Domestic credit
Dependent variable 
is output growth
   
 Financial variable with
2 year lag
Financial variable with  
1 year lag
Financial variable with 
no lag
Constant -0.001606      (0.024000) 0.008012       (0.024096) 0.026270      (0.021993)
Capital stock growth 0.817641**    (0.354184) 0.936692**   (0.365498) 0.721902**  (0.297090)
Change in labor participation 0.447449        (0.881619) 0.134697       (0.947402) 0.453807      (0.896010)
Change in educational attain-
ment
0.187395        (3.916750) 0.335582      (3.717689) 0.953832      (3.462117)
Domestic credit 0.012234       (0.027024) -0.028934     (0.026022) -0.056843*   (0.030326)
adj. R2 0.132608 0.213970 0.173021
Observations 36 40 44
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses, *** signiﬁcant at 1% level, ** signiﬁcant at 5%
level and * signiﬁcant at 10% level.
Table 6: Results - Private credit
Dependent variable
is output growth
   
 Financial variable with 
2 year lag
Financial variable with 
1 year lag
Financial variable with 
no lag
Constant 0.016905       (0.026487) 0.027180       (0.023015) 0.029426      (0.022186)
Capital stock growth 0.719703**   (0.350704) 1.034461***  (0.362886) 0.888869**  (0.369348)
Change in labor participation 0.585019       (0.904203) 0.121377       (0.966353) 0.422526      (0.912307)
Change in educational attain-
ment
-0.766118      (4.510910) -2.214132      (3.980309) -1.255035    (3.865657)
Private credit -0.024876      (0.045170) -0.088989**  (0.037099) -0.081689*   (0.046117)
adj. R2 0.135523 0.274948 0.155997
Observations 36 40 44
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses, *** signiﬁcant at 1% level, ** signiﬁcant at 5%
level and * signiﬁcant at 10% level.
As for the results of regressions using stock market capitalization and bonds 
outstanding as ﬁnancial variables (table 7 and 8), again capital stock growth
affected economic growth signiﬁcantly. Stock market capitalization was never
signiﬁcant. The results for bonds outstanding show a signiﬁcant and relatively
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strong positive inﬂuence on economic development in the results with a two-
year lag. Change in participation and change in educational attainment turned 
out to be insigniﬁcant in all speciﬁcations and for all ﬁnancial variables.
Table 7: Results - Stock market capitalization
Dependent variable
is output growth
   
 Financial variable with
2 year lag
Financial variable with
1 year lag
Financial variable with 
no lag
Constant 0.005568       (0.019104) -0.006141      (0.019852) -0.004747     (0.020307) 
Capital stock growth 0.611484*     (0.316863) 1.006602**   (0.019852) 0.869094**   (0.396512)
Change in labor participation 0.881401      (0.909666) 0.105308       (0.962111) 0.132536       (0.955516)
Change in educational attain-
ment
3.468760       (3.317986) -0.056442     (3.256318) 3.577254      (2.885296)
Stock markets capitalization -0.083320     (0.052776) 0.017834       (0.040156) -0.058881     (0.050115)
adj. R2 0.208629 0.198093 0.129823
Observations 36 40 44
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses, *** signiﬁcant at 1% level, ** signiﬁcant at 5%
level and * signiﬁcant at 10% level.
Table 8: Results - Bonds outstanding
Dependent variable is out-
put growth
   
 Financial variable with 
2 year lag
Financial variable with 
1 year lag
Financial variable with 
no lag
Constant -0.023638     (0.021068) -0.018931      (0.025684) 0.030095     (0.020813)
Capital stock growth 1.080244**   (0.398652) 1.141976**    (0.423073) 0.483630*    (0.270552)
Change in labor participation 0.032931      (0.862633) 0.061359        (0.932414) 0.506834     (0.850143)
Change in educational attain-
ment
0.964490      (3.500627) 1.097480       (3.483872) 0.229877     (3.557239)
Bonds outstanding 0.041549**   (0.015930) 0.015119        (0.025097) -0.044878** (0.019293)
adj. R2 0.225869 0.204676 0.184144
Observations 36 40 44
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses, *** signiﬁcant at 1% level, ** signiﬁcant at 5%
level and * signiﬁcant at 10% level.
5. Discussion
From the empirical evidence for other emerging countries we conclude that the 
ﬁnancial sector has the potential to contribute to economic growth in Southeast
Europe (SEE). With our focused empirical analysis of four Southeast European 
Acceding and Candidate Countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Turkey) over 
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the 1995 to 2005 period we conclude that this potential is not yet fully used. As total 
ﬁnancial intermediation (i.e. the sum of credit, stock and bond ﬁnance) showed
rather negative effects in the short term and with lags was only mildly (but never 
signiﬁcantly) positive, we suggest that the ﬁnancial segments seem to play a differ-
ent role at the stage of development these SEE countries are in. These countries 
ﬁnancial sectors share many similarities and thus provide a good comparison to the
many ﬁnance-growth studies that rely on broad and dispersed country samples.
While all segments showed negative effects in the short term (with no lags), 
bonds outstanding showed a signiﬁcant and positive effect on GDP growth (esp.
with a two-year lag). Domestic credit, which similar to the bond segment includes 
both private and public ﬁnance, similarly showed positive effects with lags, albeit
insigniﬁcant. Both private credit and stock market ﬁnance showed only minor
and rather negative effects. We conclude that domestic bonds outstanding may 
have played an important role in economic development for Southeastern Euro-
pean transition countries over the last ten years, whereas private credit and the 
stock market seem to be below potential. 
Our ﬁndings correspond with the results of Fink, Haiss and Vuksic (2005) who
tested for nine transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe. They also ﬁnd
strong evidence that bond markets contributed to growth. Similar to our results pri-
vate credit and stock market capitalization were insigniﬁcant in their regressions.
They state that the insigniﬁcance of private credit might be due to many bad loans
to the private sector. Compared to private credit, domestic credit also includes 
bank credits to central and local government and therefore has low default risk. 
A salient structural feature of bond markets in transition countries is the fact that 
government issues dominate bond markets. So, again we see a different impact of 
ﬁnancing the private and the public sector. “In early stages of development where
capital is extremely scarce, the government could play an important role in economic 
development by providing a big push to ﬁnancial development in the ﬁrst place.”19 
Results of the relationship between bond markets and economic growth for EU coun-
tries do not ﬁnd such strong evidence for the importance of bond markets (see for
example Haiss and Hristoforova 2004 or Fink, Haiss and Kirchner 2005). Therefore 
the importance of bond markets may vary upon different levels of development. 
19 Alper and Onis 2002, 6
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Stock markets were insigniﬁcant for output growth in our sample. The reason for
this lays most probably in their underdevelopment. Testing for the relationship 
between the level of ﬁnancial development (measured by banking credit and
stock market turnover) and growth Minier (2003) ﬁnds a positive effect in high
capitalization countries. Her results suggest “that the relationship between stock 
market development and economic growth may […] be different in countries with 
smaller stock markets. In particular, opening a national exchange may not be 
enough to generate positive growth effects immediately: market capitalization 
may need to reach a certain level before these growth effects are realized.”20
Turning to the non-ﬁnancial intermediation variables, only capital stock growth
proved to be signiﬁcant and positively related to economic growth. This could be
explained by the large capital scarcity in transition countries. These capital ﬂows
stem from portfolio and foreign direct investment. 
Foreign direct investment to the ﬁnancial sector mainly through foreign bank
entry has been crucial in the process of transformation from a monobank to 
a two-tier banking system. Empirical research by Cottarelli, Dell´Arriccia and 
Vladkova-Hollar (2005) and others has provided evidence that factors originat-
ing in the banking system, rather than the corporate sector, were responsible for 
growth differences in accession and transition economies. 
Summary and Conclusions
We examine whether the development of ﬁnancial markets has played a signiﬁ-
cant role for real GDP per capita growth in Southeast European (SEE) countries. 
While many studies use very broad samples (regionally dispersed, countries 
at very different stages of economic and legal development, different country 
sizes and legal origins) we use a small and homogenous sample.21 By apply-
ing a panel data approach to four Acceding and Candidate Countries (AC) for 
the 1995 –2005 period, we ﬁnd that segments of ﬁnancial markets that include
public ﬁnance (especially bond markets) contributed to economic development,
whereas private credit and stock market capitalization had no signiﬁcant inﬂu-
20 Minier 2003, 1601
21 Rousseau and Wachtel 2006
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ence on growth. For Southeast Europe we conﬁrm, the ﬁndings by Fink, Haiss
and Vuksic (2005) on Central and Eastern Europe that “the widely accepted 
aggregate effect of ﬁnance on growth varies with the level of economic devel-
opment and, therefore, country characteristics need to be considered”.22 The 
various ﬁnancial sectors (bank credit, bond and stock markets) play different
roles covering different stages of economic development. This is also in line 
with Rousseau and Wachtel (2005). As for non-ﬁnancial variables capital stock
growth proved to be an important growth trigger. This lays in the capital scarcity 
during transition years. Concerning private capital, foreign direct investment is 
essential for emerging markets. 
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Data Appendix
Output growth – growth rate of real gross domestic product per capita (source: 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF)
Capital stock growth – growth rate of real physical capital stock per capita; time 
series on physical capital stock (K) were calculated by using perpetual inventory 
methods: 
whereby I denotes gross ﬁxed capital formation and d represent the constant 
rate of depreciation that is assumed to be 0.07; the initial capital stock values 
(K
0
) were calculated following Easterly/Levine (2001) by 
where (I/Y)Ø represents annual average investment rates over a ten-year pe-
riod and gy
 Ø denotes output growth averaged over a ten-year period. (Source: 
real gross ﬁxed capital formation data from AMECO database).
Change in participation rate – changes of the ratio of the number of employed 
persons to total population (Source: population - International Financial Statis-
tics (IFS) of the IMF, employment – AMECO database)
Change in educational attainment – changes of a constructed index using re-
ported education levels of employees. Weighted population fraction 15 to 64 
years having completed 3 levels of education, attainment rates: primary educa-
tion (weight: 1), secondary education (weight: 1.4), post-secondary education 
(weight 2) (Source: Barro, Robert J. and Lee, Jong-Wha, International Data on 
Educational Attainment: Updates and Implications (CID Working Paper no. 42); 
Human Capital Updated Files (April 2000), available at: http://www.cid.harvard.
edu/ciddata/ciddata.html)
Domestic credit - volume of loans of deposit money banks and monetary author-
ities to all residents divided by GDP (Source: International Financial Statistics 
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of the IMF). In general we use line 32 (“Domestic Credit”) of the IFS monetary 
survey, which only contains deposit money banks and monetary authorities. For 
Turkey with a different institutional setup (i.e. mutual funds are important inter-
mediaries), we use IFS data from the banking survey (line 52), which addition-
ally contains “other banking institutions” and “non-bank ﬁnancial institutions.” For
details, see Blum, Federmair, Fink and Haiss (2002: 51f).
Private credit - volume of loans of deposit money banks and monetary authorities 
to the private sector divided by GDP (Source: International Financial Statistics of 
the IMF). In general we use line 32d (“claims on the Private Sector”) of the IFS 
monetary survey, which only contains deposit money banks and monetary author-
ities. For Turkey with a different institutional setup (i.e. mutual funds are important 
intermediaries), we use IFS data from the banking survey (line 52d), which addi-
tionally contains “other banking institutions” and “non-bank ﬁnancial institutions.”
Stock market capitalization – value of listed domestic stocks on domestic ex-
changes divided by GDP (Source: for Greece and Turkey Federation of Inter-
national Stock exchanges; for Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania data of national 
stock exchanges).
Bonds outstanding – value of outstanding amounts divided by GDP (Source: 
Bank for International Settlement BIS /Securities Statistics; for Croatia, Bulgaria 
and Romania data are just available for the size of public bond markets in the 
1990s; as it seems that total bond market size is almost identical with public 
bond market size in these countries, we use data on public bond markets to 
proxy total market size; data for 2003-2004 from ECB).
Total ﬁnancial intermediation I – sum of domestic credit, stock market capitali-
zation and bonds outstanding (Source: see sources for domestic credit, stock 
market capitalization and bonds outstanding).
Total ﬁnancial intermediation II – sum of private credit, stock market capitaliza-
tion and bonds outstanding (Source: see sources for private credit, stock market 
capitalization and bonds outstanding)
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Introduction
Banks were inefﬁcient and burdened with large amounts of non-performing loans
in former socialist Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) before 1990 
(Breuss, Fink &  Haiss, 2004). Capital was scarce and overall productivity low. 
The inﬂow of foreign capital – in particular foreign direct investment (FDI) – was
seen as a key component for a solution of these problems (Sergi 2004). Accord-
ingly, economic research has developed two different streams of literature. On 
the one hand, various studies have attempted to provide theoretical and em-
pirical answers to the question of the overall impact of general FDI on the host 
economy (e.g. Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee 1998; De Mello 1999; Nair-
Reichert and Weinhold 2001; Campos and Kinoshita 2002; Mencinger 2003; 
Dimelis and Louri 2004; Neuhaus 2005; Sohinger 2005). Results for CEECs are 
mixed but they mainly conclude that FDI can be a major growth trigger. On the 
other hand, the ﬁnance-growth nexus literature has elaborated meaningful links
between the ﬁnancial sector and economic growth over the last decade, though
the direction of the causality link may change with the level of economic develop-
ment (Rousseau and Wachtel 2005). Patrick (1966) points out that the ﬁnancial
sector plays a supply-leading role in underdeveloped markets and is supported 
among others by Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000). The positive view of the 
ﬁnance-led growth hypothesis normally focuses on more open and liberalized
ﬁnancial systems. Abiad, Leigh & Mody (2007) conclude that ﬁnancial integra-
23 The authors belong to the ﬁnance-growth nexus research group at the EuropaInstitut, Vienna University of Economics and
Business Administration, Austria. Markus Eller is an economist at the Centre for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR), Mos-
cow, Russia; Peter R. Haiss is a lecturer at the EuropaInstitut, Vienna and is also with Bank Austria Creditanstalt, Austria, member of 
UniCredit Group; Katharina Steiner is a re-search assistant and doctoral student at the EuropaInstitut.
We gratefully acknowledge the support by the Jubiläumsfonds of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (project no. 8868) and are 
indebted to comments by Harald Badinger, Xiaoqiang Cheng, Gerhard Fink, Emilia Jurzyk, Robert Kunst, Dušan Mramor, Márton 
Nagy, Paul Wachtel, and Martin Wagner. We received constructive comments at the 20th Workshop of the Austrian Working Group 
on Banking and Finance, Nov. 2005, Graz; the XIV ’Tor Vergata’ Conference, Dec. 2005, Rome; the Int´l Conference on Transition 
Economies at the Academy of the National Economy of the Russian Federation, March 2006, Moscow; the 14th Conference of the 
Austrian Economic Society, May 2006, Vienna; the 2006 Marmara Finance Symposium, May 2006, Is-tanbul; the EIASM Workshop, 
May 2006, Prague, the EFMA’s Annual Meeting, June 2006, Madrid and the 5th GCBE Congress, July 2006, Cambridge. Special 
thanks to Ettore Dorrucci, ECB, for data support. The opinions expressed are the authors’ personal views. For further research of the 
ﬁnance-growth nexus group see  http://www.wu-wien.ac.at/europainstitut/forschung/nexus.
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tion and capital inﬂows were negatively correlated with economic growth in poor
emerging market economies, but positively with European transition economies. 
Banking markets in CEE are an extreme case of openness as they are major-
ity-held foreign. While there is a plethora of literature on the consequences of 
ﬁnancial sector foreign direct investment (FSFDI) for the host countries’ ﬁnancial
system and also some descriptive analysis (e.g. Naaborg, Scholtens, Bol, De 
Haan and De Haas 2003, Vessel 2003, Baudino, Caviglia, Dorrucci and Pineau 
2004, Goldberg 2004, BIS 2004), empirical evidence on the economic impact of 
sectoral FDI is scarce. This paper is one of the ﬁrst attempts to ﬁll this gap.
We try to add to the understanding of economic mechanisms by combining the 
two aforementioned streams of research: the FDI-growth-literature and the ﬁ-
nance-growth-literature. We argue that the impact of FDI differs depending on 
the target industry. Reviewing the aforementioned streams of research, we are 
able to identify four important transmission channels linking FSFDI to economic 
growth (Section 2). We recognize that FSFDI induces a variety of micro-struc-
ture changes in the host countries and ask: What are the opportunities for host 
economies? What challenges for CEECs host nations exist in order to promote 
rather positive effects? The issue equally applies to other emerging markets: 
does FSFDI contribute to economic growth? 
This paper progresses as follows: Section 2 characterizes the transmission chan-
nels between FSFDI and economic growth. Section 3 provides descriptive statis-
tics for FSFDI indicators and the foreign ownership structure in emerging Europe. 
Section 4 employs a panel data analysis to evaluate the relationship between 
FSFDI and economic growth and discusses the economic impact of the empirical 
results. Finally, Section 5 concludes and depicts directions for future research.
1. Transmission Between FSFDI and Economic GROWTH
Finance-growth theory assumes that the ﬁnancial system provides services
which are crucial for economic growth, e.g. by facilitating transactions, easing 
risk management, mobilizing savings, allocating funds, and monitoring  ﬁrm
mangers (Blum et al. 2002). According to Levine (1996), the providers of these 
ﬁnancial services may affect economic development through two main chan-
nels: either via the “volume channel”, i.e. by increasing the rate of physical capi-
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tal accumulation; or via the “efﬁciency” channel, by improving the productivity
with which economies combine labor and capital in production. Levine (1996) 
argues that depending on their level of involvement, foreign banks that improve 
the provision of growth-enhancing ﬁnancial services will stimulate economic
development. Haiss et al. (2005a; see Figure 1) further emphasize the impact 
of foreign bank entry on institution building (termed the “corporate governance 
channel”) and of collateral beneﬁts via triggering real sector FDI and portfolio
direct investment (termed the “signal channel”).
The recent rise in FSFDI especially in emerging markets led to a renewed re-
search emphasis on this ﬁeld. Questions analyzed include why, which and where
banks go abroad (e.g. Clarke et al. 2001; Focarelli and Pozzolo 2005), privatiza-
tion and ownership issues (e.g. Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel 2005, Megginson 
2005) and what is the impact on host and home countries’ ﬁnancial system (e.g.
Goldberg 2004; Herrero and Sirnon 2003; Haselmann 2006). For example, it 
is argued that well-capitalized foreign owners might be able to provide a higher 
volume of credit to the host countries´ companies and thus contribute to invest-
ment and growth, i.e. that there is a “volume channel” (Bol, De Haas and De 
Haan 2003; De Haas and Van Lelyveld 2002; Detragiache, Tressel and Gupta 
2006; Engerer and Schrooten 2004; Wachtel 2003).24 Foreign owned banks can 
act as a catalyst for regulatory changes and contribute to institutional quality via 
the “corporate governance channel” (Faria and Mauro 2004). If investors that 
are regarded as rather cautious and risk averse (a usual perception of banks) 
enter and invest into a certain market, this initial move may pull in followers. Ad-
ditional non-ﬁnancial portfolio investment as well as non-ﬁnancial FDI might be
drawn in, which in turn can inﬂuence economic development (Durham 2003).25 
Direct investigations of the efﬁciency channel, however are scarce. We will try to
ﬁll this gap and thus discuss how foreign banks may improve an economys and
ﬁnancial sectors´ productivty in the following.
24 Cottarelli, Dell´Ariccia and Vladkova-Hollar (2005) and Mehl and Winkler (2003) warn in this context that fast credit growth 
driven by new foreign owners can also be a warning signal indicating a potential ﬁnancial crisis.
25 For comparative data on inﬂows into CEE in the form of FDI, bank assets, portfolio equity and debt see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2006).
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Figure 1: Identiﬁed Transmission Channels between FSFDI and Economic Growth
1.1 Transmission via the Efﬁciency Channel
Acquiring advanced technology and accumulating capital stock more effective-
ly are the major challenges for sustained growth in the CEECs (Lee and Tcha 
2004). Most transition countries possess relatively high-quality human capital 
stock (i.e. have a well-trained workforce), while the physical capital stock had 
been rather obsolete and in need of modernization through investment across 
the various economic sectors. With the lack of domestic investment (DI), FDI is 
usually argued to play a critical role in the transfer of market-oriented technolo-
gies and business practices (Dimelis and Louri 2004). Eller, Haiss and Steiner 
(2005) empirically investigate this technology channel in ﬁnancial sector FDI in
further detail. Foreign entrants can only successfully compete in host markets if 
they have competitive advantages over domestic and other foreign market partic-
ipants. Bonin et al. (2005) and Claessens et al. (2001) analyze samples of mature 
and emerging markets and point out that foreign banks operating in emerging 
markets have been more efﬁcient with regard to costs and proﬁts than domestic
banks, whereas the opposite is true in the case of mature markets. Let us stress 
subsequently the related arguments with regard to strategic issues, management 
issues and operational issues of foreign bank involvement in a host country.
Strategic issues: Strategic reorientation on the market and technology changes in 
case of an acquisition may enhance efﬁciency. As foreign institutions enter new
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markets, their strategic interests will vary according to their home market or global 
activities. Most investors in emerging banking markets have long-term proﬁt inter-
ests as these markets offer the potential for strong business volume growth across 
the various client groups, including retail banking (BIS 2004). Such “going local” 
strategies may help local ﬁnancial market development, e.g., by the implementa-
tion of products new to the host market (Gallego, Herrero and Luna 2003). 
Management issues: Acquired banks usually receive a capital injection from the 
new owner (Papi and Revoltella 2003, 160), so the ability of the target to bear 
risk and grant fresh credit rises. Particularly foreign banks have great interest in 
implementing sound policies and risk management as they have the capacity to 
implement group-wide risk assessment techniques (BIS 2004, 15). Furthermore, 
foreign banks play an important role in reducing the share of non-performing 
loans that was and still is high particularly in former state owned banks (Sergi 
and Matoušek 2005). Papi and Revoltella (2003, 160) support this view and ar-
gue that the clearing of risky credit portfolios requires majority interest by the 
foreign bank and takes time due to restructuring needs. Putting these arguments 
together, efﬁciency in risk management is achieved through transfer of know-how
and technologies as well as economies of scope due to risk-diversiﬁcation.
Operational efﬁciency: Foreign banks will have a great interest in implementing 
internal group-standards. Drawing on US-experience, Goldberg (2004, 6) ar-
gues that foreign banks are likely to have more efﬁcient credit allocation as well
as sound monitoring and thus less risk. Their operating costs are lower. Claes-
sens et al. (2001) explain the high foreign bank presence in the CEECs with low 
banking costs and low non-interest income of domestic banks. Sabi (1996) and 
Weill (2003) ﬁnd that foreign banks are more proﬁtable and more efﬁcient than
domestic-owned banks in the CEECs. 
These previous issues suggest that foreign owned banks can exploit higher efﬁ-
ciency. However, respective empirical investigations come up with mixed results. 
Havrylchyk (2006) concludes for Poland that greenﬁeld banks have achieved
higher levels of efﬁciency than domestic banks, foreign banks that acquired do-
mestic institutions have not succeeded in enhancing their efﬁciency. Green et al.
(2004), who tested eight CEE ﬁnancial markets from 1993 to 2000, found that
cost efﬁciency is not always dependent on ownership. Foreign owned banks are
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not more efﬁcient than an average domestic bank in terms of economies of scale
and scope. An explanation for these results might be that foreign owners have 
upfront costs in modernizing the acquired banks. Cost efﬁciency might only oc-
cur after some time. Nevertheless, foreign owned banks are more proﬁt efﬁcient
according to Bonin et al. (2005, 2158). They analyzed data of 67 banks in six 
CEE countries from 1994 to 2002. Papi and Revoltella (2003) provide an expla-
nation for the contradictory ﬁndings about the relationship between ownership
and bank efﬁciency on which we will draw in interpreting our empirical analysis.
They argue that a certain threshold in foreign ownership is necessary to achieve 
changes in efﬁciency levels of the acquired bank. But, what about the impact
on domestic banks and thus the whole ﬁnancial sector? How is ﬁnancial sector
efﬁciency linked to economic development?
Foreign ownership may drive down banks’ interest rate margins, thus lower com-
panies cost of borrowing which should facilitate investment. Foreign owners may 
have a direct impact on efﬁciency gains in loan portfolio management of the af-
ﬁliate and thus external ﬁnance for investment by corporations and households.
Better risk management or lower operating costs allow for more efﬁcient capital
allocation. Foreign banks are able to set narrower interest margins and offer 
their services and products at lower prices. Local as well as regional competition 
among banks will increase (Drakos 2003). These changes in the competitive 
structure of the banking industry may induce efﬁciency gains in the whole sector
as argued by most of the discussion on efﬁciency (Goldberg 2004, 5). Koivu
(2004) found evidence that increasing ﬁnancial sector efﬁciency measured by
interest margins has growth-enhancing effects on economies in transition. She 
applied cross-country and time-series regressions on nine CEE countries over 
1995–2002. Claeys and Van der Vennet (2004, 2) empirically tested the deter-
minants of interest margins in CEE and found that “institutional reform shifts risk 
behavior before competition effects push margins down”. Higher competition 
induced by foreign bank entry causes lower interest margins and thus higher 
ﬁnancial sector efﬁciency.
According to Eschenbach, Francois and Schuknecht (2000), ﬁnancial sector
competition triggered by foreign banks is closely linked to economic growth in 
emerging market economies. Their cross-country regression analysis covered 
130 countries, including most of the transition countries over 1990–1999. Higher 
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ﬁnancial sector efﬁciency induced by higher ﬁnancial sector competition should re-
sult in an overall reduction of transaction costs (Levine 1997). Greenﬁeld investors
represent new competitors per se, whereas acquisitions foster competition due to 
new market policies implemented by new owners, restructuring, and the rollout of 
group risk systems and corporate governance practices. If domestic banks are 
able to cope with foreign contenders, competition with foreign banks will improve 
the efﬁciency of the domestic banking system (see Claessens et al. 2001).
1.2 Transmission via the Credit Volume Channel
In CEE and other emerging markets, bank lending is the most common method 
of external ﬁnancing and thus important for investment activities. Credit to the
private sector remains relatively low, although it is most important for invest-
ment activities. Wachtel (2003, 44) points out that “deeper ﬁnancial intermedia-
tion may be a signiﬁcant causal factor in economic growth”. To put it differently,
well-capitalized foreign owners providing a higher volume of credit to the host 
countries’ companies might contribute to investment and thus growth. They 
have the ability to provide fresh money to the ﬁnancial host market because
foreign owned banks are backed by their parent companies. Arena, Reinhart 
and Vázquez (2007) suggest accordingly that foreign bank entry in emerging 
market countries contributed to stability in credit markets. Concerning the private 
sector, Bol, De Haas and De Haan (2003, 15) argue that foreign ﬁnancial institu-
tions are more involved in lending to the private sector than domestic banks in 
CEE. Detragiache, Tressel and Gupta (2006) empirically analyzed the impact 
of foreign bank penetration on ﬁnancial development in poor countries. Their
results pinpoint that foreign bank penetration is associated with less credit to 
the private sector in very poor countries in the short term. Papi and Revoltella 
(2003) argue that foreign bank lending is mostly directed to subsidiaries of mul-
tinational corporations because the assessment of information coming from the 
local private sector is often too difﬁcult due to missing transparency or even lack
of information (see also Mehl and Winkler 2003). While this was the case during 
early years of transition, foreign banks concentrate on growing the retail sector 
in the meantime and invest heavily into retail branch networks. Among retail 
loans, the largest fraction goes into housing and real estate ﬁnance, reﬂecting
the high catch up potential of these economies in this respect. 
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Among ﬁrms, the effects of foreign owned bank lending are unevenly distributed
showing differences in e.g. size. Foreign bank entry therefore affects lending 
to SMEs and overall industrial structures particularly in industries that are de-
pendent on bank ﬁnance. Small local businesses mostly rely on relationship
lending (IADB 2005, 136)). In many developing and transition economies, banks 
are highly involved in relationship lending. In other words, companies owned 
by related individuals may receive funding even if they are operating inefﬁcient
whereas potentially highly proﬁtable projects may face problems in search for
funding. Foreign owned institutions often “do not serve” relationship lending. 
They stick to international standards and may thus enhance allocative efﬁciency,
contribute to institution building over the long run and enhance overall stability 
as well as sustainable economic development. Interestingly, Giannetti and On-
gena (2005) found that young enterprises that were established after the early 
transition period proﬁted more from foreign bank entry. They focused on lending
practices of foreign owned banks in a sample of 14 CEE countries from 1993 to 
2002. The results showed that ﬁrms established in early transition received less
lending from foreign owned banks. According to them, this may suggest that 
foreign owned banks might be able to mitigate problems of related lending as 
these ﬁrms mostly had worse corporate governance, had less dispersed owner-
ship and beneﬁted from favors of politicians.
To sum up, foreign banks are more involved in lending to the private sector than 
domestic banks. Foreign lending stimulates ﬁrm growth in sales, assets, and
leverage via investment activities (Giannetti and Ongena 2005). Countries ex-
perienced higher growth rates when they had higher investment to GDP ratios. 
Among other reasons, efﬁcient or inefﬁcient allocation of resources contributes
to differences in growth (Wachtel 2001, 339). But, growing credit supply is not 
enough to guarantee a positive impact on investment activities and thus econom-
ic development (Mehl and Winkler 2003). If foreign owned banks were inclined 
to contribute to the overall soundness of the local ﬁnancial market, ﬁnancial crisis
risks would decline and greater stability may foster economic development.
1.3 Transmission via the Corporate Governance Channel
From the perspective of most CEE host countries, ﬁnancial markets were opened
to foreign investors with the aim of a fast improvement in the quality of banking 
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and the whole ﬁnancial system (De Haas and Van Lelyveld 2002). For example,
with the establishment of a two-tier banking system in 1987, foreign banks were 
encouraged to enter the Hungarian market, anticipating that they could improve 
corporate governance in the ﬁnancial sector and contribute to institution building.
Foreign owned banks are less involved in connected lending as they need to 
comply with internal group-wide risk management rules which contribute to a re-
duction in bad loans (Fink et al. 1998). Foreign ownership creates an incentive to 
encourage sound banking practices and a disincentive to damaging speculative 
short-term ﬁnancial ﬂows (Wachtel 2003). Better loan portfolio and risk manage-
ment can contribute to ﬁnancial stability which is important for economic develop-
ment (King and Levine 1993). In addition, the beneﬁts of foreign bank entry can
only be exploited if the institutional infrastructure is well developed (Domanski 
2005). Foreign banks have an incentive to contribute to sound and more stable 
ﬁnancial systems e.g. through the implementation of sound ﬁnancial practices.
Further collateral-beneﬁt type spillovers on the infrastructure including regu-
lation, legislation, or supervision are also possible (Bonin and Wachtel 2002; 
Abiad et al. 2007). As foreign banks enter emerging markets, the introduction of 
new types of products or services is faster and innovation can even be acceler-
ated via FSFDI (Wachtel 2001). This creates the need for supervisors to adapt 
the legal environment to these developments. Foreign owned banks seeking to 
mitigate their own risk act as a catalyst for regulatory changes and implementa-
tion of international standards (BIS 2004, 14). In this way, foreign owned banks 
can contribute to institutional quality which is determined by the absence of cor-
ruption, red tape, or political violence (Faria and Mauro 2004, 3).
1.4 Transmission via Signal Effects
If investors that are regarded as rather cautious and risk averse (a usual percep-
tion of banks) enter and invest into a certain market, this initial move may pull in 
followers from other industries (Haiss et al. 2005b). FSFDI may provide positive 
“signals” (Spence 1973) towards economic integration and development and en-
courage e.g. merchandise trade. Additional non-ﬁnancial portfolio investment as
well as non-ﬁnancial FDI might be drawn in, which in turn inﬂuences economic
growth (Durham 2003, Reisen and Soto 2001). Brealey and Kaplanis (1996) 
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ﬁnd that countries with the highest foreign bank presence registered the great-
est level of non-bank FDI links. Focarelli and Pozzolo (2000), by conducting a 
survey of 260 large banks from OECD countries, show a positive relationship 
between  bank choice of location and both real sector FDI and bilateral trade 
ﬂows. Goldstein and Razin (2005) argue that there is a trade-off between direct
and portfolio investment via stock exchanges which is worth further investigating 
with regard to ﬁnancial sector FDI.
In the discussion above, we mainly concentrated on the productivity channel 
from ﬁnancial sector FDI, though we conclude that it is important to tie in other
possible channels as well in an overall assessment. Independent from the above 
discussion of possible transmission channels from FSFDI into economic devel-
opment, an issue that sticks out is the fact that FSFDI-inﬂows into Central and
South-Eastern Europe during the last decade were massive and thus regional ﬁ-
nancial market integration outpaces other emerging markets (Abiad et al. 2007), 
as described in more detail in the following.
2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
2.1 Inward FSFDI Stock
For our empirical investigation in Section 4 we will employ two different indica-
tors for FSFDI. Inward FDI stocks that are devoted to ﬁnancial intermediation
form our ﬁrst indicator (see the data appendix for more details). Figure 2 depicts 
this indicator over time for ten CEECs (CEE-10)26. Foreign penetration in the 
ﬁnancial sector has steadily increased in this region and reached a level of more
than EUR mn 33,400 or 7.8% of GDP in 2004. Except for the outlier Estonia, the 
average inward FSFDI stock to GDP ranges between 2.7% (Slovenia) and 5.7% 
(Czech Rep.) in CEE-10, as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 4 demonstrates that FSFDI has quite a high importance for CEE-11, given 
an average share of ﬁnancial sector FDI in total FDI of 18.5% in 2004. The share of
FSFDI in total FDI ranged between 9% in Hungary and 32% in Estonia in 2004. 
26 CEE-11: Bulgaria (BG), Croatia (HR), Czech Republic (CZ), Estonia (EE), Hungary (HU), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Poland 
(PL), Romania (RO), Slovenia (SI), Slovakia (SK). CEE-10: for inward FSFDI CEE-11 except for Romania; ﬁnancial M&A: CEE-11
except for Croatia.
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Figure 2: Steady Inﬂow of FSFDI to CEE-10
Source: own calculations based on Hunya and Stankovsky (2006) and the AMECO database
Figure 3: Average FSFDI Stock in CEE-10, 1996–2004
Source: own calculations based on Hunya and Stankovsky (2006) and the AMECO database
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Figure 4: Share of FSFDI in Total FDI (Inward Stocks in mn EUR), 2003 and 2004
Source: own calculations based on Hunya and Stankovsky (2006) and the AMECO database
Figures 5 and 6 show simple scatter plots (across countries and over time) and in-
dicate a slight, positive link between economic growth and the change of the inward 
FSFDI stock. Differences in development among the CEECs are reﬂected by the
broad dispersion of the data points. Particular outliers are Croatia and Latvia, show-
ing a rather high (low) growth in FSFDI, but at the same time a low (high) growth rate 
of real GDP per worker. We take this as an indication to account for country-speciﬁc
effects in empirical investigations of the FSFDI-growth linkage (see Eller, Haiss, and 
Steiner 2006). Such effects include the timing of banking crises (e.g. Croatia 1998/
1999) and following waves of privatization. In Poland, frequent political changes (new 
governments about every year) led to a stop-and-go pattern in bank privatization.
Figure 5: Economic Growth vs. Growth of FSFDI in CEE-10, averages 1996–2004
Source: own calculations based on Hunya and Stankovsky (2006) and the AMECO database
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Figure 6: Economic Growth vs. Growth of FSFDI in CEE-10, annual obs. 1997–2004
Source: own calculations based on Hunya and Stankovsky (2006) and the AMECO database
2.2 Financial Cross-border M&A
Table 1 as well as Figure 7 presents a second indicator for FSFDI: completed 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in the ﬁnancial sector. In absolute 
terms, Poland has accumulated most of cross-border ﬁnancial M&A from 1994 to
2002, namely EUR mn 8,298. The Czech Republic (5,332 mn), Slovakia (1,219 
mn), and Hungary (1,152 mn) follow (data from ECB, see Baudino et al., 2004). 
This ranking changes notably when we express cross-border ﬁnancial M&A as
percentage of GDP, averaged over 1994–2002. The Czech Republic has been 
able to attract on average the highest share of ﬁnancial M&A in terms of national
economic power (0.96%). Estonia, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Poland follow with 
a share higher than 0.50%. As a latecomer to bank privatization (notably BCR 
in 2006), Romania turns out to be the country with the lowest respective share 
from 1994 to 2002: the average accumulation of ﬁnancial cross-border M&A
amounts here to only 0.19% of GDP. Financial M&A has increased remarkably 
since 1998 in CEE-10 (see Figure 7).  With the end of most privatization in 
the CEE-NMS, primary large-scale ﬁnancial sector M&A moved further South-
East (e.g. into Albania 2004; Serbia and Romania, 2005/2006) and East (e.g. 
Ukraine, 2004/2006).
43
Table 1: Completed Financial Cross-border M&A in CEE-10, 1994–2002 
Financial cross-
border M&A (% 
GDP) 2001
Financial cross-
border M&A (% 
GDP) 2002
Avg. ﬁnancial
cross-border M&A 
(% GDP) 1994-
2002
Accumulated 
ﬁnancial cross-
border M&A 
(mn EUR) 
1994-2002
Czech Rep. 1.85 1.94 0.96 5,332
Estonia 0.00 0.00 0.79 350
Hungary 0.18 0.04 0.78 1,152
Bulgaria 0.00 0.52 0.69 830
Slovakia 4.78 0.06 0.60 1,219
Poland 0.75 0.15 0.58 8,298
Slovenia 0.65 2.79 0.39 807
Lithuania 0.66 0.16 0.35 379
Latvia 0.38 0.00 0.34 196
Romania 0.06 0.01 0.19 628
Source: own calculations based on Baudino et al. (2004) and the AMECO database
Figure 7: Economic Growth and Financial M&A in CEE-10, 1994–2002 
Source: own calculations based on Baudino et al. (2004) and the AMECO database
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2.3 Market Share of Foreign Owned Banks in Southeastern Europe
Given that our data reveal that banks account for the largest share in ﬁnancial
M&A (about  85%), let us also highlight how the market share of foreign-owned 
banks has evolved. This can be measured by the share of bank assets con-
trolled by foreign owners. It accounted for about 70% in CEE in 2004 (Breyer, 
2004). Notably, besides some “primary” FSFDI, there were also some “second-
ary” FSFDI with ownership changes among foreign owners27. 
As mentioned above,  primary FSFDI moved from the 2004 New EU Member 
States from Central and Eastern Europe (NMS28) more to the EU Accession 
Countries and beyond that further South and East (see Hagmayr and Haiss 
2006). In addition, some “secondary” moves occurred, e.g. with the integration 
of the CEE-network of BA-CA/HVB into  UniCredit in 2005. Foreign banks now 
dominate the local markets also in most SEE countries with high market shares 
ranging from 51% in FYR Macedonia to even 92% in Albania in 2005 (Hagmayr 
2007; see Table 2). In 2005 the share of bank assets controlled by foreign own-
ers amounts on average to 72% in SEE-6 and thus reaches a similar size as in 
CEE. The shares for Greece and Turkey are much lower at the time. By March 
2007, including the shares of 13 banks traded on the Istanbul Stock Exchange, 
the share of assets controlled by foreign owners rose to 36% in Turkey, with 
several more banking acquisitions by foreigners awaiting approval from Turkish 
banking authorities (Dermirsar 2007). SEE thus followed the path of CEE in 
banking sector transition, though with a time lag in most cases. Based on the 
descriptive evidence on growing foreign banking involvement, we will empirically 
test its impact on economic development in the following. 
27 E.g., the sale of Splitska Banka (Croatia) to Société Générale because of competition requirements by the Croatian National 
Bank in course of the takeover of BA-CA by UniCredit and the sell off of Raiffeisenbank Ukraine to OTP of Hungary after the acquisi-
tion of Ukraine-based Alfa-Bank by Raiffeisen International, whereby Raiffeisen wanted to avoid local merger cost.
28 Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia.
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Table 2: Market Share of Foreign Owned Banks (% Total Bank Assets), 1996–2005 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Albania n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 35.2 40.8 45.9 47.1 93.3 92.3
Bulgaria 9.5 18.0 32.3 44.7 67.0 70.0 72.0 82.3 82.5 74.5
Croatia 1.0 4.0 6.7 39.9 84.1 89.3 90.2 91.0 91.3 91.2
FYR Macedonia n.a. n.a. n.a. 11.5 53.4 51.1 44.0 46.9 47.3 51.3
Greece n.a. n.a. 12.8 n.a. 12.3 n.a. 8.7 9.3 10.0 n.a.
Romania 11.2 17.2 20.0 47.8 50.9 55.2 56.4 58.2 62.0 59.2
Serbia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.5 13.2 27.0 38.4 37.7 66.0
Turkey 2.4 4.3 4.3 5.3 5.2 3.1 3.1 2.8 3.4 11.7
Source: Hagmayr 2007, based on BOG 2004, EBRD 2006, Gardo 2005a-b, 
Günay Özkan and Günay 2006, BAT, IMF 2006
3. PANEL DATA ANALYSIS
3.1 Speciﬁcation
The qualitative arguments as shown in Section 2 and the descriptive statistics 
as shown in Section 3 call for an empirical evaluation of the impact of FSFDI on 
economic growth in Emerging Europe. We are addressing this issue by running 
ﬁxed-effects panel data regressions that base on the following equation (for its
derivation and the econometric particularities see Eller et al., 2006).
∆ln(y
it
) = μ
i
 + λ
t
 + �∆ln(FSFDI
it
)
 
+ �∆ln(k
it
) + �∆ln(h
it
) + �
1
∆ln(GC
it
)  + �
2
�
it
 + �
it    
(1a)
∆ln(y
it
) = μ
i
 + λ
t
 + �pFSFDI
it   
+ �∆ln(k
it
) + �∆ln(h
it
) + �
1
∆ln(GC
it
)  + �
2
�
it
 + �
it               
(1b)
This static variable-intercept panel data model consists of following components: 
i. The dependent variable ∆ln(yit) represents the growth rate of real GDP 
per worker.29 
ii. Country- (μi) and time-ﬁxed effects (λt) that take the form of dummy 
variables are included to get more information about country- or time-
speciﬁc characteristics and to inhibit correlation between the regressors
purely because of contemporaneous time or country shocks (as short-
run business cycle ﬂuctuations, see Hsiao, 2003).
29 Scaling real GDP to the number of employees instead of scaling it to total population stems from the view to capture the “econom-
ic output per worker” as a proxy for productivity in the sense of the production function approach (see Temple, 1999) and is a byproduct 
of deriving the regression equation from a neoclassical pro-duction function with constant returns to scale (see Eller et al., 2006).
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iii. Our explanatory variable of main interest, FSFDI, appears in two differ-
ent ways: we are not only interested in the marginal growth effect of an 
increase of FSFDI (�p in equation 1b, reﬂecting the “permanent FSFDI-in-
duced efﬁciency-led growth hypothesis”), but also in the marginal growth
effect of an acceleration of FSFDI changes (� in equation 1a, reﬂecting
the “temporary FSFDI-induced efﬁciency-led growth hypothesis”).
iv. Deriving this baseline regression equation, we started with a neoclassi-
cal production function with constant returns to scale that uses physical 
capital K, human capital H, and labor L as inputs (see Eller et al., 2006). 
As a consequence, the growth rate of physical capital stock per worker 
∆ln(kit) and the growth rate of human capital stock per worker ∆ln(hit) 
enter equations (1a) and (1b) as base regressors.
v. To allow for robustness checks of our subsequent estimation results we 
are additionally including the growth rate of government consumption 
to GDP (∆ln(GCit), representing the size of the public sector) and the 
inﬂation rate �it as control variables. They have been found to have 
a substantial impact on economic growth in earlier studies (for a brief 
review see Eller et al., 2006, p. 306 f.). 
vi. εit is the error term representing the effects of those unobserved vari-
ables that vary over i and t. It is assumed to be an independently identi-
cally distributed random variable with zero mean and variance σ2ε.
We are running this setting for the two different indicators of FSFDI as described 
in Sections 3.1 and 3.2: inward FSFDI stock and ﬁnancial M&A. Both of them
are scaled to GDP as well as measured per employee. Our dataset for these 
variables is limited to the CEE-10 region, to 1996-2003 for inward FSFDI, and to 
1996-2002 for ﬁnancial M&A.
3.2 Presentation and Discussion of Estimation Results
3.2.1 General Estimation Results
The estimation output is summarized in the Tables 3-5. Using the inward FSFDI 
stock (Tables 3-4) or using cross border ﬁnancial M&A as indicator for FSFDI 
(Table 5) yields similar results. 
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For the estimation we are following several steps and are conducting various sen-
sitivity checks (they are documented in detail in Eller et al., 2006). Most notably, 
we are controlling for heteroskedasticity and are employing tests to assess poten-
tial endogeneity of FSFDI. Firstly, considerable differences in the standard devia-
tions of the country-speciﬁc residuals indicate group-speciﬁc heteroskedasticity 
(as also suggested by the scatter plots in Figures 6-7). Since heteroskedasticity 
leads to biased standard errors, we use White heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors to allow for reliable signiﬁcance interpretations. Secondly, one could argue
that FSFDI does not only induce higher growth rates, but that also countries with 
higher growth rates are more attractive for foreign investors, and thus, growth af-
fects also FSFDI. Therefore it is very important to control for potential simultane-
ity in our system to be sure that the estimates are not biased because of reverse 
causation. Accordingly, we are employing the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) en-
dogeneity test in line with Davidson and MacKinnon (1993)30. The DWH test 
does practically never (only in column (3), Table 3, at the 10% signiﬁcance level)
reject the null hypothesis that the FSFDI variable is exogenous. Hence we are not 
switching to an instrumental variable estimation.
The standard growth regressors behave as expected: the change of the physical 
capital stock per employee is related positively and highly signiﬁcant to economic
growth. The change of human capital per employee shows in most speciﬁcations
the expected positive sign, albeit not signiﬁcant. Government consumption to 
GDP shows always the expected negative sign; in particular it is highly signiﬁcant
for the estimations employing ﬁnancial M&A as FSFDI indicator (see Table 5).
This conﬁrms the negative impact of the size of the public sector on economic
growth. The inﬂation rate, on the other hand, changes its sign quite often and is 
only signiﬁcant in one regression (column (4), Table 5). The insigniﬁcance in other
speciﬁcations can be explained by the ex ante unclear sign pattern. Note that the
exclusion of the inﬂation rate does not change the results for other coefﬁcients in
a decisive manner. This is an indication of robustness of our speciﬁcation.
30 Under the null of the DWH test, FSFDI is exogenous and both ordinary least squares (OLS ) and instrumental variable (IV) 
estimation are consistent. Under the alternative, FSFDI is endogenous and only IV yields consistent estimates.
48
3.2.2 Lagged Effects of FSFDI
Next let us draw our attention to the results for FSFDI. Although (contemporaneous) 
FSFDI shows the expected positive impact on economic growth in most speciﬁca-
tions, the coefﬁcient is not statistically signiﬁcant. We have also imposed higher
order lags (from one up to three) given that FSFDI might require some time to affect 
the real economy.   Table 3 (columns 2 and 4) shows that an increase in the growth 
rate of FSFDI per employee of one percent leads to a signiﬁcant increase of the eco-
nomic growth rate of about 0.02% after two years. In contrast, Table 4 shows that 
the level of FSFDI---both per employee or scaled to GDP---has a negative impact 
on economic growth with a lag of three years. These results rather support the view 
that there might be limits for economic gains from FSFDI (see Section 4.2.3). 
Note that a lag of three not only reduces the number of observations, but also 
shifts the sample to the period 1999-2003. In these years in most New EU 
Member States privatization and thus the accumulation of FSFDI has already 
slowed down, which could lead to the interpretation that evidence differs among 
subperiods. FSFDI was especially high in the Czech and Slovak Republics in 
2001/2002; i.e. in countries where bank privatization took place late, high levels 
of non-performing loans had suppressed lending for an extended period, and cli-
ents may have got used to non-bank sources of ﬁnance. Alternative explanations
might rest in changes in the market behavior of foreign banks over time (e.g., 
entry with strict credit rules which become softer with rising experience in the 
host market over time; the latter causing higher loan defaults, client bankruptcies 
and loan loss provisions. Foreign banks also may have become accustomed to 
high proﬁts in the host markets and may avoid price-based competition to main-
tain margins; Kraft, 2005, 361); market microstructure (foreign banks initially 
satisfying pent-up credit demand or initially providing a safe heaven for local de-
positors), or with GDP growth capped by regulatory intervention to dampen high 
credit growth perceived as the buildup of credit bubbles (such measures were 
taken, e.g., in Croatia, Bulgaria and Poland). Evidence on these issues is still 
sketchy and rewards further research efforts. Further research might also take 
the (short) maturity of capital available in these markets and possible crowding-
out effects of short-term vs. long-term investments into account. Note that for 
the ﬁnancial M&A indicator higher-order lags are not signiﬁcant. Therefore, we
report only the contemporaneous speciﬁcation results (see Table 5).
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3.2.3 Hump-Shaped Relationship between Growth and FSFDI
The theoretical pros and cons of FSFDI for the host economy (see Goldberg, 2004) 
suggest that there are limits for economic gains from FSFDI. Thus, the optimal degree 
of FSFDI may lie somewhere in between an extremely high and an extremely low 
one. One can think about a hump-shaped relationship between economic growth and 
FSFDI. Abiad et al. (2007) argue that as host countries become richer, the growth divi-
dend from foreign capital ﬂows may decline, indicating that external ﬁnance may have
a rather transitory inﬂuence. In adapting the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argument that
foreign banks buy entry by accepting worse lending risks, one could argue that for-
eign banks do so once competitive rivalry driven by rising FSFDI surpasses a certain 
threshold. With lags this may be detrimental to GDP growth. Alternatively, the cumulat-
ing inﬂow of FSFDI over time may lead to a rising market concentration that allows the
banks to engage in oligopolistic pricing behavior in ways that curb possible economic 
growth as suggested by Kraft (2005). On the other hand, Hermes and Lensik (2003) 
ﬁnd an inverted U-shaped relationship between the change in foreign bank presence
and the performance of domestic banks. At low levels of foreign penetration, they 
indicate that spill-over effects (enhancing domestic banks´  proﬁts and costs) dominate
the effect of increased competition. Only once rising foreign involvement reached a 
certain threshold, higher competition forces foreign and domestic banks into higher ef-
ﬁciency. Zajc (2004) conceives scenarios of a U-shaped relationship between foreign
bank entry and domestic bank proﬁtability. He argues that after reaching a substantial
market share, foreign banks may ﬁnd it too costly to lure over clients  so that the level
of competition could decline and bank proﬁts rise, but with negative connotations to
economic growth. So investigating non-linear relationships seems promising.  
As a consequence, we constructed a transformed index representing a hump-
shaped impact of FSFDI on economic growth (for details see the data appendix). 
This index is related positively to economic growth with a lag of two or three periods 
(see column 6 in Table 3, column 5 in Table 4, or columns 5 and 6 in Table 5). While 
it is highly signiﬁcant for the estimations employing the ﬁnancial M&A indicator, it is
not signiﬁcant for the estimations with the inward FSFDI stock indicator (although it
shows a higher t-statistic than the contemporaneous estimates for this indicator).
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3.2.4 Interaction of FSFDI with the Countries’ Absorptive Capabilities
Borensztein et al. (1998) detected a positive and signiﬁcant interaction between the
stock of human capital and FDI. They interpret this ﬁnding with the observation that
“the ﬂow of advanced technology brought along by FDI can increase the growth
rate of the host economy only by interacting with that country’s absorptive capabil-
ity”. Evans, Green and Murinde (2002) ﬁnd human capital and bank-sector size to
be complements and suggest that the presence of a developed banking system is 
necessary to exploit the productivity-enhancing potential of human capital. 
Following this line of research, we implement as a further improvement interac-
tion terms between the stock of FSFDI and the stocks of human and physical 
capital. We enclose the products of FSFDI and human and physical capital si-
multaneously in ﬁve different regressions. While the interaction of the FSFDI 
stock with the index of employees’ education has a positive impact on economic 
growth, the interaction of the FSFDI stock with the stock of physical capital is 
associated negatively to growth. Both effects together could explain the in-
signiﬁcant impact of contemporaneous FSFDI values in other equations. The
speciﬁcations in columns (2) and (3) in Table 5 (ﬁnancial M&A per employee
or to GDP, respectively) replace the ﬁnancial M&A variable by the mentioned
interaction terms and yield coefﬁcients that are highly statistically signiﬁcant.
The high signiﬁcance of the interaction terms may be the effect of the omission
of other relevant factors, in particular, the FSFDI variable by itself. Therefore we 
include FSFDI, human capital, and physical capital individually alongside their 
product in the respective regressions of Table 3 (columns 3-4: change of inward 
FSFDI stock per employee) and Table 4 (column 4: level of inward FSFDI stock 
per GDP). In this way, we can test jointly whether these variables affect growth 
by themselves or through the interaction term (see Borensztein et al. 1998). In 
Table 3 the two interaction terms do not change their sign and are still signiﬁcant,
albeit only at the 10% level. FSFDI by itself enters the equation positively but is 
still statistically signiﬁcant only with a lag of two years.
Let us try to interpret these ﬁndings more accurately. Firstly – considering the
positive human capital-related interaction term – we can detect complementary 
effects between FSFDI and human capital on economic growth. FSFDI seems 
to spur economic growth depending on a higher human capital stock, which is 
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in line with the ﬁnding of Borensztein et al. (1998) that the contribution of FDI to
growth holds only when the host country has a minimum stock of human capital. 
Knowledge-spillovers to domestic banks associated with the inﬂow of FSFDI
(e.g. in the form of new technology introduced by foreign banks as argued by 
Zajc 2002, 200) can be an explanation for this phenomenon. These spillovers 
can take place if domestic banks are able to cope with the increasing competi-
tion induced by foreign owners. Furthermore, foreign banks seeking to mitigate 
their own risk might act as a catalyst for regulatory changes and implementa-
tion of international corporate standards. Consequently, improvements in ac-
counting standards and auditing practices have to follow (BIS 2004, 13). Such 
implemented higher standards create the need for adoptions and further human 
capital formation of employees in all industries and companies, not only those 
seeking for external bank ﬁnance. In this context, the particular role of the ﬁnan-
cial industry within an economy needs to be considered.
Secondly – considering the negative physical capital-related interaction term 
– substitutive effects between FSFDI and domestic physical capital on economic 
growth are indicated. De Mello (1999) similarly ﬁnds that FDI among OECD
economies is growth enhancing only for countries in which domestic and foreign 
capital are complements. On the one hand, FSFDI may have a weaker impact 
on economic growth in the case of a higher physical capital stock. On the other 
hand, the physical capital stock may have a weaker impact on economic growth 
in the case of a higher FSFDI stock. The latter effect can be interpreted by the 
crowding-out of local physical capital caused by the entry of a foreign bank. 
Schumpeterian effects of creative destruction seem to be at work. The ﬁrst ef-
fect, however, which is probably the stronger one, cannot be interpreted in a 
straightforward manner. Analogously to Carkovic & Levine (2002) and Campos 
& Kinoshita (2002), we could argue that FSFDI is only growth-enhancing in 
countries with low physical capital stocks. In any case, respective analysis de-
serves more attention. In general, market microstructure features like the mode 
of entry (greenﬁeld vs. M&A), the main line of business of foreign owners and
their target groups (retail vs. wholesale/corporate) have to be considered with 
regard to the impact on local physical capital formation. 
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Conclusions
Reviewing and combining the ﬁnance-growth and the FDI-growth literature, we
identiﬁed special characteristics of foreign owned banks, such as better risk-
management techniques, and discuss research results on how foreign owned 
banks have an impact on ﬁnancial sector development. We contribute to the
literature by identifying the following possible transmission channels between 
FSFDI, ﬁnancial sector development, and economic growth: intermediation/efﬁ-
ciency, intermediation/credit volume, corporate governance and institution build-
ing, as well as signal effects for total FDI and portfolio investments. 
We provided novel data on FSFDI for the CEE region and the foreign ownership 
structure of banks in the SEE region. We saw that FSFDI accounts for about 
18% of total FDI and that foreign penetration in the ﬁnancial sector of these
countries has steadily increased, whereby in recent years---because of a slow-
down of bank privatization in CEE---a shift of primary FSFDI to the SEE region 
and further East (e.g. to Ukraine and Russia) can be observed. In both the CEE 
and SEE region the importance of foreign involvement is strongly underlined by 
the fact that 70% of total bank assets are controlled by foreign owners.
Our empirical results indicate that there can be a positive relationship between 
FSFDI and growth in CEE-10 for the period 1996-2003. It depends on a careful 
examination of lagged, hump-shaped or interacted effects of FSFDI. While this 
extension of Eller et al. (2006) to South-Eastern Europe  concentrated on one 
aspect of the FSFDI-growth-relationship – the efﬁciency channel, further channels
need to be investigated in the future. Does FSFDI trigger growth in private do-
mestic credit (whereas credit volume frequently is mentioned as a likely cause for 
GDP growth in the literature)? Does FSFDI trigger shrinking interest rate margins 
(whereas credit price again should have an impact on investment and growth ac-
cording to common assumptions)? Does FSFDI also attract FDI in the real sector 
or portfolio investment into the host country stock exchange (i.e. are there spillover 
effects)? The above research clearly calls also for a regional broadening. While 
we concentrated on “emerging Europe” here, the issue equally applies to Latin 
America and South-East Asia which show many similarities in transition efforts.
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Table 5: Fixed effects panel data results - impact of ﬁnancial M&A on economic growth in CEE-10 (cross-
country growth accounting, annual data 1996-2002)
Source: Eller et al. (2006). Notes: Static variable-intercept panel data model with country-ﬁxed and time-ﬁxed ef-
fects (whose coefﬁcients are not reported here, but available upon request). t-statistics are in parentheses, basing 
on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (White diagonal s.e. & covariance; no df correction). Asterisks indicate 
signiﬁcance at the 10%(*), 5%(**), and 1% (***) level, respectively. DWH (Durbin-Wu-Hausman test): K* represents
the number of regressors with endogeneity suspicion, the t- (for K*=1) or F-statistic (for K*>1) represent the signiﬁ-
cance of the ﬁrst stage residuals in the auxiliary regression. Croatia is not included into this setting because of limited
ﬁnancial M&A data. For the variable deﬁnitions and sources see the data appendix.
Dependent Variable: �ln(RGDPLit)
REGRESSIONS
EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLES
Permanent Effects
(1) 
FINMAit 
= ln(FIN-
MAEMPit)
(2) 
FINMAit 
= ln(FIN-
MAEMPit)
(3) 
FINMAit 
= ln(FIN-
MAGDPit)
(4) 
FINMAit 
= ln(FIN-
MAGDPit)
(5) 
FINMAi,t-m 
= ln(FIN-
MA 
HUMPi,t-2)
(6) 
FINMAi,t-m 
= ln(FIN-
MA 
HUMPi,t-3)
Constant 0.036*** (5.008)
0.024*** 
(3.304)
0.026** 
(2.183)
0.048*** 
(3.684)
0.024*** 
(5.321)
0.025*** 
(4.994)
FINMAit , resp. 
FINMAi,t-m
-0.0009 
(-0.489)
-0.001 
(-0.577)
0.015*** 
(2.752)
0.011** 
(2.251)
�ln(kit)
0.111*** 
(3.717)
0.113*** 
(4.899)
0.112*** 
(3.718)
0.077** 
(2.607)
0.100*** 
(4.654)
0.101*** 
(4.256)
�ln(hit)
0.958 
(1.537)
0.292 
(0.459)
0.965 
(1.550)
0.405 
(0.659)
-0.458 
(-1.159)
0.177 
(0.589)
�ln(GCit)
-0.199*** 
(-3.512)
-0.170*** 
(-3.076)
-0.198*** 
(-3.481)
-0.160*** 
(-3.077)
-0.201*** 
(-3.471)
-0.175*** 
(-3.089)
πit
-0.008 
(-0.968)
-0.008 
(-0.943)
-0.016** 
(-2.292)
-0.005 
(-0.673)
-0.009 
(-0.932)
ln(FINMAit)� ln(hit)
0.007*** 
(3.443)
0.007*** 
(3.433)
ln(FINMAit)� ln(kit)
-0.003*** 
(-3.597)
-0.002*** 
(-3.560)
No. of Total 
Observations 45 45 45 45 70 60
Estimation Method LSDV LSDV LSDV LSDV LSDV LSDV
DWH: K*;  
t- or F-aux 1; -0.644 2; 2.27 1; -0.812 2; 1.45 1; 0.118 1; 1.264
Adj. R² 0.416 0.418 0.417 0.491 0.483 0.454
F-Value (sig. of R²) 2.655** 3.352*** 2.660** 3.128*** 4.235*** 3.873***
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Data Appendix
Real GDP per worker (RGDPL): real GDP at 1995 domestic market prices di-
vided by the number of employed persons of the total economy. The values 
for Croatia between 1994 and 1999 are interpolated with the trend growth rate 
between 2000 and 2005. Source: AMECO (annual macro-economic) database 
of the European Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs (DG ECFIN), April 2005. Trend growth rates have been calculated analo-
gously to Temple (1999, 119).
Employment (L): number of employed persons of the total economy. Source: 
AMECO database (national accounts). 
Inward FSFDI stock (FSFDI): inward FDI stocks that are devoted to ﬁnancial
intermediation according to NACE code J, including equity capital, reinvested 
earnings and loans, mn EUR, for CEE-10, from 1996 to 2004. Source: Hunya & 
Stankovsky (2006). Primary source: National Banks according to international 
investment position (IIP). 
Hump-shaped index for FSFDI: is constructed analogously to Eller (2004): in a 
country ranking the lowest and highest values of FSFDI per GDP get a value of 
one. The next lowest and highest values get higher values and this procedure is 
continued up to the medium range values of FSFDI per GDP, which get the high-
est values. This procedure is repeated for each year within the estimation period.
FDI: total inward FDI stock (mn EUR) including equity capital, reinvested earn-
ings and loans from 1996 to 2004. Source: Hunya & Stankovsky (2006). Primary 
source: National Banks according to international investment position (IIP).
Financial cross-border M&A (FINMA): ﬂow data relating to completed cross-bor-
der M&A (mn EUR) in the ﬁnancial sector for all eleven CEECs (except Croatia)
from 1994 to 2002. The data exclude corporate transactions involving less than 
5% of ownership of banks and nonblank ﬁnancial institutions or less than 3% if
the transaction value is greater than 1 million US-$. Although, in practice, all 
transactions referred to are acquisitions, the acronym M&A is used. Source: 
European Central Bank (Baudino et al., 2004).
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Physical capital stock per worker (k): real physical capital stock per em-
ployee at 1995 domestic market prices. Time series on the physical capital 
stock (K) were calculated by using perpetual inventory methods. The initial 
capital stock values (K0) were calculated following Easterly & Levine (2001) 
by , where  represents annual aver-
age investment rates (gross ﬁxed capital formation (GFCF) of the business sec-
tor) over a ten year period,  denotes output growth averaged over a ten year 
period, and  is a constant rate of depreciation assumed to be 0.07. Assuming 
that the growth rate of the capital stock can be approximated by the growth rate of 
GFCF, further values of the capital stock are calculated by taking the initial value, 
using annual real changes of GFCF and dividing the values by the number of em-
ployed persons of the total economy. Source: WIIW Research Reports 314, March 
2005; International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF; AMECO database.
Human capital stock (h): constructed index using reported education levels of 
employees 1996–2003 (low educated: ISCED-classiﬁcation 0-2, weight 1; me-
dium educated: ISCED 3-4, weight 1.4; high educated: ISCED 5-6, weight 2). 
Source: EUROSTAT, labor force surveys, primarily 2nd quarter 1998–2003 (no 
data for Croatia). Data for 1996–1997 are interpolated using the trend growth rate 
between 1998 and 2003. Data for Lithuania are adjusted because of a structural 
break 2000–2001 which has given rise to overestimated high educated and un-
derestimated low educated employees. The EUROSTAT data have been favored 
respecting educational attainment rates of the Barro and Lee (2001) database, 
since the latter one does not provide sufﬁcient data for the Baltic countries.
Government consumption (GC): Real ﬁnal consumption expenditure of the gen-
eral government to real GDP at 1995 domestic market prices, representing the 
size of the public sector. Source: AMECO database.
Inﬂation (π): Growth rate of the GDP price deﬂator at market prices (national
currency). Source: AMECO database.
Interest spreads: ratio of each CEE country’s interest spread to the aggregate 
Eurozone interest spread (lending rate minus deposit rate, in percent per annum, 
end-year). Once this spread ratio is bigger than 1, there will be an incentive for 
a Eurozone bank to invest in the speciﬁc CEE country. We used this variable as
an instrument for the DWH ﬁrst stage. Source: IMF, IFS statistics.
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Banking Transition Progress, 
Foreign Bank Entry and Economic Development: 
The Case of Serbia
Gerhard Fink, Peter Haiss and Mina von Varendorff 31
Introduction
Theoretical studies and empirical evidence have shown that countries with better 
developed ﬁnancial systems enjoy faster and more stable long-run growth. Well
developed banking systems and ﬁnancial markets have a signiﬁcant positive
impact on total factor productivity, which translates into higher long-run growth. 
Financial sector development levels differ between the New EU Member States 
from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE32) on the one hand and Accession Coun-
tries (AC33) and other South Eastern Europe (SEE34) on the other. The goal of 
the paper is threefold: (1) to present selected empirical evidence on the possible 
impact of the banking sector on economic growth in (former) transition countries; 
(2) discuss features speciﬁc to the banking sector in South-Eastern Europe,
with an emphasis on the role of foreign banks; and (3) compare and apply the 
evidence to the current situation in Serbia.
While SEE generally lags behind the NMS from (CEE) in many aspects of transi-
tion, Serbia is a special case in ﬁnancial sector transformation for a number of
reasons. War, prolonged territorial disputes and legal uncertainties for example on 
bank licenses, social bank ownership, lower banking concentration, higher work-
ers remittances substituting ﬁnancial intermediation, strong euroization, late bank-
ing reforms, a low stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) and a “small” EU impact 
carry over into distinguishing ﬁnancial sector reform in Serbia from other transition
economies. While there are several reviews about banking transformation in the 
31 Gerhard Fink (Gerhard.Fink@WU-Wien.ac.at) is Jean-Monet Professor at the EuropaInstitut, Vienna University of Economics 
and Business Administration.  Peter Haiss (Peter.Haiss@wu-wien.ac.at; corresponding author) lectures at the EuropaInstitut and is 
with Bank Austria Creditanstalt, member of UniCredit Group. Mina von Varendorff is a  junior researcher at the EuropaInstitut. The 
authors are grateful for support by Bettina Hagmayr, Stefan Marin and Jennifer Weichselbraun, all of the Finance-Growth-Integra-
tion-Nexus Team at the EuropaInstitut (see http://fgr.wu-wien.ac.at/institut/ef/nexus.html). The opinions expressed are the authors’ 
personal views and not necessarily those of the institutions the authors are afﬁliated with.
32 NMS/CEE here refers to CZ, SK, HU, PL, SI, EE, LV, LT
33 AC here refers to Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Turkey (BG, RO, HU, TK). As the data available covers the period prior to 
BG and RO joining the EU in 2007, these two NMS are referred to as Accession Countries in the following.
34 SEE here refers to Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FRY Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro (AL, BIH, MC, SCG, CG)
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EU Accession Countries (BG, RO, HR, TK) from South Eastern Europe (e.g. Bas-
tian 2003; Bonin 2004; Kraft 2005), the speciﬁc situation of Serbia and other SEE
countries has received less attention in the literature. Does the ﬁnancial sector in
Serbia and SEE already contribute to economic development, do reforms pay off? 
We ﬁll this gap by analyzing banking reform in Serbia and SEE against the experi-
ence of other transition economies.
In comparison with CEE transition economies, ﬁnancial sector reform started late
in the South Eastern European Countries (Penev and Rojec, 2004). The establish-
ment of a properly working ﬁnancial sector in SEE has been delayed or jeopardized
by a number of adverse developments such as war, political instability, hyperinﬂa-
tion and pyramid schemes in the late 1990’s. The ﬁnancial sector in all countries of
the region is dominated by commercial banks. Privatization of the banking sector 
has advanced during the last years and foreign ownership has gradually increased, 
although at an unequal pace among SEE countries. Given Serbias´ quite distinct 
political and economic transition, ﬁnancial sector reform in Serbia may be crucial.
While former Czechoslovakia split peacefully and the Baltics could reestablish 
national independence rather quickly, Serbia saw itself as the heart of the former 
Yugoslavia and got entangled in internal and external war with strong repercus-
sions onto the ﬁnancial sector. The May 2005 referendum in Montenegro voted for
a peaceful divorce from Serbia. Once among the richest parts of the communist 
world, war and sanctions led to massive disintermediation in the context of a halving 
of real gross domestic product (GDP; IMF, 2006). Banks and businesses closed by 
the thousand. Hyperinﬂation led to the issuance of 500-billion dinar notes and a high
level of euroization (Miller 2006). Freezing of foreign currency savings and large 
bank pyramid schemes of the magnitude only seen in Macedonia and Albania led to 
the loss of households´ savings, bringing down ﬁnancial depth to about half the level
of the 1980s (IMF 2006). While Serbia beneﬁted stronger than many other transi-
tion countries from remittances of guest workers abroad (e.g. 14% of GDP in 2004; 
Guiliano and Ruiz-Aranz 2005, 5), this short-term  substitute for a lack of ﬁnancial
development cannot make up for political and economic instability in the long run.
Serbia is a country at the early stages of its transition (Ristić, 2004). After ten 
years of isolation, the economy of the country collapsed, infrastructure was 
nearly destroyed and poverty increased. The payment and settlement system in 
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Serbia was inefﬁcient, while the banking sector was weak and not competitive.
The new government of Serbia and Montenegro assumed power in October 
2000 and adopted a comprehensive reform agenda. In 2001 and 2002 major 
steps were taken in cleaning up the republic’s banking sector and strengthen-
ing banking supervision by introducing new laws on banks, non-banks and the 
central bank. The new management of the National Bank of Serbia (NBS) car-
ried out a comprehensive assessment of the banking sector and drew up a bank 
restructuring and privatization strategy (NBS, 2003). Banks were classiﬁed ac-
cording to their credit rating and insolvent banks were liquidated. Measures were 
taken to encourage new foreign exchange savings. The entry of foreign banks 
into the market increased conﬁdence in the banking sector and brought rapid
improvements in many areas of the banking business. 
The main contribution of this paper is to show the signiﬁcance of banking sec-
tor reform in SEE transition countries on their way to market economies. We 
emphasise the role of foreign banks and focus on South Eastern European 
countries, and discuss the distinct development in Serbia. Our comparative 
theoretical framework enables us to compare previous reform measures in tran-
sition economies with measures in South East Europe and Serbia, in particular. 
We highlight the role of foreign banks in stimulating economic development. 
We investigate critical features of loan market development and ﬁnde that while
there is a huge growth potential, certain aspects (retail growth, foreign currency 
growth, short-termism) need to be watched closely.
The paper is organised as follows: Section one reviews a number of empirical 
studies showing the interlink between ﬁnancial sector development and eco-
nomic growth in transition economies. Section two depicts certain loan mar-
ket features of particular relevance to South Eastern Europe. Section three 
analyses the Serbian banking reform in the period between 2000 and 2005. A 
summary concludes.
1. Possible Impact of Banking Sector Reform on Economic Growth
An impressive number of empirical studies relying on large country samples show 
that ﬁnancial sector development can have an economically important impact on
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growth.35 Recent studies suggest that the relationship varies with the level of 
economic development (Rousseau and Wachtel, 1998; Fink, Haiss and Vuksic, 
2004), for example between emerging and industrialised market economies. 
Many of the empirical studies are based on the seminal work of King and Levine 
(1993a, 1993b). Using cross-section methodology, Levine and Zervos (1998) 
found that bank sector development and stock market development is positively 
correlated with contemporaneous and future rates of economic growth, produc-
tivity growth and capital accumulation in less developed countries. Evans et al. 
(2002) argued that human capital and the bank sector are complements and 
suggested that the productivity enhancing potential of human capital can best 
be exploited in the presence of a developed banking system. Beck and Levine 
(2001, 2002a) complemented ﬁndings by estimating the effect of banking sector
and stock market development, using panel data techniques. Both the bank sec-
tor and stock market showed an independent, signiﬁcant and positive effect on
economic growth. Khan and Senhadji (2000a) construct a comprehensive ﬁnan-
cial sector development indicator comprising the bank sector, stock markets and 
also bond markets. Again a positive ﬁnance-growth link was found. Apart from
sectoral issues, followers of the law-and-ﬁnance-view (e.g. LaPorta et al, 1998,
and Levine, Loayza and Beck, 2000) emphasize the important role of legal and 
accounting status and reform for economic growth. A related strand of literature, 
e.g. Beale et al (2004) and Giannetti et al. (2002), provide evidence that ﬁnancial
deepening and integration can boost economic output. Given the rising level of 
integration via foreign banks from the EU in the transition economies, this aspect 
should also be of relevance here.
A growing part of recent literature has applied the ﬁnance-growth-framework
to emerging economies and a few empirical studies were already conducted in 
the context of European transition economies; see Table 2.1 for an overview. 
In the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe in general and espe-
cially in South East Europe, ﬁnancial markets are substantially smaller than in
established market economies, as measured by the ﬁnancial intermediation ratio
(credit to private enterprises to GDP; Bonin and Wachtel, 2003; Breuss, Fink 
and Haiss, 2004). Although small ﬁnancial sectors prevail in transition econo-
mies, effects on growth could be expected if regulations were appropriately set 
35 For recent reviews, see Blum et al (2002) or Wachtel (2003). Lead effects of ﬁnancial markets on economic growth were
identiﬁed in several countries with Granger causality tests by Fink, Haiss and Hristoforova (2005). For a critique, see Rousseau and
Wachtel (2005).
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(La Porta et al, 1998; Bolton, 2002). In particular, short run effects could be 
expected (Fink, Haiss and Mantler, 2005). Based on 1996 data, Fink and Haiss 
(1999) found some early evidence of a positive impact of bank sector develop-
ment in those 10 EU Candidate countries from CEE. Using a broader sample 
of 23 transition economies, Jaffee and Levonian (1999) could show that bank 
efﬁciency is signiﬁcantly and positively related to economic output. Koivu (2002)
further reﬁned the picture by exploiting the time series component of a panel of
25 transition economies. Bank efﬁciency (measured by the net interest margin)
showed a signiﬁcantly positive and causal impact on growth, while this was not
the case for credit volume. The latter ﬁnding can be attributed to the inclusion of
laggard reformers from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Drakos 
(2003) provided an alternative explanation by arguing that high bank market 
concentration is negatively associated with economic growth in transition econo-
mies. For South East Europe (SEE), the empirical ﬁndings of Mehl and Winkler
(2003) fail to support the hypothesis of positive and causal link between ﬁnancial
development and economic growth. They explain this as a failure of the reforms 
in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s in SEE to prevent inﬂationary ﬁnance and ﬁnancial
crises.36 In some of these SEE countries, ﬁnancial development has just started
by introducing new reform steps, so that the banking sector could not yet con-
tribute to economic growth (Mehl and Winkler, 2003).
With increasing levels of development, bond markets and at later stages also 
qualiﬁed labour should become additional important factors of growth (Fink,
Haiss and Vuksic, 2004). Overall, when considering growth effects in general, 
stock market segments could also be expected to contribute to growth in the 
long run (Platek, 2002). In rather early stages of transition, stock markets were 
not signiﬁcantly related to growth in CEE in studies conducted by Fink and Haiss
(1999) and Kominek (2002). 
The application of the ﬁnance-growth-nexus to the transition economies war-
rants some caution. Due to rather short, available time series and difﬁculties to
model the evolution of output in transition economies, these ﬁndings should be
treated as preliminary (Mehl and Winkler, 2003). The possible impact of inﬂa-
tion, bad loans and the possible association of fast credit growth with ﬁnan-
cial distress are worth mentioning in this context. The inclusion of inﬂation as
36 For a deeper discussion of transition-speciﬁc effects in analysing the ﬁnance-growth nexus, see Mehl and Winkler (2003:4).
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a conditioning variable may be of special relevance during the early stages of 
economic transition, which are usually characterised by high inﬂation.37 Mamat-
zakis, Staikouras and Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki (2005) and Cottarelli, Dell´Arricia 
and Vladkova-Hollar (2005) thus control for the inﬂation rate in their investigation
of banking concentration and ﬁnancial deepening in transition economies.
Bank asset and credit data may similarly be distorted by high and volatile bad 
loans and their removal from the banks books to state consolidation agencies. 
Cottarelli, Dell´ Arricia and Vladkova-Hollar (2005) and Fink, Haiss and Mantler 
(2005) reﬂect this in their application of the ﬁnance-growth model to transition
economies. Given the fast credit growth in some transition economies, it is of 
special importance in this context whether this credit growth reﬂects a structural
deepening conducive to the real economy or a credit bubble possibly detrimental 
to medium-term economic growth. For Croatia, Kraft and Jankov (2005) ﬁnd that
rapid loan growth did indeed increase the probability of credit quality deterioration. 
Nonetheless, from the empirical evidence on the frontrunners of economic reform 
in CEE it can be derived that a sound banking sector can contribute to economic 
growth and speed up transition. As structural differences have to be taken into 
consideration, these are discussed in the following for South Eastern Europe. 
37 Khan and Senhadji (2000) and Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) provide related evidence on threshold effects in the relationship 
between inﬂation and growth.
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2. Outcome, Process and Lessons from Banking Sector Reform in SEE 
The development of a ﬁnancial system, including banking reform, is one of the
most important challenges facing Central and South East European countries 
during the transition from centrally planned to market economies. The crea-
tion of a full-ﬂedged ﬁnancial system is an integral and important part of the
transformation strategy. In a market economy, the ﬁnancial sector has a special
role, as it mobilizes resources and allocates them to those investments that are 
capable of generating the highest returns on capital. The better the ﬁnancial
sector can perform this role, the better the economy will perform in the long 
term. A sound ﬁnancial sector improves the screening of fund-seekers and the
monitoring of the recipients of funds, which improves allocation of resources. It 
encourages the mobilization of savings by providing attractive instruments and 
savings vehicles. This may also increase the savings rate. In the medium term, 
economies of scale in ﬁnancial institutions lower costs of project evaluation and
origination, and facilitate the monitoring of projects through corporate govern-
ance. Financial intermediaries provide opportunities for risk management and 
liquidity. They promote development of markets and instruments with attractive 
characteristics that enable risk sharing (Levine 1998, Wachtel 2001; Bonin and 
Wachtel, 2003). After more than 15 years of economic transition, it is possible 
to draw some useful lessons for next-wave countries. The most important ﬁrst
step for the creation of a full-ﬂedged ﬁnancial system is a reform of the banking
sector and the respective regulatory and supervisory framework. 
Foreign Ownership as a Solution to Bad Debt 
After 1990 the new state-owned commercial banks started with an inherited 
overhang of troubled assets (the “stock problem”; Fink et al, 1998; Breuss, 
Fink and Haiss, 2004). This “old” bad debt resulted in a ﬁrst round of bank re-
capitalisations. Due to the lack of efﬁcient banking reform, a wave of new bad
debt had to be swallowed, ﬁrst by the banks, and later on by the respective tax-
payers via several waves of additional recapitalizations (the “ﬂow problem”).
The process of cleansing the accounts of the politically sensitive state-owned 
enterprises and of the banking system brought hidden liabilities of the public 
sector to the surface.38 The average annualized net ﬁscal cost of bank restruc-
38 In the Czech case, taking the Consolidation Agency activity into account drove general government deﬁcit up from 3.9 per
cent of GDP to 6.7 per cent of GDP in 2002, with total holdings of bad assets amounting to about 15 per cent of GDP (European 
Commission 2003a:15f).
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turing (direct ﬁscal costs minus sales proceeds of state banks) was above 1.5
per cent of average 1995-2002 GDP in the Czech Republic and Turkey, in the 
1-1.5 per cent-range in Croatia and Romania, in the 0.5-1 per cent range in 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania and Slovakia and below 0.5 per cent in Latvia 
and Slovenia (Sherif, 2003). 
Figure 3.1 Bad Loan Levels (2004)
Data source: EBRD (2005); BA-CA (2006b); Breuss, Fink, Haiss (2005)
Non-performin     vg loans accounted for 13.6 per cent of total loans in the CEE-8 
(New Member States) in 2001 but could be reduced to an average of about 5 
per cent in both the CEE-8 and the AC-4 Accession and Candidate Countries. 
Besides Poland, this shows a remarkable success with the CEE-8 average not 
far above the EU-15 average any more.  Only some South Eastern European 
countries show still higher bad loans, on average about 14 per cent (equivalent 
to the 2001 level of the CEE-8). 
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Figure 3.2 Foreign Bank Involvement (2004)
Data source: Allen, Bartirolo, Kowalewski (2005); BA-CA (2006a), BA-CA (2006b); ERRD (2005)
More stringent lending policies by foreign-owned banks helped to reduce bad 
debt levels. On average roughly 75 per cent of the banking market in the New 
Member States is under the control of foreign banks according to end of 2004 
data – far above the 28 per cent foreign bank assets in the EU-15. In the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, Croatia, Albania (and in the meantime 
also Romania and in most other South Eastern European countries), local banks 
are essentially owned by foreign banks (Backé and Thimann, 2004; Buch, Klein-
ert and Zajc, 2003), with Slovenia and Turkey as a notable exceptions.  
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Figure 3.3 Banking Concentration (2004)
Data source: Allen, Bartirolo, Kowalewski (2005); BA-CA (2005a,b); EBRD (2005)
While two thirds of the Baltic bank assets are in Swedish hands, Greek and 
Italian banks are most active in South-Eastern Europe (Bastian, 2003). Austrian 
and Italian banks are strongly involved across the region (Breyer, 2004). The 
high involvement of major banking groups from neighbouring countries coin-
cides with a high level of market concentration. The top ﬁve banks, often foreign,
account for more than 60% of aggregate bank assets in new EU Member States 
compared to about 40% in the Euro12-zone (Breuss, Fink and Haiss, 2004; 
Bruckbauer, 2004).
These foreign banks have been a substitute for domestic ﬁnancial supervision in
CEE during the transition process (Wagner and Iakova, 2001; European Com-
mission, 2003a). Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel (2005) and Fries and Taci (2005) 
ﬁnd that foreign-owned banks are more cost-efﬁcient than domestic banks in
transition economies. Rising foreign involvement improved corporate govern-
ance, drove the bank reform process and improved banking sector efﬁciency.
Plotting the interest rate margin (i.e. the difference between lending and deposit 
interest rates) against the EBRD (2005) Banking Reform Indicator shows that 
thereby banking reform lead to narrower spreads (Kraft, 2005; ﬁgure 3.3).
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Figure 3.4 Banking Reform and Interest Differentials (2004)
Figure 3.5 Foreign Bank Ownership Versus  Loan Portfolio Quality (2004)
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Besides providing stability and bringing “fresh money”, credit risk management tech-
niques and improved corporate governance to these markets (Buch, Kleinert and 
Zajc, 2002), the strong involvement of foreign banks in CEE markets, mainly from 
the European Union, also implies a growing integration of these ﬁnancial markets
into the “old” EU-15 ﬁnancial markets. Theory and empirical ﬁndings (e.g. Beale et
al, 2004; Gianneti et al, 2002) suggest that integration of ﬁnancial markets contrib-
utes to economic growth, which should equally apply to the transition economies. 
Increasing foreign ownership has lead to a decrease in the share of bad loans in 
banks´ loan portfolios as can be seen from (ﬁgure 3.5; ECB 2006, 60).
2. Speciﬁc Credit Features in South Eastern Europe
Over the 2002 to 2005 period, cumulative growth of private sector loans amounted 
to about 260 percent in nominal terms in the CEE-8 New Member States. Loan 
growth in the Accession and Candidate countries (AC-4) was even faster with about 
360 per cent, with the SEE-4 inbetween and again high (Mihaljek, 2006). This high 
growth in credit stock also reﬂects the low starting base (e.g. for Serbia). In real
terms, the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) exceeded 30% per year for quite 
a number of countries, especially compared to the eurozone level of about 4% (Mi-
haljek, 2006). Compound annual growth for the CEECs’ banking sector until 2013 
is forecasted at about 14 per cent, and at 18 per cent in the retail banking sector (Di 
Maggio, Romanowski and Walter 2003; Perrin and Bruckbauer, 2004).39 Whether 
this rapid loan growth is consistent with the process of convergence and structural 
ﬁnancial deepening or if the high loan growth increased the probability of credit qual-
ity deterioration and might thus raise prudential concerns is heavily debated (e.g. 
Backé, Ègert and Zumer, 2006; Duenwald, Gueorgiuev and Schaecher, 2005; Cot-
tarelli, DellÁriccia and Vladkova-Hollar, 2005; Kraft and Jankov, 2005). The EBRD 
(2005, 39) argues that this credit boom resembles that of the cohesion countries 
(Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) prior to the introduction of the euro and thus 
rather supports the view that the ongoing credit boom is a structurally driven ﬁnan-
cial deepening. Nevertheless, monetary authorities have responded to this possible 
ﬁnancial stability challenge by tightening monetary conditions and prudential stand-
ards (ECB, 2006) and pay increasing  attention to the growth drivers.
39 Rapid growth of consumer credit is a widespread phenomenon in both CEE and SEE; see Kraft (2004). Cottarelli, Dell´Ariccia 
and Vladkova-Hollar (2005) analyse credit growth in CEE with regard to  the likely convergence to “normal” credit/GDP-levels of 
countries with similar fundamentals.
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Figure 4.1 Private Sector Credit Growth (2004)
Data source: Mihaljek (2006)
The major factors behind further growth forecasts are per capita income dou-
bling within a decade, rising ﬁnancial product usage, and GDP growth (Perrin
and Bruckbauer, 2004:38; Bruckbauer, 2004:6). Hitherto underdeveloped cus-
tomer and product groups are increasingly targeted, especially retail banking 
with an overall market share of 36 per cent in the CEECs compared to 55 per 
cent in the EU in 2001 (Di Maggio, Romanowski and Walter 2003). Overall, 
competition has strengthened in CEE banking as evidenced by a shift in bank 
portfolios from government securities to private sector lending (Iakova and Wag-
ner 2002) and by shrinking interest rate margins (Perrin and Bruckbauer, 2004) 
which are conducive to investment and economic growth. 
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Figure 4.2 Retail Lending (2004)
Data source: EBRD (2005)
The retail sector is driving aggregate credit growth, as lending to households has 
expanded nearly four times faster than corporate lending during the last years 
(Backé, Reininger and Walko, 2006; EBRD, 2005; see ﬁgure 4.2 for a compari-
son between 1999 and 2004 ratios). This can be explained by the market entry 
of foreign banks which are attracted by the low utilisation of banking products 
by the respective population compared to the saturated EU-15 markets (Moneta 
and Mayr, 2006). Households were rather ignored during the initial reform phase 
in the 1990ies. After privatising them to mainly foreign owners these introduced 
many products new to the local markets, e.g. housing loans (Mihaljek, 2006). 
Relatively broad interest spreads and improved collateral (e.g. in the form of 
guarantees and real estate) turned household lending into an attractive new 
business (Backé, Reininger and Walko, 2006). 
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Figure 4.3 Foreign Currency Lending Growth
Data source: BA-CA (2005b); EBRD (2005)
Compared to the euro area share of foreign currency (FX) lending of about 5 per 
cent (with only Austria showing quite higher ratios), with roughly 40% the  share 
of  FX loans is quite high across the CEE, AC and SEE regions.Lower borrowing 
rates in FX and longer maturities are certainly an attraction to borrowers. While 
credit growth will boost investment and growth, much of the credit especially in 
South Eastern Europe is used to purchase imports, putting pressure on the ex-
ternal balance (Sorsa, 2006). While corporate borrowers are the main source of 
FX loan demand, particularly unhedged non-euro FX borrowing by households 
for consumer goods and by small and medium sized enterprises (SME) raises 
concerns (Got and Ross, 2006). As much of the rise is in FX, whether or not this 
may make the countries more vulnerable to shocks depends on the respective 
currency regime and on the foreign currency used to pick up loans.. The growth 
in FX lending was facilitated by cross-ownership with euro-area Member States 
(EU, 2004, 15) and was particularly pronounced in currency board countries 
(BG, EE, BIH) and in Slovenia prior to adopting the Euro (EBRD, 2005). Among 
the remaining countries, those with a combination of higher  currency volatility 
and higher FX exposure (HU, RO, and to a certain extent HR and PL) are closely 
watched (Got and Ross, 2006). Vulnerabilities might also be higher in countries 
with lower GDP levels, as is the case across the SEE region.
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Figure 4.4 Share of Short Term Loans
Figure 4.5 Remittances 
Data source: EBRD (2005); Guilano & Ruiz-Arranz (2005)
Data source: BA-CA (2004, 2005b); EBRD (2005)
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South Eastern Europe also sticks out with regard to a still high share of short-
term lending. At an average of about 50 per cent, the share of short-term lend-
ing in SEE is about twice as high as for the CEE New Member States. In CEE, 
the proportion of short-term credit in total private sector credit has fallen due to 
access to more long-term funding, including foreign credit lines (EBRD, 2005). 
Another factor where SEE sticks out are remittances. Migrants transfers, work-
ers remittances and compensation received by employees account for 14 per 
cent of GDP for the SEE-4 average, compared to just 2 per cent for CEE and 
AC. While remittance inﬂows usually support consumption, in countries with a
weak ﬁnancial sector, remittances can also ﬁnance new or existing business or
be used as collateral (EBRD, 2005). Remittances thus can substitute for the lack 
of ﬁnancial development and hence promote growth in countries where they are
sizable like in Serbia (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2005). 
4. Bank Reform in Serbia – Current Status and Open Issues
The recent political history, the former workers´ self management system and 
the diaspora of guest workers differentiates the legacy countries of the former 
SRF Yugoslavia from other European transition economies. These facets have 
repercussions to the economic and ﬁnancial system in Serbia. In order to deline-
ate growth implications from ﬁnancial sector reform, it thus makes sense to take
a closer look at the speciﬁcs of ﬁnancial development in Serbia.
On the political side, a major territorial issue is worth clarifying. While Serbia 
and Montenegro formed a state union in February 2003 and represented a sin-
gle legal person in international law in succession of the SFR Yugoslavia, the 
National Bank of Serbia continued to operate on the territory of Serbia (Dvorsky, 
2004); in May 2006, Montenegro ﬁnally separated. Even previously, banking
licences for Montenegro wer a matter of the Central Bank of Montenegro, which 
introduced the Deutsche Mark as republic’s legal currency and withdrew the 
dinar from circulation in 2000 (Barisitz, 2003; Bastian, 2003). Various highly 
sensitive territorial issue had repercussions on bank operating licenses, FDI, 
investor sentiment and ﬁnancial market and economic prospects at large over
the last years (Bastian, 2003; Jansson, 2005). We will concentrate mainly on 
Serbia from 2000 in the following, while tying in related aspects.40
40 For ﬁnancial sector reform in the Kosovo and in Montenegro, see Gardó (2005), European Commission (2004a), and Popovic
(2004); for Macedonia, see Petkovski and Bishev (2004). For a review of earlier ﬁnancial market development in Serbia and Mon-
tenegro, see Barisitz (2003) or Fink, Haiss and Ugljesic (2005).
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Recent developments and data on Serbian banks 
Much of the more recent data on banking reform in Serbia reﬂects the fact that
Serbia started reforms late. As mentioned before, Serbia ranks poorly compared 
to SEE peers in terms of aggregate credit intermediation, credit to the private 
sector, deposits relative to GDP, the share of foreign banks in total assets, proﬁt-
ability, and average loan quality (see tables 4.1 to 4.4). Lack of collateral and 
difﬁcult claim enforcement kept lending cautious for a prolonged period, and
short-term lending prevails. Taking a look at developments over time provides a 
more optimistic picture. 
Table 5.1: 
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While arguably still overbanked, the number of banks in Serbia was cut to 43 at 
the end of 2004, about one third of the 1995 peak level (EBRD, 2004). Since 
2004, reviving private consumption and strong investment activity boosted credit 
demand especially for loans to households (+126%), with corporate loans grow-
ing by 43% and access to credit by private enterprises still somewhat limited 
(Gardó, 2005; EBRD, 2004). Despite a low base, the National Bank of Serbia 
is ready to intervene with the usual measures (raising of minimum reserve re-
quirements, minimum down payments for loan applicants, credit risk provisions, 
etc.) to avoid overheating loan growth (Gardó, 2005). The establishment of the 
Central Credit Registry (CCR) in mid-2002 also helped in this respect. Shrinking 
interest rate spreads reﬂect the more competitive banking scene. Both private
sector deposits and loans are on the rise. Banking concentration (47% for the 
largest ﬁve banks) showed an upward trend throughout the last years, driven by
foreign bank entry in the ongoing privatisation process.
The rather high level of non-performing loans combines the intertwined issues 
of enterprise reform and banking restructuring (Cocozza et al, 2002:19). Bank-
ing reform must go hand in hand with real sector reform, the latter still operating 
under soft budget constraints (Gardó 2005:11). Given that the banking sector 
is still partly burdened by the unresolved problem of claims on heavily indebted 
companies, a strategic decision concerning non-performing loans in the port-
folios of banks will have to be made as this blocks privatisation of both banks 
and indebted companies and may cause additional delays (EU Commission, 
2004b:26). Continuing banking reform and privatisation and ensuring sufﬁcient
budgetary resources for restructuring and recapitalisation of the banking system 
are among the short-term priorities identiﬁed in the European Partnership with
Serbia and Montenegro (EU Commission. 2004c:9). 
Privatization via FDI  in the Serbian Banking Sector
Foreign ownership and participation in the banking sector generally form a cru-
cial part of bank privatisation in transition countries (Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel, 
2005). Speciﬁc to Serbia41 was the particular need to re-establish public con-
41 and for pyramid scheme reasons, also in Albania
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ﬁdence to banks. For a population that was expropriated repeatedly by hyper-
inﬂation, bank closures and the freezing of foreign currency deposits, and that
suffered from being shut off economically from most of the rest of the world 
(Barisitz, 2003), strong signals were necessary to re-establish conﬁdence in the
banking system. While Serbia started late with full-ﬂedged bank privatisation,
both the visible support of the EBRD encouraging foreign bank entry and the ar-
rival of foreign banks provided such strong signals to the economy and investors 
at large and helped to restore conﬁdence (Bastian, 2003).
The EBRD acquired a 25% stake in Komerciljalna Banka in Spring 2006, and 
National Bank of Greece bought Vojvidjanska Banka in fall 2006. Consequently, 
the market share of foreign banks rose markedly towards levels common in CEE 
markets. While growth so far has been driven more by private consumption and 
foreign direct investment in Serbia than by domestic ﬁnancial intermediation,
the strong presence of foreign banks is likely to change this trend. In addition 
to the provision of ﬁnancial services at market standards, foreign banks play a
special role in framing expectations by market participants sending visible sig-
nals of change (Vives, 1996). For banks to fully reach their potential in bringing 
about healthy economic growth in Serbia, it was imperative to ﬁnd a solution to
the highly sensitive territorial issues and overcome the legacy of workers´ self 
management system and still pending enterprise restructuring.
Summary and Conclusion
This article discusses if and how the banking sector in South Eastern transition 
economies can inﬂuence economic growth with a speciﬁc emphasis on ﬁnancial
sector reform in Serbia. We review empirical ﬁndings on the “ﬁnance-growth-nexus”
in European transition economies and  discuss ongoing banking reforms in South 
Eastern Europe (SEE) and in Serbia in particular and provide data on various ﬁnan-
cial sector aspects in Central and Eastern European (CEE) and SEE countries.
From the empirical evidence on the ﬁnance-growth-nexus in European transi-
tion countries, we conclude that ﬁnancial sector reform, especially of the banking
sector, can contribute to economic growth and speed up transition. Empirical 
research by Cottarelli, Dell´Arriccia and Vladkova-Hollar (2005) and others has 
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provided evidence that factors originating in the banking system, rather than the 
corporate sector, were responsible for growth differences in transition econo-
mies. In extending the conventional ﬁnance-growth framework and based on
observations in CEE, we suggest that strong foreign bank investment and related 
cross-border credit from parent banks may have been a substitute for domestic 
bank growth, thus supporting real sector growth in SEE. Given the massive-scale 
involvement of foreign banks in CEE and SEE, more research is necessary in this 
area whether this is transition-speciﬁc or applies generally to emerging markets.
In South East European countries, economic and bank transition started later 
than in CEE because of political circumstances. Serbia is at an earlier stage of 
transition compared to the peers. Ensuring smooth relations with the European 
Union, as was the case with the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (Eu-
ropean Commission 2004c, 2005) would provide signals of growing institutional 
stability and EU involvement to foreign and domestic investors in Serbian banks 
and enterprises at large. The 2005 EBRD annual meeting in Belgrade and the 
massive entry of foreign banks have called attention to new developments. Such 
signals strengthen investor conﬁdence and thus help markets to grow. The “EU-
factor” (Sergi, 2004:15) alone, however, will not be enough to enable the ﬁnan-
cial sector to contribute to economic growth. The ﬁnancial sector can only trigger
positive growth if the real sector also follows market rules and if state frameworks 
allow for good investment opportunities (European Commission. 2004a). 
As evident from the experience in CEE, ﬁnancial development is not growth-sup-
portive when the institutional and legal framework given to market participants is 
not appropriate. Unsound banking intermediation has a direct impact on economic 
growth as such behaviour perpetuates economic stagnation and the inefﬁcient
use of resources. Unsound ﬁnancial sectors can also indirectly hamper economic
growth, as they pose serious obstacles to inﬂows of foreign direct investment which
in turn would contribute to economic growth. Given the particularities of the loan 
market in South Eastern Europe (fast credit growth from a low level, particularly in 
the household sector and in foreign exchange denominated loans; a still high, al-
beit shrinking, share of short term lending), some more time is required to improve 
the legal and economic framework. When ﬁnancial institutions are subject to poor
governance and incentive structures, ﬁnance can hardly promote growth. Instead
of supporting growth, granting bad loans back to the companies of their owners, 
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for example, lead to resource misallocation, reduced private sector conﬁdence and
results in lower investment and growth. Policies should therefore continue to focus 
on alleviating the bottlenecks to ﬁnancial intermediation by guaranteeing stable
macroeconomic conditions and a sound institutional legal and supervisory environ-
ment. The involvement of prudent foreign banks is found to be a major factor for 
stabilizing the banking sector and making it ﬁt to support economic growth.
Serbia is still overbanked, however recently ﬁnancial intermediation has been
rising robustly from a very low base. With rising foreign involvement by reliable 
banks with a long-term commitment, conﬁdence returned to the banking sec-
tor. This is further supported by the fact that these banks focus on establishing 
a regional network, with the implication not to abandon their regional strategy 
should local difﬁculties arise. Access to capital for the private corporate sector
however still remains limited and the level of non-performing loans is still high 
in Serbia. The ﬁrst necessary steps have already been taken, but lasting reform
requires persistent commitment and strong support. Lending growth must not be 
accompanied by a return to dubious lending practices. Expectations on ﬁnance’s
contribution to growth have not yet been fully met in Serbia, as ﬁnancial develop-
ment in a proper sense may have just started. 
Continuing reform will attract foreign investors, improve the overall business en-
vironment, encourage investments and bring back the conﬁdence of the popu-
lation. The relationship with international organizations will continue to play a 
crucial role in the assessment of the stability and progress in Serbia and will be 
a precondition to further integration into the EU. In most of Central and Eastern 
Europe, the ﬁnancial architecture has converged to a bank-based system with
substantial foreign ownership. There are encouraging signs that ﬁnancial devel-
opment in Serbia may follow the successful path of Central and Eastern Europe, 
but the banking sector should not get too far ahead of the rest of the economy.
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CHAPTER II
FOREIGN BANK PENETRATION
Banking Sector Reform Efforts in South East 
European Countries 
Todor Vanev 42
Introduction
Building of viable and sound ﬁnancial systems in South Eastern Europe (SEE)
has been a fundamental aspect of the transition to a market economy. Building 
such a system has proven to be very difﬁcult and challenging.
Various studies and analyses have conﬁrmed that in the beginning of the tran-
sition process the ﬁnancial sector was weak and underdeveloped. During the
second half of the 1990s banking reform efforts were impeded either by internal 
setbacks or by external causes. 
Every single banking system suffered shocks, downturns and in most cases it 
was a turning point for the banking and macro economy of SEE countries. And 
it can’t be different as far as economic performance, macro economic stability 
and long term growth depend on the extent to which ﬁnancial institutions and
markets carry out their activities efﬁciently within an adequate infrastructure.
As a result of macroeconomic stability and reached predictability of the main proc-
esses within the region, trough privatization in general, banking sectors of SEE 
countries attract foreign investors. It should be stressed that strategies of market 
entrants vary widely. Major players in the market, Raiffeisen Zentralbank, UniCredi-
to, HVB BA-CA, Erste Bank and KBC Bank and Insurance have all built a presence 
in the region by acquiring local universal banks. As far as the peak of investments 
42 The author thanks Svetoslav Veselkov for his dedicated research assistance
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fade the conclusion possible is that we are against next stage of developments in 
the banking markets of SEE. Competition is set to heat up in these still relatively 
fragmented banking markets, and ﬁrst signs of consolidation we can see.
To thrive in SEE, banks must continue to adopt international best practices, 
such as raising volumes by expanding product portfolios and service channels, 
as well as making organizations more cost-efﬁcient by reducing head counts,
reﬁning branch processes, and applying centralized IT solutions.
Reforms in banking sectors 
Albania
Reforms of banking sector in Albania started with the introduction of the Laws 
on the Bank of Albania and on the Banking System in the Republic of Albania 
(1992). The banking system was transformed from a mono-system into a two-
tier one, introducing the central bank’s (Bank of Albania) independent status and 
its primary function of maintaining monetary stability and carrying out banking 
supervision activities.
Next step was in 1993 when the four state-owned banking institutions were consoli-
dated into three commercial banks: the Savings Bank, National Commercial Bank and 
Rural Commercial Bank. Lack of public conﬁdence in an inefﬁcient banking system
and insufﬁcient capacity of authorities resulted in the broad use of alternative chan-
nels for deposits and encourage pyramid schemes to be born. By year-end 1996 the 
pyramid schemes’ estimated liabilities were USD 1.2 bln. or some 50 % of GDP. 
The pyramid schemes’ existence and their subsequent collapse pushed further 
banking sector legislative and structural reform. Amendments in 1996, 1997 and 
1998 to the 1992 banking laws dealt with issues such as minimum capital require-
ments, capital adequacy, credit exposures and connected lending, largely in line 
with the Basel Committee’s Basic Principles of Banking Supervision. Prudential 
measures were tightened, with the BoA given increased supervisory authority.
Rehabilitation of Albania’s banking actually started in 1997 when the Bad Asset 
Resolution Trust (BART) was established to deal with the banks’ non-performing 
loans. Between 1998 and 2000 BART assumed more than USD 235 mln. bad 
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loans from National Commercial Bank and Savings Bank. In addition Albanian 
government recapitalised both banks with USD 161 mln. (mainly treasury bills) 
in order to facilitate the privatisation process.
The National Commercial Bank (NCB) was privatised in 2000 and Savings Bank 
in 2004 thus ﬁnalising big scale privatisation of the banking sector in the country.
Bulgaria
At the end of 1989, following the dramatic political changes that year, major in-
stitutional reform took place in the banking system as it moved to a two- tier sys-
tem. Existing sector-speciﬁc (transport, high-tech etc.) banks were then trans-
formed into universal banks which loaned to all sectors of the economy. At the 
same time, new local commercial banks were created out of the 59 branches of 
the BNB. In June 1991 the Law on the Bulgarian National Bank came into effect, 
altering fundamentally the roles, objectives and functions of Bulgarians central 
and commercial banks. In 1992, another key ﬁnancial act, the Law on Banks and
Credit Activity, was enacted. This law established the regulatory framework for 
the activities of banking institutions. Under this law, all banks, even state-owned 
banks, were given signiﬁcant autonomy.
To overcome problems with the fragmentation of the banking sector the govern-
ment established the Bank Consolidation Company (BCC) to encourage the 
formation of larger state-owned banks through mergers.
Outside this consolidation process, however, many new private banks entered 
the market. Since only limited regulatory controls were in place at the time, these 
banks operated in an environment without the regulatory supervision found in 
developed market economies. In many instances the ﬁnancial resources needed
to open these private banks was borrowed from state-owned banks. The origins 
of the private banks shaped their later behaviour and contribute signiﬁcantly to
the deepening the crisis of 1996-1997.
Not long after that political uncertainty, economic instability, lack of structural re-
forms, soft budget constraints, a lack of market discipline on the part of newly-
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founded banks (moral hazard), as well as factual absence of supervision of banks’ 
activities led to undercapitalisation at Bulgarian banks. Initial restructuring efforts 
involving the issue of ZUNK bonds (government bonds denominated in foreign 
currency) in light of still state-owned major banks and related interference in the 
day-to-day management failed to solve the problem of non-performing loans. 
Banks’ ﬁnancial situation deteriorated as a result of the continued subsidisation
of state-owned enterprises. Liquidity and solvency problems of the bank system 
resulted in a massive bank run. The crisis followed developed into a full-blown 
economic and ﬁnancial crisis. As a result, economic performance contracted
sharply, dropping by 9.4 % in 1996 and another 5 .6 % in 1997 and nearly half of 
the banks were closed. Unemployment rose and inﬂation exceeded 1000%.
The introduction of the currency board arrangement in 1997 (Bulgarian Lev was 
pegged to DM, now to EUR) not only stabilised the currency and prices, it also 
tightened liquidity by restricting the central bank ability to practice “lender of 
last resort” function thus, as a side effect, disciplining both the government and 
the commercial banks. In the end, the stabilisation measures got the economy 
back on track in 1998, and since then Bulgaria has experienced positive eco-
nomic development. Over the last years the country recorded average economic 
growth of 4 .9%. The disciplined ﬁscal course followed in recent years resulted
in budget deﬁcits of less than 1 % of GDP for several years and more recently
in the accumulation of huge budget surpluses and the only cause for concern 
remains accelerating current account deﬁcit. Between 1998 and 2001 most of
Bulgarian state-owned banks were privatised by attracting foreign investors. The 
last two privatisation deals in the sector took place in 2001 and 2003. Last one 
opened the retail market for Hungarian OTP through take over of DSK Bank.
Croatia
In contrast to other transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe, upon 
independence in October 1991 Croatia already possessed a set of market-like 
banking practices and a basic institutional and legal framework, although some-
what limited in scope. Unfortunately the years of military conﬂict in the Balkans,
unstable economic and reform-reluctant political environment, prevented the 
country from leveraging these initial comparative advantages.
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The ﬁrst steps in the ﬁeld of bank restructuring were taken as a reaction to the
National Bank of Yugoslavia freezing private foreign currency deposits. Yet, these 
measures were merely of a ﬁnancial nature, thus neglecting the need to imple-
ment effective corporate governance structures. As a result, problems (e. g. soft 
budget constraints, moral hazard, bad debt legacy) that had been concealed by 
the economic recovery in 1994 in the wake of stabilisation measures taken in 
1993, resurfaced at three of the four largest banks in 1996 . After recognising the 
importance of the problem the Croatian National Bank (CNB) launched a second 
round of restructuring measures with the help of the Bank Rehabilitation Agency, 
which was founded in 1994 . These new measures aimed to restructure indi-
vidual banks, including Privredna, Splitska and Rijecka Banka, at an estimated 
combined ﬁscal cost of USD 1.6 bn or 8.3 % of average 1991 – 2002 GDP.
Nevertheless, Croatia’s banking sector continued to experience difﬁculties,
which were exacerbated by the high-risk activities of some small and medium-
sized banks. These accumulated problems ultimately lead to a full-blown bank-
ing crisis betweeen 1998 and 1999.
The Banking Act of 1998 ﬁnally provided a basis for decisive intervention by the
CNB, paving the way for the 1999 launch of key reforms which were already 
a decade overdue. In the end, the closure of insolvent banks, the withdrawal 
of the state from the banking sector, and ultimately, the injection of ﬁnancial
and human capital through privatisation established a sound foundation for the 
recovery of Croatia’s banking sector
Foreign banks’ market access to Croatia started in 1994, but was slow due to mili-
tary conﬂicts, the hostile political environment and the obvious problems plaguing
the country’s banking sector in the early 1990s. In 1998, when foreign banks’ mar-
ket share in terms of total assets had already climbed to over 60 % in other transi-
tion countries (e. g. Hungary), Croatia lagged far behind with a mere 6.7 %, as 
foreign banks preferred greenﬁeld investment. However, in 1999 and 2000 Croatia
also raced ahead in the ﬁeld of bank privatisation, quickly moving from the rear
into the vanguard. The breakthrough came with the sale of a 66 % share package 
in Privredna Banka to Banca Commerciale Italiana in late 1999. Shortly thereafter, 
Unicredito Italiano acquired a 51 % interest in Splitska Banka, and Bayerische 
Landesbank bought 60 % of Rijecka Banka. Market conditions, however, altered 
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rapidly, leading to changes in the ownership structure at most of the country’s 
major banks. Splitska Banka, for example, has been a subsidiary of BA-CA since 
April 2002 and Hungary’s OTP bought a 95 .6 % stake in seventh-placed Nova 
banka in December 2004 for EUR 236 mn, a price well above market estimates 
of some EUR 150 mn. Foreign banks’ market share has continued to increase, 
reaching 91.3 % in 2004 . By contrast, state-owned banks’ market share declined 
from 45 .6 % in 1999 to 3.1 % in 2004, leaving only two banks, Croatia banka and 
Hrvatska Postanska banka, directly or indirectly owned by the state
FYR Macedonia
Despite having inherited from the SFRY a two-tier banking system the country’s 
four commercial banks played marginal role in terms of lending to the real sector. 
Characterised by ownership by formerly socially-owned enterprises commercial 
banks did not succeed to build reliable lending practices and in fact were not in-
terested to improve their proﬁtability. The lack of corporate governance stemming
from the banks’ ownership structures encouraged connected lending, with banks 
continuing to fund loss-making enterprises whose ﬁnances had deteriorated in
the post-independence period. By year-end 1992 the misallocation of funds had 
driven the share of non-performing loans to 85 % of the banks’ total loan portfolio. 
Public conﬁdence in the banking system was low, exacerbated by the freezing of
households’ foreign exchange deposits and prohibitively high lending rates.
This situation in the banking sector began to reverse itself somewhat with the 
introduction of the Macedonian denar (MKD) in April 1992, marking monetary 
independence from the SFRY. Monetary independence was accompanied by 
the issuance of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia Act (April 1992), 
which conﬁrmed the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia (NBRM) as an
independent entity, entrusted with the primary tasks of maintaining monetary 
and price stability and carrying out the banking supervision function. Further-
more, the Bank and Savings House Act was introduced in 1993 (with subse-
quent amendments), based on the principle of universal banking. Minimum capi-
tal requirements for founding a bank and licensing requirements were tightened 
and legally mapped out in the wake of the proliferation of commercial banks from 
four prior to 1992 to 19 by the end of 1993, during which time the NBRM had set 
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lenient requirements. The Banking and Savings House Act also set down regula-
tions that included those relating to capital adequacy and single exposures.
By 1995 Macedonia’s banks were still confronted with a high level of non-per-
forming loans (44.4 %) and the issue of frozen foreign currency deposits. Re-
habilitation and restructuring of the banking sector got underway in 1995, with 
the adoption of the Act on Rehabilitation and Restructuring. The process was 
administered by the Bank Rehabilitation Agency (BRA). Rehabilitation focused 
on writing off DM 1.4 bln. (EUR 0.7 bln.) in frozen foreign currency deposits from 
the banks’ balance sheets; writing off debts related to the Paris and Zurich Club 
Creditors; and restructuring the country’s largest bank, Stopanska banka, a. d. 
Skopje, which included transferring the bank’s bad loans to the BRA and recapi-
talising the bank with 15-year government bonds. An additional debt/equity swap 
occurred at the end of 1999, prior to Stopanska banka privatisation. Furthermore, 
market share of Stopanska banka (65 %) was diluted to 34 % by spinning off its 
ﬁve largest branches into stand-alone banks. In addition, in 1995 as part of a
Special Restructuring Programme a debt / equity swap eliminated claims against 
25 large loss-making companies from the banks’ balance sheets.
The cost of rehabilitating Macedonia’s banks was signiﬁcant, reportedly amount-
ing to 42 .3 % of GDP (12 .1 % attributable to the loan portfolio restructuring 
and 30.2 % to costs associated with the payment of frozen foreign currency 
household deposits) as of year-end 1995. Additional costs incurred in the above-
mentioned 1999 recapitalisation of Stopanska banka a. d. Skopje boosted the 
total cost of the banks’ rehabilitation to 45 .8 % of GDP
Serbia
The history of banking reform in the country was deeply substituted by political 
processes until 2000. In 2000, a turnaround in political thinking in the form of 
a new government and the related easing in the country’s economic isolation 
leaded the beginning of the banking reform. The basis of reforms became the 
ratiﬁcation of two new laws - the “Law Governing the Relations between the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Banks within the Territory of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, being the original Debtors or Guarantors toward the 
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Paris Club and London Club Creditors” and the “Law on the Settlement of the 
Public Debt of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia arising from the Citizens’ For-
eign Exchange Savings”. These two laws constituted the legal framework for 
solving the problem of non-performing loans, and for providing compensation 
to private individuals whose foreign currency deposits had been conﬁscated. In
addition, the Law on the Agency for Deposit Insurance and Bank Rehabilitation, 
Bankruptcy and Liquidation (BRA) of 1989 was amended. The amendment  of-
ﬁcially  named  the  BRA  as  the  agency responsible for overseeing the reform
of the banking sector, and speciﬁcally outlined its competencies in regard to the
restructuring, insolvency and liquidation of banks. The Law on the National Bank 
and the Banking Act were also amended.
An extensive screening of the banking sector began in the context of the new 
legal framework. This included the classiﬁcation of the commercial banks into
four groups according to their liquidity and solvency, and prompted the BRA to 
close 19 smaller insolvent banks in 2001, which accounted for about 10 % of the 
banking sector’s total assets. At the beginning of 2002 this was followed by the 
closure of the four largest Serbian banks (Jugobanka, Beobanka, Beogradska 
banka, Investbanka) on account of ﬁscal restrictions. Based on the banking sec-
tor’s total assets, these banks had a market share of 57 % and a recapitalisa-
tion requirement of an estimated EUR 4 bln. Within the framework of portfolio 
restructuring, the state furthermore acquired majority or signiﬁcant minority in-
terests in sixteen banks through debt-equity swaps pursuant to the new laws of 
2001 and 2002, i. e. the state assumed the obligations of ailing Serbian banks 
(most of them socially-owned) towards Paris and London Club creditors, and in 
return received equity in the banks involved. These restructuring measures were 
followed by the initiation of the privatisation process. Initial privatisation suc-
cesses and the growing presence of foreign-owned banks in the market have in 
the last few years strengthened conﬁdence in the banking sector.
Romania
The beginning of bank privatisation was marked by the sale of 51 % of the Roma-
nian Development Bank to Société Générale in 1999, with GE Capital and Banco 
Portugues do Investimento (BPI) acquiring 45 % of Banc Post in the same year. A 
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next step in the bank privatisation process was the sale of Banca Agricola to Raif-
feisen Zentralbank in April 2001. October 2002 brought the sale of a further state 
holding of 17 % in Banc Post to Greek EFG Eurobank Ergasias. These privatisa-
tion successes raised the market share of foreign banks in terms of the banking 
sector’s total assets to 62 % by the end 2004, compared with just 20 % in 1998. 
Based on capital, foreign banks’ market share at year-end 2004 was even higher, 
at 69.3 %, with some 80 % of the total foreign capital originating from EU member 
states. In terms of total foreign capital the keenest interest in the Romanian bank-
ing sector was shown as of June 2004 primarily by Austrian (33 .5 %), Greek (15 
.2 %), Italian (9.5 %), Dutch (9.2 %) and French (8.6 %) investors.
An important derivable from the restructuring of the markets is the number of 
banks, especially foreign owned, and dynamics in which they enter the market.
SEE : Number of banks (foreign owned)
1998 2000 2003 2005
Albania 10 (8) 13 (12) 15 (13) 17 (14)
FRY (Serbia/Montenegro) 104 (3) 81 (3) 47 (16) 39 (21)
FYR Macedonia 24 (6) 22 (7) 21 (8) 20 (8)
Croatia 53 (13) 43 (21) 41 (19) n.a.
Bulgaria 34 (17) 35 (24) 35 (26) 35 (26)
Romania 36 (16) 33 (21) 30 (21) 31 (24)
Source : EBRD Transition report
Market Structure
With total assets close to EUR 95 bln. in 2005, the banking sector in SEE is less 
than one-quarter the size of the New EU Member States, which in 2005 report 
total assets of around EUR 420 bln. The region’s GDP is expected to reach EUR 
157 bln. for 2005 and thus approximately 30% of GDP of the New EU Member 
States (2005 GDP: EUR 524 bln.).
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2004
population
mln.
GDP (PPP)
USD
in % of
EU - 25
Albania          3.2        4,929           20 
FYR (Serbia/Montenegro)        10.6  n.a.           25 
FYR Macedonia          2.0        6,767  n.a. 
Croatia          4.4       12,336           46 
Bulgaria          7.8        8,026           31 
Romania        21.7        8,413           31 
Total :        49.7 
Source : EBRD Transition report, wiiw
 
Compared to EU25 in terms of GDP per capita Romania and Bulgaria count for 
31% of the target level, Albania for 20%, Serbia for 25% and the leader of the 
group , Croatia has 46%.
 Overall, SEE is served by 224 banks and thus, despite the lower volume of 
banking transactions and the smaller number of inhabitants, by more banks than 
the New EU Member States (205 banks). 
Increased level of reforms including legislation, recapitalisation of banks and passing 
out the legacy of bad debt loans marks foreign banks entry into markets of SEE. 
SEE Countries’ Banking System Reform Index
1998 2000 2003 2005
Albania 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.7
FYR (Serbia/Montenegro) 1.0 1.0 2.3 2.7
FYR Macedonia 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7
Croatia n.a. 3.3 3.7 4.0
Bulgaria 2.7 3.0 3.3 3.7
Romania 2.3 2.7 2.7 3.0
Source : EBRD Transition report
The push of large scale privatisation in banking sector, in terms of few years, 
drove market share of foreign owned banks to level in excess of 50% (Croatia, 
Bulgaria and Romania).
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Market Share of Foreign-owned banks in total assets  In %
1998 2000 2003 2005
Albania 18.5 35.2 47.1 n.a.
FRY (Serbia/Montenegro) n.a. 0.5 38.4 n.a.
FYR Macedonia n.a. 53.4 47.0 n.a.
Croatia 6.7 84.1 91.0 n.a.
Bulgaria 32.3 75.3 82.7 n.a.
Romania43 20.0 46.7 54.8 n.a.
Source : EBRD Transition report
At present, countries such as Croatia, Bulgaria and Serbia have as many or 
even more banks than countries from Central Europe, thus indicating possible 
consolidation.
The degree of concentration in terms of market share of total assets held by the 
top ﬁve banks is, at an average 60. This is attributable to the high level of concen-
tration in Croatia and Albania, whereas in Serbia and Bulgaria concentration lev-
els are lower, close to 50% and comparable to the markets of Central Europe.
Bank Market Concentration (in total assets), Top 5
1998 2004
Albania n.a. 82 
FYR (Serbia/Montenegro) n.a. 47 
FYR Macedonia n.a. 53 
Croatia 53 65 
Bulgaria 56 52 
Romania 67 60 
Total number of bank branches in Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania marks increase 
of almost 20% between 1999 and 2004 (4328 and 5151 respectively) with practi-
cally unchanged number of bank employees (close to 89,400). Thus indicating 
increased bank penetration level. 
In general countries from South Eastern Europe that privatised their banks at a 
fairly early stage currently enjoy a higher level of ﬁnancial intermediation.
43 After closing the privatisation deal for BCR market share of foreign banks will increase to approximately 89%.
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Total assets / GDP in %
1998 2004
Albania 50.4 53.5
FYR (Serbia/Montenegro) 91.2 38.8
FYR Macedonia 45.6 56.7
Croatia 67.8 108.9
Bulgaria 35.2 65.6
Romania 40.2 38.3
Clear sign for the diverse landscape within the region of SEE is the fact that here we 
ﬁnd the country with the lowest intermediation rate (Romania 38%) and the country
with the highest one (Croatia 109%) for Central and Eastern Europe in general. 
Relationship between a country’s level of income in terms of per-capita GDP 
and the level of intermediation would be difﬁcult to explain in absolute, even
because of the fact that one of wealthiest countries (Romania) record lowest 
rate of intermediation. Income, therefore, cannot be used as a valid explanation 
of differences in intermediation between these countries. 
Loans in % of GDP
 1996 2004
Albania 5 9
Bulgaria 52 36
Croatia 29 62
FYR Macedonia 9 17
Romania 25 18
Serbia 36 20
Source: National banks
The current level of intermediation, measured in terms of the ratio of loans to 
GDP, was signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the level of intermediation that had been
reached by the mid 1990s and which in Croatia and Serbia was clearly higher 
than in Albania or Macedonia. This must of course be considered against the 
fact that a number of countries, among them Bulgaria and Romania as well 
as Serbia, have experienced periods of hyperinﬂation since the mid-1990s. A
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noticeable positive correlation can also be identiﬁed between the degree of in-
termediation and privatisation. Countries that privatised more than 50 % of their 
banks early on, today boast a higher intermediation level, with a large presence 
of foreign banks providing additional momentum in this regard.
Regarding possible explanations for ﬁnancial deepening as reﬂected by a higher
ratio of loans to GDP in recent years, it appears that countries with largely priva-
tised banking sectors also experience stronger loan growth, with foreign ownership 
contributing to this development. Solving the problem of non-performing loans was 
also of key importance for credit growth. Countries such as Croatia and Bulgaria, 
which had a head start in privatising their banking systems, have a large share of 
foreign banks and a low proportion of non-performing loans, and lending has ex-
panded at an annual rate equivalent to six percentage points of GDP. The situation 
is even more acute in Serbia, where 60 % of the banks had been privatised by the 
end of 2004, with slightly more than half foreign-owned. The non-performing loans 
ratio in Serbia, at 23 %, was by far the highest in the region as of year-end 2004.
However, as all of the countries that are lagging behind in privatisation have 
stepped up their efforts substantially in recent, an upward trend may be expect-
ed in the coming years even in countries with a still low level of intermediation.
Retail Business in Focus
In the coming years, new business (loans and deposits) is expected to amount 
to around EUR 80 bln. The expectations are the retail banking revenue pool to 
increase by an average of 14 percent a year, to EUR 16.4 billion by 2010. Proﬁts
over the same period will increase ﬁvefold, to EUR 6.8 billion — a 19 percent
compound annual growth rate. Retail banking share of the overall banking mar-
ket will exceed 50 percent by 2010, at the expense of corporate banking. Al-
though retail banking proﬁts are expected to grow two or three times faster in the
region than they will in leading EU markets over the next decade, the proﬁt pool,
currently no bigger than Spain’s, will remain small for the foreseeable future. And 
while revenues and proﬁts are set to grow quickly, so too is competition, which
will make it harder to maintain strong returns.
In many countries in SEE, retail lending gathered momentum once the problem of 
non-performing loans had been resolved. The banks’ risk assessment expertise 
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improved and the legal environment strengthened. Over the past years, retail 
lending expanded at an annual rate of 53 %. This segment therefore showed 
even more growth in SEE than in the New EU Member States, where retail lend-
ing also grew very vigorously at an annual rate of 24 %, compared with growth of 
just 6 % in the EU area. Despite this fast-paced expansion, however, retail lending 
volume is still only some 12 % of GDP versus 50 % in the EU area. On the other 
hand, 12 % indicates that retail lending has attained a similar level to the New 
EU Member States, although the distribution is still very uneven. At 32 %, Croatia 
has hit a level that is signiﬁcantly above that of the New EU Member States and
not even roughly within the reach of any of these countries. At the same time, the 
corresponding levels in Romania, Serbia, Albania and Macedonia are around 5 
% or less, and thus considerably below that of the New EU Member States.
Measured in terms of household deposits, lending in SEE stands at 52 %, a 
level similar to the New EU Member States, where lending amounts to 46 % of 
deposits and still exhibits potential for growth (EU area - 91 %). In Croatia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, the corresponding rates are very high. In 
terms of per capita retail lending, Croatia, at close to EUR 2,000, is signiﬁcantly
above the New EU Member States average as well as clearly above the level of 
Slovenia, the frontrunner among the New EU Member States (EUR 1,600). Even 
though retail lending growth potential will be limited in Croatia during the next 
few years, expected annual growth rates remains close to 10 %. The region’s 
more heavily populated economies such as Romania and Serbia offer consider-
able potential, with growth rates expected to rise to 20 % or even 30 % and in 
Serbia, even higher. Forecasts for annual growth rates of retail lending are close 
to 20 %, in line with the projection of higher nominal GDP growth in SEE. Ac-
cordingly, retail lending as a percentage of GDP will not exceed 15 % in 2008, 
thereby remaining below the levels the expected for the New EU Member States 
(17 %). Per capita loan volume is expected to reach EUR 665, or slightly less 
than half the level of the New EU Member States in 2008.
At 22 % of GDP, deposits of households in SEE were lower than in the New EU 
Member States (28 %) and in the euro area (55 %), although the difference is 
less substantial than in retail lending. In line with the somewhat lower catch-up 
potential, deposits expanded at a slower pace (29 % per year) than retail lending 
(53 %) and the gap with the EU area was therefore less signiﬁcant. At 29 %, the
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rate of growth was signiﬁcantly higher in SEE than in the New EU Member States,
where deposits grew at approximately 6 % per year and thus at the same rate as 
in the EU area. In the New EU Member States, a shift to alternative investments is 
becoming increasingly noticeable as bank deposits are no longer the only type of 
assets held by wide parts of the population. In addition, the decline in interest rates 
has reduced the attractiveness of bank deposits in many of the New EU Member 
States. Despite the highly diverse situation where bank deposits are concerned, 
Croatia and Albania, at 40 % or more, are already above the New EU Member 
States average and approaching the level of the EU area. Serbia and Romania, 
at 10 % and 15 %, respectively, are still clearly below the New EU Member States 
level. Overall, deposits are expected to expand at a faster pace in SEE than in the 
New EU Member States. At an annual growth rate of 16 %, deposits will reach 26 
% of GDP by 2008, a level similar to that of the New EU Member States. In SEE, 
deposits will thus be growing faster than nominal incomes, which are no longer 
expected to be the case in the New EU Member States.
The Effects
The immediate effect from the political changes in the beginning of 1990s for 
the banking sector was illiquidity of corporate clients, mainly state-owned. Rais-
ing debt and contractions of real sector shifted, for a long time, attention from 
the problems of corporate governance of the banks. Essential issues such as 
organisational and functional organisation, reporting, credit risk assessment and 
pricing, corporate risk management, human resources and information technol-
ogy, with small number of exceptions were not in focus.
Up to late 1990s organisational structures of the banks in Bulgaria were developed 
with understanding about functionalities, i.e. accounting, lending treasury etc. but not 
in terms of business lines, respective market segments and products. Even newly 
founded, private banks copied in full the approach. In common, outlets (branches and 
ofﬁces), as an organisation, were mirrors of the headquarters system of divisions,
thus implying some of the foundations of inefﬁciency for the bank system at all.
Reporting was completely substituted by general accounting. In most cases 
managers were more interested and informed about interest income in foreign 
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and local currency (traditional accounting elements) than about the breakdown 
of non-interest income from individuals by products, for instance. The broken link 
between structure of information reported and market elements headed man-
agement of the banks into the comfort of believing that they know everything 
about market. Here, should be clariﬁed that for the years in discussion the mar-
ket was weak and incentives to think and compose banks behaviour in market 
based manner were relatively low. And it can’t be different when prevailing part 
of the income comes form state owned enterprises. In addition technology sup-
port for client/market oriented type of reporting was weak.
Another issue with crucial impact for the performance of the banks was credit risk 
assessment. The structure of incomes (mainly interest income and based on the 
debt of state owned enterprises) was one of the origins of so called “directed lend-
ing”. In the years of shallow reforms, for the state owned companies raising debt 
was equivalent of survival. On the other side, ﬁnancing of private sector, erode,
for the prevailing part of the banks, into forming of huge exposures to related 
parties what marked the beginning of the crisis in 1996-1997. Actually bad prac-
tices from the 1990s were just the signs of weak regulatory framework and lack 
of structural reforms. For the banks itself assessing the credit risk as a system 
was subdued by understanding about lending as a single process with different 
phases i.e. analysis, granting and administering and most important – covered 
by a single expert, thus eliminating healthy approach of separated sales from as-
sessment of related risks. Emerging market conditions, weak regulatory practices 
and ﬁght for market share resulted in inadequate pricing of bank products (not
related to inherent risks) and unreasonable maturity extensions in loan portfolio of 
most banks. Not surprisingly liquidity problems started in a late 1995 and leaded 
16 banks to insolvency. Short after crisis from 1997 regulatory requirements were 
tightened and, for instance, banks were obligated to form independent bodies 
with main responsibility to deal with provisioning of credit risk. 
Information technology implemented in Bulgarian banks marked signiﬁcant de-
velopments through 1990s. In the very beginning of transitions main provider 
of production systems (centralised with provider) for the banks was then state 
owned company Banservice. Rapidly increased number of banks in short time 
caused strong demand for technology backup. By assigning development of 
information systems for so called local accounting and processing some of the 
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banks tried to bypass sluggish services form Bankservice. In fact up to 1996 
on the market existed at least ﬁve such systems (domestically developed). As
a philosophy these systems were accounting and transaction oriented, in other 
words pure production systems with insufﬁcient or completely absent analytical
support. Even at that time the gap between needs and provided functionali-
ties was clear. The ﬁrst attempt, well developed technology to enter Bulgarian
banking was in 1992 when The Economic bank bought well known in western 
banks system “MIDAS CAPITY” (now MISYS). The project was not success 
due to several reasons. First of all attempt to provide real-time processing of 
transactions on a basis of existed telecommunication infrastructure was impos-
sible. Second and more important, the project has just IT meaning, what in fact 
stipulated additionally subdued core functionalities of the technology.
Another big scale project took place in 1994 when Balkanbank tried to develop 
card business with the ﬁrst smart card in SEE. Unfortunately the project was too
revolutionary and short after that the bank suffered liquidity crisis so technology 
jump was suppressed. Common problem for the banking in terms of analysis 
of risk and market behaviour of clients was lack of satellite systems such as 
corporate register and loan register. For instance for the period 1989 to 1998 
corporate register changed corporate’s ID (BULSTAT) four times. Loan register 
became operative just after 1999 and for some time with limited functionalities.
Conclusions
No doubt foreign owned banks entry into the markets of SEE helped restoration 
of conﬁdence in ﬁnancial systems of those countries. In addition such a pres-
ence became fore post of sound practices in ﬁelds proven to be essential for
the stability of the banking i.e. credit risk management and general corporate 
governance.
The ﬁrst challenge for the banks acquired from foreign ﬁnancial institution was
completely restructured process and substance of reporting. Clariﬁed ﬁelds of
activities and implemented set of performance measures pushed forward the 
process of building new corporate culture based on focused responsibilities for 
the staff and managers within the bank. Basic elements of balance sheet and 
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proﬁt and loss account became more visible and understandable in terms of
market segments and products caused concrete volumes. Strict planning and 
goal placing through all the levels of selling process were implemented, thus 
building the prerequisites for increased efﬁciency of the system. Traceable goals
and increased intensity of reporting changed management of the banks too. 
Another process with strong impact on the privatised banks was organisational 
and functional reengineering. Two basic segments of the market were institu-
tionalised, respectively retail and corporate banking divisions were formed. From 
some point, such functionalities existed even in the beginning of 1990s but were, 
more or less, derivable from the type of processing, including accounting specif-
ics, of the client orders. The new, for the banking system in Bulgaria divisions 
took the responsibility for the management of the product portfolio and sales. 
Something more, these institutionalised business functions were, from the be-
ginning, structured as a mirror of the market. For instance typical retail banking 
division consists of at least two subdivisions, in some banks clear specialisation 
of senior experts, afﬂuent customers and mass market. After 2001 completely
new element of the business model for most banks was introduced – relation-
ship management. Thus, backed by improved reporting, management of the 
banks straighten selling capabilities of commercial system. On branch level the 
process of organisational and functional reengineering resulted in full shift of 
back ofﬁce functionalities to headquarter. In addition optimised business proc-
esses signiﬁcantly promote improved quality of client servicing.
Credit risk assessment was signiﬁcantly developed as an organisation and im-
plied analytics. Redeﬁned goals and performance measures for the underwrit-
ing function with headquarters of the banks transformed that function into real 
policy maker in ﬁeld of credit risk. In addition increased level of standardisa-
tion of loan based products relaxed the day-to-day pressure on underwriting. A 
natural extension of renewed underwriting was introduction of credit analysts, 
on branch level, with main responsibilities to provide analytical backup for the 
relationship managers with loan related products. The differences between the 
banks now is not in the logic implemented, but in the practical issues such as 
available resources (people), scale of business in concrete point of sale and 
related reasonability to be enacted in full the model.
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Not surprisingly all of the banks acquired by foreign ﬁnancial institutions changed
their banking information systems short after the acquisition. Focal point for the 
projects was centralisation of clients’ ﬁles and processing capabilities. But an-
other similarity can be found – all the projects were extremely complex with 
targeted coverage of functionalities from retail system, going through wholesale 
systems, client relationship modules, enterprise resource planning system and 
ﬁnishing with reporting and MIS modules. Now in the banking sector we can see
solutions from the leading providers of IT technology for the banking incl. iFlex, 
MYSIS, Fiserv, Temenos.
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Foreign Banks Penetration 
in Albania, FYR Macedonia and Serbia 
Irena Mladenova 44
Introduction
This study analyzes and presents a cross-country comparison of the banking 
systems of Albania, Macedonia and Serbia, with references to EU member 
states. 
The banking sectors in the three countries envisaged in this study are at different 
levels of development, although there could be identiﬁed some similarities. The
reforms started in late 1990s, somehow later than the reforms in most Eastern 
European countries. Like in most transition countries the reforms did not follow 
a straightforward path, and were interrupted by ﬁnancial crises and political tur-
moil. The conﬂicts in former Yugoslavia further hampered the reforms in practi-
cally all economic and social ﬁelds, including the ﬁnancial sector, and created
impediments to the development of the whole region as well. The restructuring 
of the banking sectors has been delayed by various adverse developments, in-
cluding war, political instability (Serbia and Montenegro), hyperinﬂation (Serbia)
and pyramid schemes in the late 1990s (Macedonia and Albania). Only recently 
some macroeconomic stability has been reached in these countries.
The ﬁnancial sector restructuring was undertaken within the overall economic
and social reforms. The restructuring agenda, however, was followed with dubi-
ous persistence and did not lead to the desired results quickly. At the beginning, 
the ﬁnancial sectors envisaged were characterized by prolonged maintenance
of the state ownership and poor governance, lax regulations on licensing new 
private banks and connected lending, lack of lending expertise, inadequate 
banking supervision and a poor institutional and legal environment.
Main focus of the reforms agenda in most countries was the restructuring of the bad 
debts the state-owned banks had acquired, separating the vicious circle and link-
44 The author thanks Valentin Maximov for his dedicated research assistance
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ages with the state-owned companies, and putting the banking sector on a market-
principle base. The logical way to do that was to initiate privatization of the banks.
The privatization of the banking sector has advanced during the last years al-
though at an unequal pace among the three countries envisaged. The privatiza-
tion process was characterized by opening up to foreign ownership, which has 
gradually increased, as domestic capital was scarce and foreign capital was 
seen as a key solution to this and other structural problems. Privatization and 
opening to foreign capital started slowly as comparison to other SEE and CEE 
countries. Key role in this process played not only private foreign banks but also 
institutions like the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
The restructuring of the banking systems in the countries envisaged was char-
acterized by restructuring the bad debt of state-owned banks and the withdrawal 
of the state from the banking sector. This was aimed to deal with the structural 
problems of the banking sectors in particular (and economies in general), includ-
ing bad management and interrelationship of banks and enterprises, poor capi-
talization, low productivity, low banking services penetration, etc. In this regard, 
two dimensions of ownership structure should be discerned – private versus 
state-ownership, and domestic versus foreign ownership.
Albania
Since 1998, Albania registered considerable progress in the restructuring and 
modernization of the banking sector as a result of the legal and regulatory 
reforms45. The banking sector dominates the ﬁnancial system in Albania. Still,
the banking sector remains underdeveloped, and the economy is largely a cash 
economy. Only 10% of people have bank accounts or any kind of a promissory 
paper from a bank.
According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, “the inadequacy of Albania’s ﬁ-
nancial sector has been an important factor inhibiting the development of the 
economy. Most transactions are carried out in cash, and banking services 
remain undeveloped; there are few cash dispensers, and payment by credit 
45 Among which the most important are: Law on the Bank of Albania (23.12.1997), with which the Bank of Albania became inde-
pendent, and exercises the banking supervisory functions; Law on Banks in the Republic of Albania (02.07.1998); deposit insurance 
scheme was introduced in 2004 
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card is relatively rare.” The banking system is highly liquid, with liquid assets at 
a high 75 percent of total assets, mainly because of a lack of lending opportu-
nities and relatively high and safe returns on government securities. Besides, 
the Albanian banking system has much of its assets  and loans denominated 
in foreign currency (principally Euro and U.S. Dollar).
Privatization was initiated in late 1990s. Lack of consistent and straightforward 
reforms led to a severe ﬁnancial crisis in 1997, when by the end of 1996 12 out
of 16 existing pyramid schemes46 collapsed. The consequence was a severe 
economic, social and political crisis, which was accompanied by social unrest, 
and (partly violent) mass protest and riots. Political and economic stabilization 
was restored after an intervention of UN-led troops, and a process of dynamic 
growth started. Privatization was given a major boost after 2002.
The total number of banks operating in Albania composed of 16, as of end of 
2004, compared to 15 in 2003. The increase in the number was due to the 
completion of the ﬁnal license of a new bank – Popular Bank – which was
founded solely on domestic capital and started operation in February 2004. 
On December 30, 2005 the Central Bank of Albania declared that it has is-
sued its ﬁnal banking license to Union Bank, which is the country’s third private
bank. Thus, the number of banks operating in Albania increased to 17.
By the end of 2004 the banking system consisted of 88 branches and 100 
agencies (compared to 67 branches and 94 agencies in 2003). The expansion 
of the network envisaged both existing locations (where banks were already 
operating), as well as in new regions, thus improving the bank presence in the 
country. This development corresponded to the development of the banking 
system (in terms of increasing loan portfolios, larger amount of total assets, as 
well as personnel increases, which was 26 percent higher compared to 2003). 
In 2004, total assets for the entire banking system were increased to 52.8 Bil-
lion ALL, or 14.1 percent or about 18.5 Billion ALL more than in 2003. 
1. Ownership structure as regards level of privatization
The capital structure of the banking system reﬂects the progress of the privatiza-
46 More that 50 percent of Albania’s total GDP of 1996 (i.e. around USD 12 bln) were invested in highly speculative 
pyramid schemes.
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tion process. The privatization was ﬁnalized in 2004 with the sale of the shares
of the last entirely state-owned bank – the Savings Bank, which accounted for 
80 percent of all deposits – to the Raiffeisen Zentralbank Oesterreich AG Group. 
The second largest bank – the National Commercial Bank – was privatized four 
years ago, in 2000, by a Turkish bank (SFID) and IFC.
At present all 17 operating banks in Albania are privately owned. The domestic 
government capital accounted for 6 percent in 2004, which is a substantial de-
cline as compared to 32.1 percent in 2003.
2. Ownership structure as regards the share of foreign vs. domestic capital
The banking sector structure as regards foreign vs. domestic ownership is rep-
resentative for the goals and progress of the privatization process. Out of the 17 
operating banks, there are two whose capital is domestic – the Popular Bank, 
the Credins Bank – which both started operations in 2003.
Table 1: Financial sector in Albania – structure (2000 – 2004)
Entities 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Banks and branches of foreign banks 13 13 14 15 16
Non-bank ﬁnancial institutions 2 4 5 7 7
Foreign exchange bureaus 19 38 58 58 54
Savings and credit associations - - 113 131 130
Unions of savings and credit associations - - 2 2 2
Source: Bank of Albania
Foreign capital dominates the group of the largest banks (G3), representing 100 
percent, while in the medium-sized (G2) and small banks (G1) foreign capital 
accounts for over 50 percent. The majority of foreign entered Albania in the 
aftermath of the 1997 collapse of pyramid investment schemes that led to the 
fall of the government.
According to the Bank of Albania data, the banking system is characterized by 
94.1 percent foreign equity, 3 percent government equity, and 2.9 percent pri-
vate domestic equity. The dominance is even higher if we take into consideration 
the direct and indirect control of total assets. As a result, foreign shareholders 
have direct control on 97.1 percent of total assets of the entire banking system.
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Besides, the government planned to sell its 40 percent stake in two small banks 
– the Italian-Albanian Bank and the United Albanian Bank. During early Decem-
ber 2005, the government sold its shares in the Italian-Albanian Bank, the last 
bank under partial public ownership in Albania. 
Former Yugoslavia
The former Yugoslavia, which included Macedonia and Serbia, transformed its bank-
ing system in mid-1960 into a two-tier system, separating the commercial banks from 
the central bank. Until the reforms in the beginning of 1990s, the Yugoslav banking 
system was functioning in a quasi-market environment. Bank management had a 
certain degree of autonomy in managing business decisions and business policy, 
however, they were characterized by all the problems other Eastern European coun-
tries faced due to the state-ownership – low proﬁtability and a lack of business
efﬁciency. After 1989 formerly state-owned banks were transformed into joint-stock
companies, and at the same time a large number of private banks appeared.
The successor-countries of former Yugoslavia inherited similar problems and had to 
address common issues in order to improve the efﬁciency of the banking system and
thus to ensure development and growth of their economies. They  approached the is-
sues differently, and at different speed, which led to different results and successes.
Macedonia
In 1991, Macedonia gained its independence peacefully by referendum. At that 
time the country was the least developed of all Yugoslav republics. Macedonia en-
gaged in economic and social reforms, which were hampered till 1996 by the UN 
embargo on Yugoslavia (the country’s largest market), a Greek economic embar-
go over the constitutional name, and in 2001 by the ethnic Albanian insurgency.
The country’s banking system is two-tier. In 1992, the National Bank of Mac-
edonia was created to become the Central Bank with the right to issue currency, 
conduct monetary polices, and regulate the banking sector of the country.
The reforms of the banking system in Macedonia started at the beginning of 
1995, when the Bank Rehabilitation Agency was established. As part of the re-
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structuring procedures, the largest banks were audited. The Bank Rehabilitation 
Agency undertook the bank loans of the largest Macedonian Bank – Stopanska 
Banka – and in a number of cases converted them into equity in the indebted 
enterprises. This also resulted in constituting a substantial portfolio of stocks in 
a number of Macedonian enterprises, which were also available for sale through 
the Macedonian Privatization Agency. 
The banking system is still weak and suffers from a legacy of bad loans. Al-
though, the reforms have advanced during the past several years. According 
to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the banking sector 
supervision standards are well advanced.
The banking system comprises two segments: banks and savings houses. As of 
March 2005, there were 21 banks and 15 savings houses operating in the coun-
try. However, banks represent the major segment, accounting for 98.7 percent 
of the total assets. Despite the steady progress in the restructuring, the banking 
sector remains highly concentrated and is still not competitive enough, accord-
ing the European Bank for Restructuring and Development.  The three largest 
banks hold about three-quarters of total deposits in the banking sector in 2003.
1. Ownership structure as regards level of privatization
Macedonia has advanced steadily in the banking sector reform, and especially 
in the area of privatization. Private capital dominates the ownership structure of 
the banking system. As of March 2005 the government operates only one state-
owned bank, and the degree of privatization is more than 90 percent, or 95.6 
percent if the entirely state-owned Macedonian Bank for Development Promo-
tion is exempted from the analysis47. The Macedonian Bank for Development 
Promotion was established to conduct special activities  for development pro-
motion through ﬁnancing small- and medium-sized enterprises  and supporting
exports solely through other domestic banks, in accordance with the Law on 
Establishing Macedonian Bank for Development Promotion (“Ofﬁcial Gazette of
the Republic of Macedonia” no. 24/98 and 6/2000)
47 The degree of privatization is lower in the group of medium-sized banks, estimated at 80.1 percent. The groups of the small-
sized and the large banks are at approximately the same level of privatization – 95.7 and 96.4 respectively (Report on Banking 
Supervision and Banking System of the Republic of Macedonia in 2004, National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, May  2005)
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2. Ownership structure as regards the share of foreign vs. domestic capital
Macedonia has opened up its banking sector to foreign investments through 
direct sale or licensing of new entities. By the end of 2004 foreign capital is 
present in 15 banks out of all 21 banks operating in Macedonia. 
8 banks, including two of the three largest, are majority foreign-owned, repre-
senting 47.6 percent of the total capital and 47.3 percent of the total assets of the 
banking system. Four of these eight banks are subsidiaries of foreign banks: 
Stopanska Banka a.d. Skopje (subsidiary of the National Bank of Greece 
- Greece),
Tutunska Banka a.d. Skopje (subsidiary of Nova Ljubljanska Banka d.d. 
Ljubljana - Slovenia, 
Alpha Bank a.d. Skopje (subsidiary of Alpha Bank Athens - Greece), and
T.C. Ziraat Bankasi Skopje subsidiary (subsidiary of T.C. Ziraat Bankasi - Turkey). 
Banks owned by domestic and private shareholders have approximately the 
same share in the total capital as the banks owned by foreign shareholders.
In terms of grouping according to the size of the banks, foreign capital has the 
largest share in the large banks group and accounts for 56.9 percent. In the 
medium-sized banks group this share is 34.5 percent, while in the small-sized 
banks it is 48.8 percent.
Table : Structural share of banks according to the type of ownership48
Type of ownership
Number of banks
Share in the capital at 
the level of the banking 
system
Share in the assets 
at the level of the 
banking system
Dec 31 
2003
Dec 31 
2004
Dec 31 
2003
Dec 31
 2004
Dec 31 
2003
Dec 31 
2004
Banks owned by domestic 
private shareholders 12 12 46.6% 47.5% 51.3% 50.8%
Banks owned by the state 1 1 4.8% 4.9% 1.8% 1.9%
Banks owned by foreign 
shareholders 8 8 48.6% 47.6% 46.9% 47.3%
Total 21 21 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia
48 The type of ownership is determined according to the dominant ownership of shares (over 50%) by domestic legal entities, 
government or foreign entities.
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Serbia
The beginning of the transformation in Serbia in 1990s was marked by nearly 
a decade of sanctions, wars and decline. The inherited uncollected claims and 
problems were addressed only with the reform of the banking system which was 
launched in May 2001 when the Bank Restructuring Strategy was adopted. At 
the ﬁrst stage, banks were classiﬁed into four groups on the basis of a detailed
ﬁnancial analysis which identiﬁed the actual status of bank assets: 10) good
banks, 2) solvent banks that have been allowed a period of recapitalization, 3) 
insolvent banks of strategic importance, and 4) insolvent banks without stra-
tegic importance. After deciding that no option for ﬁnancial rehabilitation was
viable, four state-owned banks (Beogradska banka, Beobanka, Investbanka, 
and Jugobanka) and 19 smaller banks were liquidated; nearly 66 percent of the 
balance sum of the overall banking system was concentrated in those banks. 
The ﬁrst step of the restructuring and privatization efforts was the establishment
of the Agency for Deposit Insurance, Rehabilitation, Bankruptcy and Liquidation 
of Banks in 2001. At the end of 2002, the Bank Privatization Strategy was adopt-
ed, outlining the privatization method, competent institutions and the dynamics 
of the process. A total of 25 banks were put into liquidation, among them four of 
the largest banks holding 57% of aggregate bank assets. Privatization was initi-
ated, and has been relatively slow during the ﬁrst years..
The banking system has advanced in the process of restructuring and privatiza-
tion. At present, banks in Serbia are founded as joint-stock companies, and are 
of general and universal nature. They conduct their business independently, with 
a view to generating proﬁt in line with the principles of solvency, proﬁtability and
continually maintained liquidity. The supervisory functions are conducted by the 
central bank – the National Bank of Serbia.
Table: Number of banks operating in Serbia (2002-March 2006)
 
Dec 31 
2002
Dec 31
2003
Dec 31
2004
Dec 31
2005
March 31
2006
Number 
of banks 50 47 43 40 39
Source: National Bank of Serbia
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The number of banks operating in Serbia has steadily decreased over the period 
as a result of the restructuring measures (including liquidation and/or merger of 
banks). The banks licensed by the National Bank of Serbia as of March 2004 
are listed in Attachment).
1. Ownership structure as regards level of privatization
The privatization of the banking system is still under way, although well advanced 
for the ﬁve years after the initiation of the process. Out of the total of 39 banks
currently operating in Serbia, 11 are in majority ownership of the Republic of 
Serbia. Three banks are under way of privatization procedures: Vojvodanska 
banka, Panonska banka and Credy banka. 71.8 percent of the banking system is 
in private hands.
2. Ownership structure as regards the share of foreign vs. domestic capital
The entry of foreign banks has progressed steadily in line with the privatiza-
tion. Out of all banks, 19 are in majority ownership of foreign stakeholders as of 
March 2006 (representing 47.7 percent of all banks), compared to 12 as of end 
of 2004 (representing 24 percent). Out of the domestically owned banks 9 are in 
majority ownership of domestic private capital (physical and legal entities).
Table : Ownership structure of banks operating in Serbia
 2004 2006*
Foreign capital 
(incl. banks and other entities 12 19
Domestic private capital 15 9
Socially-owned capital 8  
State owned capital 4 8
In process of privatization 11 3
Total 50 39
* as of March 2006
Source: National Bank of Serbia
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Conclusions
The reforms of the banking systems in the three countries envisaged in this 
study have progressed steadily, although a lot is yet to be done. 
State ownership has been reduced to minimal levels in Albania and Macedonia. 
Albania practically ﬁnalized the privatization process in 2004 with the sale of the
Savings Bank to Raiffeisen Zentralbank Oesterreich AG Group. The situation 
is practically the same in Macedonia, where the government operates only one 
state-owned bank - Macedonian Bank for Development Promotion – which was 
created on special purpose to support the SME sector in the country. Serbia 
started the reforms later that the other countries of the Western Balkans, and is 
lagging behind in the advancing with the privatization. As of March 2006, 28.2 
percent of the banking system is state-owned, however the country is proceed-
ing with the privatization process.
Changes in the the structure and ownership and the clean-up of the banks’ bal-
ance sheets have kept total banking sector assets rather stagnant in the region. 
However, in all three countries banking sectors are dominating the ﬁnancial sec-
tors. Financial penetration is low, compared to other CEE countries.
All three countries opened their banking systems to foreign capital at early stages 
of reforms. Foreign capital entered mainly through privatization, although there 
are a number of green-ﬁeld investments as well. Like in the rest of the transition
economies in Central and Eastern Europe, foreign capital originates primarily 
from the neighboring and closely situated developed countries – Italy, Austria, 
Germany, Greece, etc. Foreign banks dominate in all three countries.
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Attachment : List of banks operating in Albania
Source: An Investor’s Guide to Albania, 2005
Source: An Investor’s Guide to Albania, 2005
Attachment : List of banks operating in Macedonia
№ Name of the bank
1 Alpha bank a.d. - Skopje
2 UNI bank a.d. - Skopje
3 Eurostandard banka a.d. - Skopje
4 Internacionalna privatna banka a.d. - Skopje
5 Investbanka a.d. - Skopje
6 Izvozna I kreditna banka a.d. - Skopje
7 Komercijalna banka a.d. - Skopje
8 Komercijalno investiciona banka a.d. - Kumanovo
9 Ohridska banka a.d. - Ohrid
10 Postenska banka a.d. - Skopje
11 ProKredit banka a.d. - Skopje
12 Sileks banka a.d. - Skopje
13 Stopanska banka a.d. - Bitola
14 Stopanska banka a.d. - Skopje
15 Teteks Kreditna banka a.d. - Skopje
16 Tetovska banka a.d. - Tetovo
17 NLB Tutunska banka a.d. - Skopje
18 Makedonska banka a.d. - Skopje
19 Macedonian Bank for Development Promotion a.d. - Skopje
20 Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG Representative Ofﬁce - Skopje
Source: National Bank of Macedonia
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Attachment :  List of banks operating in Serbia
№ Name of the bank
1 AIK banka a.d. Nis
2 A banka a.d. Beograd
3 Alpha Bank A.E. Beogradska aﬁlijacija, Beograd
4 Banka Intesa a.d. Beograd
5 Continental banka a.d. Novi Sad NLB Grup
6 Credy banka a.d. Kragujevac
7 EFG Eurobank a.d. Beograd
8 ERSTE Bank a.d. Novi Sad
9 Findomestic banka a.d. Beograd
10 HVB banka Srbija I Crna Gora a.d. Beograd
11 Hypo-Alpe-Adria Bank a.d. Beograd
12 Jubanksa a.d. Beograd
13 JUBMES banka a.d. Beograd
14 Jugobanka Jugbanka a.d. Kosovska Mitrovica
15 Komercijalna banka a.d. Beograd
16 Kosovsko-Metohijska banka a.d. Zvecan
17 Kulska banka a.d. Novi Sad
18 Laiki Bank a.d. Beograd
19 LHB banka a.d. Nis
20 Meridian bank - Credit Agricole group a.d. Novi Sad
21 Metals banka a.d. Novi Sad
22 Nacionalna stedionica-banka a.d. Beograd
23 National Bank of Greece S.A. Filijala Beograd
24 Niska banka a.d. Nis
25 Panonska banka a.d. Novi Sad
26 Pireus Atlas banka a.d. Beograd
27 PB Agrobanka a.d. Beograd
28 Postanska stedionica a.d. Beograd
29 Privredna banka a.d. Pancevo
30 Privredna banka Beograd a.d. Beograd
31 ProCredit banka a.d. Beograd
32 Raiffeisenbank a.d. Beograd
33 Societe Generale Yugoslav Bank a.d. Beograd
34 Srpska banka a.d. Beograd
35 Univerzal banka a.d. Beograd
36 Vojvodanska banka a.d. Beograd
37 Volksbank a.d. Beograd
38 Zepter banka a.d. Beograd
39 Cacanska banka a.d. Cacak
Source: National Bank of Serbia
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Foreign Banks Penetration 
in Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia 
Ivanka Petkova 49
Introduction
Due to a growing trend towards globalization and ﬁnancial integration, banking
sectors are experiencing  important transformations.  A rapid increase in the de-
gree of foreign bank participation is one of their basic features.  Foreign partici-
pation in the banking sectors of South East European countries counterparts the 
trend of rapidly increasing  inﬂows into the ﬁnancial sectors of emerging market
economies since  mid 1990s. In their expansion strategies banks have been 
accompanied also  by securities and investment ﬁrms. Nevertheless, banks ac-
count for the majority of ﬁnancial sector foreign direct investment.
There are several positive effects expected by host countries on foreign entry 
into the banking sectors of transition economies. The increase of quality of as-
sets, transfer of better management practices, upgrading of efﬁciency coefﬁ-
cients, widening of the clients’ base, are some of them. The impact on lending by 
domestic banks is also associated with foreign bank entry.  There are insufﬁcient 
studies that capture both the direct and the  indirect effects for host countries. It 
is difﬁcult to isolate the impact of foreign bank penetration on domestic lending
and access to credit from macroeconomic and technological changes, espe-
cially given that data is usually available for only short periods.
This paper presents the ﬁndings and conclusions on restructuring, rehabilitation,
consolidation and foreign bank entry in Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania. In the three 
observed countries foreign banks now account for a major share of total banking 
assets. The analysis concentrates on the developments in the last decade. Refer-
ences have been made to countries’ experience in Central Europe, or to EU coun-
tries. The paper is structured in cross countries comparisons and conclusions.
49 The author thanks Tsvetelina Maximova for her dedicated research assistance. 
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Cross country comparisons
Bulgaria
Bulgaria was one of the countries, which managed to start practical experience 
in building (or imitate) commercial banks during the central planning period of 
the economy. With all the natural limitations the system put at that time, in  1980 
Mineralbank , a bank to support small and medium enterprises, has been cre-
ated to operate on commercial basis. It was the second bank (after the Foreign 
Trade Bank) possessing the opportunity to act on the international ﬁnancial mar-
kets.  In mid 80-ies (before the political changes) there were 12 commercial 
banks set up on a sectoral basis to the respective ministries. These institutional 
experience has not been effectively used at the beginning of the political and 
economic transformation to a market economy. 
The creation of the Bank Consolidation Company in 1991 did not help substantially 
in transforming the Bulgarian banking sector, being rather  a passive observer of the 
situation. In addition to the 42 branches of the central bank  (the Bulgarian National 
Bank), several licenses for the operation of new commercial banks have been issued. 
Many of these banks intensively granted credits to their owners. In mid-90-ies the 
economy was overbanked by 81 banks most of them (both private and state-owned) 
undercapitalized and facing a big bad-debt burden. They were acting in an environ-
ment of soft budget constraints of the corporate sector, slow and unclear structural 
reforms of the economy and political uncertainty. The government attempts to secu-
ritize the non-performing loans50 was not sufﬁcient to overcome the problems.
In 1996 Bulgaria faced a severe ﬁnancial and banking crises and in July 1997 a
currency board arrangement was introduced. The qualitative change the curren-
cy board arrangement created, is the very narrow maneuvering room for moral 
hazard by banks and for soft budget constraints at state-owned enterprises, the 
tight ﬁscal policy resulted in less a of 1% GDP budget deﬁcits.
The introduction of the currency board arrangement helped the banking system to 
recover and consolidate. By the end of 1997 the number of bank fell from 81 to 34. 
The Bulgarian National Bank is arranging the banks into three groups for statisti-
cal purposes based on the amount of their assets. The ﬁrst group always con-
50 By issuing long-term government bonds, denominated in foreign currency (so called  ZUNK bonds)
128
sists of 10 banks, the second group comprises all the remaining banks, and the 
third group comprises the branches of foreign banks in Bulgaria (Attachment 1). 
This grouping does not entail any rating element, and should not be interpreted 
as rating of their ﬁnancial position. The content of the groups can change as of
each particular period (Attachment 2).  As of 1 March, 2006 the ﬁrst group had a
share of  74,89% , the second group 22% and the third group 3,119 % in total as-
sets of the banking system (Attachment 3). The number of banks remained un-
changed and in May 2006 there are 28 commercial banks with an international 
banking license and 5 branches of foreign banks operating on the market. 
Foreign banks did not show particular interest in the Bulgarian banking sector 
almost until mid 90-ies. Financial markets kept memory on declaring the mora-
torium on foreign debt payments by the government in 1990 and the associated 
consequences for private creditors to Mineralbank. Foreign banks started to open 
branches and subsidiaries in 1994/95. They played a crucial role in privatization 
of state-owned banks after the crisis in 1996/97 and in consolidating the sector. 
In 2001 in terms of total assets the banking sector was dominated by foreign 
banks with a market share of 70%. After the sale of Bank Biochim to Bank Austria 
Creditanstalt in 2002 and the sale of the savings bank DSK to the Hungarian OTP 
Group the share of foreign banks increased to 82,5% by the end of 2004. 
Foreign banks generated considerable impulses to the second wave of consolida-
tion of the banking sector. Bank Austria Creditanstalt initiated the process by ac-
quiring Hebrosbank in late 2004 getting a market share of more than 10%. In early 
2005 the Greek Pireaus Bank bought almost 100% of the capital of Eurobank. In 
the second half of 2005 the operations of the United Bulgarian Bank have been 
merged with the activities of  the local branch of the National Bank of Greece. Cur-
rently, the level of concentration of the banking sector is relatively modest, with the 
ﬁve biggest banks having a market share of 54 %: DSK Bank (15,18% ) Bulbank 
(11,01%), United Bulgarian Bank (10,39%),Raiffeisenbank (Bulgaria) - ( 9,28%), 
HVB Bank Biochim (8,14%)51. For the ﬁrst time Bulbank is ranked not on the ﬁrst
place. Not only moved DSK Bank to the ﬁrst place, but the market share distance
between them increased as well. Measured as a percentage in total assets the 
market share of  Bulbank in 2004 was 14,5% and of DSK Bank 13,1%.52
The market of banking services in Bulgaria is currently dominated by foreign banks. 
51 See Attachment 4.
52 Bulgarian National Bank
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Ownership and Market Share of the Largest Bulgarian Banks (March , 2006)
Bank Name Main Shareholders Total Assets(in BGN)
Market 
share 
(in %)
DSK Bank OTP (100%) 4 751 229 15,18%
Bulbank UniCredito Italiano SA (85,2%) 3 444 665 11,01%
United Bulgarian Bank National Bank of Greece (99,9%) 3 252 022 10,39%
Raiffeisenbank Bulgaria Raiffeisen International Bank-Holding AG (100%) 2 902 991 9,28%
HVB Bank Biochim
(including Hebros Bank) Bank Austria Creditanstalt (99,6%) 2 548 366 8,14%
First Investment Bank
Ivaylo Mutafchiev (31,8%),
Tzeko Minev (31,8%),
EBRD (20%)
2 535 616 8,10%
Bulgarian Post Bank Aliko/CEN Balkan Holdings AG (91,7%) 2 348 413 7,50%
Pireos Eurobank Piraeous Bank Group (99,66%) 1 419 802 4,54%
Economic
&Investment Bank Katex AD (21,1%) 1 205 080 3,85%
Central Cooperative Bank
CCB Group Asset Management EAD (67,38%); 
Chimimport JSC (3,05%); Armeets Insurance Company 
(5%); Chiminvest, Vaduz (4,86%); Hansapank Clients 
(4,65%)
828 887 2,65%
Source: BNB, web-sites of respective banks
As of the market share, the ﬁrst three places are occupied by foreign owned
banks (a Hungarian, Italian and a Greek one). All the big ﬁve banks have also
foreign owners.
Market Share of Individual Banks (in percent)
In their aims at acquiring a market share, banks are relying on the clients’ trust. 
According to a study53, in Bulgaria the bank DSK is enjoying the highest trust in 
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2005: about 45% of the respondents have designated this bank as the bank they 
trust in most. This ranking rather rely on the long-term history of the bank as the 
only saving bank, which is well known among a broad scope of clients, as the 
bank which remained stable during the ﬁnancial and political crisis in 1996/1997, 
then on the positive trust-building changes of the bank after being privatized by 
the Hungarian OTP. The distance the next bank is ranged however is remark-
able: OBB has been chosen by 20% of the respondents to trust in. The list is 
followed by Bulbank (9%) and Postbank (8%). 
The impact of foreign bank entry on the domestic banking market can be meas-
ured by the increase of the number of clients. According to a survey, by the end 
of 2005 bank services have been used by 60% of the population in Serbia, 45% 
of the population in Romania, 39% of the population in Bulgaria.54 In Bulgaria 
65% of the bank clients are between 20 and 50 years old. The demographic 
characteristics play a substantial role in the results of the survey.  
Using of debit cards rate (25 % in 2005) is still low, but becomes more intense 
among bank clients in Bulgaria. Credit cards are used by 4% (in 2005) of the 
population only. 
Foreign banks contributed to widening the array of products offered to inves-
tors in the Bulgarian leva market. For example, end of September, 2006 the 
European Investment Bank launched its ﬁrst ﬂoating rate note in Bulgarian leva
(BGN)55. This issue was also a proof to EIB’s commitment to responding to 
investor needs. The transaction was jointly arranged by Raiffeisen Zentralbank 
Austria AG (RZB) and Raiffeisenbank (Bulgaria) EAD. This was the ﬁrst ever
international Floating Rate Note denominated in Bulgarian Leva for the EIB. The 
RZB Group was the sole-Lead-manager of this pioneering deal for the issuer. 
This Floating Rate Note issue shows that the RZB subsidiary in Bulgaria has the 
capacity to serve its partners in the capital markets.
Croatia
During the period being part of Yugoslavia, Croatia practiced the two-tier banking 
53 Gogova, A. , GfK Bulgaria, in: Capital Weekly, 22-28  April, 2006.
54 Ibid. 
55 The issue was launched under EIB’s Euro Medium Term Note programme and has a volume of BGN 150 million (approximately 
EUR 77 million) with an issue price of 100.00% The bond bears a coupon linked to the BGN 3M SOFIBOR and matures on 20 
October 2009.
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system since the 60-ies. The banking sector was based on the principals of mar-
ket socialism and workers’ self-management of enterprises. One can speculate, 
whether this experience could had brought more positive or negative impacts on 
the real market transformation of the banking system of Croatia in view of the ex-
ample of Slovenia. Unfortunately, this initial advantage of Croatia has been offset 
by the military conﬂict, which destroyed the banking infrastructure of the country.
Restructuring was approached to all banks and was organized in the frame of 
a  rehabilitation program envisaging  the issuance of big bonds and counterpart 
bonds. Thus, corporate governance structure has been neglected 56 and the 
problems of moral hazard and non-performing loans have been not sufﬁciently
addressed. Accumulated these deﬁciencies urged  the National Bank of Croatia
to initiate another package of restructuring measures directed this time to se-
lected banks. 
The consolidation process in Croatia started in 1998/99 with 60 banks and devel-
oped gradually. In 2001 the number of banks fell to 43 and till 2004 declined to 37 
banks due to bank mergers.57 Regulatory amendments initiated saving banks to 
consolidate (from 26 in 2000 ) to four in 2004 and remained at this level.58 
The banking system is structured in two basic groups – banks and saving banks. 
All banks are arranged into licensed banks, licensed Housing Savings Banks, the 
Croatian bank for Restructuring and Development (Hrvatska Banka za Obnovu I 
Razvitak ) and the  Representative Ofﬁces of Foreign Banks (Attachment 5).59
Consolidation of the Croatia’s Banking Sector (1995- 2006)
56 Banking in South Eastern Europe on the Move. Xplicit, Bank Austria Creditanstalt,  September, 2005.
57 National Bank of Croatia
58 As of 22 May, 2006, according to the National Bank of Croatia.
59 The Croatian National Bank publishes also the list of  Banks and Savings Banks Under Bankruptcy Proceedings,  Banks and 
Savings Banks Under Liquidation Proceedings and  Banks and Savings Banks Whose License Was Revoked, But Have Not Initiated 
Liquidation Proceedings
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1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2006
Number of 
Banks 54 58 60 60 53 43 43 46 41 37 34
Number 
of Savings 
Banks
21 22 33 36 34 26 18 4 4 4 4
Source: National Bank of Croatia
Five banks together take currently a share, which accounts 70%  of  to-
tal bank assets. These are Zagrebacka Banka (23,65%), Privredna Banka 
Zagreb (18,29%), Raiffeisenbank Austria (11,19%), HVB Splitska Banka 
(9,3%), hypo-Alpe-Adria-Bank (7,46%). 
Share of individual banks in total bank assets ( 31 March, 2006)
Banks Total Assets (in thousand kuna )
Share 
in Total Assets
(in %)
Total Assets 262 748 447 100,00
ZAGREBAČKA BANKA d.d. 62 134 075 23,65
PRIVREDNA BANKA ZAGREB d.d. 48 058 123 18,29
RAIFFEISENBANK AUSTRIA d.d. 29 394 764 11,19
HVB SPLITSKA BANKA d.d. 24 424 960 9,30
HYPO ALPE-ADRIA-BANK d.d. 19 611 723 7,46
OTP BANKA HRVATSKA d.d. 9 075 409 3,45
Source: Croatian National Bank
Market Share of Individual Banks (in percent of total bank assets)
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The interest of foreign banks in the Croatian banking sector has been shown in 
mid 90-ies, however due to military conﬂicts this investment interest could not
been realized on a broader hand. In addition, at that time the Central Bank of 
Croatia together with the Bank Rehabilitation Agency started restructuring meas-
ures on individual banks (Splitska, Rijecka, Privredna). After the banking crises 
in 1998/1999 a boost to reforms in the banking sector was created by the more 
prospective relations with the EU. Insolvent banks have been closed, capitaliza-
tion of banks has been reached by privatization deals. Typical feature of foreign 
investments inﬂows in the Croatian banking sector is, that at the beginning foreign
banks entered the market by green ﬁeld investments. End of 1999 and in 2000 for-
eign banks participated in bank privatization. Banca Commerciale Italiana started 
the process by acquiring 66% of the capital of Privredna Banka. Unicredito Italiano 
bought 51% of the capital of Splitska Banka and Bayerische Landesbank  became 
owner of  60% of Rijecka Banka. Ownership structure has been changed as a re-
sult rather of policy decisions taken by foreign banks’ headquarters or of structural 
changes of foreign banks. In April 2002, Splitska Banka became a susidiary of 
Bank Austria – Creditanstalt. In December 2004, the Hungarian Bank OTP bought 
a 95,6% stake in Nova Banka (ranged seventh in total assets). In 2004 the share 
of foreign banks in total assets reached 91,3%. There are two banks– Hrvatska 
Postanska Banka and Croatia Banka - owned by the state.
Currently, the structure of the banking sector is a mixture of domestic 
and foreign (mainly Austrian) banks as of end of March 2006: Zagrebacka 
Banka (with a share of 23,65% of total banking assets), Privredna Banka 
Zagreb (18,29%), Erste&Steiermärkische Bank (11,71%), Raiffeisenbank 
(11,19%), HVB Splitska Banka  - a subsidiary of BankAustria-Creditanstalt 
(9,3%), and Hypo Alpe-Adria Bank (7,46%)60. 
The banking market is highly concentrated, however according to the share in 
total assets the three of the ﬁrst four places (54,2%) occupy domestic banks. In
terms of deposits held, the ﬁrst four banks have a share of 61, 4%, symmetrical
to their share in lending activities (61,7%). 61
Privatization and restructuring of the banking sector have been complet-
ed. Mergers and acquisitions increased the level of market concentration. 
Banks are ringing for a market share, which will help avoid any mistreat-
ment of dominant market position.
60 See Attachment 8
61 Croatian National Bank 
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Romania
There were several developments in the Romanian banking sector, which marked 
a different path in restructuring and consolidating at the beginning of the 90-ies. 
First, compared to other transition countries in the region with clear EU perspec-
tive Romania was a latecomer in reforming the banking sector. The sector was 
characterized  by undercapitalization, an extensive bad debt problem and a lack 
of market discipline on the part of banks (moral hazard).62 Second, the banking 
sector crisis followed lasted for a longer time in comparison to the same group of 
countries. During this period a lot of banks collapsed. Third, an investment fund 
sector crisis and a related crisis in the credit co-operative sector in 2000 were 
clear signals calling for deep  reforms. Cleaning-up of the non-performing loans 
and restructuring of the two biggest state-owned banks (Bancorex and Banca 
Agricola) required a considerable amount of  budget expenses. Next step was to 
close of  insolvent banks (Bankcoop, Banca Albina) and privatize banks ( Bank 
Post, BRD) and open the market to foreign banks entry. 
Bank privatization with foreign participation was gradual and marked by foreign 
owner reaching about 50% of the capital of domestic banks at the beginning. The 
process started in 1999 with Société Générale, acquiring 51% of the Romanian 
Development Bank, and GE Capital and Banco Portugues do Investimento (BPI) 
buying 45% of Banc Post. The next stake (17%) of Post Bank has been sold in 
2002 to the Greek EFC Eurobank Ergasias. Similar approach has been applied to 
the Romanian Commercial Bank (in 2004 the ownership structure involved 36,88 
state ownership and 25% of the capital owned  by the EBRD and IFC ). After sell-
ing 68,11 % of the bank shares to Die Erste at the end of 2005, other shareholders 
remained: the ﬁve Financial Investment Companies (SIFs) - holding 30 percent of
the bank, and the bank’s employees, holding eight percent of the capital. 63 
The share of foreign private capital in the banking sector increased from 20% 
(1998) to 69,3% (2004). 
The signiﬁcant structural changes in the banking sector since 2000 contributed
to the high growth rates of the total bank assets (between 66% and 77%).
62 Banking in South Eastern Europe on the Move. Xplicit, Bank Austria Creditanstalt,  Sep-
tember, 2005.
63 Bucharest Dayli News, 21 December, 2005.
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Total Assets of Romanian Banks (ROL Million)
Year Assets Growth Rate to the previous year (%)
2000 232 673 620
2001 352 146 442 66%
2002 478 192 132 73,6%
2003 617 367 026 77,4%
2004 913 844 579 67,5%
Source: National Bank of Romania, Annual Report, 2004
The structural reforms also accelerated the consolidation process. As a result 
of closing, privatizing and the entry of foreign banks the share of state-owned 
banks declined from 84,3% (1995 ) to 6,8 (2004) and 3,2% in 2005%64. Ex-
cluding privatization deals only foreign banks play a considerable role both in 
consolidation of the sector65 and in changing its ownership structure. Some 
cases show changing of ownership between foreign banks only (the acquisition 
of Robank by the Hungarian OTP from a Turkish bank).
Romanian Banks Ranked by Total Assets  (as of October, 2005)
Bank Main Shareholders Market share in %
Banca Comerciala 
Romana
(BCR)
Erste (61,88%), SIFs (30%), bank 
employees (8%)
25,9 %
Banca Romana Petru 
Dezvoltare (BRD)
Société Générale (58,3%), EBRD 
(5,0%) 13,9 %
Raiffeisenbank Raiffeisengroup (99,5%) 8,8 %
HVB Bank Romania
Bank Austria Creditanstalt 
(99,7%) 7,5%
ABN Amro Bank Romania ABN Amro (100%) 6,5%
Casa de Economii si 
Consemnatiuni Ministry of Finance 4,4%
Bank Post 
EFG Eurobank (55,3%), GE 
Capital (7,5%), EBRD (7,3%), 
IFC (7,3%) 4,2 %
Banka Transilvania EBRD (15%) 3,5%
Alpha Bank Alpha bank Group (95,4%) 3,3%
Top 10 banks 82,9%
Source: National Bank of Romania, bank reports.
64 Romanian National Bank
65 About the consolidation process , see Attachment 7
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Market Share of Individual Banks (in percent of total assets)
The ﬁve biggest banks have a market share of 62,6% in terms of total assets.
In terms of asset value the biggest bank in Romania is Banca Comerciala Ro-
mana  with a more than a quarter market share. This bank has a network of 325 
branches and about 4,9 million clients.66 The second biggest bank is the Roma-
nian Development Bank – Groupe Société Générale (BRD) with a twice smaller 
market share. 
The privatization process of the Romanian Savings Bank (CEC) will continue in 
a similar manner as the privatization of BCR. 69.9% of the CEC stocks will be 
sold to a strategic investor. This percentage includes those 6.9% of the stocks 
which are a part of the Proprietatea Fund. The Fund will receive the value of the 
stocks after the privatization privatization process is completed.67
Conclusions 
First, during the last decade the structure of the banking sectors of the analyzed 
countries has been profoundly altered.  Extraordinary quantitative changes since 
the beginning of the 90-ies made the structure of banking markets comparable 
to those in developed market economies and created the grounds for their quali-
tative transformation. 
Second, the three observed countries went through a painful process of restructur-
66 Bucharest Daily News, 21.December, 2006
67 InvestRomania, Bucharest, April 13, 2006. 
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ing and consolidating the banking sectors, accompanied either by a longer (Roma-
nia) or a short lasting, but sever crisis (Bulgaria and Croatia). The crises have been 
followed by recovery and rehabilitation of the banking sector. Focusing rather on 
cleaning up of bank balance sheets during this process and avoiding to address 
the profound corporate governance reasons required at least two waves of pro-
grams (Bulgaria, Croatia) were necessary to apply in order to achieve results. 
Third, there are two common features between the Bulgarian and Croatian banking 
sector. In both countries the foreign bank entry after the crisis was connected with 
the privatisation of domestic banks via the sale of the large majority of the banking 
sector to well-capitalised foreign banks. The other one is the credit expansion of for-
eign banks since 2001. Especially a rapid growth in consumer credit was induced. 
Fourth, the restructuring process envisaged measures to close state-owned 
banks, to clean-up bad loans of banks, which created a big burden for the 
state budget (Romania), to securitize part of the bad debt burden, which also 
increased government expenses (Bulgaria).
Fifth, the three countries gradually accelerated bank privatization after the crisis 
in the sector  (since 1997 Bulgaria, since 1998 Croatia and since 2000 Roma-
nia), simultaneously opening  the market for foreign bank entry. The share of 
state-owned banks in the three countries is under 5 %.
Sixth, at the beginning most of the acquisitions of domestic by foreign banks 
were based on privatization deals. 
Seventh, political actions have inﬂuenced the consolidation process in the three
countries. The consolidation process in Croatia was based on bank mergers, in Bul-
garia it was accelerated by banks mergers or actuations of foreign banks as a deci-
sion taken outside of the market of the host country (the acquisition of HVB Bank by 
UniCredit). A growing interest has been shown by foreign banks to take part in the 
process of consolidation by buying foreign owned domestic banks (Romania). 
Eighth, the concentration rate measured by the market share of the ﬁve larg-
est banks, is fare from the Euroland average (39%)68 and differentiates in the 
observed countries. More similar G5 rates show Bulgaria ( 54 %) and  Romania 
68 Deutsche Bank Research, N 13, 28 June, 2004.
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(59,8%). Quite higher is this rate in Croatia (74,14%). 
Ninths, as to the indicator bank density ( the number of banks per 100 000 
inhabitants) Romania is the country with the highest score (6,03), followed by 
Bulgaria  with 2,24  and Croatia with 1,29. 
Tenth, Austrian, Greek and Italian investments dominate in the banking sec-
tors of the three countries. The Raiffeisenbank, UniCredit and later OTP are 
presented in all the analyzed South East European countries. The entry of these 
banks creates the basis for the banking markets in the host countries to spread 
across geographical space and national boundaries. 
Eleventh, among the three analyzed countries, the most aggressive policies 
in occupying market share in the host country has been followed in Bulgaria: 
measured in total assets, the ﬁrst three (and even ﬁve) places are occupied by
foreign owned banks. In Croatia the ﬁrst three places take domestic banks. In
Romania the ﬁrst three places are occupied by banks with foreign participation.
Twelfth, basic institutional  characteristics of the banking sectors are differentiating 
in the three countries. The three countries have a different number of branches 
per institution. Typical for these countries is that foreign banks decided to expand 
their branch networks  in order to be closer to customers (UniCredit in Bulgaria ).
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Attachment 1 
LIST OF BANKS AND BANK BRANCHES AS AT 31/03/2006
I Group 
1.DSK Bank
2.Bulbank
3.United Bulgarian Bank
4.Raiffeisenbank 
(Bulgaria)
5.HVB Bank Biochim
6.First Investment Bank
7.Bulgarian Post Bank 
8.Piraeus Eurobank
9.Economic and 
Investment Bank
10.Societe Generale 
Expressbank 
II Group
1.DZI Bank
2.Central Cooperative Bank
3.Hebrosbank
4.Allianz Bulgaria
5.Corporate Commercial Bank
6.Procredit Bank 
7.Municipal Bank
8.Union Bank
9.Bulgarian-American Credit Bank
10.BNP Paribas
11.International Asset Bank
12.Investbank
13.West-East Bank
14.Emporiki Bank - Bulgaria
15.Encouragement Bank 
16.D Commerce Bank
17.Tokuda Bank
18.Private Entrepreneurial Bank 
Texim 
III Group
Branches of foreign banks
1.ING Bank - Soﬁa Branch
2.Alpha Bank - Soﬁa Branch
3.Citibank - Soﬁa Branch
4.T.C. Ziraat Bankasi - Soﬁa Branch
5.National Bank of Greece S.A. - Soﬁa
Branch 
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Source: Bulgarian National Bank
Attachment 2
ASSETS OF THE BULGARIAN BANKING SECTOR
Bank Assets  (in BGN)
Internatioanal Asset Bank 303 833
Invest Bank 288 461
Municipal Bank 479 379
First Investment Bank 2 535 616 
Raiffeisenbank (Bulgaria) 2 902 991
Bulgarian American Credit Bank 414 090
Poreos Eurobank 1 419 802
Unionbank 475 857
United Bulgarian Bank 3 252 022
Corporate Commercial Bank 675 684
ProCredit Bank (Bulgaria) 584 312
D Commerce Bank 91 990
Tokuda Bank 91 931
DSK Bank 4 751 229
Allianz Bulgaria Commercial Bank 702 489
Encouragement Bank 95 709
Bulbank 3 444 665
HVB Bank Biochim 2 548 366
Central Cooperative Bank 828 887
Hebros Bank 790 489
Economic and Investment Bank 1 205 080
Bulgarian Post Bank 2 348 413
ING Bnank N.V. – Soﬁa Branch 501 937
National Bankl of Greece – Soﬁa Branch 1 870
City Bank N>A> - Soﬁa Branch 254 030
T.C. Ziraat Banksi – Soﬁa Branch 39 527
Alpha Bank S.A. – Soﬁa Branch 263 628
Source: Bulgarian National Bank
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Attachment 3
 Asset Structure of the Bulgarian Banking Sector ( March, 2006) (in BGN)
Banks  Total Assets Share in total assets (in %)
Banking sector 34 012 676
First Group 25 473 194 74,89
Second Group 7 479 490 21,99
Third Group 1 060 992 3,119
Source:  Bulgarian National Bank
Attachment 4
BANKS IN BULGARIA RANGEDBY ASSETS (in BGN)
Bank Assets
DSK Bank 4 751 229
Bulbank 3 444 665
United Bulgarian Bank 3 252 022
Raiffeisenbank (Bulgaria) 2 902 991
HVB Bank Biochim 2 548 366
First Investment Bank 2 535 616
Bulgarian Post Bank 2 348 413
Poreos Eurobank 1 419 802
Economic and Investment Bank 1 205 080
Central Cooperative Bank 828 887
Hebros Bank 790 489
Allianz Bulgaria Commercial Bank 702 489
Corporate Commercial Bank 675 684
ProCredit Bank (Bulgaria) 584 312
ING Bnank N.V. – Soﬁa Branch 501 937
Municipal Bank 479 379
Unionbank 475 857
Bulgarian American Credit Bank 414 090
Internatioanal Asset Bank 303 833
Invest Bank 288 461
Alpha Bank S.A. – Soﬁa Branch 263 628
City Bank N>A> - Soﬁa Branch 254 030
Encouragement Bank 95 709
D Commerce Bank 91 990
Tokuda Bank 91 931
T.C. Ziraat Banksi – Soﬁa Branch 39 527
National Bank of Greece – Soﬁa Branch 1 870
Source: Bulgarian National Bank
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Attachment 5 
Licensed Banks in Croatia (as of May 22, 2006)
  1. BANKA BROD d.d. Slavonski Brod
  2. BANKA KOVANICA d.d. Varaždin
  3. BANKA SONIC d.d. Zagreb
  4. BANKA SPLITSKO-DALMATINSKA d.d. Split
  5. CENTAR BANKA d.d. Zagreb
  6. CREDO BANKA d.d. Split
  7. CROATIA BANKA d.d. Zagreb
  8.ERSTE & STEIERMÄRKISCHE BANK d.d. Rijeka
  9. GOSPODARSKO KREDITNA BANKA d.d.. Zagreb
10. HRVATSKA BANKA ZA OBNOVU I RAZVITAK Zagreb
11. HRVATSKA NARODNA BANKA 
12. HRVATSKA POЉTANSKA BANKA d.d. Zagreb
13. HVB SPLITSKA BANKA d.d. Split
14. HYPO  ALPE-ADRIA-BANK  d.d. Zagreb
15. IMEX BANKA d.d. Split
16. ISTARSKA KREDITNA BANKA UMAG d.d. Umag
17. JADRANSKA BANKA d.d. Љibenik
18. KARLOVAČKA BANKA d.d. Karlovac
19. KREDITNA BANKA ZAGREB d.d. Zagreb
20. KVARNER BANKA d.d. Rijeka
21. MEĐIMURSKA BANKA d.d. Čakovec
22. NAVA BANKA d.d. Zagreb
23. OTP BANKA  HRVATSKA d.d. Zadar
24.  PARTNER BANKA d.d. Zagreb
25. PODRAVSKA BANKA d.d. Koprivnica
26. POŽEŠKA BANKA d.d. Požega
27. PRIMORSKA BANKA d.d. Rijeka
28. PRIVREDNA BANKA ZAGREB d.d. Zagreb
29. RAIFFEISENBANK AUSTRIA d.d. Zagreb
30. SAMOBORSKA BANKA d.d. Samobor
31. SLATINSKA BANKA d.d. Slatina
32. SLAVONSKA BANKA d.d. Osijek
33. ŠTEDBANKA d.d. Zagreb
34. VABA  d.d. BANKA  Varaždin
35.  VOLKSBANK d.d. Zagreb
36.ZAGREBAČKA BANKA d.d. Zagreb
Source: Croatian National Bank
Attachment 6
Banks in Romania
1. ABN-AMRO  
2. Alpha Bank Romania  
3. Anglo-Romanian Bank Limited, Anglia Londra  
4. BANC POST  
5. Banca Comerciala “CARPATICA”    
6. Banca Comerciala Romana   
7. Banca de Export-Import a Romaniei EXIMBANK
8. Banca di Roma  
9. Banca Ion Ţiriac 
10. Banca Italo Romena 
11. Banca Romana pentru Dezvoltare (BRD)  
12. Banca Romaneasca  
13. Banca Transilvania 
14. BLOM Bank Egypt - Bucharest Branch 
15. C.E.C. (Romanian Savings Bank) 
16. Citibank Romania 
17. Emporiki Bank – Romania (previous Commercial 
Bank of Greece)  
18. EGNATIA Bank 
19. EUROMBANK  
20. FINANSBANK (ROMANIA) 
21.
22. BANCA C.R. FIRENZE ROMANIA S.A.
23. GarantiBank International NV - Bucharest Branch - 
24. HVB Bank Romania  
25. HVB Banca pentru Locuinte  
26. ING Bank N.V., Amsterdam - Bucharest Branch -
27. Libra Bank  
28. Banca pentru Mica Industrie si Libera Initiativa
29. MINDBANK S.A  
30. Nova Bank
31. OTP Bank România S.A.
32. Piraeus Bank Romania
33. Porsche Bank Romania
34. ProCredit Bank
35. Raiffeisen Bank
36. Raiffeisen Banca pentru Locuinte  
37. Romanian International Bank   
38. ROMEXTERRA Bank   
39. Sanpaolo Imi Bank Romania  
40. UniCredit Romania S.A. 
41. Volksbank Romania  
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CHAPTER III
LEGAL ASPECTS
Banking Law Perspective:
Regulatory Challenges and Implications 
of the Basel Core Principles and Basel II
Dimitar Totev 69
Introduction
This part of the research project “Foreign Banks’ Penetration on Southeast Eu-
rope” (the “Project”) relates to the banking legislation of the researched coun-
tries: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania and Serbia (“Researched 
Countries”).  The paper presents a discussion on issues of banking law of the 
Researched Countries.  The study relates mainly to the rules affecting the su-
pervision of a bank authorised in a country other than any if the Researched 
Countries (a “foreign bank”) which carries on bank operations through an estab-
lished presence in a Researched Country.  
The latest developments in the international standards of bank supervision of 
cross-border banks notably the principles of effective banking supervision of the 
Basel Committee of Banking Supervision and the new Basel Capital Accord, as 
well as the EU banking directives enacted in 2006, manifest the major regulatory 
issues that need to be uniﬁed across jurisdictions: mutual recognition of foreign
banks’ supervision (home country supervision principle); cooperation between 
supervisors in the oversight of banking groups of which a parent institution in 
one state owns a subsidiary in another; and the capital adequacy standards.  
In the geographical area of the Researched Countries, bank regulation is en-
tirely national, including in the two EU countries among the Researched countries 
69 The author thanks Radoslav Borov for his dedicated research assistance.
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– Bulgaria and Romania.  The EU banking legislation has been recently codiﬁed
in the “Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit insti-
tutions (recast)” (the “Banking Directive”) and the “Directive 2006/49/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on the capital adequacy 
of investment ﬁrms and credit institutions (the “Capital Adequacy Directive”).  
The issues are discussed on the basis of the current legislation operating in the 
Researched Countries.  The existing legislation in almost all of the Researched 
Countries is new and replaced the laws operating at the periods when the for-
eign banks’ penetration in the countries had begun and produced the current 
shape of the Researched Countries’ banking sectors.  Therefore, the paper is 
oriented more towards future establishments of foreign banks’ operations in the 
Researched Countries rather that historical analysis of those countries’ legisla-
tion at the time when the process of foreign banks’ penetration started.  Still, the 
discussion is relevant to the existing foreign banks’ operations there since some 
of the researched issues are not one-off rules taking effect at the entry, but such 
that continue to affect the cross-border banking business as the consolidated 
supervision principle and the capital adequacy standards.  
In addition to the rules on the licensing of foreign bank’s establishments (applying 
to future entries of foreign banks’ establishments), the paper covers questions of 
the distribution of the on-going supervisory powers between the local supervisor 
(“host country supervisor”) and the supervisor in the country where the foreign 
bank which “branched” into the local market or started direct cross-border opera-
tions, or set up a presence in the form of a subsidiary was authorised (the supervi-
sor of that country generally referred to as the “home country supervisor”).  There-
fore, the home – host supervisors’ issues are central to the present paper.  A clear 
overview of the host – home relationship issues brought about by cross-border 
banks (both in the case of bank branching abroad or a banking group setting up 
subsidiaries) is provided by Borchgrevink and Moe in a paper released in 200470.
Going back to the Project’s title, the legal perspective presented in this paper 
does not speciﬁcally deal with any practical effects of the foreign banks’ pen-
70 Henrik Borchgrevink, economist in the Financial Institutions Department, and Thorvald Grung Moe, senior economist in 
Norges Bank Financial Stability, “Management of ﬁnancial crises in cross-border banks”,
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etration in the Researched Countries. Rather, it is aimed at providing a general 
overview of the legal environment in which international banks operate locally. 
Focus was kept on legal issues that are presumed to have higher priority from 
the perspective of the internationally active banks carrying out operations in the 
Researched Countries.
1. International Standards And Rules
In the context of the increased role of the foreign banks in the Researched Coun-
tries’ ﬁnancial markets, the paper discusses the extent to which the countries’ bank-
ing laws follow the internationally accepted principles of modern banking legislation. 
The widely accepted model rules on banking supervision are those developed by 
the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (BCBS), entitled “The Core Princi-
ples of Effective Banking Supervision”, as revised and reissued in October 2006 
(the “Basel Core Principles”).  The other set of prudential standards agreed on in 
the BCBS is the capital accord, initially published as “International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards” of 1998 (the “Basel Capital Accord”), 
and now replaced by “International Convergence of Capital Measurement and 
Capital Standards: A Revised Framework”, commonly referred to as “Basel II” 71.
In the analysis of the banking laws of Bulgaria and Romania, who recently joined 
the EU, references are made to EU legislation, and speciﬁcally to the Banking
Directive and the Capital Adequacy Directive. A basic feature of the ﬁrst one is
that it resolves the distribution of competencies among the home and host regu-
lators in case a bank authorised in a member state enters the market of another 
member state either by directly providing services there (through cross-border 
agreements), or through the establishment of a branch, or by way of participa-
tion in the share capital of a local banking institution (a bank subsidiary, if that 
participation leads to control over the institution). With respect to direct cross-
border operations or the establishment of a branch, the Banking Directive fully 
adopts the principle of home country control. The rules of the directive on the 
home country control are also known as the Single License principle, that is, the 
right of a credit institution authorised as such in a member state to do banking 
business in any other member state without further authorisation. The Capital 
Adequacy Directive is aimed at unifying at the most detailed level practically 
71 For a brief and clear introduction of the Basel II framework see Andrew Cornford, “Basel II: Origin, Rationale, and Concepts”, 
December 2004
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possible the capital adequacy of banks and investment ﬁrms in the EU countries. 
The directive strictly follows Basel II.  
EU law is important from another aspect too – European banks represent the 
most substantial part of the foreign banks’ direct activities or ownership in the 
local banks in the Researched Countries. 
Basel II – introductory remarks
Basel II and its implementation in the legislation of the Researched Countries 
is particularly relevant to the Project.  Capital adequacy rules require banks to 
maintain the amount and quality of capital that can cover losses from risks in-
herent to their activities.  The rules are intended to serve as comprehensive set 
of risk management policies and as a regulatory tool for the bank supervisors 
to assess degree of risk that each bank carries and the adequacy of the bank’s 
capital relative to that risk.  As such, Basel II rules are central in the prudential 
supervision.  
Basel II builds on the capital adequacy standards issued by BCBS in 1988 and 
presents a more sophisticated set of rules aimed at aligning the capital require-
ments more closely to the individual risk proﬁle of each bank.  Under Basel II,
banks may choose to develop their own internal models of risk assessment for 
particular types of risk and have them approved by the regulator.  The require-
ments on the reliability and sophistication of the internal models make them 
costly at a degree where only very large, internationally acting and sophisticated 
banks will opt for them. Those who do not will calculate their capital requirements 
under standard methodologies which compared to the 1988 standards are also 
modiﬁed providing a more ﬂexible and sensitive risk assessment methods. Ba-
sel II is designed for internationally acting banks, but its implementation in the 
EU changes their original scope.  First, the Capital Adequacy Directive will apply 
to European credit institutions irrespective of how active they are internationally. 
Second, the Capital Adequacy Directive provides a comprehensive framework 
for credit institutions, as well as investment ﬁrms.  
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Home or host country authority
As a result of the increasing role of the internationally active banks, the banking 
markets (and more generally the ﬁnancial markets) of the Researched Countries
become more integrated with other countries’ markets.  The rules relating to 
the distribution of competencies between the host and home supervisors thus 
become more relevant.  Without such distribution resolved on a national law 
level, a bank which carries on operations abroad through a branch may have 
to comply with one set of rules in the host country (with respect to the branch) 
and with another set of rules in the home country with respect to the bank itself. 
Even if the rules are the same in the home and the host countries (i.e. leading to 
same results under similar processes) there would be a duplication of the com-
pliance costs because the rules in the home country would typically take into 
account the ﬁnancial position of the branch abroad, but still the branch would
have to comply separately for the purposes of the local supervision.  Supervi-
sion, however, is not just following rules. It also involves the manner in which 
those rules are enforced by the country’s regulator.  Therefore, even if the rules 
are the same in the home and host jurisdiction, the regulator that would have to 
leave full supervision to the foreign regulator under the ﬁrst regulator’s national
legislation would have to have conﬁdence in its foreign counterpart – that it will
supervise the institution “to the same standards as those required for domestic 
institutions.” (Basel Core Principles, Principle 25).  
Considering the issues of home and host supervision, BSBC published “High-level 
principles for the cross-border implementation of the New Accord” in August 2003 
(the “High-level principles”).  It concerns the issues of cooperation between su-
pervisors with respect to the implementation of Basel II across the organization of 
a bank or a banking group spread in more than one country.  While it focuses on 
Basel II implementation, the High-level principles inﬂuenced the Banking Directive
in the general approach to home – host cooperation and exchange of information.
Internationally developed rules of bank supervision of internationally active 
banks should take into account divergent interests of the supervisors in whose 
territorial jurisdiction a bank or a banking group operates. 
The differences in the interests of the home and the host supervisors become 
more evident in cases of crisis in internationally active banks.  If a bank estab-
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lishes foreign operations in the form of branches, a solvency crisis in the bank 
directly affects any branch.  A number of issues concerning the responsibility 
of the bank arise when the crisis becomes evident in the respective branch or 
branches.  The supervisor of the country hosting the branch would expect some 
form of involvement of the foreign bank which owns the branch so that the results 
of the crisis on the local ﬁnancial system are avoided or mitigated.  It follows from
the legal nature of the branch as a legally dependent place of business of the for-
eign bank, that the bank is ﬁnancially responsible for the liabilities of the branch. 
If the crisis is present in the bank as a whole however, there may be uncertainty 
about the assets which have to cover the liabilities of the respective branch.  The 
longer this remains uncertain, the greater the risk of loss for the deposits in the 
branch.  In such situation, the home supervisor is not necessarily motivated to act 
quickly in reducing the risks for the deposits of the bank in the foreign branch.  If 
the bank is an important part of the ﬁnancial structure of its country of authorisa-
tion, the home supervisor may be reluctant to act quickly in liquidating the bank 
on the expectation that some measures to save it are still available.  
In the same cross-jurisdictional context a foreign bank may own a subsidiary 
(instead of a branch), which from the local law perspective is a self-standing 
institution subject to local licensing and supervision on the same basis as the 
other local banks.  But the fact that the locally incorporated bank has foreign 
shareholder(s) is taken into account in the national legislation both in terms of 
the licensing procedure, as well as with respect to the on-going supervision.  
Regulation of cross-border banking supervision deals with different issues de-
pending on the form that a bank may chose for its operations outside its country 
of authorisation (branch or subsidiary).
(a) Foreign bank with a branch in the host country – the home country 
control principle
 With respect to foreign banks operating on the local market through a 
branch, the principle of home country control plays a role in leaving the 
capital adequacy and other important aspects of prudential supervision 
to the home country.  From international law perspective, the rule is sim-
ply an example of the well known principle of mutual recognition adopted 
in many areas of international law.  The home country control principle 
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is implemented to a widest possible extent in the EU law trough the 
Banking Directive and is present in the Bulgarian and Romanian bank-
ing laws.  According to the Banking Directive, recital 7 the harmoniza-
tion is aimed at securing “the mutual recognition of authorisation and of 
prudential supervision systems, making possible the granting of a single 
license recognised throughout the Community and the application of the 
principle of home Member State prudential supervision.”  Under Article 
23 of the Banking Directive, any Member State shall allow any credit 
institution to carry on banking activities (as formulated in Annex I of the 
Banking Directive) there directly - through cross-border transactions, or 
by the establishment of a branch, if such institution has obtained license 
for those activities in another Member State.
 As a result of the full implementation of the Banking Directive and the 
Capital Adequacy Directives in their national legislation, Bulgaria and 
Romania apply the home country control principle to banks licenses 
elsewhere in the Community. From the perspective of the foreign Euro-
pean banks, these countries present the only question of whether their 
supervisory practices are compatible with those of the respective Euro-
pean home countries. In the rest of the Researched Countries the level 
of implementation of the home country control principle and the Basel II 
is a central issue. With respect to the home country supervision princi-
ple, these countries, being outside the EU, either adopt the principle with 
explicit reservations in their national laws or simply leave it to the regula-
tor to decide on a case by case basis whether and how to apply it.
(b) Subsidiary of a foreign bank – consolidated supervision
 Where the foreign bank has established a subsidiary, it is subject to the 
licensing rules relevant to any other bank of the same country.  The fact 
that the subsidiary of the foreign bank is fully controlled by the foreign 
parent bank brings the issue of the inﬂuence of the management of
the parent bank on the management of the subsidiary.  In practice, the 
management is often concentrated with the parent bank and thus brings 
the issue of its responsibility with respect to the ﬁnancial condition of
the subsidiary.  While the subsidiary remains fully independent from 
home and host legal perspective, effective supervision supposes that 
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the capital requirements and other prudential rules are checked against 
the consolidated ﬁnancial position of both the parent and the subsidi-
ary.  This is done through the consolidated supervision of the parent in 
whose ﬁnancial reports the subsidiary’s ﬁnancial position is also taken
into account.  The consolidated supervision would be effective only if 
the supervisor which performs it (the home country supervisor of the 
parent) has relevant information on the subsidiary collected and pro-
vided by the supervisor of the subsidiary (the host country supervisor). 
The High-level principles and the Banking Directive provide rules for 
cooperation and coordination between the home and host supervisors 
with respect to banking groups in order to achieve the objectives of the 
affective supervision on a consolidated basis.
 As mentioned, the host country supervisor preserves its full scope of 
competencies with respect to the local subsidiary of the foreign bank 
treating it just as any other locally incorporated and licensed institu-
tion.  Under the High-level principles, the host supervisor is expected 
to provide the home supervisor with the relevant information with re-
spect to the subsidiary so that the home supervisor exercises effective 
supervision on a consolidated basis with respect to the parent bank. 
According to Principle 24 of the Basel Core Principles supervisors shall 
“supervise the banking group on a consolidated basis, adequately mon-
itoring and, as appropriate, applying prudential norms to all aspects of 
the business conducted worldwide.”  Further, according to Principle 2 of 
the High-level principles “The home country supervisor is responsible 
for the oversight of the implementation of the New Accord for a banking 
group on a consolidated basis.”  
 The High-level principles recognise that a bank group may be struc-
tured in more than one level where a bank subsidiary of another bank 
and has its own subsidiary bank as well.  Each level of the group may 
be present in a different country.  In that case, within a country, a su-
pervisor shall perform consolidated supervision with respect to the local 
bank of the group, which has a subsidiary in another country, but is itself 
a subsidiary of a parent bank abroad.  The functions performed by such 
supervisor are generally referred to as “sub-consolidated” supervision. 
(Point 2 of the High-level principles).
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 According to the Banking Directive, a credit institution which participates 
in another credit institution or in a ﬁnancial institution (including where they
are controlled by the parent and thus become subsidiaries) is supervised 
on a consolidated basis by its home supervisor, unless that parent credit 
institution is itself a subsidiary of another credit institution authorised in 
the same state or of a ﬁnancial holding company set up in the same state. 
Such a credit institution (which participates in another one or in a ﬁnan-
cial institution and does not have a credit institution or a ﬁnancial holding
company in the same state as parent) is referred to in the Banking Direc-
tive as a “parent credit institution in a Member State” (art. 4(14) of the 
Banking Directive).  It may be a subsidiary of another credit institution or 
a ﬁnancial holding company from another member state, and still fall into
the deﬁnition.  Taking the bank group as a whole, each credit institution
from the group shall have its home country supervisor as a supervisor on 
a consolidated basis so long as the credit institution is complying with the 
above condition of not being subsidiary of a credit institution authorised in 
the same country or of a ﬁnancial holding company set up in the country. 
Where the credit institution does not have as parent any credit institution 
authorised in any member state or a ﬁnancial holding company setup in
a member state, it is referred to in the Banking Directive as “EU parent 
credit institution” (art. 4(16) of the Banking Directive).  
 Rules on consolidated supervision become more complicated when “at 
the top” of the group of companies (having at least one bank) stays a 
company which is not a bank (although it may provide some non-bank-
ing ﬁnancial services).  While the parent is not a bank (and not subject
to bank supervision) it is the company through which consolidated su-
pervision is only possible for the whole group that includes at least one 
bank and such supervision becomes more necessary if the parent is in 
the business of ﬁnancial services, though not in the banking business. 
The EU law uses the expression “ﬁnancial holding company” to deﬁne
the institution which is not a bank, but performs some non-banking 
ﬁnancial services, and “the subsidiary undertakings of which are either
exclusively or mainly credit institutions or ﬁnancial institutions, at least
one of such subsidiaries being a credit institution …” (art. 4(19) of the 
Banking Directive).
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 Corporate groups involving banks and other ﬁnancial institutions present
unique challenges in their supervision on a consolidated basis.  The super-
vision of such groups in the EU is performed in accordance with the spe-
cial rules designed for them in the Directive 2002/87/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002 on the supplementary 
supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment 
ﬁrms in a ﬁnancial conglomerate, as amended by Directive 2005/1/EC, (the
“Financial Conglomerates Directive”). It builds on the rules of the Banking 
Directive.  The member states, Bulgaria and Romania implemented the 
Financial Conglomerates Directive in separate laws and regulations.
 Researched Countries outside the EU also deﬁne groups of companies
consisting of at least one bank in order to develop the rules on consoli-
dated supervision in their jurisdiction.  In Serbian law, for instance, the 
term “banking group” is used to formulate the requirement that the ex-
ternal audit of the group is performed on a consolidated basis.  The par-
ent company which controls directly or indirectly the group is referred to 
as the “ultimate parent”.
Common structure of the Researched Countries’ bank legislation
As a general note, the Researched Country’s banking sector is formally organ-
ised in the traditional two-tier structure, with the National Bank of the country 
exercising the supervisory functions over the banking institutions (and  only over 
that part of the ﬁnancial sector).  While the model applied in the EU countries is
that the oversight of the whole national market of ﬁnancial services is concen-
trated in one regulator (combining banking, securities market, and insurance su-
pervision) in the Researched Countries the banking sector is supervised by the 
national bank and the business in other ﬁnancial services is supervised by other
specialised institutions, except the Serbian National Bank which supervises also 
the insurance business.  The banking legislation is structured in two legislative 
acts – one relating to the taking up and the pursuit of the banking business (re-
ferred to as the “banking law”, regulating the permissible activities that deﬁne a
business as a bank, licensing procedure and on-going supervision) and another 
act regulating the functions and competencies of the central bank.
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Structure of the Researched Countries’ presentation
The country by country analysis is organised under the following headings:
• Authorisation – the Researched Country’s rules on the authorisation 
of a foreign bank to provide banking transactions on the local marked 
either cross-border or through the establishment of a branch and the 
rules on the acquisition of controlling stake in a local banking institution 
by a foreign bank thereby creating a foreign bank’s subsidiary; and
• Supervisory regulations, relating to on-going supervisory issues rel-
evant to the regulation of international banks performing operations on 
the Researched Countries’ markets.  
The topics are discussed in reference to the Basel Core Principles and with 
respect to the EU member countries – to the Banking Directive.
2. Highlights of the Countries’ Banking Regulations
ALBANIA
Relevant legislation
Albanian banking legislation is laid down in the Banking Law of 1998 (the “Alba-
nian Banking Law”) and the Law on Bank of Albania of 1997.  Bank supervision 
is performed by the Bank of Albania.
Authorisation
Definition of ‘bank’
Under the Albanian Banking Law, ‘bank’ denotes a juridical person licensed by 
the Bank of Albania to engage in banking business.  Banking business is de-
ﬁned as publicly attracting deposits and making loans or investments for own
account, as well as such other business as the Bank of Albania may specify in 
a regulation.  The Bank of Albania has the discretion to deﬁne banking business
(modifying the legal deﬁnition), as well as to exempt entities engaging in such
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business from the regulations of the Albanian Banking Law, and also to consider 
whether an entity actually engages in banking business and should be made 
subject to the law.  In practice, the Bank of Albania decides on which entity is or 
is not subject to the law.
Licensing
The licensing process is based on provision of relevant information and evidenc-
es by the applying institution on issues such as minimum required subscribed 
and deposited share capital and its origins, business plan, disclosure of control-
ling shareholders, due incorporation of the entity, and ﬁt and proper test of the
management.  
Foreign banks may operate in Albania trough a branch following a process of 
authorisation of the foreign bank proposing to establish it.  Such foreign bank 
is subject to the licensing process applied to the local banks with the usual ad-
ditional requirements: profs of proper authorisation of the applying foreign bank 
from its home country supervisor as well as home country approval to open the 
branch, standard ﬁnancial disclosures with respect to the foreign bank, as well
as endowment capital (deposit of the branch dedicated to covering liabilities 
arising from its activities in Albania).
If a foreign bank proposes to own more than 10 per cent of the capital in a lo-
cal bank, it has to prove its authorisation to do banking business in its country 
obtained from its home supervisor. 
Prudential Regulations
The Albanian Banking Law generally requires each bank to operate under in-
ternal management rules deﬁning the bank’s organizational structure and its
operational units.  Each bank is required to have an Audit Committee whose 
independence from the directors is provided for by its election from the general 
meeting of shareholders.  
The law refers to special regulations of the Bank of Albania on prudential matters 
such as capital requirements, large exposures, and liquidity. 
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BULGARIA
Relevant legislation
The banking activities in Bulgaria are regulated on the basis of the recently 
adopted “Credit Institutions Act”, promulgated in July 2006.  The legal status and 
functions of the Bulgarian National Bank are set forth in the “National Bank of 
Bulgaria Act” of 1997 (amended in 2006 to comply with certain requirements of 
the country’s EU accession in 2007)
The Basel II accord is implemented (through the transposition of the Banking 
Directive and the Capital Adequacy Directive) in a detailed regulation of the 
Bulgarian National Bank No 8 of 14 December 2006 on the capital adequacy of 
the credit institutions, issued in 2006 and in effect from 1 of January 2007.
Authorisation
Definition of “bank”
Following the Banking Directive, the Credit Institutions Act includes banks and 
the electronic money institutions in the term “credit institution”.  The term “bank” 
is separately deﬁned as a juridical person who performs the activity of publicly
attracting deposits or other repayable funds and grants credits or other kind of 
ﬁnancing on its own account and at its own risk.  The activities which deﬁne an
institution as a bank are referred to as “banking activities”.  Other ﬁnancial serv-
ices listed in the Credit Institutions Act are performed by “ﬁnancial institutions”
(deﬁned in accordance with art. 4(5) of the Banking Directive).
Licensing
With respect to banks licensed in EU member states, the Credit Institutions Act 
adopts the principle of Single License of the Banking Directive (art. 23).  Accord-
ing to art. 20 and art. 22 of the Credit Institutions Act, a credit institution from a 
member state may perform banking activities on the Bulgarian territory directly 
or through a branch provided that such activities are covered by the institution’s 
license issued by its home state competent authority.
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Locally incorporated entities may receive a banking license if they are set up in the 
form of joint stock companies and comply with the other conditions of the Credit In-
stitutions Act.  Among the requirements to the joint-stock company, the law requires 
that its shares are only de-materialised (book-entry) shares and the share-capital is 
paid up in cash up to the required minimum (as opposed to in-kind contributions). 
In accordance with the Banking Directive, the applicants present a plan of the busi-
ness activities of the bank (the “program of operations” under the Banking Direc-
tive) and descriptions of the management structure of the proposed bank, as well 
as a description of the internal control and risk management systems of the entity. 
In cases where the company proposed to receive a license is a subsidiary of an-
other member state bank or is controlled by a company (or a group of persons) 
that also control another bank in a member state, the Bulgarian National Bank 
performs prior consultations with the competent authority that authorised the 
other member state bank.
The Bulgarian National Bank is entitled to review the application for license con-
sidering the experience and integrity of the members of the management and 
supervisory bodies of the company, as well as the shareholders controlling more 
than 3 per cent of the company’s capital.  
Prudential regulations
Bulgarian banking law follows closely the EU directives.  
The minimum own funds requirements, the liquidity regulations and other im-
portant prudential standards comply with the Banking Directive and the Capital 
Adequacy Directive.  Regulation No. 8 of the Bulgarian National Bank on the 
capital adequacy of credit institutions fully implements Basel II.  
The rules on consolidated supervision transpose the respective rules of articles 
125 and 126 of the Banking Directive (articles 89 and 90 of the Credit Institutions 
Act).  These rules are developed in more detail in the “Regulation No. 12 on the 
supervision on a consolidated basis” of the Bulgarian National Bank, issued in 
2000 and most recently amended in 2005. 
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In compliance with the Financial Conglomerates Directive, Bulgaria has adopted 
the “Supplementary Supervision of Financial Conglomerates Act”, promulgated 
in 2006 and in force from the 1 of January 2007.
CROATIA
Authorisation
Definition of ‘Bank’
Under the Croatian Banking Law the term “bank” refers only to institutions au-
thorised as such by the Croatian National Bank.  Only a bank may provide bank-
ing services which are deﬁned in line with the Banking Directive as “accepting
monetary deposits and extending loans and other placements from these re-
sources by a bank, in its own name and for its own account, as well as issuing 
means of payment in the form of electronic money.” 
Licensing
The licensing regime distinguishes between three types of institutions depending 
on their country of origin: Croatian entities, banks form Member States and foreign 
banks from states other than Member States.  The regime is designed to provide 
freedom of establishment to banks from Member States.  A bank authorised in a 
Member State may provide banking services directly or through the establishment 
of a branch in Croatia (art. 47, sub-par. 1).  In case of branch operations, equally 
to the locally authorised banks, the Member State banks are required to submit 
their annual audited consolidated ﬁnancial statements to the Croatian National
Bank.  That way, Croatia adopts the “single license” principle and regulates Mem-
ber States banks with the recognition of the home supervisor’s authority.  The host 
supervision with respect to a branch is limited to the requirement for provision of 
reports and information necessary in the exercise of Croatian National Bank’s 
competences in the monetary, foreign exchange policy, and the statistics.
The home – host relationships with respect to Member States banks are further 
detailed with respect to on-site examinations in Croatia of branches of Member 
States banks by their home regulator.  Art. 49 of the Croatian Banking Law 
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provides for a notiﬁcation procedure according to which the home regulators
receive the same administrative powers as the host regulator with respect to 
branch’s inspection upon sending a notiﬁcation to the Croatian National Bank
on the intended  inspection.  Alternatively, the home regulator may request the 
Croatian National Bank itself to conduct the inspection of the branch of the Mem-
ber State bank.  The Croatian National Bank may perform its own inspections 
of such branches only for the purposes of its limited supervisory powers (mon-
etary and foreign exchange policy and statistics).  Generally, the law provides for 
relatively detailed provisions of home – host supervisory cooperation, covering 
different aspects of the exchange of information between them.
Banks authorised outside Croatia or a Member States may enter the Croatian 
market only through a branch (i. e. no cross-border operation).  That branch is 
licensed by the Croatian National Bank. The licensing is done under a separate 
procedure which provides the Croatian National Bank with the powers to require 
the foreign bank (as a condition for a license) to provide guarantee deposit with a 
locally operating bank “for the settlement of liabilities arising from arrangements 
concluded within the Republic of Croatia”.  Further, the law gives the regulator 
virtually unlimited discretion to allow or reject the licensing of the branch.  Under 
art. 52, sub-par. 4 of the Croatian Banking Law, the Croatian National Bank de-
cides on the request for license considering (based on the documents provided) 
the ﬁnancial, managerial and technical capabilities of the proposed branch of
“operating in accordance with the provisions of this Law.”
Prudential regulations
Croatian banking law follows the principles of the respective EU directives.
Croatia implements Basel II by means of a set of rules of the Croatian National 
Bank entitled “Decision on the capital adequacy of banks” of January 2003.
MACEDONIA
Relevant legislation
The banking activities in Macedonia are regulated by the “Banking Law” of 2000, 
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published in that year’s Ofﬁcial Gazette No. 63.  It is a comprehensive document
covering all major aspects of the modern banking regulation. The law deﬁnes
the banking activities which are reserved to licensed institutions only, sets forth 
the licensing procedure, the disclosure of acquisition of control in a bank, and 
provides legal basis for the supervisory issues such as capital requirements, 
credit risk concentration levels and mandatory reserves.
The supervision over the banks in Macedonia is performed by the Macedonian 
National Bank.
Authorisation
Definition of ‘Bank’
Bank is any legal entity which carries out “the business of accepting deposits 
and using such funds, either in whole or in part, for extending credits or invest-
ing for the account of the bank” (art. 2, point 2 of the Banking Act).  “Deposit” 
is deﬁned to include a cash claim on the bank whether accruing interest or not,
and irrespective of the agreed terms for repayment of the claim (on demand or 
at a certain period).  The above deﬁnition of banking business is different from
the respective deﬁnition in the Banking Directive mainly in limiting the form of
attraction of funds only to deposits, thus excluding the issuance of bonds and 
other comparable securities.
Licensing
Under the Banking Law, a Macedonian entity is not allowed to accept deposits 
(art. 5 of the Banking Law), or make registration in the Trade Register of a com-
pany name with the term “bank” without such entity ﬁrst obtaining a license from
the Macedonian National Bank to carry on banking business.
The licensing process is clariﬁed in terms of procedural steps, required docu-
mentation and competencies and powers of the Macedonian National Bank 
acting as licensing institution.  The regulator grants or rejects an application 
exercising broad discretion while evaluating the level of risk that the applying 
entity potentially brings to the ﬁnancial system (art. 11, sup-par. 7, point 3), the
legitimacy of the origins of the entity’s funding, and the application of ﬁt and
proper test for the applicant’s shareholders (art. 15, point 8), and under separate 
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rules – for the applicant’s management.  A rejection may be appealed only within 
the National Bank itself.
There are no restrictions on the nationality of the shareholders (art. 6 of the 
Banking Law)
Authorisation of foreign-owned subsidiaries
A foreign bank may set up a subsidiary bank in Macedonia as explicitly provided 
for in art. 6, sub-par. 2 of the Banking Law.  The process of authorisation and the 
degree of discretion of the National Bank to grant or reject an application for license 
are the same for a foreign-banks’ subsidiaries and locally owned entities, except for 
the usual additional requirements for the foreign bank’s subsidiary to prove that: the 
parent bank is authorised in its home country to collect deposits and other sources 
of funds; the establishment of the subsidiary in Macedonia has been speciﬁcally by
the home country regulator, and the home country regulator “conducts adequate 
supervision on a consolidated basis” (art. 19, sup-par. 2, point 3).
Prudential rules
According to art. 28 of the Banking Law, the capital adequacy standards are de-
veloped in special acts of the Macedonian National Bank.  The capital adequacy 
ratio is set at 8 per cent in art. 30 of the law.  Macedonia implements Basel II 
by means of a recently adopted national banks’ regulation of the on the capital 
adequacy of banks (promulgated in 2007).
The consolidated supervision is based on a rule in the Banking Law establishing 
the requirement for any bank in Macedonia to prepare consolidated ﬁnancial state-
ments in cases to be deﬁned in a regulation of the Macedonian National Bank.
ROMANIA
Relevant legislation
In line with the EU law, Romania has taken the approach of codifying the law 
on ﬁnancial market players.  To that end, the “Emergency Ordinance No. 99 on
Credit Institutions and Capital Adequacy” (“Romanian Credit Institutions Act”) 
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was enacted in 2006 (Ofﬁcial Gazette No. 1027 of 27 December 2006) as a
comprehensive document providing detailed rules on credit institutions and ﬁ-
nancial investment companies.  It is intended to provide full coverage on the 
subject matter of regulation, closely following the main EU ﬁnancial market regu-
lation documents – the Banking Directive and the Capital Adequacy Directive. 
Another part f the Romanian Banking legislation – the “Law on the National 
Bank of Romania” regulates the functions of the Romanian central bank.
The Credit Institutions Act is a modern and sophisticated piece of legislation 
implementing in a comprehensive manner the current EU law on credit institu-
tions.  Generally, it applies to the activities on the territory of Romania of credit 
institutions and ﬁnancial investment companies, and also regulates the Roma-
nia’s payment and securities settlement systems.  That way, the law codiﬁes the
rules concerning the main institutions on the Romanian ﬁnancial market and the
relevant market infrastructure.
Authorisation
“Credit institutions”
The regulation of the banking business is based on the deﬁnition of ‘credit institu-
tion’ (in line with Art. 4, sub-par. 1 of the Banking Directive) which is an undertak-
ing in the business of receiving deposits or other repayable funds from the public 
and granting credits for its own account, or an electronic money institution whose 
business is the issuance of means of payment in the form of electronic money.  
Licensing
The National Bank of Romania is the competent authority for the licensing, regu-
lation and prudential supervision of credit institutions.  
In accordance with art. 23 of the Banking Directive, the “Romanian Credit Institu-
tions Act” permits any credit institution authorised in another member state to 
provide directly or through the establishment of a branch the services for which it 
was authorised in its home country with the condition only that the credit institu-
tion shall observe the laws of Romania which are established “in the interest of 
the general good” (art. 45(1) of the Act.)
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Locally incorporated entities are licensed under clear rules following the respec-
tive provisions of the Banking Directive.  Together with usual requirements for 
the applicants such as the obligation of the shareholders to pay up the compa-
ny’s capital in full and in cash only, the licensing rules also require provision of 
information by the applicants on person that is going to have 10% or more of 
the capital or of the voting shares of the company (“qualifying holding”) whose 
licensing is requested.  Under the law, the National Bank of Romania has the 
right to reject the application if it ﬁnds that those persons are not suitable for
the sound and prudent management of the institution.  In line with art. 7 of the 
Banking Directive, an applicant for a banking license is required to present a pro-
gramme of operations of the future institution.  The National Bank of Romania 
has the discretion to decide that the programme is not convincing with respect 
to the institution’s ability to achieve the goals set forth in the programme.  Such 
inability constitutes a ground for rejection of the application.
Prudential regulations
The Credit Institutions Act provides for elaborate provisions to deﬁne the National
Bank of Romania’s competence to exercise supervision on a consolidated basis 
with respect to parent credit institutions that are Romanian legal persons, author-
ised in Romania to act as credit institutions.  As mentioned in A., 4. (b) above, the 
Banking Directive provide uniform rules on the deﬁnition of the bank institution
with respect to which its home country supervisor shall exercise supervision on a 
consolidated basis.  These rules are transposed in Part I, Title III, Chapter II of the 
Credit Institutions Act.  Article 176 of the Credit Institutions Act deﬁnes the types
of credit institutions which are subject to consolidated supervision by the National 
Bank of Romania.  The rules follow the respective article 125 and 126 of the 
Banking Directive.  Generally, credit institutions which are set up in Romania and 
authorised to act as such by the National Bank of Romania are subject to consoli-
dated supervision.  In line with the Banking Directive’s terminology, such institu-
tions may either be parent credit institutions in Romania (art. 4(14) of the Banking 
Directive) or EU parent credit institutions (art. 4(16) of the Banking Directive).  Art. 
176 of the Credit Institutions Act further details types of credit institutions which 
are subject to consolidated supervision by the National Bank of Romania in ac-
cordance with the rules the Banking Directive (articles 125 and 126).
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The parent – subsidiary relationship is deﬁned as broadly as possible to allow in
fact the regulator to treat any entity over which “in the opinion of the competent 
authorities” the credit institution exercises a “dominant inﬂuence” as a subsidiary
of that credit institution, thus requiring the institution to include that subsidiary in 
its consolidated reporting for the purposes of prudential supervision.  A “partici-
pation” in an undertaking is present where the institution holds 20% or more of 
the voting shares of that undertaking.  
Romania implements Basel II following the respective provisions of the Bank-
ing Directive and the Capital Adequacy Directive.  The requirements for the 
minimum level of own funds (set forth in art. 75 of the Banking Directive) are 
implemented by the National Bank of Romania through “Regulation NBR-NSC 
no. 13/18/2006.  The operational risk is regulated in the special “Regulation No. 
24/29/2006 regarding the calculation of the minimum capital requirements for 
operational risk of credit institutions and investment ﬁrms”.
SERBIA
Relevant legislation
The “Law on Banks” of Serbia was passed in November 2005 – Ofﬁcial Gazette
No. 107/2005 (the “Law on Banks”) replacing the “Law on Banks and Other 
Financial Organisations” enacted in 1993 (and amended several times the last 
being in 2002).  The Law on Banks is viewed as improving many of the deﬁcien-
cies of the old law in bringing Serbian banking regulation more closely to the EU 
standards and the Basel principles72. The National Bank of Serbia operates un-
der a separate law deﬁning its supervisory authority and its lender of last resort
functions.  The function and competencies of the National Bank of Serbia are set 
forth in the Law on the National Bank of Serbia of 2003 (as amended in 2004).
Authorisation
Definition of ‘Bank’
Bank is deﬁned with reference to its legal form (a joint stock-company), and the
72 International Monetary Fund, Country Report No. 06/96 of March 2006 “Serbia and Montenegro: Serbia – Financial System 
Stability Assessment, including Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes on the following topics: Monetary and 
Financial Policy Transparency, Banking Supervision and Payment Systems”, Executive Summary, point 3
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conduct of the core banking activities (deposit taking and provision of loans) carried 
on pursuant to a license granted by the Serbian National Bank. The term “foreign 
bank” is deﬁned separately to include a foreign legal entity (i. e. with registered ofﬁce
outside Serbia), registered and licensed as a bank by the competent authority of its 
home state, being the state of incorporation and where its head ofﬁce is located.
Licensing
The persons proposing to incorporate and own the legal entity which is proposed 
to receive a bank license (the “founders”) apply to the Serbian National Bank for 
preliminary approval on the basis of the draft documentation for incorporation 
and other documents in set forth in Art. 15 of the Serbian Law on Banks.   If 
preliminary approval is granted, as a second step, the founders request operating 
license for the entity after its incorporation.  As mentioned, the entity may be only 
in the form of a joint-stock company so the founders applying for the authorisa-
tion appear in their capacity of prospective shareholders in the ﬁrst step of the
licensing process and actual shareholders in the second step.  Speciﬁc rules of
the licensing process apply to a founder which is a foreign bank or a ﬁnancial
organisation that is under special supervision under its national law.  The special 
requirements relating to such prospective shareholders during the ﬁrst step of the
licensing procedure depend on the size of their prospective participation in the 
joint-stock company subject to licensing.  If such a person would own a control-
ling stake, the National Bank of Serbia requires proofs that the competent regula-
tory authority in the home country (the parent institution country) has permitted 
the establishment the subsidiary and its licensing as a bank in Serbia – a require-
ment complying with Principle 3 of the Basel Core Principles.  If the proposed 
participation by the foreign entity in the Serbian joint-stock company is less than a 
controlling one, the foreign person must comply with the procedure for acquisition 
of a qualifying holding (that is 5 per cent or more) in the local entity.  The qualify-
ing holding rules (established under Art. 94) require a foreign entity proposing to 
own a qualifying participation in the local bank to comply with speciﬁc conditions
set forth in a special regulation of the National Bank of Serbia.  
In the substantive review of the application for the preliminary approval the Na-
tional Bank of Serbia makes the usual consideration of the proofs of the qualiﬁca-
tions and reputation of members of the board of directors and the executive board 
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of the company subject to licensing.  Also, the regulator requires presentation of 
“the bank’s proposed program of activities for the period of three years and draft 
business policy”, which is in line with Principle 3 of the Basel core Principles and 
Art. 7 of the Banking Directive.  Both the “ﬁt and proper test” of the management
and the programme of operations are reviewed by the regulator with full discre-
tion and serve as a basis for rejection of the application for preliminary license.
Prudential regulations
The Law on Banks establishes the principle of consolidated supervision.
The new Law on Banks contains capital adequacy rules which reﬂect some fea-
tures of Basel II (interest rate risk, liquidity risk and operational risk are treated 
separately).  In 2006 the National Bank of Serbia issued a regulation on the capi-
tal adequacy calculation (“Decision on Capital Adequacy of Banks”).  Subject to 
valuation are balance-sheet and off-balance sheet assets.  The risk assessment 
of the assets in terms of the risk they carry for the bank (risk-weighting of as-
sets) is made by grouping them in different categories each applying a different 
percentage to the value of the asset depending on the level of risk assigned to 
each group (the higher the risk, the higher the percentage).  For balance sheet 
items, the credit risk is zero for assets such as cash, or claims to the National 
Bank of Serbia or the Republic of Serbia, where loans secured by real estate in 
value covering the loan amount receive 50% risk weight, and corporate loans 
are weighted with 100%.  The classiﬁcation of certain borrowers according to
the credit rating assigned to them by recognised credit agencies, as for instance 
the 20% weighting of the claims on banks that have been awarded the rating 
of at least BBB by certain recognised credit rating agencies, shows that Serbia 
is in the group of countries implementing Basel II.   The Decision on Capital 
Adequacy also marked a signiﬁcant step of Serbia’s banking law reform that had
started with the passing of the new Law on Banks.  
Generally, the National Bank of Serbia has adequate powers to inﬂuence the
Serbian banking sector players. The Law on Banks provides the regulator with 
instruments which are signiﬁcantly aligned with the internationally adopted stand-
ards (Basel Core Principles, Basel II and the Banking Directive), including some 
form of prompt corrective action rules under art. 110 and 111 of the law.  Under 
those rules, the National Bank of Serbia is entitled to prescribed measures to-
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wards troubled banks depending of the severity of their de-capitalisation.  From 
that respect, banks who fall below the prescribed capital adequacy ratio (classi-
ﬁed as “undercapitalised”) becomes subject to approval by the National Bank of
Serbia with respect to taking of new lines of business, increase of assets that are 
fall into the deﬁnition of risk-weighted assets under the capital adequacy rules
(practically any banking asset), and automatically becomes restricted to pay divi-
dends or make any capital distributions, and increase the current compensations 
of the directors.  If the capital ratio falls below one third of the prescribed one 
(but is higher than one half of it) the respective bank is classiﬁed as “signiﬁcantly
undercapitalised” and in addition to the restrictions applying to undercapitalised 
banks, it may not accept deposits, or pay interest rates on deposit higher than 
market rates, increase salaries, or enter into transactions with related persons 
without the prior consent of the National Bank of Serbia.  A bank, whose capital 
adequacy ratio is less than half of the required ﬁgure, is considered “critically
undercapitalised” and is subject to revocation of the license and receivership 
administered by the National Bank of Serbia.
 
Conclusions
First, there are great and important differences between the Researched Coun-
tries’ national legislation relating to the taking up and pursuit of banking business 
and the degree of implementation of Basel II.  
Second, EU member countries achieved harmonisation with the EU law by trans-
posing the Banking Directive, the Capital Adequacy Directive and the Financial 
Conglomerates Directive in their national legislation.  In those countries, Basel 
II implementation is fostered by the adoption of the rest of the EU banking law 
which creates the necessary environment for the application of the capital ad-
equacy rules in line with the EU goal for EU wide ﬁnancial market integration.
Third, Croatia has achieved considerable level of harmonisation of its banking 
legislation with that of the EU.  It recognises freedom of establishment principle 
with regard to banks from Member States.  It also implements Basel II and the 
higher degree of integration of its legislation with that of the EU provides the es-
sential legal basis for an effective implementation of the new accord.  
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Fourth, the other non-EU Researched Countries however follow their own path in 
shaping their bank legislation, despite the obvious progress of Serbia to harmo-
nize its banking law with the internationally developed standards for cross-border 
bank supervision and the adoption of the regulation by the Macedonian National 
Bank for the implementation of Basel II in 2007.  The inﬂuence of the Basel Core
Principles over the legislation of those countries resulted in similarities with respect 
to licensing of banks (including foreign or foreign owned banks).  For example, the 
requirement for a foreign bank applying to open a branch in the country to provide 
information to the regulator on the existence and the quality of control of the home 
country’s regulator over its activities; the consideration of the majority owners of 
the bank as well as the management with regard to their ﬁtness and competence
to own and run the bank; and the requirement for transfers of bank’s substantial 
ownership to be disclosed by the new owners to the regulator and above certain 
levels to obtain permission to acquire the respective stake in the bank’s capital. 
Despite those similarities, each of those countries’ legislation present differences 
as to the level of implementation of the Basel Core Principles.  
Fifth, the implementation of Basel II in the Researched Countries that are not 
EU members was actively pursued in Croatia who achieved considerable level 
of implementation.  The process has not started in Albania, achieved only lim-
ited results in Serbia and resulted in a regulation in Macedonia whose effective 
operation would probably need more advanced harmonisation of the other areas 
of the Macedonian banking law (such as the rules on consolidated supervision) 
with the internationally developed models (especially the EU legislation). 
Sixth, Basel II presents a challenge even to the industrialized nations.  With 
respect to its implementation in the EU-members among the Researched Coun-
tries, this process is pushed by the harmonization of the countries’ legislation 
with the Capital Adequacy Directive.  Both Romania and Bulgaria has imple-
mented the directive through relevant acts of Parliament and regulations issued 
by the supervisors. For them, the Basel II implementation becomes a fact simply 
because of their EU membership.  Since Basel II was ﬁnalised and became part
of the EU law only recently, it is not yet clear how the newly acceded countries 
(Bulgaria and Romania) will implement it in practice, and how their respective 
national banking markets will respond to the rules.  At this stage, it is safe to say 
that Bulgaria and Romania will face the biggest implementation challenge in ac-
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quiring the necessary degree of knowledge and skills of the regulators to imple-
ment the rules ﬂexibly yet correctly. Also, the complexity and scope of the rules,
as well as their inﬂuence on the required capital that the banks must maintain
to cover eventual losses from the risks they carry, may result in bigger pressure 
to smaller domestic banks to attract capital or reduce risk (this reducing proﬁts). 
Whether the locally owned banks will manage to cope with such pressure or 
leave more room for further increase of the foreign, internationally active banks 
(for which Basel II was in principle created) is unclear.
Seventh, from the perspective of internationally active banks operating in the Re-
searched Countries, the differences explained above will inﬂuence the regulatory
challenges each bank would face entering each individual market.  In the new EU-
members, the practical implementation by the regulator of the rules with respect 
to domestically licensed subsidiaries of foreign banks would obviously present 
less problems to the management the more this implementation is aligned with 
the home regulator.  With respect to foreign banks’ branches the home country 
control principle is established similarly to any other Member State.  
Eighth, in non-EU members the situation would be different (again with the res-
ervations with respect to Croatia mentioned above).  Albania and Macedonia 
generally follow the Basel Core Principles in structuring their prudential rules. 
Serbian legislation has made progress in adhering to Basel Core Principles with 
the passing of the Law on Banks in 2005, but the implementation of Basel II 
is at an early stage.  Croatia implements Basel II and follows the respective 
European banking directives.  Macedonia adopted Basel II rules in the context 
of general banking law which needs further development in areas which are 
important for the effective implementation of the new Basel capital accord with 
respect to cross-border banks.
Ninth, the Researched Countries show a diverse picture with respect to the level of 
harmonisation of each country’s regulations with the recently developed internation-
al standards of effective banking supervision and of the capital adequacy of banks.
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CHAPTER IV
EFFICIENCY AND PROFITABILITY
Efﬁciency and Proﬁtability
of the Host Banking Sector
Galina Dimitrova 73
Introduction
Using data on a bank and country level for the period 2000-2004 and 2005 
this paper analyzes the impact of foreign capital entry on the efﬁciency and
proﬁtability of the banking sector in six transition countries in the South Eastern
Europe – Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Romania and Serbia. The 
research  period is characterized by political and economic stabilization, rapid 
economic growth and radical institutional, legislative and regulatory reforms. 
They were accompanied by massive or signiﬁcant foreign capital inﬂows, mainly
in the form of acquisitions of the major banks in the countries and consequent 
dramatic changes in the banking industry in the region. Due to scarcity of reli-
able public banking information in several of the countries making the building of 
a consistent own dataset and calculations difﬁcult, the paper draws heavily from
the existing country research and studies. Furthermore, the author makes exten-
sive use of the research results and ﬁndings contained in the abundant literature
concerning the effects of foreign capital entry in transition economies as well as 
on the determinants of the banking sector proﬁtability and efﬁciency.  
The aim is to capture the effects of foreign capital entry on the ﬁnancial deepening
of the economy, emphasizing similarities and differences resulting from common 
and speciﬁc political and economic factors and developments. The level of the
banking sector intermediation and development is important for several reasons.
First, since it reveals the banking business growth potential it seems to be the domi-
73 The author thanks Todor Ilinkolov for his dedicated research assistance
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nant driving force and motivation for the expansion of foreign banks in the region. 
All six countries exhibit high growth rates on the back of the political and macroeco-
nomic stabilization achieved in the period 2000-2005. However, it is also character-
ized by low levels of ﬁnancial intermediation and a severe credit squeeze, due to the
banking sector inability and unwillingness to lend, and generally low conﬁdence of
the public to the national currencies and the domestic banking sector, following the 
severe ﬁnancial crises experienced by all six countries in late 1990s. Therefore, the
potential for banking business in all countries is enormous and is the major determi-
nant of foreign banks’ mode of entry and business strategy.  In general, especially 
for the major foreign players, business strategy seems to be broadly based and 
domestically focused, targeting both the retail and the domestic corporate sector 
and the SMEs, nation-wide, rather than following their international clients. It seeks, 
furthermore to establish a long-term presence as well as to build a new customer 
base. These in turn, affects both the deepening of the banking sector intermedia-
tion and the developments in the banks’ proﬁtability and efﬁciency.
Second, studies so far indicate that the effect of foreign capital on the efﬁciency
and proﬁtability of the host banking sector is associated with the level of ﬁnancial
sector development and ﬁnancial intermediation. More speciﬁcally, these stud-
ies  indicate that at low levels of development foreign capital entry is associated 
with higher cost and margins, while at higher levels of development the effects 
are lower costs and lower margins resulting in improved performance due to ef-
ﬁciency gains. In both cases there might be a proﬁtability and efﬁciency gains as 
measured by the evolution of the ROE and ROA. However, a detailed analysis 
of the factors contributing to proﬁtability and efﬁciency, both quantitative (based
on the DuPont analysis) and qualitative (asset and liability mix, quality and sus-
tainability of earnings, asset quality, funding proﬁle etc.), reveal substantial dif-
ferences both across countries and within the banking sector of each country. 
Generally, at lower levels of development of the banking sector and ﬁnancial
intermediation, ROA and ROE, are largely associated with one-off gains, non-
recurring revenues or revenues from non-core banking activities, mainly low-
risk, low-return investments in government securities or interbank- and off-shore 
placements and higher interest rate margins, based on low volumes of lending 
and deposit mobilizing activities. Proﬁts are therefore, highly exposed to market
risk and highly volatile and their level highly insufﬁcient, even if fully retained,
to allow business expansion or technological advancement. Capital adequacy 
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and liquidity though at a high level reﬂect underutilization of funds and lack of
risk assumption (due to inadequate risk assessment expertise and risk control 
systems) while capitalization and internally generated earnings are insufﬁcient
for business expansion. High proportion of liquid assets, though prudent under 
highly uncertain environment represent a drag on the returns of assets.
In contrast, in a more developed banking systems, with higher level of ﬁnancial
intermediation, revenues and proﬁts are more diversiﬁed, stemming mainly from
the core lending and deposit mobilizing activities, more diversiﬁed client and prod-
uct structure, driven by customers  demanding more sophisticated products and 
services. Intensiﬁed competition both within the banking sector and from the non-
banking ﬁnancial sector and easier access to information resulting from IT devel-
opments and therefore, higher sensitivity to pricing, result in squeezing interest 
rate margins. Combined with higher costs and risks associated with increased 
lending activities and the need to develop new services and products, cost efﬁ-
ciency and the ability to manage risk prudently become the determining factors of 
banks’ proﬁtability while trying to increase or maintain their market shares.
Based on the hypothesis of higher efﬁciency and proﬁtability effect of foreign cap-
ital entry depending on the level of ﬁnancial intermediation and banking sector
development the paper makes a comparative analysis of the performance of the 
banking sectors dividing the six countries into two groups: Bulgaria and Croatia 
with higher levels of development of the banking system and a longer history of a 
dominant foreign capital presence, on the one hand, and Romania, Albania, Mac-
edonia and Serbia, on the other hand. The paper presents the historical evolution 
of efﬁciency and proﬁtability in each country, and examines the determinants of
their current state and future developments. The analysis is based on the Dupont 
system of the ﬁnancial results, analyses of the structure of activities, balance
sheets and income statements, interest margins and  non-performing loans to 
capture the effects of foreign penetration in terms of efﬁciency gains, strategic ori-
entation, banking intermediation, quality and diversity of products and services, 
funding proﬁle etc. and taking into account the speciﬁc effects of the monetary
policy in each country on the banking sector performance.
For most of the countries the analysis is based on the aggregate data for the 
banking system as a whole. This approach differs from the standard approach 
173
of a comparative analysis of the performance of domestic versus foreign-owned 
banks. Apart from the unavailability of a consistent and reliable time-series of 
bank-based data due in part to the apparent differences in practices and disclo-
sure requirements,  this approach is justiﬁed by the following reasons.
The objective of this project is to evaluate the impact of foreign capital entry on 
the development and performance of the banking sector as a whole and its role 
in improving the ﬁnancial deepening of the economy. We are, therefore, less
interested in the differences between foreign and domestic banks but rather in 
the changes in the performance of the banking sector, which are largely attribut-
able to the direct and indirect impact of foreign capital on the major factors and 
determinants of banks’ proﬁtability and efﬁciency. This is because the effect of
foreign banks entry on the efﬁciency and price formation in the acquired banks
through the introduction of the best banking practices and the transfer of new 
technology and risk management techniques spreads across the ﬁnancial sys-
tem as a whole through heightening competition forcing the domestic banks to 
restructure to catch up to the best practices and increase efﬁciency.
Since the share of the majority foreign-owned banks in total banking assets 
and especially in lending and deposits to the private sector  is dominating in 
most countries, the evolution of the proﬁtability and efﬁciency indicators of the
foreign banks are largely representative of the changes in the banking system 
as a whole.  Where this is not the case as in Serbia and Romania cross-country 
comparison may also be indicative of the impact of the foreign banks presence 
on efﬁciency and proﬁtability.
Takeovers were the dominant form of foreign capital entry. When foreign banks 
acquired the largest state-owned banks they inherited institutions with proﬁtabil-
ity and efﬁciency characteristic similar to the domestically-owned banks. Thus
any differences in the consequent evolution of the proﬁtability and efﬁciency
indicators could be attributed to superior corporate governance, business strat-
egy, technological advancements and risk management, product and services 
know-how, diversiﬁcation etc., introduced by the foreign partners, which allows
them to mitigate and control risk and expand their business activities without 
sacriﬁcing proﬁtability. Empirical studies indicate also that the presence of for-
eign banks has the advantage of reducing the sensitivity of banks’ proﬁts to do-
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mestic downturns due to the ﬁnancial support of their parents which contributes
further to the efﬁciency and proﬁtability in ROA terms.
1. Historical and comparative review of the banking sector develop-
ment and ﬁnancial intermediation and deepening in SEE.
Bulgaria
(‘000 EUR) 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Gross Domestic 
Product 12,163,859 13,678,506 15,190,078 16,532,665 
         
17,663,418 
         
19,433,389 
         
21,188,000 
Banking System 
Assets
           
4,204,572 
           
4,997,121 
           
6,248,257 
           
7,442,939 
           
8,857,438 
         
12,740,043 
         
16,796,390 
% y-o-y
change 19.40% 25.04% 19.12% 19.00% 43.83% 31.84%
Loans to non-
ﬁnancial institutions
and households
           
1,226,808 
           
1,545,254 
           
2,119,747 
           
3,085,092 
           
4,609,015 
           
6,823,269 
           
9,068,920 
% y-o-y
change 24.94% 37.18% 45.54% 49.40% 48.04% 32.91%
Total Deposits            3,122,146 
           
3,638,456 
           
4,885,748 
           
5,768,477 
           
6,950,254 
           
9,984,720 
         
12,993,214 
% y-o-y
change  16.43% 34.28% 18.07% 20.49% 43.66% 30.13%
Loans to deposits 39.29% 42.47% 43.39% 53.48% 66.31% 68.34% 69.80%
Assets % GDP 34.57% 36.53% 41.13% 45.02% 50.15% 65.56% 79.27%
Loans % GDP 10.09% 11.30% 13.95% 18.66% 26.09% 35.11% 42.80%
Standard Loans (% 
total loans) 88.28% 91.80% 92.98% 94.47% 92.72% 93.12% n.a
Capital Adequacy 41.31 35.64 31.32 25.22 22.03 16.58 16.66
Assets % GDP
Private Loans % GDP
Corporate Loans % of GDP
Deposits % GDP
Loans to Deposits
NPLs % loans
Concentration
State-owned banks share
Foreign-owned banks share
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Still suffering from the scars of the severe ﬁnancial crisis in 1996-1997,  but also
from the legacy of the centrally planned economy, Bulgaria started the period from 
2000 with very low levels of development of the banking and the ﬁnancial sector
and ﬁnancial intermediation. In the following period, however, the Bulgarian bank-
ing system experienced one of the most impressive developments in the region. 
The turning point was marked by the privatization process in the banking sector in 
which the major state-owned banks were privatized to strong strategic investors 
from the EU resulting in a massive inﬂow of foreign capital into the banking sec-
tor and the dominance of the majority-foreign-owned banks in the sector holding 
more than 85% of total banking assets. Stronger capitalization, introduction of 
moderns business practices, IT and risk management expertise brought about 
by the foreign banks led to radical changes in the banking business in Bulgaria, 
supported the growth and the diversiﬁcation of the banking sector activities. Fur-
thermore, foreign capital entry enhanced the stability of the banking sector and 
helped restore the conﬁdence to it. This in turn has led to dramatic improvements
in the monetary aggregates and the share of quasi money in monetary supply 
grew rapidly accompanied by radical shifts in their currency structure towards the 
euro and BGL denominated deposits. The resulting widening of the deposit base 
of the banks now dominating their funding proﬁle increased their lending capac-
ity. Funding opportunities increased also as a result of the support of the foreign 
parents and the much improved access to the European ﬁnancial and capital
markets. Foreign ownership of the banks have brought about signiﬁcant improve-
ments in terms of modernization, sophistication, products and service lines, more 
efﬁcient allocation of funds, improved risk-assessment and management skills.
Widening deposit base, access to euro denominated funding and improved risk 
assessment abilities helped replace the foreign assets investment of the banks 
by lending with increased exposure to the Bulgarian economy. Improved real sec-
tor performance and rising demand for credits resulting from the strong growth of 
exports to the EU and domestic investments and consumption allowed for a rapid 
expansion of the banks’ lending activity. The asymmetry in terms of currency de-
nomination of the supply and demand for credits was largely eliminated. The ini-
tial period of disintermediation was followed by a period of credit boom with credit 
growth among the strongest in the region. The decelerating growth rates in 2005 
and the beginning of 2006 are mainly the result of the restrictive monetary policy 
on the credit growth introduced by the Bulgarian National bank since 2005. 
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As at the end of 2004 the ratio of the banking sector’s assets to GDP was 
65.6%, closely approaching the CEE average of 74%, but far below the EU 
average of 206%. At the end of 2005 it increased further to 79.3%, which is 
more than double that level at the end of 2000 (36.53%). The total assets of 
the banking system amounted to €12.7b at the end of 2004 compared to just 
€5 b at the end of 2000, and grew further in 2005 to €17.0b. The growth was 
mainly due to changes in gross loans to non-ﬁnancial institutions and house-
holds which increased nearly six fold between 2000 and 2005 to €9.1b (4.5 fold 
between 2000 and 2004) with the highest annual growth rates (above 40% and 
far exceeding the CEE average annual growth rate of 24%) between 2001-2003 
before decelerating in 2004 (to 20.3%) and further in 2005 (17.3%) as a result of 
the restrictive measures imposed by the BNB. Yet lending still grew faster than 
assets. Group I banks, among which the major majority foreign-owned banks 
remained the biggest lenders, disbursing 80 per cent of new loans. At the end 
of 2004 the share of lending in GDP reached 35.11% from as low as 11.31% at 
the end of 2000 and exceeding the CEE average of 34%. It increased further to 
nearly 35% at the end of 2005 but is still far below the EU average of 102%. 
As a result of these developments loans extended to non-ﬁnancial institutions now
represent the most signiﬁcant position in the asset structure of the banks, with a
share of 54.0%. (53.6% at the end of 2004 and compared to just 31% share at the 
end of 2000).  As of December 31 2005, the structure of the loan portfolio of the 
banks is as follows: 11% in mortgage loans, 22.6% in consumer loans and 63.1% 
in corporate loans. Although radically different from that of 2000 (when retail cred-
its were almost negligible) this structure is speciﬁc for the Bulgarian banking sector
and is reﬂective of the still low level of penetration of the banking services in the
retail sector and its still enormous untapped potential. Recent aggressive market-
ing and pricing efforts targeting the retail sector and the ﬁerce rivalry between
major banks is an evidence of the increasing shift in focus towards this sector that 
may be expected to lead to radical changes in this structure.
Enhanced lending was ﬁnanced primarily by growing deposit, which though ini-
tially lagging behind the lending growth started to pick up at rates close to those 
of lending in 2005.  As of 31 December 2005, the total deposit base of the bank-
ing system reached nearly €13b representing an increase of 3.6 times compared 
to the end of 2000 levels (2.74 times in 2004) with the highest annual growth 
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rate achieved in 2004 reﬂecting both increasing wealth levels and conﬁdence to
the banking system, but also more intensive offering of new, more sophisticated 
products and services to both the retail and the corporate sector enhancing the 
deposit mobilizing activities of the banks. Deposits from non-ﬁnancial institutions
now account for 77.4% of the liabilities on the balance sheet, and represent a 
stable and relatively cheap source of funding for the banks radically improving 
their funding proﬁle. Growth in deposits was accompanied by an improvement in
their term and currency structure with time deposits representing 65.1% of total 
deposits and deposits in the national currency and in euro having almost the 
same share in their currency structure. 
Credit and deposits dynamic during the period led to a signiﬁcant change in the
ratio of loans to deposits which increased from 42% at the end of 2000 to nearly 
70% at the end of 2005 evidencing the deepening of the ﬁnancial intermediation
in the economy. The radical shifts in the liabilities and assets mix of the banks re-
sulted in their improved funding, assets and risk proﬁles.  Despite the robust credit
growth the Bulgarian banking system remains adequately capitalized. The bank-
ing system aggregate equity grew 1.79 times between 2002 and 2005 to reach € 
1.79 b owing to capital injections from shareholders and the signiﬁcant increase
in the internal capital generation due to the improved proﬁtability of the banks and
the high earnings retention rates.  The signiﬁcant decline in the capital adequacy
ratio (from 34.64% in 2000 to 16.6 in 2004-2005) reﬂects the shift in the asset mix
towards more riskier lending and the increased risk taking activities of the banks.
Despite of the aggressive loan growth and the shifts towards more riskier retail 
and SMEs credit markets the asset quality of the banking system remained good 
and even improved with the share of standard loans increasing from 91.8% in 
2000 to 93.12% in 2004 reﬂecting partially the dilutive effects of the increased
lending volumes but also the improved loan underwriting standards, risk control 
and risk management techniques and skills of the banks. System liquidity and 
that at individual banks has also remained high in recent years, despite the ag-
gressive lending and its large share in assets, and the rising liquidity need of 
the banks due to the enhanced ﬁnancial intermediation of their clients as banks
employed a conservative approach and allocated adequate resources to meet 
their risk proﬁles and payment needs.
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The performance of the banking sector improved signiﬁcantly, reﬂecting the ma-
turing proﬁle of its revenue, asset and funding mix with the disappearance of the
heavy dependence on one-off gains or investments in low-risk low-return assets. 
Despite of the decreasing interest rates and intensifying competition, the banks 
beneﬁted from growing lending volumes, increasing levels of recurring revenues
from fees and commissions, as well as good cost management and more ef-
ﬁcient allocation of funds and personnel. The banking system reported proﬁts
increased steadily year on year, growing by 16.7% in 2004 and 34.6% in 2005.
The distinguishing feature of the Bulgarian banking sector is the relatively lower 
level of banking sector concentration compared to its peers in the region and the 
intense rivalry between larger and medium-sized banks beneﬁting the public due
to competitive pricing and improving quality of products and services offered 
and increasing the efﬁciency and welfare effects of the ﬁnancial intermediation
for the economy. As at the end of 2004 the cumulative market share of the ﬁve
largest banks in Bulgaria decreased to 52.2% and further to 50.8% at the end 
of 2005.  The sophistication of the banking business, products and services 
improved signiﬁcantly both on the asset and liability side  with banks diversifying
their activities into leasing, factoring, insurance, pension and investment funds, 
cash and asset management to satisfy the ever rising needs and demand of 
both the corporate and the household sectors for enhanced services, and alter-
native investment and savings instruments.
Source: BNB
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Source: Bulgarian National Bank
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Assets % GDP 72.10% 86.10% 92.30% 101.10% 108.90%
Loans to clients  64,111 89,674 106,731 121,913
 % y-o-y change   39.87% 19.02% 14.22%
Loans to deposits 113.20% 73.80% 89.80% 93.40% 97.10%
Deposits % of GDP 31.80% 56.90% 56.90% 57.90% 59.80%
Household loans %of GDP 36.00% 42.00% 51.10% 54.10% 58.10%
Corporate Loans % GDP 20.70% 23.10% 26.20% 25.60% 25.80%
Capital Adequacy 21.30% 18.50% 17.20% 16.20% 15.30%
Interest rate spread 7.10% 6.80% 7.30% 7.0% 7.30%
NPLs % of Total loans 9.50% 7.30% 5.90% 5.10% 4.60%
Market Share of state-
owned banks in assets 5.70% 5.0% 4.0% 3.40% 3.10%
Market Share of foreign-
owned banks in assets 84.10% 89.30% 90.20% 91.00% 91.30%
Concetration in assets 62.00% 60.00% 58.60% 61.00% 65.00%
Croatia
Source: Bank of Croatia, Bank Austria Credit Anstalt 
Croatia is the country with the highest degree of ﬁnancial intermediation in the
region as measured by all indicators of ﬁnancial intermediation and deepening.
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With total banking assets in GDP of 109%, loans to household and corporate 
sector comprising 84% and deposits 59.8% of GDP as well as with loan to 
deposits ratio of 97.1% as of 2005 Croatia is not only the leader among the six 
countries but also compares vary favorably with the more advanced countries 
from the CEE.  The banking sector beneﬁted from the strong inﬂow of foreign
capital at much earlier stage of the restructuring and privatization of the banking 
system and currently accounts for the highest share in the Croation banking sys-
tem assets as compared with the other ﬁve countries in the region and among
the CEE countries. Strong funding and capital support, introduction of modern 
business practices, services and products, radical shift of focus towards lending 
and expansion in the retail and corporate sectors, enhanced risk management 
and IT systems and improved corporate governance brought about by the for-
eign partners combined with macroeconomic and political stability and prosper-
ity and improved operating environment helped the impressive expansion of the 
banking sector business and the performance of the banks. 
Romania
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Nominal GDP in mln of 
RON 80,377 116,769 151,475 190,335 238,791 281,200
  % y-o-y change  45.28% 29.72% 25.65% 25.46% 17.76%
Banking Assets % GDP 28.90% 30.20% 31.60% 32.60% 38.30% 45.59%
Non-government credit in 
mln of RON 7,501 11,825 17,873 30,288 41,762 61,864
% y-o-y change  57.66% 51.14% 69.46% 37.88% 48.13%
Non-government credit in 
% GDP 9.33% 10.10% 11.80% 15.30% 17.00% 21.10%
Non-government credit 11,230 16,984 25,542 36,397 50,183 66,682 
% y-o-y change  51.24% 50.39% 42.50% 37.88% 32.88%
Loans to households 52 121 426 1808 4023 10285
% y-o-y change  132.69% 252.07% 324.41% 122.51% 155.65%
Household loans % total loans 0.46% 0.71% 1.67% 4.97% 8.02% 15.42%
Loans to deposits 49.5 53.2 56.3 78.2 75.8 71.0
Deposits % of GDP 18.9 19 21 20.5 23.1 17.7
Household loans %of GDP 9.3 10.1 11.8 16 17.5 12.6%
Corporate Loans % GDP 8.8 9.4 10.4 12.1 12.5 23.0
NPLs % total loans 6.4 3.9 2.8 8.3 8.1 8.3
Capital Adequacy 23.8 28.8 25.04 21.09 20.64 20.3
Concentration of assets 65.4 66.1 62.8 61.5 59.2 58.8
Market Share in Assets of 
State-owned banks 46.1 41.8 40.4 37.5 6.9 6.0
Market Share in Assets of 
foreign-owned banks 53.8 60.6 64.9 66.3 62.1 62.2
Source: Bank of Romania, Bank Austria Credit Anstalt  and own calculations
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Romania is the country with the smallest banking sector compared to its large size 
and among the lowest level of ﬁnancial intermediation in the region despite the
tremendous growth rates of lending in the last 3 years with the share of total bank-
ing assets in GDP of 45.59% as of the end of 2005. The share of GDP accounted 
for by corporate lending is also particularly low in Romania, amounting to only 
12.5% at the end of 2004 and 23% in 2005. The population though overbanked 
especially with the recent expansion of bank branches is heavily underserviced 
as evidenced by the low though very dynamically increasing share of household’s 
credits in GDP of 17.5% at the end of 2004 and 12.6% in 2005. Persistently low 
level of conﬁdence to the national currency and the banking system, still insufﬁ-
cient marketing efforts and low pace of modernization of the banking services and 
products combined with recent rebound in economic activities hampered the mo-
bilization of deposits in the banking system. The dynamics of the share of deposits 
in GDP is very volatile, with deposits growth reaching its peak in 2004 before 
subsiding again in 2005 accounting for just 17.7% of GDP. The ratio of loans to 
deposits increased signiﬁcantly in the last three years due to the enormous growth
in lending activity, but decreased again in 2005 due to the restrictive measures of 
the Central banks curbing the growth of household deposits.
The major reasons behind were the slow processes of the restructuring and 
privatization in both the real and the banking sector, and the hesitant and incon-
sistent political approach to allowing foreign capital penetration in the banking 
sector which combined with the very volatile macroeconomic environment (high 
inﬂation and exchange rate volatility) and political instability led to very slow
monetization of the economy despite its impressive stabilization and growth. 
Major achievements during the period were the rehabilitation, recapitalization 
and the privatization of the banking sector initiated already in 1999-2000 but 
only completed with the privatization of the last two but largest state-owned 
bank - BCR in 2005 and the CEC Savings Bank in 2006. This resulted in the 
decrease of the state-owned banks in the banking system assets from 46.1% in 
2000 to only 6% in 2005.  The privatization of the banks was accompanied by 
the increase in the foreign capital presence in the banking sector as measured 
by the share of the majority foreign owned banks in the banking system’ assets 
from 53.8% in 2000 to 62.2% in 2005. (69.3% in total banking system’ equity). 
The penetration of foreign banks is even more pronounced if we take into ac-
count the relatively high concentration in the sector where the largest ﬁve banks,
which are majority foreign-owned banks, account for 58.8 % of the banking 
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system’s assets. However, except for Serbia, Romania has the lowest share of 
foreign capital penetration among the six countries.
Banking sector solvency has improved sharply in recent years, thanks mainly to the 
successful privatization and steadily higher minimum capital requirements. High 
capital adequacy ratio, however, evidence the still high aversion to lending due 
in part to the very tight regulation of the banking sector and restrictive monetary 
measures but also to the insufﬁcient improvements in risk assessment and man-
agement in the banks. The asset structure of the banking sector reveals a persist-
ent focus on low-risk business with interbank market operations, accounting for still 
very high though diminishing share in assets (31.8%) and credit to non-govern-
ment, non-banking sector only slowly increasing (47.3% at the end of 2005). The 
crowding-out of the private sector is still high while at the same time this structure 
dramatically increases the banks’ vulnerability to unexpected exchange rate and 
interest rate movements. Moreover, the bulk of lending to the private sector is in 
foreign currency which adds implicitly to the credit risk of the banks.
Albania
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2Q/2005
Banking System Assets in 
billions ALL 270.8 318.5 339.3 373.6 426.4 476.8
                  % y-o-y change 17.61% 6.53% 10.11% 14.13% 11.82%
Assets % GDP 50.20% 53.50% 51.60% 50.20% 51.90% n.a.
Loans to clients            27,725 30,642 32,070 37,111 41,342 58,374 
 % y-o-y change 10.52% 4.66% 15.72% 11.40% 41.20%
Placements with other 
banks 27,285 29,576 33,803 37,301
% y-o-y change 8.40% 14.29% 10.35% 10.20%
% change in Other 
securities 46.70%
Loans to deposits 9.10% 10.20% 13.50% 15.70% 19.00%
NPLs % of Total loans 36.3 7 5.5 4.5 4.2
Deposits % of GDP 47.90% 46.80% 45.40% 46.50% 47.30%
Household loans %of GDP 1.60% 0.70% 1.10% 1.80% 2.70%
Corporate Loans % GDP 2.80% 4.10% 5.10% 5.60% 6.20%  
Capital adequacy 42 35.3 31.6 28.5 21.6
Market Share of state-
owned banks in assets 42 35.3 31.6 28.5 21.6
Source: Bank of Albania, Bank Austria Credit Anstalt  and own calculations
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Albania ranks forth in terms of the share of banking sector assets in GDP (53.5% 
in 2004) and second in terms of deposits to GDP (47.4% in 2004) yet has the low-
est level of ﬁnancial intermediation and deepening of the private and household
sectors with the shares of household and corporate loans in GDP of only 8.9% 
and 6.2%, respectively at the end of 2004. The reasons were the slow process of 
restructuring and privatization of the banking sector in the face of the tremendous 
scales of the problems of the non-performing loans. This led to prolonged time of 
credit freeze and restrictions on lending activities of the banks in an effort to sta-
bilize the ﬁnancial health of the sector. Combined with insufﬁcient capitalization,
limited access to funding and the lack of attractive investment opportunities in the 
slowly developing real sector and the  low wealth levels of the population, due in 
part to high unemployment this limited the activities of the banks to treasury and 
interbank operations and investments in foreign securities. 
However, the period 2000-2005 was marked by the completion of the restructur-
ing and privatization process resulting in the now much healthier, better capitalized 
and modernized banking system. With more adequate ﬁnancial resources, the
banks are now both more willing and capable to intermediate both the corporate 
and the retail sector. Moreover, the Albanian banking sector now ranks among the 
countries with the highest foreign majority ownership in the region, with majority 
foreign-owned banks accounting for over 90% of total banking system’ assets.
The results were quick to come and 2005 saw a boom in the credit activities 
of the banks with half year volumes exceeding the volumes of 2004. The most 
dynamic component are the household credits, followed by corporate credits. 
Thease developments are driven by strong demand due to rising consumption, 
booming real estate market and investment activities of the corporations.
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Macedonia
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Nominal GDP in mln of 
denars 236,389 233,841 243,970 251,486 265,257 284,027
   % y-o-y change  -1.08% 4.33% 3.08% 5.48% 7.08%
Banking Assets % GDP 55.60% 54.90% 49.90% 52.00% 56.70% 53.35%
Non-government credit in 
mln of RON 27,725 30,642 32,070 37,111 45,889 58,908
   % y-o-y change  10.52% 4.66% 15.72% 23.65% 28.37%
Non-government credit in 
% GDP 10.80% 11.00% 11.60% 13.40% 17.30% 20.74%
Loans to deposits 72.5 42.3 52.8 52.7 58.8 60.1
Deposits % of GDP 14.9 26 22 25.4 29.4 34.5
Household loans %of GDP 1.5 1.5 2.2 3.5 5.4  
Corporate Loans % GDP 9.3 9.5 9.4 10 11.9  
NPLs % total loans 34.8 33.7 15.9 15.1 13.2 10.9
Capital Adequacy 36.8 35.3 28.1 25.8 23 21.3
Concentration of assets 55.8 55.5 54.1 55.5 52.9 66.1
Market Share in Assets 
of State-owned banks 1.1 1.3 2 1.8 1.9  
Market Share in Assets 
of foreign-owned banks 53.4 51.1 44 46.9 47.3  
Interest rate margin 7.70 9.50 8.80 8.00 5.90 6.90
ROE 3.8 -3.2 2.1 2.3 2.3 8.1
ROA 0.8 -0.7 0.4 0.5 1.1 1.3
Macedonia has one of the least developed banking systems in the region de-
spite the relatively high number of banks compared to its small population. (21 
banks and a population of 2.1 million at the end of 2004). Despite the fact that 
the country is overbanked and ranks favorably compared to Serbia, Albania and 
Romania in terms of most of the indicators, the level of ﬁnancial intermediation
is low and progress in its deepening as well as the development in the banking 
sector is very slow compared to its peers. Macedonia lags behind most of the 
countries in terms of growth in assets and most importantly in lending activities 
to the corporate and the retail sector, except for the recent boom in the consum-
er lending. This is mainly due to the low level of development and sophistication 
of the banking sector, still heavily burdened with non-performing loans, and con-
tinued practices of inefﬁcient lending to the corporate sector, resulting from the
inefﬁcient ownership structure of the banks and poor corporate governance.
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Slow process of banking and real sector restructuring and privatization and weak 
macroeconomic environment prevented a sizable inﬂow of foreign capital in the
country and Macedonia has one of the lowest levels of foreign capital presence in 
the banking system. (Majority foreign-owned banks’ share of  47.3% in total assets).
Serbia
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Banking Assets % GDP 185.20% 126.70% 36.40% 31.50% 38.80%
Loans to deposits 385 237.3 111.4 90.3 104.1
Deposits % of GDP 14.7 13.4 15.5 17.7 20.7
Household loans %of GDP 56.6 31.7 17.2 16 21.5
Corporate Loans % GDP 54.5 29.7 15.2 13.2 16.2
NPLs % total loans 13.7 12.7 24.3 22.5 23.3
Capital Adequacy 0.7 21.9 30.6 31.3 27.9
Concentration of assets   46.6 39.5 47.3
Market Share in Assets of 
State-owned banks 91.4 65.5 49.4 46.7 34.7
Market Share in Assets of 
foreign-owned banks 1.4 13.2 27 22.9 37.7
Interest rate margin 71.60 28.40 16.50 12.10 11.00
ROE -78.5 -26 -34.5 -1.2 -5
ROA -6.2 -3.6 -8.7 -0.3 -1
Serbia is a special case in the region due to the very late start of the profound bank-
ing sector reforms following a period of a prolonged political, military and economic 
turmoil, economic sanctions and international isolation. The period 2000-2004 was 
marked by sweeping and probably the most radical reforms of the banking sector 
in the region, including: the closure of the four major banks accounting for 60% of 
banking sector assets and three quarters of the outstanding commercial loans; the 
mergers between ﬁfteen other banks; a considerable cleansing up of bank portfolios
and the recapitalization of banks.  Closing down of banks and consolidations result-
ed in the reduction of the number of banks and a considerable improvements in the 
capitalization and liquidity of banks but also to a considerable reduction in all indica-
tors of ﬁnancial intermediation. The turning point in the development of the banking
system was 2004 which was characterized by a rebound of the lending activities of 
the banks. Furthermore, the entrance of foreign banks played a prominent role in the 
restoration of the conﬁdence in the banking sector helping the growth of the banking
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sector deposits, with foreign banks accounting for the lion share in new deposits.
All these positive developments, notwithstanding, the banking sector develop-
ment has still a long way to go.
The review of the development of the banking sector reveals that the level of ﬁnan-
cial intermediation as measured by the share of total banking assets/GDP, private 
sector credits/GDP and private sector deposits/GDP differs substantially among the 
six countries and as compared with the Euro zone ranging between 108.9%(61.7%, 
60.3%) for Croatia, followed by Bulgaria with 65% (35.5%, 39.4) and 38.3% (18.4%, 
24.1%) for Romania and compared with the Euro zone average of 206%(102%,73%). 
Furthermore, the evolution and the deepening of the ﬁnancial intermediation seems
to be associated with the timing and scope of the foreign capital penetration as most 
of the lending and deposit growth appeared only after a sizable entry of foreign capi-
tal following large scale privatizations of banks. Countries with the most dynamic 
growth of credits to private sector and deposit growth are those with the highest 
share of foreign banks Bulgaria ( 85% of total assets), Croatia (91%), Albania (90%) 
and recently Romania. The reasons were that foreign banks brought about  not 
just capital and access to external funds that helped resolve the undercapitalization 
and illiquidity  problems of the banks, but helped restore conﬁdence to the banking
systems, devastated by ﬁnancial crises, introduced  prudent and advanced lending
practices, new products and services, customer orientation, modern risk assess-
ment and management practices, IT upgrades that helped both risk management 
and reach out broader customer base, and western style corporate  governance that 
made the banks both more capable and willing to intermediate the private sector.
2. Country analysis of proﬁtability and efﬁciency of the banking sector
The paper next makes a comparative analysis of the evolution and current state 
of the proﬁtability and efﬁciency of the banking sectors in each country with
emphasis of the contribution of foreign capital entry on these developments. 
Using quantitative (Dupont analysis) and qualitative methods (assessment of 
the quality of earnings, assets and liabilities, business strategy, product mix, risk 
management and corporate governance etc.) the paper examines the evolution 
of the determinants of the banking sector proﬁtability and efﬁciency.
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The Dupont model is based on the following identities starting with the 
return on equity (ROE) as the generally accepted measure of proﬁtability of
an investment:
ROE = EAT/EBT x TA/E x ROA
Where: EAT/EBT is the ratio of after-tax earnings to earning before tax and 
measures the success of tax management policy.
TA/E  is the ratio of total assets to equity and  is a measure of ﬁnancial
leverage.
Both of the above indicators are relatively stable over time.
ROA is the return on assets, deﬁned as earnings before tax to equity and
measures the ability to generate revenues from assets after all expenditures 
are covered and is the most widely used indicator of comparing banks ef-
ﬁciency and proﬁtability.
ROA or return on assets is further disaggregated into:
ROA = NNII/TA + EA/TA x (IR-IE)/EA
Where:
NNII/TA is the ratio of net non-interest income to total assets and along with other 
indicators measures the bank’s success in maintaining control over operating costs. 
Very high levels of this ratio may indicate low credit activity, heavy reliance on non-
core activities and a focus on investments and foreign exchange transactions. This 
implies high exposure to market risk, lack of diversiﬁcation of revenues and assets
and therefore high volatility and unsustainability of earnings.
EA/TA is the ratio of earnings assets to total assets. It is indicative of the 
strategic focus of the bank and the success in diversiﬁcation of business and
product mix and therefore, of revenue diversiﬁcation. It may be affected by the
competition and the monetary policy.
(IR – IE)/EA – Interest revenue minus Interest expenditures to earnings as-
sets or net interest margin (NIM) is a key indicator representing the net income 
achieved from the core intermediation activities of the banks from investing 
trough borrowed funds.
NIM can be further analyzed by breaking it down into: the return on earn-
ings assets as measured by the ratio of interest revenues to earnings asset 
which is largely reﬂective of the level and intensity of competition, the cost of
liabilities as measured by the ratio of interest expenditures to liabilities, which 
depends on the access to funding and the ability to mobilize deposits, and the 
ratio of liabilities to earnings assets as a measure of intensity of bank’s invest-
ment activities and business focus.   
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Apart from revealing the determinants of the proﬁtability and efﬁciency of the
banking sector in each country, the Dupont analysis’ indicators will be reﬂective
of the developments in the banking sector capturing also the impact of foreign 
capital penetration in terms of deepening ﬁnancial intermediation, better risk
management, business strategy and corporate governance.
The analysis includes various other indicators of cost efﬁciency, non-performing
loans, capitalization and liquidity of the banks as well as the developments in inter-
est margin that  help capture the effect of foreign capital entry in terms of competi-
tive environment, micro- and  macroeconomic efﬁciency of ﬁnancial intermedia-
tion and  risk management, improvements in ﬁnancial soundness and stability of
the banks and the sustainability of efﬁciency and proﬁtability in the future.
When using the components of the Dupont system the generally accepted rule 
says that if the sector is competitive the proﬁt margin should decrease over time
as a result of efﬁciency gains due to the decreased overheads, transferred to
customers. Enhanced corporate governance, efﬁcient cost control systems, and
productivity gains would normally lead to a steady decrease in the non-interest 
expense to net operating income and cost to assets ratios despite considerable 
investment and labor cost, contributing to improved efﬁciency. High overheads
especially with respect to proﬁt before taxes are clearly an indicator of inef-
ﬁciency.
The relative weight of interest revenue and non-interest revenue is also of spe-
ciﬁc importance here as its evolution reﬂects the changing role of the banking
system in the ﬁnancial deepening of the economy, as well as the ability of the
banks to diversify the sources of their revenues.
Since economies of scale and scope are an extremely important factor for the 
efﬁciency and proﬁtability gains of the banks, the superiority of the foreign banks
in providing the bulk of net loans due to better risk assessment and credit expan-
sion expertise attracts special attention. Moreover, since foreign banks seem to 
rely less on deposit-based funding, and have much better access to whole-sale 
and parents capital, loan growth is usually stronger and less volatile, contributing 
to better performance results.
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The Bulgarian Banking sector
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Gross Domestic Product 12,163,859 13,678,506 15,190,078 16,532,665 17,663,418 19,433,389 21,188,000 
Banking System Assets  4,204,572 4,997,121 6,248,257 7,442,939 8,857,438 12,740,043 16,796,390 
  % y-o-y change  19.40% 25.04% 19.12% 19.00% 43.83% 31.84%
Loans to clients 1,226,808 1,545,254 2,119,747 3,085,092 4,609,015 6,823,269 9,068,920 
 % y-o-y change  24.94% 37.18% 45.54% 49.40% 48.04% 32.91%
Total Deposits 3,122,146 3,638,456 4,885,748 5,768,477 6,950,254 9,984,720 12,993,214 
 % y-o-y change 16.43% 34.28% 18.07% 20.49% 43.66% 30.13%
Loans to deposits 39.29% 42.47% 43.39% 53.48% 66.31% 68.34% 69.80%
Assets % GDP 34.57% 36.53% 41.13% 45.02% 50.15% 65.56% 79.27%
Loans % GDP 10.09% 11.30% 13.95% 18.66% 26.09% 35.11% 42.80%
ROA 2.47% 3.14% 2.90% 1.99% 2.38% 2.06% 2.02%
ROE 16.45% 20.35% 20.25% 14.85% 18.02% 17.32% 18.91%
Net Interest Margin 4.87% 5.47% 5.09% 4.57% 5.55% 5.70% 5.47%
Cost-Income Ratio* 59.48% 50.06% 62.94% 63.23% 61.99% 57.77% 54.74%
Loan Loss Reserve Ratio na 6.50% 5.16% 4.11% 3.85% 3.37% 3.49%
Net Interest Income/Gross 
operating Income      88.04% 65.54%
Price of Financing      1.94% 3.09%
Recurring earnings power      1.85% 2.27%
Standard Loans (% total 
loans) 88.28% 91.80% 92.98% 94.47% 92.72% 93.12% na
Equity/Assets ratio 15.55% 15.35% 13.54% 13.30% 13.17% 10.97% 10.49%
Tier I CAR 30.31% 25.10% 22.01% 17.05% 14.40% 14.06% na
Total CAR 41.31% 35.64% 31.32% 25.22% 22.03% 16.08% na
Degree of asset coverage 15.28% 15.15% 13.60% 12.75% 13.24% 9.84% na
Source: BNB and own calculations
* adjusted cost/income ratio to exclude other non-interest income for 2003: 65.87%, 2004:60.35% and 2005:58.13%
Note: BNB requires a 6.0% Tier I ratio and 12% total CAR 
The performance of the now transformed and predominantly foreign-owned 
banking sector in Bulgaria improved signiﬁcantly during the period 2000-2005
with the increasing share of assets deployed in loan rather than trading activi-
ties, government securities and interbank placements and the elimination of their 
heavy dependence on one-off gains from currency revaluations and on revenues 
in which banks have little inﬂuence on yields. The earnings have been increas-
ingly diversiﬁed with revenues from lending now dominating the earnings proﬁle
and with the broadening client base and revenue mix that improved their quality 
and sustainability. The diversiﬁcation of revenues, the increased volume and
diversiﬁcation of lending led to improved and more sustainable results despite
the decreasing interest rate margins resulting from the intensiﬁed competition.
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Revenue growth was driven by high net interest income from the booming loan 
activity and strong fees and commission income on new products and services, 
both in lending and borrowing. Steady revenue growth from core operations, 
high net interest revenue, supported by increased share of the higher margin 
retail and SMEs sectors were the most signiﬁcant determinants of ROE and
ROA. They were further supported by strong deposit base of the banks which 
dominate their funding proﬁle (72% share of customer deposits in total liabilities)
and beneﬁted from positive inﬂows due to increasing corporate and household
wealth and liquidity. Banks have been also diversifying further their funding pro-
ﬁle by increasing recourse to capital markets both at home and abroad.
The graduate decline of ROE and ROA over the period reﬂected the outpacing
growth of assets compared with the main revenue sources (interest, fees and com-
missions), diminishing average return on earnings assets due to declining lending 
rates resulting from the intensiﬁed competition, rising cost of funding and provision-
ing and higher non-interest costs driven by the investment requirements in new IT 
and infrastructure upgrade and new distribution channels. This was reﬂected in the
declining net interest margin from 5.7% in 2004 to 5.5 % in 2005. All these trends 
notwithstanding, and despite of the tightening monetary measures which curbed 
the credit expansion from the peak of 43% in 2004 to less than 20% in 2005, net 
proﬁts continued to rise which is especially pronounced in the last two years. The
net income of the system amounted to €299m in 2005, up from €222m in 2004. 
Despite the stiffened competition between the banks, resulting in a decrease of the 
interest rates on loans and increase of the interest rates on deposits, the proﬁtability
of the banking system remained robust. Proﬁts, however, are concentrated among
the largest banks which beneﬁt from pricing power, economies of scale, more ef-
ﬁcient allocation of funds and good cost management. In 2005 the ROE of the
system increased from 17.3% in 2004 to 18.9%, the ROA remained almost ﬂat – at
2.0% and the net interest margin decreased from 5.7% in 2004 to 5.5%. 
The interest rates spread (measured as the difference between the weighted 
average interest rate on BGN-denominated long- and short-term loans and 
overdraft and the weighted average interest rate on the BGN-denominated term 
deposits of households and institutions, incl. savings deposits and overnight) 
continued to decrease to 7.26% as of the end of December 2005. The decline 
was driven mainly by the decrease of the weighted average interest rate on 
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loans to 8.88% in December 2005 with interest rate on deposits increasing only 
slightly to 1.62%. The interest rates on corporate loans (short- and long-run) 
decreased to 9.10% in December 2005, whereas the average interest rate on 
consumer loans (short- and long-run) decreased to 10.58% in December 2005, 
narrowing the spread between the consumer and corporate loans to 1.48%. The 
decrease of the rates on consumer loans resulted from the increased competi-
tion in the banking sector and the desire of the banks to offer more favorable 
rates for the long-term loans, associated with a longer “binding” of the clients 
and guaranteeing interest and non-interest income of the banks.
Despite robust credit expansion the asset quality remained good with nonperforming 
loans to total customer loans of 3.6%, at the same time the standard loans increased 
from 92.72% in 2003 to 93.12% in 2004. Capitalization although declining from the 
previously high level to 16.08 % currently is adequate and well above the required 
minimum of 12% and the degree of balance-sheet liquidity is high. Thus the ﬁnancial
health of the banking system and the quality and degree of their intermediation be-
tween the borrowers and savers improved dramatically. The efﬁciency ratio (56.67
per cent by June 2005) improved both on June 2004 (60.58 per cent) and on the 
same period of 2003 (63.46 per cent) showing good proﬁtability at most institutions.
The impressive improvements in pre-provisioning income provides a comfortable 
cushion against unexpected deterioration of loan quality and was the source for inter-
nal generation of capital needed for the business expansion of the banks, investments 
in new product and service lines, modernization and technological innovation.
Under the conditions of the restrictive monetary policy, increased credit risk 
and intensiﬁed completion, as well as squeezing net interest margin, the banks
sought to diversify their revenues and enhance their proﬁtability by entering new
lines of businesses like investment banking and consulting, underwriting bonds, 
discretionary and non-discretionary asset management, custody, trading, leas-
ing, factoring, investment and pension plans and life insurance etc. that along 
with protection against squeezing net interest margins provided them with pro-
tection against loss due to increasing savings and asset disintermediation.  
The wholesale banking is increasingly turned into a mix of fee-generating and loan 
providing services in order to support corporate sector needs. In addition to provid-
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ing loans to businesses the banks started to explore opportunities for underwriting 
bonds, arranging project ﬁnance for the large projects in the local market expected
to be launched within the EU initiatives, provide advisory, trading, custody and as-
set management services to support their ﬁnancial plans and growth.
The banks now control fully the intermediation between savers and borrowers 
and most of the other areas of ﬁnancial activities like share brokerage, fund man-
agement, leasing companies and insurance. As the ﬁnancial markets develop,
opportunities will increase for banks to diversify and enhance their earnings as 
well as to lower their risks through new services and products. 
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The Croatian Banking system
in millions Kunas and % 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2Q/2005
Total Assets 148,428 174,139 204,115 229,305 235,748
   % y-o-y change  17.32% 17.21% 12.34% 2.81%
Loans to non-ﬁnancial institutions and
households  64,111 89,674 106,731 121,913 134,929
    % y-o-y change  39.87% 19.02% 14.22% 10.68%
Loans/assets  43.19% 51.50% 52.29% 53.17% 57.23%
Total Liabilities  134,732 157,630 185,958 209,623 214,995
Deposits  104,697 124,472 143,693 155,278 155,947
   % y-o-y change  18.89% 15.44% 8.06% 0.43%
Deposits/liabilities  77.71% 78.96% 77.27% 74.07% 72.54%
Loans/Deposits  61.23% 72.04% 74.28% 78.51% 86.52%
Equity  13,696 16,509 18,157 19,681 20,753
Equity/liabilities  10.17% 10.47% 9.76% 9.39% 9.65%
Equity/deposits  13.08% 13.26% 12.64% 12.67% 13.31%
ROA 1.40% 0.90% 1.60% 1.60% 1.70% 1.50%
ROE 10.70% 6.60% 13.70% 14.50% 16.10% 14.50%
Interest income   9,919 11,093 11,825 6,237
Interest expenditure   4,655 4,784 5,368 2,790
Net interest income   5,264 6,309 6,457 3,447
NIM 4.19% 3.56% 3.02% 3.09% 3.00% 3.00%
Net Income from commissions and fees  1,373 1,482 1,642 910
Net Other income   1,580 1,494 1,819 228
Net non-interest income   2,953 2,976 3,461 1,137
Total non-interest expenses   1,932 2,317 2,058 913
Overhead&depreciation   4,427 4,832 5,055 2,583
Net operating income before provisions   3,096 3,666 4,244 2,001
Gross operating income   14,110 15,598 16,726 8,287
Provisions   552 655 552 180
EBT   2,544 3,011 3,693 1,775
Net Income   2,075 2,507 3,142 1,461
Total Operating expenses   11,014 11,933 12,481 6,286
Operating costs/assets 3.44% 3.08% 6.32% 5.85% 5.44% 2.67%
Non-interest expense/net operating income 61.74% 63.96% 67.98% 63.20% 48.49% 45.63%
Net Interest Income/Gross operating 
Income   37.31% 40.45% 38.60% 41.60%
Price of Financing   2.95% 2.57% 2.56% 1.30%
Non-performing placements in % of total 
placements 9.50% 7.30% 5.90% 5.10% 4.60% 4.30%
Capital Adequacy 21.30% 18.50% 17.20% 16.20% 15.33% 15.06%
Interest rate spread 3.30% 3.80% 7.30% 7.00% 7.30% 7.70%
Source: Bank of Croatia  and own calculations
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Source: National  Bank of Croatia 
Source: National Bank of Croatia 
Proﬁtability and efﬁciency evolution of the banking sector in Croatia reﬂect the
beneﬁts associated with the strong foreign banks penetration into the system,
which contributed to the competition, modernization and strengthening of the 
banking business on both the asset and liability side, in terms of volumes and 
quality of banking products and services. Earnings have improved strongly since 
2000, with increasing share of revenues from core banking activities and di-
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versiﬁcation into new lines of activities leading to a steady increase of income
from commissions and fees. Credit expansion was accompanied by signiﬁcant
improvements in assets quality due to better bank risk management.  The re-
duction in the share of non-performing loans reduced sharply the provisioning 
costs of the banks and was among the major factors behind the improvement 
of the net results of the banks. The share of non-performing placements to total 
placements decreased from 9.5% in 2000 to 4.3% in 2005. Enhanced corpo-
rate governance, efﬁcient cost control systems, realized economies of scale and
productivity gains led to a steady decrease in the non-interest expense to net 
operating income and cost to assets ratios despite considerable investment and 
labor cost, contributing to improved efﬁciency. Restrictive monetary measures
as well as banks’ successful efforts in mobilizing deposits improved the fund-
ing proﬁle of the banks limiting to a certain extent its previous heavy reliance
on foreign borrowings and allowing to keep control on funding costs despite 
intensifying competition leading to a rise in the interest rates on deposits. Re-
cent decrease in the net interest margin, despite the relatively stable interest 
rate spreads can be attributed to the decrease in the interest earnings assets 
associated with the restrictive monetary policy. High minimum liquidity require-
ments and the requirements of the banks to maintain a minimum coverage of 
their foreign currency liabilities in short-term foreign currency claims imposed by 
the Central bank to curb the foreign borrowings of the banks which was heavily 
used by the banks to ﬁnance their domestic credit expansion have led to a shift
in the asset structure of the banks towards lower yielding assets that have had a 
negative effet on the proﬁtability of the banks.
In Croatia the predominance of the lending to households as opposed to cor-
porate lending and within the retail sector, is predominated by mortgage lend-
ing against consumer lending. This structure enhances proﬁtability from higher
exposure to the higher margin retail sector and improves the risk proﬁle of the
credit portfolios of the banks due to the collateralized nature of housing loans as 
opposed to uncollateralized consumer lending and the high concentration risk 
of corporate lending. It also reﬂects the high level of household intermediation in
Croatia. On the other hand, however, still low levels of corporate lending reveals 
the insufﬁcient levels of banking intermediation of the private corporate sector
and the conservative risk-taking approach to consumer lending, further restraint 
by the restrictive monetary policy.
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The considerably lower rates of credit growth in recent years in Croatia accounts for 
the major differences between the ROE and ROA evolution in the Bulgarian and the 
Croatian banking sector. Despite of the comparable interest rate margins, the net-
interest margin of the Bulgarian banks is considerably higher contributing to much 
better results in terms of ROA and ROE. Part of the explanation of these results is 
also the differences in concentration levels of the banking sectors in the two coun-
tries. Much higher concentration in the Croatian sector allows for efﬁciency gains
due to economies of scale, however, ﬁerce rivalry within the more segmented Bul-
garian banking sector exerts hard pressure on improving efﬁciency of the banks.
The dynamics of the ROE and ROA for the Romanian Banking sector has been 
volatile reﬂecting the dynamic and radical changes in the banking industry and
operating environment of the banks. Though much higher until 2002 ROE and 
ROA were largely associated with the volatile macroeconomic environment (high 
inﬂation and interest rates) with banks beneﬁting from investments in government
The Romanian Banking system
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
ROA 1.5 3.1 2.6 2.2 2 1.7
ROE 12.5 21.8 18.3 15.8 15.6 13.0
Equity/Assets 8.62 12.11 11.61 10.89 8.93 8.8
General risk ratio 38.67 39.73 42.9 50.57 46.95 47.8
Interbank placements/
assets 37.08 38.62 38.75 32.77 33.58 29.5
Loans to clients/Assets 30.5 32.02 35.9 48.24 45.64 46.6
Net interest income less 
provisions/assets    4.1 4.1 3.0
Net interest income less 
provisions/gross income    11.6 15.3 6.3
Liquid assets/total assets    62.7 63.6 61.8
Liquid assets/short-term 
liabilities    210.8 193.9 245.7
f.c.loans/total loans    56.4 61.5 54.4
f.c.liabilities/total liabilities    45 46.8 44.3
off-balance-sheet credit 
equivalents/total loans    35.3 33.8 33.9
monthly average T-Bill 
yield 62.4 38.4 17.4 18.4 11.5 6.2
real monthly average 
T-Bill yield 15.4 6.3 -0.3 3.7 2 -2.2
Interest Rate Spread 20.8 19.6 18.3 15.4 14.5 17.7
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securities providing high, risk-free return and very high interest margins in the cor-
porate and retail sectors to compensate for the very low credit volumes.  Further-
more, improvements in ﬁnancial results were associated with the decrease in the
provisioning requirements due to a large extent to the cleansing up of the portfolios 
of the banks, by transferring non-performing loans to a specialized agency, but also 
due to the very risk averse lending behavior of the banks which engaged mainly in 
foreign currency and trading activities and safe investments at the expense of the 
lending to the real sector, comprising only 30% of their assets. Despite the impres-
sive ﬁgures of ROE and ROA, the proﬁts of the banks were meager and insufﬁcient
to generate internal capital which coupled with their low capitalization did not allow 
sizable expansion of the banks. Subsiding inﬂation rates, accompanied by decreas-
ing interest rates and yields on the government securities market forced the banks 
to seek opportunities to enhance proﬁtability by increasing their exposure to the
corporate and the retail sectors. This was further facilitated by the bank’s now much 
better capitalization resulting from the restructuring and the privatization of banks 
associated with large capital injections as well as by the improved funding proﬁle
of the banks with the rebound in the growth of the deposits from households and 
corporations and sizable inﬂow of foreign capital into the banking system.
The period after 2003 saw the ﬁrst visible results of improved proﬁtability due to
core banking activities with net proﬁts rising at double digits rates due mainly to
the expansion of net interest margin associated with the tremendous increase 
in the lending activities of the banks to the non-government sector. Moreover, 
the banks with the largest increase in their credit market share accounted for the 
bulk of the proﬁtability growth rates.
Net interest margin increased on the back of a tremendous increase in the vol-
ume of lending to corporations and households which grew more than eightfold 
between 2000 and 2005 and now account for 47.3% of the banking system as-
sets compared to 30.5% in 2000 and 36% in 2002. Improvements of proﬁtability
and efﬁciency were also associated with better diversiﬁcation of revenues in
terms of client and product base, which allowed banks to make proﬁts despite
the fast decreasing interest margins due to monetary policy measures and as 
competition for market share intensiﬁed. Moreover, strengthened and efﬁcient
credit risk control allowed credit expansion without a signiﬁcant deterioration of
the quality of assets, despite tightening classiﬁcation requirements.
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Still low contribution of interest revenues from lending activity, high proportions of 
provisioning costs, combined with still insufﬁcient interest income lead to low and
diminishing net interest margins despite the high interest rate margins and the rela-
tively low funding costs of the banks as low interest deposits provide the main fund-
ing source for the banks. Extremely high liquidity ratios though prudent under the still 
very volatile macroeconomic environment and fragile conﬁdence towards the bank-
ing sector represent a considerable drag on the return of assets. Explosive growth 
of labor, administrative and investment costs associated with the expansion of the 
banking infrastructure is an additional factor for the low efﬁciency of the banks.
The Albanian Banking System
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2Q/2005
Share of Treasury and interbank 
transactions in total assets 80.6% 76.5% 72.4% 69.7%
Incl. treasury bills 51.6% 49.6% 45.8% 44.5%
Incl. interbank transactions 18.3% 16.2% 15.6% 14.7%
Loans to private sector and households 10.9% 12.8% 15.2% 16.1%
Of which: real estate loans 1.9% 2.1% 2.5% 2.5%
Securities transactions 5.0% 5.4% 7.0% 8.9%
Net Interest Income 2,594 1,858 2,430 2,536 3,017 3681.33
      % y-o-y change  -28.37% 30.79% 4.36% 18.97% 22.02%
Net Provisions 2,922 2,542 1,798 2,334 229 45.04
Net Interest income after provisions -328 -684 632 202 2,788  
Net fees and commissions income 1,866 1,802 2,287 1,927 1,103 1069.05
Operating costs 3,084 3,525 4,059 4,281 2,364 2504.35
Operating expenditures 10,691 10,860 11,242 11,088   
Net Income 6,450 -6,200 3,960 4,456 9149 3316
ROE 20.70% 21.60% 19.10% 19.50% 21.10% 24.29%
ROA 2.10% 1.50% 1.20% 1.40% 1.28% 1.46%
NIM -0.50% -0.70% 0.80% 3.23% 3.08% 3.30%
Interest revenue/earning assets 2.60% 1.30% 3.30% 2.00% 6.96% 6.70%
Cost of borrowing 3.30% 2.20% 2.80% 2.00% 3.88% 3.40%
NPLs/total loans 33.60% 7.00% 5.50% 4.50% 4.20% 2.40%
Capital Adequacy 42.00% 35.30% 31.60% 28.50% 21.60% 19.80%
Source: Bank of Albania
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The Albanian banking system shows consistently high results in terms of ROE 
and relatively good results in terms of ROA over the period 2000-2005. A 
closer look at the components of ROE and ROA, and the determinants of 
these results, however, reveal heavy reliance on inter-bank and treasury op-
erations which accounted for the bulk of the banking sector business and 
revenues. Improvements in net results were mainly based on the lucrative 
government securities market providing the banks with consistently high and 
relatively risk-free income at the expense of real sector lending which ac-
counted for just between 11 and 16% of all banking assets. Furthermore, 
improvements in performance were associated with the drastic decrease in 
non-performing loans as a result of the cleansing up of the banking sector 
loan portfolios as part of the restructuring and privatization process of the 
banks from 2002 on. Despite the considerable lending potential judging from 
the high proportion of deposits in GDP (more than 47%) compared to private 
sector lending of just 11% in GDP and loans to deposits ratio of only 19% the 
banks followed extremely risk-averse lending behavior partly because of the 
weak real economy but also as a  result  of the lending freeze imposed on 
the banks with high share of non-performing loans as well as the lending re-
strictions on the largest Savings Bank holding 56.5% of total deposits, which 
resumed its lending activity only in 2005. Despite of the large interest rate 
spread the contribution of net-interest income from lending activities has only 
minimal contribution to proﬁtability and efﬁciency of the banking system. The
risk-averse behavior is also evidenced by the high capital adequacy ratios 
and the high proportion of liquid assets (over 75%) in total assets. 
Starting from 2004 the lending activities of the banks increased particularly 
from the beginning of 2005 with lending volumes in the ﬁrst half of the year
exceeding their annual volume for the whole 2004. Despite narrowing inter-
est rate spreads resulting from the easing of the monetary policy, revenues 
from lending activities increased considerably contributing to improvements 
of the net results despite the  increase in operating expenditures and other 
costs associated with the broadening banking infrastructure, IT upgrades and 
personnel developments. 
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The Macedonian Banking system
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
ROE 3.8 -3.2 2.1 2.3 2.3 8.1
ROA 0.8 -0.7 0.4 0.5 1.1 1.3
Total assets 131,432 128,379 121,741 130,773 150,401 151,528
Placements to other banks 27,285 29,576 33,803 37,301 37,711 42,906
in % assets 20.76% 23.04% 27.77% 28.52% 25.07% 28.32%
Placements to clients 27,725 30,642 32,070 37,111 42,119 62,973
 21.09% 23.87% 26.34% 28.38% 28.00% 41.56%
Liabilities 81,999 105,633 93,213 104,875 109,159 145,377
Equity 19,102 19,159 19,279 20,075 20,479 22,607
Assets/Equity 7 7 6 7 7 7
Net Interest Income 2,594 1,858 2,430 2,536 n.a. 1,300
Net provisions 2,922 2,542 1,798 2,334 199
NII after provisions -328 -684 631 202 n.a. 1,101
Net fees and commissions income 1,866 1,802 2,287 1,927 n.a. 666
Other income 3,039 2,020 2,259 2,902 n.a. 277
incl. extraordinary income 2,306 1,384 1,785 2,136 n.a. 175
Operating costs 3,084 3,225 4,059 4,281 n.a. 1,265
Operating income 11,500 10,346 11,713 11,619 n.a. 2,044
Operating expenditure 10,691 10,860 11,242 11,088 n.a. 1,341
EBT 809 -514 471 531 n.a. 818
Net Income 645 -620 396 448 n.a.  
NIM 1.97% 1.45% 2.00% 1.94% n.a. 0.86%
NNII/TA 3.73% 2.98% 3.73% 3.69%  0.62%
IR/TA 3.90% 3.49% 4.46% 3.95%  1.42%
IE/Liabilitities 33.00% 22.00% 2.80% 2.00%  0.59%
Interest rate margin 7.70 9.50 8.80 8.00 5.90 6.90
NPLs % total loans 34.8 33.7 15.9 15.1 13.2 10.9
Except for the Serbian banking system, the Macedonian banking sector has the 
lowest performance indicators in the region in terms of ROE and ROA. Apart 
from the negative impact from the political crisis in 2001 (contributing to the 
negative results for the banking sector) the major factors for these results were 
the inefﬁcient structure of banking sector activities and assets. With insufﬁcient
capitalization, limited access to external funding, and weak deposit base as well 
as heavily burdened with problem loans the banks had little to offer as lending 
to the real sector, which combined with their risk-averse behaviour and weak 
real sector left them with very limited investment opportunities.   Mostly derived 
from revenues from low-yielding placements in ﬁnancial institutions or govern-
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ment securities and heavily depending on one-off extraordinary revenues the 
ﬁnancial results were weak and volatile and barely able to cover provisioning
(which despite considerable decline in non-performing loans remain a signiﬁcant
burden for the banks) and operating costs not to speak for business expansion 
or modernization. Net interest margins declined despite the declining deposit 
interest rates, serving as bank’s main source of funding, along with the access 
to low-interest credit lines (which were only 45% utilized) due to the decreasing 
rate of return on assets as lending activities were growing only modestly. 
The low skills and capacity of the banking management and inadequate cor-
porate governance standards in both the banking and the real sector leaving 
a signiﬁcant scope for unsound or inefﬁcient lending practices and the lack of
proﬁtability orientation were also an important aspect and a signiﬁcant constraint
on the banking sector development and performance in Macedonia.
Serbia
Extremely volatile and uncertain macroeconomic environment hampering the 
normal functioning of the ﬁnancial system and the poor ﬁnancial health of the
banking system, inherited from the past periods, determined the extremely poor 
performance of the banking sector in Serbia until 2002. Restructuring measures 
that resulted in substantial reduction of provisioning costs, stronger capitaliza-
tion and liquidity and the gradual increase in the lending activities of the banks 
helped reduce the losses in the system. However, performance is still poor and 
characterized by the following weaknesses:
High level of bad debt portfolios and low levels of interest-bearing assets, re-
sulting in low proﬁts; low levels of reserves to absorb potential loan-loss provi-
sions; low levels of capitalization, limiting the ability to absorb losses and support 
business expansion; high levels of liquid assets dragging on returns on assets; 
inadequate system of internal control and risk management; poor corporate gov-
ernances, managerial skills and capacity 
Countries with the most developed banking systems and the highest levels 
of foreign capital penetration, where beneﬁcial effects of foreign presence on
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banks activities and performance could develop, are the countries with the high-
est proﬁtability and efﬁciency indicators. Bulgaria, taking the lead, with ROE and
ROA as of the end of 2004 of 20.6% and 2.1%, respectively, Croatia  - 16.1% 
and 1.7% and recently Romania with ROE of 17% and ROA of 2.1% comparing 
favorably with the CEE average of 18.2% and 2%,  respectively. A distinguishing 
case is the Albanian banking sector with the highest ROE of 21.1% (but among 
the lowest ROA of 1.3%) which derived most of its proﬁtability from non-core ac-
tivities by investing the bulk of its assets in high yielding government securities.
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Conclusions
1. The general conclusion of the analysis is that among the many factors contrib-
uting to the improvements in proﬁtability and efﬁciency of the banking sector in
the region, the foreign banks entry seems to play a crucial role. It was the main 
driving force behind the recent impressive developments of the banking system 
and ﬁnancial intermediation in all countries. Privatization, which in most of the
countries preceded the entry of foreign capital, did not contribute to the devel-
opment of the banking sector, despite a spike in the level of the banking sector 
intermediation as measured by the share of credits/GDP in the early years of the 
economic transition. Reasons were lending practices to related companies, lax 
banking supervision and regulations, soft budget constrains, easy access to Cen-
tral bank reﬁnancing etc. Retail sector was neglected and although overbanked
the population was heavily underservices. The result was extremely low quality 
of the banking assets, with share of non-performing loans reaching record levels, 
illiquidity and heavy reliance on the Central bank reﬁnancing.  Despite the enor-
mous cost of loan restructuring in the form of transforming non-performing debts 
of state-owned enterprises and capital injections into ailing banks the situation in 
the banking sector did not improve. The resulting spike of inﬂation and currency
depreciation was followed by a run on the banks and banking and ﬁnancial crises.
The period following the ﬁnancial crises was characterized by the introduction of
stricter monetary and ﬁscal policy, banking legislation, regulations and supervi-
sion contributing to the ﬁnancial stabilization in terms of a drop and stabiliza-
tion of inﬂation and exchange rates volatility and graduate improvement of the
economy and the real sector. However, banking intermediation lagged far behind 
with banks both incapable and unwilling to lend. The credit squeeze resulting 
from the risk aversion of the banks and their limited credit resources and the slow 
recovery of the deposit base as a consequence of the lack of conﬁdence in both
the national currencies and the banking sector hampered the development of 
both the real and the ﬁnancial sector with the bulk of banking assets invested in
low risk, but also low yield foreign assets or government securities.
Evidence from all six countries shows that macroeconomic stabilization  as well 
as the privatization and balance sheet restructuring of the banks  alone seem not 
be  sufﬁcient prerequisites for the improvements in proﬁtability and efﬁciency of the
banking sector (as evidenced by the experience of most of these countries and 
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especially Romania). The majority of state-owned banks-when privatized-were 
handed over with a fairly clean asset base, following state-sponsored bail-out. 
Many of these banks, however, were in dire need of restructuring and moderniza-
tion. The entry of foreign capital helped resolve many of the persisting problems of 
the banking sector - low capitalization and limited access to external ﬁnancing, poor
corporate governance, non-performing loans etc., by introducing the best market 
practices, expertise in risk management and assessment, product development, IT 
and planning, by strengthening credit risk control practices through introduction of 
enhanced risk models and centralization of credit processes. Furthermore, under 
the conditions of low conﬁdence level to both the banking sector and the domes-
tic currencies capital support from strong foreign shareholders was essential to 
the banking business, to fund growth and development, stimulate competitiveness 
and efﬁciency and provide stability to the system. All these developments helped
restore the core banking activities which is the main driving force behind the recent 
improvements in the proﬁtability and efﬁciency of the banking sector in the regions.
Strategic focus, customer orientation and expansionary policies in core banking 
activities beneﬁted the corporate sector, the SMEs and the households by offering
higher quality and diversiﬁed products and services at competitive prices.  
The comparative analysis shows that those countries that were slow to allow or 
attract sizable foreign capital in reforming their banking systems lag far behind 
their peers in terms of efﬁciency and proﬁtability of their banking sectors and the
level of ﬁnancial intermediation and deepening.
2. With respect to the level of intermediation we distinguished two groups of 
countries: Croatia and Bulgaria, on the one hand, and Romania, Serbia, Mac-
edonia and Albania, on the other hand.  As mentioned above, studies indicate 
that the effects of foreign capital on efﬁciency and proﬁtability of the banks is as-
sociated with the level of ﬁnancial intermediation. More speciﬁcally, at low levels
of development, foreign capital entry increases both the costs and margins. At 
higher levels of development it leads to lower cost, higher efﬁciency and lower
margins. Therefore, we would expect low or improved proﬁtability in the countries
of the second group due mainly to higher margins – either attributable to pricing 
power or to shift in focus to high margin sectors, but no cost advantages.
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At higher levels of development represented by the ﬁrst group, proﬁtability is
mainly associated with cost efﬁciency, revenue diversiﬁcation, contributing to im-
proved proﬁtability despite pressures on interest margins.  Explanation is intensi-
ﬁed competition. Under these circumstances proﬁtability depends on the ability
to proﬁtably expand credit portfolio, controlling its quality, diversify products and
services, improve efﬁciency, achieve economies of scale and manage maturing
credit portfolios. In such countries revenue growth is driven by high net-interest 
income from core banking activities and strong commission and fee on new 
products and services, both in lending and borrowing. Net interest margin is 
further supported by the increased share of SMEs and retail business due to 
risk assessment expertise. Despite higher costs driven by investment require-
ments in IT, infrastructure investments, alternative distribution channels, as well 
increasing staff cost due to performance based compensations, rising funding 
and provisioning cost,  performance improves due to productivity and efﬁciency
gains, improved risk management and practices. 
3. The Dupont analysis of the ﬁnancial results of the Bulgarian and the Croatian
banking systems as well as the analysis of interest rate margins did in fact show 
that they are more efﬁcient both in terms of  ROA, ROE and  overhead costs.
Both countries’ banking systems were devastated by massive credit-related 
problems, which resulted in eventual state bailouts and restructuring with a 
number of the large state- and privately owned banks not surviving. Both coun-
tries suffered a severe credit squeeze in the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crises. 
Both countries followed the strategy of privatizing major banks to strong foreign 
strategic investors. Both countries now reap the fruits and the beneﬁts of for-
eign capital entry in terms of deeper ﬁnancial intermediation. After 2000, both
quality of revenues and sustainability of proﬁts were improved. Higher efﬁciency
from technical upgrade as well as realized economies of scale helped reduce 
operating costs. Proﬁtability improved despite the declining interest margins due
to intensiﬁed competition and falling interest rates and despite the restrictive
monetary policies in both countries aiming at curbing the credit activities of the 
banks. This was due to the more efﬁcient allocation of funds and good cost
management leading to a substantial decline in the cost to income ratios. ROE, 
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although declining is still high, despite the maintenance of high levels of capital 
adequacy, which will give the banks the continuing ability to grow their lending. 
Another important factor was the relatively low cost of ﬁnancing due to the banks’
improved funding proﬁle and liquidity as core deposits increased substantially
due to foreign banks expertise in savings products and services.
Additional indicator of banks’ efﬁciency is the decline in the amount of non-per-
forming loans in banks’ balance sheets. The overall ﬁgures of NPLs in these
countries are low compared to its peers both because of the dilution effect of the 
expansionary credit activities and due to improved risk management practices. 
4. All these developments notwithstanding, negative trends started to emerge 
concerning the banking sector and macroeconomic stability:  high capital ero-
sion due to high credit growth and business expansion and intensiﬁed pressure
on capital from the shift in savings to alternative investment, unfavorable cur-
rency structure of consumer and mortgage loans presents a foreign exchange 
risk that may turn into e credit risk, increased reliance on external and wholesale 
ﬁnancing leading to growing indebtedness of  the banking sector and  higher
cost of ﬁnancing,  some banks employ high pricing policy to lure depositors
into longer-term deposits, credit restrictions to curb credit growth starts to bite 
into proﬁtability, especially for banks with aggressive growth, increasing com-
petition from external ﬁnancing following the increased recourse of corporate
sector to external direct ﬁnancing may bite into the domestic banking business,
loan growth outpacing  deposits growth may lead to increased cost of funding, 
increasing credit risk due to potential decrease in asset quality, increased size 
of largest loans to meet growing clients and attract new ones, growing indebted-
ness of clients, vulnerability to external shocks, still existing concentration of 
credit portfolios exposure to certain sectors-tourism and real estate in Croatia 
and Bulgaria,  high deposit and securities concentrations restricts liquidity and 
ﬁnancial ﬂexibility and endangers proﬁtability if the bank’s largest exposures be-
come nonperforming and  its credit costs increase sharply.
5. The group of the other four countries lags far behind in proﬁtability and ef-
ﬁciency with the notable exception of the Albanian banking system, which man-
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aged to achieve double digit ROE during the period. Proﬁtability, however is
derived by non-core banking activities, with the bulk of assets (77% in 2003) in-
vested in treasury transactions. Efﬁciency is low, however, as measured by ROA
not exceeding 1.5 during the period. Despite the high level of foreign ownership, 
the lending activities of the banks were constraint by the extremely high levels of 
non-performing loans and the restrictions imposed by the central bank 
Serbia and Macedonia have high levels of concentration of the banking sector 
with most of the deposits and assets concentrated in a handful of banks. This 
structure results in a lack of competition among banks, thus hurting their ef-
ﬁciency. The ﬁnancial systems remain vulnerable to weak governance and to
the weaknesses in the banks’ balance sheets reﬂected in the high percentage
of nonperforming loans. Banking is characterized by high real interest rates, 
large spreads, and a limited appetite for lending. Interest rate spreads are above 
8 percentage points, reﬂecting lack of competition, inefﬁcient operations (over-
stafﬁng), and high credit risk. Most banks are expanding lending only modestly,
reﬂecting their own weak balance sheets as well as a legal environment not
conducive to repayment and loan recovery. Historical analysis and compara-
tive approach with the other transition countries point to an insufﬁcient level of
development and poor performance. The DuPont analysis of the banks’ ﬁnancial
results shows high level of non-interest revenues (from fees and commissions) 
and lesser interest revenues, meaning that earnings from non-core activities 
(rather than the core business of ﬁnancial intermediation) are the main determi-
nant of the banks’ proﬁtability. The high level of non-performing loans is hurting
the performance of the banks despite the high interest margins. 
There have been some positive trends moving the banking sectors of these 
countries closer to the standards of the more advanced transition countries. The 
most signiﬁcant trend is the reduction of the lending rates, which resulted in in-
creased lending and narrowing of the interest margin. On the other hand, the re-
duction of deposit rates has not decreased the positive trend of deposits growth, 
implying a strengthening of conﬁdence in the banking system. Recent expansion
of the banks’ credit portfolio and the introduction of new banking products and 
services have resulted in improved performance.
Proﬁtability in the Romanian banking system has been volatile and vulnerable
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to economic trends. While the efﬁciency and proﬁtability of Romanian banks
suffered badly during the crisis years, it has improved markedly in the recent 
past thanks to the growing stabilization of the macroeconomic environment and 
the (slow but steady) progress made in restructuring and privatizing the banking 
sector. The main impact of the consolidation measures was a drastic reduction 
in the proportion of non-performing loans in the total loan portfolio, from 35.4 per 
cent in 1999 to 8.1 % in 2004.  Shrinking interest margins, higher provisioning 
needs (due to stricter loan classiﬁcation framework) and increasing operating ex-
penses have put downward pressure on banks’ proﬁtability. Banks need to ﬁnd
more sustainable and diverse sources of proﬁtability, which are vital elements
for the development of the industry as a whole. A signiﬁcant portion of banks’
proﬁt comes from interbank and trading activities income which is a volatile and
unsustainable revenue source and is not considered to be a recurrent or core 
source of income. On the positive side, net interest revenues have increased 
signiﬁcantly in the past two years, supported by lending growth. Fee and com-
mission income still remain low compared to interest income, but is growing with 
a broader range of products and services. Interest rates have fallen signiﬁcantly
in the past years reﬂecting declining inﬂation.
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Banking Efﬁciency in Bulgaria and Romania
Following Privatisation
Sonya Dilova 74
Introduction
Banking privatisation is largely perceived by academics and policy-makers as a 
major factor for economic growth. This was evidenced in transition economies in 
Eastern Europe like Bulgaria and Romania, which following ﬁnancial crises at the
early years of reforms reviewed their restrictive regulations on foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI). EU-based banks were well positioned to beneﬁt from the deregulation
due to expected geographical synergies and funding requirements of their major 
corporate clients. Hence, the privatisation of the banking system in East European 
countries has been one of their main sources of FDI alone, while upon its comple-
tion foreign banks became the main facilitator of FDI in those countries.  
Foreign banks penetration in domestic banking systems in Eastern Europe in-
creased competition and called for diversiﬁcation of banking products. It also co-
incided with a period of increasing purchase power of population which resulted 
in higher demand for loans. The latter resulted in an aggressive loan growth on 
average of 50% per annum for the last three years which called for concerns 
on systemic risks at the back drop of raising current account deﬁcits (Duenwald,
Guerguiev and Schaechter, 2005). Lending restrictions imposed by respective 
supervisory authorities in those counties proved to be efﬁcient in the short-term.
However, in-depth review of the monitoring process can outline some further 
measures required, especially in light of banks’ faced trade-off between exit and 
commitment costs (Blavy, 2005).  
There is a school of thought who argues that synergies created via clusters of 
corporate networks contribute to improvement in efﬁciency, strengthen domestic
markets and increase returns via spillovers (Yehoue, 2005). It is natural to com-
pare foreign banks and their networks of large corporate clients to such clusters. 
However, increased concentration of banking assets into a handful number of 
74 The opinion expressed is personal and does not represent the view of the institution the author is working for.
212
foreign banks called for increased intuitional responsibilities of their respective 
parent banks through cross-border supervision (Majaha-Jarby and Olafsson, 
2005). With increasing globalisation of the ﬁnancial services and ongoing con-
solidation of European banks, cross-border supervision of banks’ operations in 
countries with dominant presence of foreign banks like Bulgaria and Romania, 
is not only needed but required. It will underpin ﬁnancial discipline of the banks
and prevent cross-border systemic risks.
1. Penetration of foreign banks in Bulgaria and Romania 
By 2001, banking privatisation has already gathered pace in both Bulgaria and 
Romania as foreign banks accounted for an average 60% of total assets which 
increased to an average 70% in 2005 (see Chart 1). Despite this growth and largely 
completed privatisation of the banking system in both countries as of today, the 
level of ﬁnancial intermediation measured by the share of banking assets to GDP
remains below the average of 90% in Hungary and the Czech Republic, for in-
stance. This is largely due to the late start of the banking privatisation in the former 
two countries following ﬁnancial crises and high inﬂationary periods in mid 19 90s.
Source: Compiled from Scenario 2020, Raiffeisenbank Research, November 2006 
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It is also notable that the majority of foreign banks which entered both Bulgaria 
and Romania via privatisation process had EU-origin headquarters. As Table 1 
shows banks present in one country are more likely to be present in the other. 
This provides them with geographical synergies and facilitates EU integration 
process through cross-border investment of EU-based corporations.
Table 1: Market share of Major Foreign Bank (%Total Assets in 2005)
Foreign Banks Bulgaria Romania
Erste Bank - 26.3
ABN Amro - 3.8
HVB Bank 19.0 7.3
OTP 13.6 -
NBG 8.8 -
Raiffesien Bank 8.5 8.6
EFG Euroobank 5.2 4.5
Soc Gen 3.3 15.2
ING Bank 1.2 5.2
Total 59.6 70.9
Source: Raiffeisen Research, 2006
Thanks to the progress made towards adopting EU regulation as part of the ac-
cession process, both banking systems in Bulgaria and Romania demonstrated 
strong ﬁnancial soundness and ability to underpin ﬁnancial services in South East
Europe. In particular, credit growth is strong and largely supported by healthy de-
posit levels as well as good capitalisation ratios (see Chart 6). Proﬁtability ratios
like net interest margin (NIM) and return on assets (ROA) are marginally higher 
than the average of 1% in some major European banks (see Charts 7-10).
2. Lending Policy
The signiﬁcant level of penetration of foreign banks in both countries contributed
to high competition, addressed over-banking and encouraged pro-active lending 
policies, despite that banks’ proﬁtability became under pressure. Raising foreign
banks’ presence in both countries coincided with a period of robust economic 
growth and an increase in purchasing power of population. Given the signiﬁcant
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level disposable income and demand for luxurious goods, it was nor surprising 
that the period was also associated with a strong demand for loans. As a result, 
both countries experienced aggressive credit expansion with an average CAGR 
of 48% since 2001 (see Chart 2).
Source: Compiled from Scenario 2020, Raiffeisenbank Research, November 2006 
It is of note however, that this credit expansion is mainly driven by a few banks. 
In particular, the top ten foreign banks in both countries accounted for more than 
60% of banking assets in 2005 (see Table 1). It is reasonable to conclude, there-
fore, that smaller banks are more likely to opt for aggressive and less prudent 
lending activities, which can potentially pose ﬁnancial but limited systemic risks.
Larger banks can afford to take bigger risks than the smaller ones, perhaps 
partly due to ‘too big to fail’ notion. The size also provides an advantage to those 
banks to service relatively large but few clients as substantial capital is required 
to provide meaningful facilities to large corporate players. Similar ﬁnancial ﬂex-
ibility is less feasible for small banks, which focus on niche markets and rely on 
corporate rather than household deposits as a source of funding. The concen-
tration of the banking assets in a few banks contributes to the polarisation of the 
banking systems in both Romania and Bulgaria. 
A lack of banking defaults in both countries since the ﬁnancial crises in mid-
1990s, increased the self-conﬁdence of banks’ management. Banks absorbed
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with an ease less familiar banking products such as consumer lending which 
posed challenges to their internal risk management and ability to manage large 
number of small clients. Given that consumer lending is generally short-term and 
higher margin, it seems to gain some momentum at the expense of corporate 
lending (see Charts 3 and 4). Nevertheless, the banks are yet to test their con-
sumer lending portfolio in a downturn economic cycle. 
Source: Compiled from Scenario 2020, Raiffeisenbank Research, November 2006 
Another area of credit expansion in both countries is mortgage loans which in-
creased their share in total loans from 0% to 10% over the last three years. 
Nevertheless, mortgage lending accounted for just 5% of GDP in both Bulgaria 
and Romania, which is well below the EU average of 50% in 2005. Despite the 
low level of mortgages in total loans, the pace of their growth generated a lot of 
headline risks. In particular, raising property prices, called for concerns about a 
property bubble and a liquidity squeeze on banks. But those calls for systemic 
risk associated with mortgage lending are likely to be exaggerates. The latter can 
be further supported by the average 100% security taken by the banks against 
the amount of their mortgage portfolio. Moreover, asset-backed securitisation is 
far from being developed in either of the countries which can potentially diminish 
the value of the underlying mortgage security on banks’ balance sheet.
216
Source: Compiled from Scenario 2020, Raiffeisenbank Research, November 2006 
Despite the growth dynamics of banks’ lending activities for the last three years, there 
is a ﬁne balance between banks’ assets and liabilities in foreign currency. Chart 3
shows that corporate loans accounted for more than 60% of banks’ loan portfolio 
since 2001 which are mainly denominated in foreign currency, predominantly euro. 
This is balanced against the fact that roughly half of deposits are denominated in 
foreign currency (see Table 4). However, the banks may face some liquidity squeeze 
should deposits fail to catch up with the lending growth (see Chart 6). 
3. Sources of Funding
Romanian and Bulgarian banks traditionally ﬁnanced their loan growth via de-
posits, mainly from the households. Despite the change of banks’ ownership 
following privatisation, household deposits continue to be the main source of 
funding although their volume is declining (see Chart 6). 
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Source: Compiled from Scenario 2020, Raiffeisenbank Research, November 2006 
Capital injections by the parent banks have been kept at minimum reﬂected in
generally low level of return on equity in some banks, particularly in Romania 
(see Chart 7). Furthermore, following the privatisation and becoming subsidiar-
ies of large international banks, neither of the commercial banks in both coun-
tries has been able to underpin its capital base via external sources of funding 
(e.g. debt capital markets). This is mainly due to their limited ability to access 
international markets on stand-alone basis. Hence, their capital adequacy ratios 
are also declining particularly in Romania (see Chart 8).
Source: Compiled from Scenario 2020, Raiffeisenbank Research, November 2006 
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In contrast, countries with limited foreign banks entry like Russia and Kazakhstan 
have been able to diversify their sources of funding through debt capital markets, 
thus adequately responding to raising domestic credit demand. Without undermin-
ing the importance of foreign banks in developing banking systems in Bulgaria 
and Romania, the reliance on deposits as a source of funding of loan growth is 
unlikely to be sustainable in the long-run. Particularly in the environment where the 
annual loan growth is above 50%. Perhaps subsidiaries of foreign banks in those 
countries should be allowed to raise funds on stand-alone basis. This needs to be 
facilitated by increasing co-operation between supervisory authorities of countries 
involved. In light that both Romania and Bulgaria just joined EU, it is plausible to 
assume that such co-operation is feasible as the majority if not all of the foreign 
banks operating in their domestic banking markets are with EU-headquarters. 
4. Monitoring 
It is largely agreed that foreign banks expansion into Eastern Europe is mainly 
driven by the globalisation of the ﬁnancial service industry and international
operations of their major clients. This highly competitive environment constrains 
banks’ proﬁtability. Banks, therefore, are prepared to face the challenge of ven-
turing into less developed and much riskier markets in a search for high proﬁts.
On the other hand, host countries expect foreign banks penetration into their 
domestic banking systems to provide fresh sources of funding, to improve man-
agement expertise and efﬁciency and to strengthen ﬁnancial discipline. The
latter particularly implies an ability to share the existing know-how in EU bank-
ing supervision, in particular. However, hosts’ countries over-reliance on foreign 
banks’ home-supervisory authorities and a lack of co-ordination in cross-border 
supervisory efforts can contribute to deﬁciencies and malpractices.
The quality of the monitoring can be measured by the cost of exit and cost of 
commitment, respectively. The former measures imperfections in the functioning 
of the banking systems and can be approximated by either the share of clas-
siﬁed loan or NPLs in banks’ loan portfolios. The cost of commitment reﬂects
banks’ proﬁtability (Blavy, 2005 ). He argues that should the costs of commit-
ment are higher than the exit costs, the banks are likely to terminate a lending 
contract. However, the cost of contract termination could be high when banks 
face signiﬁcant agency problems and weak internal risks controls (et al).
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Source: Compiled from Scenario 2020, Raiffeisenbank Research, November 2006 
Despite the signiﬁcant increase of the loan portfolios of Bulgarian and Romanian
banks since 2002, the share of provisions in net loans remained unchanged over 
the last three years (see Table 1). On average, provisions made by Bulgarian 
banks are higher than those made by Romanian banks despite the similar pace 
in credit growth. This is at the backdrop of a relatively low level of provisioning at 
about 1% in EU-based peers. However, there is an argument that the level of pro-
visions should be higher in banks which experience a signiﬁcant credit expansion
as it takes time to test the quality of the loan portfolio in high growth environment. 
It is plausible to assume, therefore, that the exit cost for foreign banks operating in 
Bulgaria and Romania is high, thus implying some operational risks as well.
The aggressive credit expansion is viewed as one of the factors for existing 
economic imbalances such as raising current account deﬁcits. Nevertheless,
lending growth in both countries should not be reviewed in isolation from the 
global operations of foreign banks which participated in the banking privatisa-
tion of East European countries. There are views that the overall risk manage-
ment should be conducted on group basis and facilitated by cross sector and 
cross country supervision (Majaha-Jarby and Olafsson, 2005). The latter can be 
particularly enforced by cross-country memorandums of understanding (MOU) 
which have proved to be successful in EU, in the case of Nordic countries (et 
al). Furthermore, monitoring process can determine banks’ lending behaviour 
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(Blavy, 2005). Hence, improvement in banks’ ﬁnancial performance can partly
result from foreign banks transfer of know-how and risk-control practices and 
partly from the quality of banking supervision. Overall, countries like Bulgaria 
and Romania with largely completed banking privatisation can imply increased 
banking efﬁciency via clusters of networks which facilitate investment, strength-
en domestic market and increase returns via spillovers (Yehoue, 2005).
Conclusion
Since 2003, both Bulgarian and Romanian banking system beneﬁted from strong
economic growth, largely completed privatisation of the state-owned banks and 
raising demand for bank products due to increase income per capita. Despite 
the signiﬁcant foreign bank penetration and increased compliance of regulatory
framework with EU benchmarks, banks’ credit activity entailed signiﬁcant level of
risk in both countries. It is mainly associated with a concentration of bank lend-
ing in a few banks, reliance on implicit support by the parent foreign banks and 
a short-term track record of the lending portfolio.
Upon completion of the banking privatisation, banking systems in both countries 
remained largely concentrated in a few foreign banks. Other banks which oper-
ate in those markets are privately owned and mainly niche players. Given the 
composition of the banking systems in both countries, any potential systemic 
risk is likely to be associated with larger rather than smaller banks. Hence, the 
applied implicit support by the parent foreign banks can prove inadequate.
Banking systems in Bulgaria and Romania can face liquidity squeeze due to 
the diminishing level of household deposits, while banks’ access to alternative 
sources of ﬁnding remains limited. In particular, subsidiaries of foreign banks
have not been able to access debt-capital markets on stand-alone basis.
The increased concentration of banking assets into a handful number of foreign 
banks called for increased intuitional responsibilities of their respective parent 
banks through cross-border supervision. With increasing globalisation of the ﬁ-
nancial services and ongoing consolidation of European banks, cross-border 
supervision of banks’ operations in countries with dominant presence of foreign 
banks like Bulgaria and Romania, is not only needed but required. It will under-
pin ﬁnancial discipline of the banks and prevent cross-border systemic risks.
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Proﬁtability of Foreign and Domestic Banks
Marko Košak
Introduction
Banking sectors in Eastern Europe have undergone a remarkable transformation 
from the beginning of the 1990s, which resulted in a relatively consolidated and to a 
large extent privatized banking industry that is characterized by a heavy presence 
of foreign owned banks. While several authors emphasize the beneﬁcial effects
of foreign banks’ entry in developing Eastern European economies (e.g. Fries and 
Taci, 2005), there is still very little evidence on the impact of foreign-owned banks 
on bank performance in the South-East European region. Some of the countries 
from the region were included as subsets in broader studies (e.g. Demirguc-Kunt 
and Huizinga, 1999), but research focused on this region is scarce.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between bank owner-
ship (foreign vs. domestic) and bank proﬁtability in six South-Eastern European
countries (SEE-6): Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Romania, and 
Serbia & Montenegro, using individual bank data. The analysis is based on the 
bank level, industry level and macroeconomic data for the period 1995 – 2004 
and consists of two parts. The ﬁrst part of the analysis contains a series of the
mean equality tests for four proﬁtability indicators for domestic and foreign owned
banks in each of the studied countries. The second part of the analysis relies on 
the econometric analysis of the bank proﬁtability determinants in selected banking
sectors. Results do not reveal any substantial statistically signiﬁcant differences in
proﬁtability measures of domestic and foreign owned banks, while the economet-
ric tests identify several factors that are clearly associated with bank proﬁtability.
In section 2 we describe the banking sector developments in selected SEE-6 
countries, section 3 reviews the ﬁndings of previous studies on foreign bank
entry and banking industry performance measurement. Section 4 introduces 
the characteristics and corresponding variables that can be explored as bank 
performance determinants. In section 5 data and methodology are explained. 
Section 6 brings two sets of the empirical results. First, the outcome of the proﬁt-
ability indicators’ equality testing for each country in the sample, and second, the 
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results of the four proﬁtability models, explaining the determinants of bank proﬁt-
ability, using pooled data across all analysed countries. Section 7 concludes.
1. Banking sector development in the selected SEE-6 countries
Performance analysis in this paper focuses on banking sectors in six Balkan 
countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Romania, and Serbia 
and Montenegro75. This region is considered to be highly heterogeneous with 
regard to the stage of integration with the EU, the level of economic develop-
ment, the degree of ﬁnancial intermediation and the development of banking
sector. Despite the differences among countries the overall size of banking 
sector (measured by total assets or loans extended to private sector) is small 
in comparison to the EU banking sectors. Consequently, a degree of ﬁnancial
intermediation remains signiﬁcantly smaller than in the EU countries, although
the region is quickly developing in all respects.
The lower development stage of banking sector has the roots in the pre-transi-
tion political and economic history. Since the beginning of transition in the early 
1990s, the banking sector in all transition economies has undergone tremendous 
changes. However, the starting position in the individual countries in the SEE-
6 group was quite diverse. According to Bonin (2004), former centrally planned 
economies used to be characterized by a noticeable structural segmentation (i.e. 
large specialty banks monopolizing speciﬁc market segment), state ownership of a
signiﬁcant proportion of banking assets and high concentration ratios. Conversely,
banking system in former Yugoslav republics (Croatia, FYR Macedonia and Serbia 
& Montenegro in our sample) used to be a two-tier banking system, with universal 
banks operating in individual republics. Furthermore, banks were not state-owned 
(since 1950s), rather they were owned collectively according to the principles of 
Yugoslav self-management (Bonin, 2004). Introduction of internal company banks 
in the late 1970s further contributed to a more diverse banking structure.
Despite the pre-transition historical differences, during the past decade the 
banking systems in SEE-6 have been transformed by three major trends - pri-
vatisation, consolidation and the entry of foreign banks on a large scale (Turner, 
2006). The role of foreign-owned banks has become dominant in Central and 
75 In the analysed period, until 2004, Serbia & Montenegro constituted one country.
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Eastern Europe, including in the SEE-6 countries. Foreign banks penetrated 
these markets either directly by establishing greenﬁeld operations or by partici-
pating in privatisation of domestic state-owned banks. The later represented an 
important entry channel for foreign banks.
Table 1 illustrates rapidly growing proportion of foreign-owned banks76 in total 
number of banks in all SEE-6 countries since the mid-1990s. At the end of 2004, 
the proportion of foreign-owned banks was the highest in Albania, where it reached 
87.5 percent, followed by Romania with 71.9 percent and Bulgaria with 68.6 percent 
in total number of banks. In Croatia and FYR Macedonia the proportion of foreign-
owned banks was 40.5 percent and 38.1 percent respectively, while the banking 
sector in Serbia & Montenegro was largely dominated by domestic-owned banks.
The data on asset share (Table 2) to some degree mirrors the data on the pro-
portion of foreign-owned banks in total number of banks. Serbia & Montenegro, 
with the smallest proportion of foreign-owned banks in total number of banks, had 
also the smallest market share under control of foreign-owned banks (37.7 percent 
of total assets), whereas foreign-owned banks in Croatia and Bulgaria controlled 
91.2 percent and 81.6 percent of the total banking assets, respectively. Thus these 
data also reveal the size structure of the individual banking sectors and/or the size 
structure of banks controlled by foreign shareholders. Namely, for example foreign 
banks in Croatia represented only 40.1 percent of total number of banks, but on the 
other hand they represented 91.2 percent of total banking assets in the country, 
indicating that mostly large banks have got under control of foreign shareholders.
Table 1: The proportion of foreign-owned banks in total number of banks in SEE-6 countries for the 
1995-2004 period (in percent)
In % 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Bulgaria 7.3 7.1 25.0 50.0 64.7 71.4 74.3 76.5 71.4 68.6
Romania 25.0 25.8 39.4 44.4 55.9 63.6 72.7 77.4 70.0 71.9
Croatia 1.9 6.9 11.5 16.7 24.5 48.8 55.8 50.0 46.3 40.5
Albania 50.0 37.5 33.3 80.0 84.6 92.3 92.3 92.3 86.7 87.5
Macedonia 50.0 22.7 9.1 25.0 21.7 31.8 38.1 35.0 38.1 38.1
Serbia & Monetenegro --- --- --- --- 4.0 3.7 14.8 24.0 34.0 25.6
Note: Foreign-owned banks are deﬁned as those with foreign ownership exceeding a 50 % share as end-of-year.
Source: EBRD, Transition report, different issues
76 As foreign-owned banks are considered the banks where foreign ownership exceeds 50 percent
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Table 2: Asset share of foreign-owned banks in SEE-6 countries for the 1999-2004 period (in percent 
of total bank sector assets)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Bulgaria 42.8 75.3 72.7 75.2 82.7 81.6
Romania 43.6 46.7 51.4 52.9 54.8 58.5
Croatia 40.3 84.1 89.3 90.2 91.0 91.2
Albania 18.9 35.2 40.8 45.9 47.1 ---
Macedonia 11.5 53.4 51.1 44.0 47.0 47.3
Serbia & Monetenegro 0.4 0.5 13.2 27.0 38.4 37.7
Note: Share of total bank sector assets in banks with foreign ownership exceeding 50%, as of end-of-year.
Source: EBRD, Transition report, different issues
The lowest proportion of foreign-owned banks in Serbia & Montenegro is largely 
a consequence of lower degree of banking sector privatisation as compared 
to the other countries in SEE-6 group. At the end of 2004, state-owned banks 
in Serbia & Montenegro still represented 23.4 percent of total banking market 
in the country, while their share was well bellow 10% in the rest of the SEE-6 
group (Table 3). In Albania for example, banks have been almost completely 
privatised77, whereas in Bulgaria, Croatia and Macedonia state-owned banks 
controlled 2 – 3 percent of the market, and in Romania 7.5 percent of the market 
at year end 2004. For most of the countries in the SEE-6 group the percentage 
of foreign-owned banks has increased substantially in the 1995 – 2004 period. 
In most of these countries relatively large proportions of foreign-owned banks 
and rapid changes in their cumulative market share can be explained by a rela-
tively low total number of banks at the beginning of economic transition, which 
however has increased through the 1990s and after year 2000.
Table 3: Asset share of state-owned banks in SEE-6 countries for the 1995-2004 period (in % of total assets)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Bulgaria 0 82.2 66 56.4 50.5 19.8 19.9 14.1 2.5 2.3
Romania 84.3 80.9 80 75.3 50.3 50 45.4 43.6 40.6 7.5
Croatia 51.9 36.2 32.6 37.5 39.8 5.7 5 4 3.4 3.3
Albania 94.5 93.7 89.9 85.6 81.1 64.8 59.2 54.1 51.9 0
Macedonia 0 0 0 1.4 2.5 1.1 1.3 2 1.8 1.9
Serbia & Montenegro 94.7 92 89.8 90 89 90.9 68 35.6 34.1 23.4
Note: State-owned banks are deﬁned as those with state ownership exceeding a 50 % share as end-of-year.
Source: EBRD, Transition report, different issues
77 According to CEE Banking Sector Report (RZB Group, 2005) there are still two minority state stakes left to be sold in the Italian 
Albanian Bank and in the United Bank of Albania.
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As it is evident from the data, the potential for foreign bank entry through the 
state-owned banks privatisation in the SEE-6 region remains insigniﬁcant.
2. Foreign bank entry and performance in banking sector
There exists a substantial body of the literature focusing on performance meas-
urement and on analysis of performance determinants in banking. Studies on for-
eign bank entry and performance represent a quite extensive part of this literature. 
Initially these studies focused almost exclusively on individual countries. They tried 
to identify any systematic differences in bank performance and establish possible 
relationships with the ownership structure or the origin of banking ﬁrms. Although
some surveys date back to the 1980s, an important progress in the ﬁeld was made
in the 1990s. DeYoung and Nolle (1996) made a signiﬁcant contribution with their
research where they investigated relative proﬁt efﬁciency of foreign-owned U.S.
banks and U.S.-owned banks between 1985 and 1990. Their results suggest that 
foreign-owned U.S. banks were signiﬁcantly less proﬁt efﬁcient than U.S.-owned
banks during the investigated period. Since in that period foreign banks expanded 
rapidly in the U.S. market, the results were consistent with the hypothesis that 
foreign banks sacriﬁced proﬁtability in exchange for increased market share.
Similarly, Williams (1998) investigated factors affecting the performance of for-
eign owned banks in Australia. Consistent with DeYoung and Nolle (1996) results, 
he found that foreign banks in Australia were willing to sacriﬁce proﬁts to achieve
size targets. Namely foreign bank size was found to be a positive function of 
holding a bank licence, parent size and duration of operations in Australia, and a 
negative function of Australian net interest margins and fees. His research further 
reveals that proﬁts in the host nation are a function of ﬁrm characteristics and
nation-speciﬁc factors, with the nation-speciﬁc factors being relatively the least
important. In his latter work, Williams (2003) integrates the existing multinational 
bank literature with the domestic bank proﬁts literature. One of the most impor-
tant conclusions based on the integrated approach applied to Australian banking 
market was that concentration in the host market reduces proﬁts of the foreign
entrants. Thus the market concentration acts as an effective barrier to entry.
Results of the research performed in the individual banking markets represented 
a challenge for researches who tried to broaden the scope of bank proﬁtabil-
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ity empirical investigation to multinational level. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 
(1999) analysed determinants of commercial bank interest margins and proﬁt-
ability for 80 countries in the 1988–1995 period. According to their ﬁndings, in
developing countries, foreign banks have higher net interest margins and proﬁts
than domestic banks, while the opposite holds for developed countries. Their 
analysis also shows that a larger ratio of bank assets to GDP and a lower market 
concentration ratio lead to lower margins and proﬁts, controlling for differences
in bank activity, leverage, and the macroeconomic environment. The same au-
thors (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2000) investigated the impact of the level 
of ﬁnancial development and market structure on bank performance using bank
level data for a large number of developed and developing countries over the 
1990–1997 period. Their results indicate that a higher level of bank development 
lowers banks’ proﬁts and margins, which can be explained by the fact that higher
level of development brings tougher competition, higher efﬁciency and lower
proﬁts. Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) focused on studying the
effect of foreign entry on domestic banking markets and conﬁrmed the results of
the Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) study.
Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) analysed the impact of foreign participation 
and high concentration level on the evolution of banking sectors’ market struc-
tures in ﬁve Latin American countries in the late 1990s. Their results suggest
that foreign banks were able to charge lower spreads relative to domestic banks. 
This particular characteristic proved to be more typical for “de novo” banks than 
for those that entered through acquisitions. Further, their results indicate that the 
overall level of foreign bank participation inﬂuenced spreads indirectly, primarily
through its effect on administrative costs.
In a more recent paper, Micco et al. (2006) used a fairly broad data set, covering 
the period 1995-2002, to reassess the relationship between bank ownership and 
bank performance, providing separate estimations for the developing and industrial 
countries. Speciﬁcally, the authors focus on the question whether the differential in
performance between public and private banks is driven by political considerations. 
Their ﬁndings suggest that state-owned banks located in the developing countries
tend to have lower proﬁtability and higher costs than their private counterparts, and
that the opposite is true for foreign-owned banks. They did not ﬁnd a strong correla-
tion between ownership and performance for banks located in industrial countries.
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The research on bank performance and more speciﬁcally on bank proﬁtability cov-
ering European banking sectors has lagged the research on U.S. banking and 
used to be relatively scarce through the 1990s (one exceptions is Molyneux and 
Thorton, 1992). In recent research efforts Goddard et al. (2004) studied proﬁtability
determinants in six European banking sectors (Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain and the UK) for the period 1992–1998. Their results suggest that despite 
intensifying competition it was possible to detect signiﬁcant persistence of abnor-
mal bank proﬁts from year to year. Although they found some signiﬁcant size-proﬁt
relationships in some of the estimations, the evidence for any consistent or system-
atic size-proﬁtability relationship was not found. Apart from that they discovered a
positive relationship between the capital-asset ratio and proﬁtability, but systematic
relationship between ownership type and proﬁtability could not be established. Pa-
siouras and Kosmidou (2006) examined bank-speciﬁc and environmental factors
inﬂuencing the proﬁtability of domestic and foreign commercial banks in 15 EU
countries over the period 1995 – 2001. Their results indicate that proﬁtability of both
domestic and foreign banks is affected not only by bank-speciﬁc characteristics but
also by ﬁnancial market structure and macroeconomic conditions.
Despite the existence of several multi-market studies in the EU some researchers 
focus their attention on speciﬁc individual banking markets in the region. Athana-
soglou et al. (2006) examined the effect of bank-speciﬁc, industry-speciﬁc and
macroeconomic determinants of bank proﬁtability in Greek banking for the period
1985-2001. The results produced by testing the traditional structure-conduct-per-
formance hypothesis show that proﬁtability persists to a moderate extent, indicat-
ing that departures from perfectly competitive market structure may not be too 
large. All bank-speciﬁc determinants, with the exception of size, proved to have
a signiﬁcant effect on bank proﬁtability. No ﬁrm evidence was found in support
of SCP hypothesis. Another interesting single market study was published by 
Kosmidou et al. (2006). The authors investigated the performance of the banking 
sector in the UK, focusing on the performance of the domestic banks as opposed 
to the performance of the foreign banks operating in the UK, over the period 1998 
– 2001. Their results suggest that domestic banks exhibit higher overall perform-
ance compared to the foreign banks operation in the UK. The results of their 
study generally support the home advantage hypothesis under which domestic 
institutions are overall more efﬁcient than foreign-based institutions.
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With some exceptions the research on bank performance has been restricted 
throughout the 1990s to the developed market economies. With the transition 
processes in several European economies and the revitalization of their banking 
sectors, banking markets in transition countries are attracting growing attention 
of researchers investigating bank performance. Although this research does not 
abound, some studies focusing on (former) transition economies can be found. 
Fries, Neven and Seabright (2002) examined the performance of 515 banks in 
16 transition economies for the period 1994–1999. Their results indicate that 
banks’ performance differs signiﬁcantly depending on the reform environment,
as well as the competitive conditions in which they operate. Further, banks with 
high market shares have higher costs and achieve lower margins on their loan 
and deposit activities. Their research also reveals that interest margins are de-
clining over time but are substantially higher in low- reform environments. The 
results indicate that an appropriate policy and regulatory framework may be the 
necessary conditions for achieving any signiﬁcant progress.
A recent work in the ﬁeld represents the paper by Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2005)
who concentrated on the investigation of foreign and domestic banks’ proﬁtabil-
ity in Central and Eastern Europe, covering only the “new” EU member states 
and the two accession countries (i.e. Bulgaria and Romania) in the region. How-
ever, their methodological approach and results may be relevant also for other 
transitioning countries in the region. The authors offered the following conclu-
sions: ﬁrst, foreign-owned banks are not affected by business cycles of their host
countries which makes them more competitive with respect to domestic banks. 
Second, the macroeconomic conditions in the foreign banks’ home countries 
have no impact on the proﬁtability of foreign-owned banks in Central and East-
ern European markets which is considered to be one of the potential dangers 
of foreign bank ownership for host countries. In respect to market concentra-
tion–bank proﬁtability relationship, their results show that proﬁts of foreign banks
are not affected by market concentration, whereas domestic banks ﬁnd it more
proﬁtable to operate in such markets. The authors also take into account the
mode of foreign bank entry and ﬁnd a superior performance (in terms of ROA) of
greenﬁeld banks as compared to domestic and acquired banks. Interestingly, the
proﬁtability of acquired banks does not turn out to be signiﬁcantly different from
the domestic banks, which could be ascribed to the economic policy of some 
countries that allowed foreign bank entry only after crisis.
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Our research draws heavily on Havrylchyk and Jurzyk’s (2005) work, but com-
plements it with the suggestions offered by several other authors (e.g. Micco et 
al., 2006; Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2001). As compared to Ha-
vrylchyk and Jurzyk (2005), who  concentrate methodologically exclusively on 
banks’ proﬁtability, speciﬁcally on ROA (return on assets) measure, based on its
accounting deﬁnition, we consider a wider set of bank performance measures.
In addition, our study is carried out in an interesting but ill-researched setting 
encompassing six South-Eastern European countries
3. Determinants of bank performance
In this section the bank performance measures and performance determinants, 
as known from the literature, are introduced. The relationships between both 
are elaborated according to the prior theoretical ﬁndings and results already
reported in the empirical literature.
Bank performance measures
Generally bank performance studies rely on two types of indicators: accounting-
based indicators and proﬁt or cost efﬁciency indicators based on the efﬁciency
and productivity analysis. In this paper we use accounting-based proﬁtability
indicators in banking.
Proﬁtability ratio return on asset (ROA) is considered to be a core performance
indicator used in majority of studies. ROA directly or indirectly incorporates most 
of the aspects of the banking business. It can be derived from a simpliﬁed bank
income statement equation:
,
where NI = net income, II = interest income, IE = interest expenses, NII = non-
interest income, NIE = non-interest expenses (w/o operating expenses and LLP), 
EXP = operating expenses (inc. LLP) and TAX = taxes. Dividing simpliﬁed in-
come statement equation by TA (total assets) gives us the following expression:
 
,
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where NIM = net interest margin, NNIM = net non-interest margin, OVH = over-
head costs and LLP = loan-loss provisions.
An alternative proﬁtability indicator frequently used in bank performance studies
is return on equity (ROE) ratio. If ROA reﬂects the ability of bank management to
generate proﬁts from the available bank’s assets, then ROE indicates the return to
shareholders’ equity. Both indicators are directly related through the asset-to-equity 
ratio, which measures the ﬁnancial leverage of the banking ﬁrm. Despite the popu-
larity of both indicators we need to be aware of their shortcomings. The ROA indi-
cator may be biased because it ignores the off-balance sheet activities of banking 
ﬁrms, while the ROE indicator disregards the impact of risk associated with different
levels of leverage that in connection with ROA directly determines the size of ROE.
In the present study we employ two additional proﬁtability measures: PBTTA
(proﬁt-before-taxes over total assets) and NIM (net interest margin). The PBTTA
measure is designed to capture the proﬁtability of a banking ﬁrm without poten-
tially disturbing taxation effects. Namely because of different taxation practices 
in individual countries proﬁtability measures based on after tax proﬁt (i.e. usually
ROA and ROE indicators) can be misleading and therefore, proﬁt before tax
measure should help to detect differences in bank proﬁtability that can not be at-
tributed to the management of each bank but rather to the environment in which 
a speciﬁc bank operates. Similarly, net interest margin (NIM) as a performance
measure reveals performance of a banking ﬁrm resulting from the core banking
business (i.e. it is taking into account interest income from interest bearing activi-
ties and interest expenses that appear as a cost bank funding).
Bank-speciﬁc performance determinants
The relationship between banking ﬁrm size and its performance (especially 
proﬁtability) has traditionally been one of the most widely studied relationships
in the ﬁeld. In spite of many research efforts the direction of this relationship
is not completely straightforward as the studies produced mixed results. Wil-
liams (2003) ﬁnds that larger foreign banks in Australia are more proﬁtable over
the longer run. Similarly Chmielewski and Krzesniak (2003) detected a positive 
size–ROA relationship for Polish banking sector. On the other hand Pasiouras 
and Kosmidou (2006) ﬁnd negative relationship between size and bank perform-
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ance in 15 EU countries, regardless of bank ownership. Boyd and Runkle (1993) 
tested predictions of two theories that try to explain the impact of the size of 
banking ﬁrm: deposit insurance theory and modern intermediation theory. Their
empirical results could not support either of theories. However, they found an 
inverse relationship between size and two other variables: the rate of return on 
assets and the ratio of equity to assets. Many authors (CITATI?) explain such 
size-proﬁtability relationship by diseconomies of scale, which are present in
larger banks especially after the periods of accelerated growth. On the contrary, 
a positive size-proﬁtability relationship is usually rationalized by positive effects
of scale and scope economies. Additionally, large banks may be able to exert 
market power through stronger brand image or implicit regulatory (to-big-to-fail) 
protection. In many studies the impact of banking ﬁrm size on proﬁtability re-
mains precarious. Athanasoglou et al. (2006) report that the effect of bank size 
on proﬁtability is not important and Goddard et al. (2004) ﬁnd no systematic
evidence for relationship between size and performance.
Capital strength of a banking ﬁrm is the next important bank-speciﬁc determinant
included in almost all studies. The level of bank capital is typically closely linked 
to the level of credit risk (Thakor, 1996) and therefore banks with high capital-as-
set ratios are considered relatively safer in the event of loss or liquidation. A high 
capital adequacy ratio should signify a bank that is operating over-cautiously and 
ignoring potentially proﬁtable trading opportunities (Goddard et al., 2004), which
implies a negative relationship between equity to asset ratio and bank perform-
ance. At the same time, banks with higher equity to asset ratio will normally have 
lower needs of external funding and therefore higher proﬁtability (Pasiouras and
Kosmidou, 2006). Again the direction of the relationship between bank capital and 
bank proﬁtability can not be unanimously predicted in advance.
Another important dimension of banking management is efﬁcient liquidity man-
agement. Generally, liquidity of banking ﬁrms is a necessary condition for ongo-
ing banking operations and any severe liquidity disruptions can eventually lead 
to a bank failure. On the other hand, maintenance of a superﬂuous liquidity very
easily leads to the underperformance of banking assets and thus to lower proﬁt-
ability of banking ﬁrm. Following other authors (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2006,
Kosmidou K. et al., 2006) we include a liquidity ratio in our empirical model and 
expect this ratio to be negatively related to bank proﬁtability.
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Cost efﬁciency of banking ﬁrm is predicted to be negatively associated with
bank performance and speciﬁcally with bank proﬁtability. It is important to sepa-
rate operating cost from other expenses (e.g. taxes, depreciation, etc.), as op-
erating expenses are a cost category that can be actively controlled by bank 
management. The indicators that account for operating expenses thus reﬂect
management’s ability to inﬂuence bank performance. In previous research, sev-
eral attempts have been made to measure the impact of cost efﬁciency. Athana-
soglou et al. (2006) computed the ratio of the operating expenses to total assets, 
while Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2006) included standard cost to income ratio, 
which basically reﬂects the ability of bank’s management to cover operating ex-
penses by the generated bank income.
Credit risk exposure is usually treated as a separate determinant of bank perform-
ance (proﬁtability). Some authors describe this factor as assets quality (Kosmidou
et al., 2006), which can be usually measured only indirectly by taking into account 
the loan-loss provisions. As provisions roughly indicate the probability of loans to 
become non-performing, higher provisions are expected to be negatively related to 
bank proﬁtability. Again, different authors try to capture this effect by using different
indicators, for example Athanasoglou et al. (2006) use loan-loss provisions to loans 
ratio and Kosmidou K. et al. (2006) loan-loss provision to total assets ratio. In either 
case the relationship with bank proﬁtability is expected to be negative.
Bank asset structure can also be regarded as a signiﬁcant factor determining
bank performance. The sign of the relationship with bank proﬁtability depends on
the choice of the indicator. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) use for example 
loan to total assets ratio as an indicator of bank asset structure and expect the ratio 
to be positive. Analogously, Claessens et al. (2001) employ non-interest earning-
assets-to-total-assets variable and expect the ratio to be negative. Similarly, Kos-
midou et al. (2006) include in their analysis the short term earning assets to total 
loans ratio and expect the ratio to be negatively related to bank proﬁtability, since
a greater proportion of short term earning assets results in lower proﬁtability of the
overall portfolio. A quite unique approach is taken by Goddard et al. (2004), who 
incorporate OBS ratio in their analysis. OBS ratio is measured as a ratio between 
total off-balance sheet items and sum of total on- balance sheet and off-balance 
sheet items. According to their interpretation, the ratio accounts of non-interest 
income and fee generating services from various contingent liabilities.
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Bank income structure also reﬂects the changing dynamics of banking busi-
ness, which normally results in bank performance. Namely, it is well known that 
income structure in banking industry is changing and that the structure is shift-
ing in favour of bank non-interest income. Therefore, the bank income structure 
variable should capture this effect and convey information on the impact on 
performance of the banking ﬁrm. Following this principle Kosmidou et al. (2006)
employed a share of net interest revenues in total earning assets as a proxy for 
bank income structure and established that domestic-owned banks exhibited a 
clear dominance regarding the signiﬁcance of net interest revenues for their prof-
itability. However, alternative ratio deﬁnitions are also applicable and the sign
of the income structure–performance relationship depends on the structure of 
the ratio itself.
Banking sector and macroeconomic determinants
Empirical studies investigating bank performance commonly strictly differentiate 
between bank-speciﬁc determinant and all other factors that may have an impact
on bank performance. For example Williams (1998, 2003) includes a set of vari-
ables reﬂecting market conditions and general macroeconomic conditions in home
country and, when testing multinational hypotheses, some variables reﬂecting mar-
ket and macroeconomic conditions in host countries. Likewise, Athanasoglou et al. 
(2006) implement variables reﬂecting industry-speciﬁc (e.g. concentration ratio) and
macroeconomic proﬁtability determinants (e.g. inﬂation expectations, cyclical out-
put). Claessens et al. (2001) also include some control variables that account for 
environmental effects (e.g. GDP per capita, annual inﬂation, real interest rate, etc.).
Some authors (e.g. Havrylchyk and Jurzyk, 2005; Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 
2006) include in the analysis beside common bank-speciﬁc characteristics,
some speciﬁc factors denoting ﬁnancial structure development (e.g. total bank-
ing assets to GDP ratio, stock market capitalization to GDP ratio, EBRD index of 
ﬁnancial sector development), which is an important aspect of investigation when
comparing banks from the economies at the different level of development.
Surprisingly, some authors don’t pay a lot of attention to possible macroeconomic 
effects on bank performance or account for them only partially or indirectly (e.g. 
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Micco et al., 2006, Goddard et al., 2004). In the next section we present the select-
ed data set, estimation methodologies and variables’ deﬁnitions, including the char-
acteristics of selected bank speciﬁc variables and variables representing different
external (i.e. banking system and macroeconomic) factors used in our analysis.
4. Data, variables and methodology
Data and deﬁnition of variables
Three types of data were used in the analysis. First, individual bank-level data, 
which were obtained from the BankScope database. Only data for banks with 
unconsolidated ﬁnancial statements were used for the statistical analysis. Second,
market-speciﬁc data, illustrating major characteristics of speciﬁc banking markets.
The data in this category were obtained from the BankScope and from the IFS 
database. Third, macroeconomic data, reﬂecting some macroeconomic charac-
teristics in countries included in the analysis. This set of data was obtained from 
the IFS database and from the EBRD publications for the 1995 – 2004 period with 
annual frequency. All the variables are summarized and explained in Table 4.
As already explained four variables were employed as bank performance meas-
ures: return on assets, return on equity, net interest margin and proﬁt before tax
compared to total assets.
The ﬁrst set of the explanatory variables refers to the individual bank character-
istics. Banking ﬁrm size (SITE) is measured as a log of total loans and total other
earning assets of each individual bank. Variable EQTASUR measures bank capital 
strength and is calculated as equity to total assets ratio that exceeds 10%. Further, 
LOANFUND is calculated as total loans over total deposits ratio and depicts the 
liquidity of banking ﬁrm. Cost efﬁciency is expressed by a conventional cost-to-
income ratio (CIR) and credit risk exposure by loan loss provisions to total assets 
ratio (LLPTA). Two additional variables reﬂecting bank asset structure and bank
income structure, are computed as net earning assets to total assets ratio (NEA-
TA) and as other operating income to net interest revenues ratio, respectively.
The second set of the explanatory factors consists of three variables reﬂecting
banking market characteristics and therefore vary across countries. Interest rate 
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spread (SPREAD) is obtained as a difference between the average aggregate loan 
rate and average aggregate deposit rate as provided by the IFS dataset. The other 
two variables in the set describe the market situation. The variable HHITACEL is 
the Hirschman-Herﬁndahl concentration index based on the individual bank total
assets, whereas MKTSHARE reﬂects market share of each individual bank.
Table 4: List of the variables used in the empirical analysis
Symbol for the variable Description of the variable
Dependent variables
1 ROAA Return on average assets
2 ROAE Return on average equity
3 NIM Net interest margin
4 PBT/TA Proﬁt before tax over total assets
Bank-speciﬁc variables (explanatory)
1 SIZE Size of a banking ﬁrm
2 EQTASUR Excessive capitalization of banking ﬁrm
3 LOANFUND Loans-to-funding ratio
4 CIR Cost to income ratio
5 LLPTA Loan loss provisions over total assets
6 NEATA Non-earning assets over total assets
7 OOINIR Other operating income over net interest revenue
Market-speciﬁc variables
8 SPREAD Difference between loan and deposit rate (average aggregate rates)
8 HHITACEL HHI index measured by total assets
10 MKTSHARE Market share of individual bank, measured by total assets
Macroeconomic variables
11 STOCKGDP Stock market capitalization as a share in GDP
12 LOGCNGGDP Log of relative change in GDP
13 LOGCNGFXRATE Log of relative change in the ofﬁcial foreign exchange rate
14 EBRDBANK EBRD index of banking sector reform
Source: BankScope, IFS, EBRD
The third set of the variables consists of the macroeconomic variables. The 
STOCKGDP variable is calculated as the stock market capitalization to GDP 
ratio in each country. The LOGCNGGDP variable is log of the GDP growth rate 
and LOGCNGFXRATE is log of the local foreign exchange growth rate. The 
EBRDBANK variable is the EBRD index of banking sector reform as regularly 
published in the EBRD Transition reports.
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Methodology
In order to investigate bank speciﬁc and environmental factors that affect the
performance indicators of banks in selected SEE countries, the following gen-
eral model is applied:
where i refers to an individual bank, t refers to year and j refers to speciﬁc coun-
try. The dependent variable  denotes a selected performance measure ob-
served for bank i in year t,  stands for a set of J bank speciﬁc variables,
 for M banking sector variables that vary across banking markets and time, 
but not across individual banks within a country,  for L macroeconomic vari-
ables that vary across countries and time, but not across individual banks within 
a country.  is an error term.
The structure of the available data implies the use of panel data estimation tech-
niques. First, the appropriateness of ﬁxed effects model as opposed to random ef-
fects model was tested with the Hausman test. The test was performed for different 
model speciﬁcations and three different sample subsets: pooled data, a subset of
foreign-owned banks and a subset of domestic-owned banks. Test results are pre-
sented in Table 5. With the exception of one model speciﬁcations (domestic banks
and ROAA dependent variable) use of ﬁxed effects model was indicated.
Table 5: Summary of Hausman test Chi2 statistics and signiﬁcance levels for different model speciﬁcations
Depend. Variable/
Subsample
ROAA ROAE NIM PBTTA
Pooled
73.98 102.34 58.83 65.24
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Foreign
41.47 50.12 42.6 23.87
0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0475
Domestic
18.34 34.92 22.09* 50.77
0.1915 0.0015 0.0000* 0.0000
* Breusch-Pagan test for random effects. The test procedure renders a failure in meeting asymptotic assumptions 
of the Hausman test.
Fixed effect estimation technique was thus employed to estimates series of 
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models, using various bank performance measures (ROAA
ij
, ROAE
ij
, NIM
ij
, 
PBTTA
ij
) interchangeably as a dependent variable .
The model is speciﬁed as follows:
The estimation results are presented in Tables 1A to 4A in the Appendix.
5. Empirical results
First we present the results of the mean equality tests for four performance 
measures between foreign-owned and domestic-owned banks for all SEE-6 
countries separately. Then we pool the data for all countries and use econo-
metric analysis to establish which indicators are signiﬁcant determinants of bank
performance.
Performance of foreign vs. domestic banks 
Four accounting based indicators were used to assess the differences in bank 
performance in SEE-6 countries. Since the ambition of the comparison was to 
detect the performance differences resulting from ownership structure character-
istics, banks were separated in two groups: foreign owned and domestic banks. 
Banks were considered to be foreign owned if foreign shareholders controlled 
more than 50 percent of the shares and analogously they were considered to be 
domestic if domestic shareholders controlled more than 50 percent of the stakes. 
Mean equality tests were performed separately for two periods: 1995-1999 and 
2000-2004 period in order to capture developments in the performance-owner-
ship relationship. The two timeframes approximated two typical evolution periods 
in banking sectors of Eastern European countries. The ﬁrst timeframe covered
the early years of transition, and was characterised by intensive consolidation 
and privatisation processes, resulting in foreign bank dominance in most of the 
countries. The second timeframe covered the period after year 2000 when con-
solidation was largely ﬁnished and banking sectors started to develop more inten-
sively. The results of group mean testing are presented in Table 6.
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Contrary to our expectations the results for the two most widely used perform-
ance (proﬁtability) indicators across countries were highly insigniﬁcant, mean-
ing that substantial differences in ROAA and ROAE between foreign-owned 
and domestic banks were statistically undetectable. The only exceptions were 
Bulgaria and Croatia in the 2000–2004 period, where foreign-owned banks out-
performed the domestic ones in terms of ROAE. In case of Albanian banking 
sector it was not possible to carry out the standard t-tests due to a small number 
of banks in one of the groups (i.e. the group of domestic banks).
The best discriminator between foreign-owned and domestic banks was net in-
come margin (NIM). The differences were statistically signiﬁcant in two countries
(Bulgaria and Romania) in the ﬁrst observed period (1995-1999), and in three
countries (Bolgaria, Romania and Croatia) in the second observed period (2000-
2004). The results show that only in case of Bulgaria foreign-owned banks out-
performed the domestic ones, while in case of Croatia and Rumania the situation 
is just the opposite: domestic banks operated on average with a higher NIM than 
foreign-owned banks. This ﬁndings are surprising to some extent, since foreign
owned banks are typically expected to operate with lower NIM due to their indis-
putably better access to lending funds via their parent banks in Western Europe.
Statistical insigniﬁcance of results is found also with the fourth performance
variable, PBTTA, which means that also the pre-tax proﬁtability of foreign owned
banks does not really differ from the proﬁtability of domestic banks before the
taxation. This ﬁnding might indicate the absence of any major differences in
taxation of banking operations in the studied countries.
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Table 6: Group mean equality test for four selected performance variables (ROAE, ROAA, NIM and 
PBTTA) in six SEE countries for 1995-1999 and 2000-2004 period.
Explanation of the abbreviations: Albania (AL), Bulgaria (BG), Serbia and Montenegro (CS), Croatia (HR), Macedo-
nia (MK), Romania (RO).
Source: Author’s calculations.
Determinants of bank performance in selected SEE-6 countries
The estimation outcomes are separately reported in four different sets of results 
in Tables 1A through 4A in the Appendix. Table 1A displays regression results for 
ROAA equation, Table 2A for ROAE equation, Table 3A for NIM equation and Ta-
ble 4A for PBTTA equation. Each of the equations was estimated ﬁrst for the entire
sample of banks and then for foreign-owned and domestic banks separately. 
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Dependent variables in each equation represent three groups of explanatory factors, 
as discussed in section 4: variables describing individual characteristics of banking 
ﬁrms;, variables representing banking market characteristics; and variables reﬂect-
ing macroeconomic characteristics of individual countries in the SEE-6 group.
6. Bank-speciﬁc determinants
The size (SIZE) of a banking ﬁrm does not seem to be an important determinant
of bank performance measures. Postulated positive relationship is detected only 
between SIZE and ROAE for the entire sample of banks, while in a sub-sample 
of foreign banks, a negative relationship with ROAA and PBTTA proved to be 
statistically signiﬁcant. A possible explanation for such an outcome could be
found in different market positioning of foreign as opposed to domestic banks 
in SEE countries. Namely, foreign-owned banks usually experience above aver-
age growth rates immediately after the entry in the market. With increase in size, 
foreign-owned banks also improve their performance, which is typically poor at 
the beginning of their operations in a new market (e.g. because of initial invest-
ments) and is gradually improving when the entrant is gaining market share 
and customers. A positive relationship between size and bank proﬁtability is for
example reported by Williams (2003) for foreign-owned banks in Australia, while 
Goddard et al. (2004) and Athanasoglou et al. (2006) didn’t detect any statisti-
cally signiﬁcant association between size and proﬁtability.
Capital strength parameter (EQTASUR) is signiﬁcant for the entire sample and
for the sub-sample of domestic banks. According to Goddard et al. (2004) the 
capital–proﬁtability relationship is expected to be negative, since overcapitaliza-
tion of banks is generally a sign of unused investment opportunities, which is 
also in line with Thakor (1996). On the other side some authors point out , that 
well capitalized banks normally have lower needs for external funding which 
can lead to better proﬁtability (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2006). In our setting
a positive relation of EQTASUR to ROAA needs to be observed together with 
a negative relationship between EQTASUR and ROAE. In our opinion higher 
EQTASUR enables banks to invest more aggressively on account of the extra 
capital coverage, which eventually can lead to higher return on assets. How-
ever, at the same time, higher EQTASUR does not enable banks to operate 
with signiﬁcantly higher ROE indicators. The latter is conﬁrmed with insigniﬁcant
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coefﬁcients in the ROAE equation for the entire sample and the sub-sample of
foreign-owned banks. In case of domestic banks even the association between 
EQTASUR and ROAE is conﬁrmed to be positive. A positive relationship be-
tween capital strength and proﬁtability is conﬁrmed also in the NIM and PBTTA
equation. The latter indicates that different taxation regimes should not have any 
signiﬁcant impact on the capital strength determinant.
Liquidity management determinant (LOANFUND), does not have any impact 
on performance indicators in our analysis. All estimated parameters, with the 
exception of the LOANFUND parameter in ROAA equation for domestic banks, 
are statistically insigniﬁcant.
Cost efﬁciency (CIR) is the next factor that importantly determines banking 
performance. The estimated coefﬁcients (with only one exception) are highly
signiﬁcant and according to prior expectations also negative.
Credit risk exposure, measured by the LLPTA variable, which demonstrates 
the proportion of loan-loss provisions in total banking assets is expected to be 
inversely related to different proﬁtability measures. Only the relationship with the
NIM measure is expected to be positive, since NIM represents a basis for the 
formation of loan-loss provisions, meaning that a bank which has intention to 
build up loan-loss provisions needs to create sufﬁcient net interest and net non-
interest margin. Given that banks in developing markets predominantly rely on 
traditional banking activities we expect the net interest income to be prevalent in 
the banking income structure and accordingly net interest margin is expected to 
demonstrate a relatively high degree of association with loan-loss provisioning 
capabilities. The estimated LLPTA parameters conform to prior expectations. 
In three proﬁtability equations (ROAA, ROAE and PBTTA) the coefﬁcients are
negative and highly signiﬁcant. In the NIM equation coefﬁcients are statistically
signiﬁcant as well, but all have a positive sign. It is important to note that the
obtained results do not detect any signiﬁcant differences between foreign owned
and domestic banks, with regard to the LLPTA variable, so we can conclude that 
foreign and domestic banks behave in a similar way.
The impact of bank asset structure is captured by only one variable: NEATA 
(net earning assets to total assets), which reﬂects the proportion of assets that
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directly enable a bank to generate banking income. However, the estimated co-
efﬁcients in all the proﬁtability equations (ROAA, ROAE and PBTTA) are statisti-
cally insigniﬁcant, indicating no relationship between asset structure and bank
proﬁtability. Only the NEATA parameter in NIM equation, estimated for the entire
sample of banks proved to be signiﬁcant and negative. There is no straight-
forward explanation for this particular result, unless one believes that higher 
proportion of net earning assets in total assets would absolutely imply higher 
loan-loss provisions. In any case, this particular issue needs detailed investiga-
tion. Alternative asset structure variables (e.g. loans to total asset ratio) that 
were also employed in some other studies instead of NEATA variable did not 
render any improvements in the signiﬁcance of the results.
Analogously to the bank asset structure, the bank income structure was in-
vestigated by employing the OOINIR (other operating income to net interest rev-
enues ratio) variable. The variable should explain the importance of non-interest 
income for the proﬁtability of banking operations. Only in the PBTTA equation
the OOINIR coefﬁcient proves to be signiﬁcant. The result shows that OOINIR is
positively related to PBTTA, when the relationship is tested for the entire sample 
of bank and for the sub-sample of foreign-owned banks. The detected positive 
relationship indicates that proﬁtability of banks is sensitive to the proportion of
non-interest income in total income structure. For the sub-sample of domestic 
banks a negative, although not very strong, relationship is detected, so we could 
infer a greater dependence of domestic bank proﬁtability on interest income as
compared to the relationship detected with foreign-owned banks. This interpre-
tation is partly supported by estimation results for the ROAE and ROAA equa-
tion, although not all the parameters are signiﬁcant.
7. Market-speciﬁc determinants
Interest rate spread (SPREAD) measures earning potential in the market (i.e. 
the greater the interest spread the greater is the earning potential of ﬁnancial
intermediaries) and indirectly also competitiveness in the market, since greater 
interest spread reﬂects lower competitiveness, while a narrower spread indi-
cates more intense competition in the market. In all the equations the results for 
the entire sample and for the sub-sample of foreign-owned banks are in line with 
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our prior expectations. In both samples spread proves to be positively related to 
proﬁtability indicators ROAA, ROAE and PBTTA. This means that on average,
an increasing interest rate spread can be associated with better proﬁtability op-
portunities. Surprisingly, the results are just the opposite for the sub-sample of 
domestic banks, where the estimated coefﬁcient has a negative sign and is most
cases also signiﬁcant. One of the explanations for a different reaction of domes-
tic banks could be in their lower proﬁtability efﬁciency as compared to foreign
banks. Obviously the results obtained on the entire sample are inﬂuenced by the
impact of foreign owned banks which dominate the sample.
The degree of banking market concentration is measured by HHI index based 
on total assets (HHITACEL). In three (ROAA, ROAE, NIM) out of four equations 
the estimated coefﬁcient proves to be signiﬁcant only for the sub-sample of do-
mestic banks, but not for the sub-sample of foreign owned bank or for the entire 
sample. The estimated HHITACEL parameters for domestic banks are also strict-
ly negative, meaning that higher market concentration adversely affects the prof-
itability of domestic banks. One possible explanation is that the banking market 
concentration is increasing at the expense of domestic banks, which loose their 
position in the market. Additionally, we could also assume that foreign-owned 
banks on average have certain competitive advantages over domestic banks 
(Berger et al., 2004), which results in market share loses of domestic banks.
In order to control for the impact of the market share we include the MKTSHARE 
variable, which is calculated as a share of total assets of each individual bank in the 
total assets of the entire banking sector. The estimated parameters are signiﬁcant
only for NIM equation for the entire sample of banks and for the sub-sample of for-
eign-owned banks. Both coefﬁcients are positive, which means that on average, for-
eign-owned banks improve their net interest margins (NIM) by increasing their market 
shares. This result is to a large extent consistent with market concentration results.
8. Macroeconomic determinants
As suggested by previous research (e.g. Havrylchyk and Jurzyk, 2005; Pasiouras 
and Kosmidou, 2006) we control for stock market capitalization by including 
STOCKGDP variable (stock market capitalization to GDP ration) reﬂecting the
development level of the stock market in each individual country. Negative rela-
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tionship between stock market capitalization and bank proﬁtability is expected.
In our case only one coefﬁcient in the ROAA equation turns out to be signiﬁcant
and also negative. However, all other coefﬁcients are not signiﬁcant
Most performance models control, directly or indirectly, for the GDP growth in the 
local economy. In our sample, GDP growth rate (LOGCNGGDP) is statistically 
signiﬁcant predictor of ROAA, ROAE and PBTTA for the entire sample and of
ROAA and ROAE for the sub-sample of foreign banks. According to our expecta-
tions it has a positive sign. Again we can conclude that foreign-owned banks are 
more successful in taking advantage of favourable macroeconomic conditions.
Similar results as observed in case of growth rate of the foreign exchange 
rate in domestic economy (LOGCNGFXRATE). A positive growth rate of the 
foreign exchange rate indicates depreciation of national currency, which should 
stimulate export industry. Analogously to GDP growth rate we expect the sign of 
the LOGCNGFXRATE to be positive. In fact, positive regression coefﬁcient is de-
tected for the entire sample of banks and for the foreign-owned banks in ROAA, 
ROAE and PBTTA equation and for the foreign-owned banks in NIM equation. 
Coefﬁcients for the sub-sample of domestic banks are mostly insigniﬁcant.
EBRDBANK variable indicates the general development level of the bank-
ing sector. The direction of the association with the dependent variables is the 
same for foreign-owned and domestic banks, although the estimated coefﬁcient
proves to be signiﬁcant only for all three parameters in the ROAA equation, one
parameter in ROAE equation and two parameters in the PBTTA equation. The 
obtained results are consistent with ﬁndings of previous studies.
Conclusions
The purpose of this paper was to investigate the relationship between bank own-
ership (foreign vs. domestic) and bank performance in selected set of six South-
East European countries (SEE-6): Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, 
Romania and Serbia & Montenegro.
The entire region was characterized by a substantial inﬂux of foreign investors in
local banking markets in the last 10 – 15 years. In most of these countries (the only 
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exception was Serbia & Montenegro) the market share of foreign owned banks 
was close to 50 percent or even well above it. Foreign investors (mostly larger 
Western European banks) entered East European markets either by establish-
ing greenﬁeld operations or by acquiring domestic banks, in most cases heavily
troubled. Intuitively one would expect that a signiﬁcant presence of foreign-owned
banks would be reﬂected in performance indicators of the banking industry.
Our analysis was based on the bank level, industry level and macroeconomic data 
for the period 1995 – 2004. The data were obtained from the BankScope data-
base, IFS dataset provided by IMF and from the EBRD publications. The ﬁrst part
of the analysis consisted of a series of the mean equality tests for four perform-
ance measures between foreign owned and domestic banks in each of the studied 
countries. The second part of the analysis relied on the econometric investigation 
of the bank performance determinants in selected banking sectors.
Our results obtained in the ﬁrst part of the analysis demonstrated only a limited
differentiation between the performance indicators for foreign-owned banks and 
domestic banks across countries. The most pronounced differences between 
domestic and foreign owned banks were detected only with the net interest mar-
gin indicator, while with the other performance indicators statistically signiﬁcant
differences appeared to be rare. Any systematic differences in equality testing 
for both sub-periods (1995-1999 and 2000-2004) were not detectable.
The econometric investigation of bank performance explanatory factors offered 
only limited evidence on the relationship with performance determinants. While 
bank speciﬁc factors reﬂecting capital strength, cost efﬁciency and credit risk
exposure proved to be associated with performance measures according to 
prior expectations, liquidity management and bank asset structure factors did 
not demonstrate any statistically signiﬁcant link to performance indicators. The
results with size and income structure were mixed and could not lead to any 
systematic conclusions. Further, among market speciﬁc and macroeconomic
factors only interest rate spread and HHI index and to some extent GDP growth 
rate and the growth rate of the foreign exchange rate proved to have signiﬁcant
explanatory power, whereas market share and stock market capitalization to 
GDP ratio turned out to be inconclusive.
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Further research should rely on the employment of additional explanatory vari-
ables that could better reﬂect differences in banking business structure among
banks. Control variables for the mode foreign bank entry into the market need 
to be added and state owned banks, although almost inexistent in some of the 
countries, should be treated as a separate group.
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Appendix
Table 1A: Estimation results for the ROAA equation estimated for the entire sample of banks, foreign 
owned and domestic banks.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Table 2A: Estimation results for the ROAE equation estimated for the entire sample of banks, foreign 
owned and domestic banks.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Table 3A: Estimation results for the NIM equation estimated for the entire sample of banks, foreign 
owned and domestic banks.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Table 4A: Estimation results for the PBTTA equation estimated for the entire sample of banks, foreign 
owned and domestic banks.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Credit Efﬁciency and Consumer Loans Price
Mileti Mladenov and Irina Kazandjieva
Introduction
The increase of ﬁnancial market integration includes a wide scope of factors, e.g.
institutional factors for regulating the ﬁnancial market, different types of control on
capital movement, application of deﬁnite accounting standards and tax laws. But
the creation of common standards and the lack of artiﬁcial barriers are not enough
for the development of the ﬁnancial integration within the European Union.
In a more narrow sense the integration of ﬁnancial markets is not only a possibil-
ity to perform cross border transactions, but it is also the desire of investors to 
take part in such transactions. According to Obstfeld (1986) there are two con-
cepts in measuring the ﬁnancial markets integration – the ﬁrst concept is based
on the amount of cross border transactions and the second one on the mar-
ket efﬁciency78. The small amount of transactions on the international ﬁnancial
markets means not always market segmentation. It can be due to the investors’ 
perception that their investments on the local and international markets are not 
proﬁtable and for that reason they do not participate in them. On the other hand,
the capital ﬂow due to monetary and ﬁnancial crisis is not an indicator for high
degree of integration of ﬁnancial markets. For that reason we can consider the
existence of competition and market efﬁciency as a more precise measure for
market integration compared to the number of transactions. When measuring the 
existing competition on the ﬁnancial markets and their efﬁciency, the law of one
price has a very important application. According to this law the prices of identical 
ﬁnancial products become equal when there is market integration. It means that
the assets held by the investor have the same risk and the yield that is going to 
be achieved from them will be the same no matter where these instruments are 
traded. If there are differences in the prices of a ﬁnancial asset when it is traded
on different markets, this is an indicator for the existence of market segmentation 
and it leads to a decrease of the amount of cross border transactions. 
78 Obstfeld, M., Capital Mobility in the World Economy: Theory and Measurement, NBER Working paper, 1986.
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The main aim of the creation of the EU is the creation of a single market which 
has to foster the existence of ﬁnancial market integration. For that reason a
number of regulations and directives are adopted by the EU Commission and 
they have to be transposed by the member states. Despite the existing regula-
tory framework the integration of the retail ﬁnancial market is taking place with
slow paces and the national differences and market segmentation are common 
for retail credit markets within the EU countries79. From the three main types of 
barriers – natural, political and private that inﬂuences the demand and supply
of ﬁnancial products on the European market, the natural barriers are of great
importance. Cultural difference, language and geographical distances hinder 
the creation of a single market, but it can be supposed that the integration is 
possible for the natural language areas as Germany and Austria or Great Britain 
and Ireland, or for neighboring countries with traditionally close trade links. 
Regarding the credit market in the EU Dell’Ariccia (2001)80 argues that the com-
petition is different on the different market segments, that’s why ﬁnancial regula-
tions have a different effect on the different categories of debtors. If there are 
differences in credit reporting in the EU countries as well as different access to 
credit, it may hinder the creation of a single credit market. It should be also tak-
en into consideration the banks’ behavior on the concentrated markets, where 
banks inﬂuence strongly price setting for the different products, which causes
higher transaction costs for the client when he or she changes the bank.  
The aim of the paper
The paper is going to explore the transposition of the consumer credit directive81 
in Bulgaria and Romania, the obligation for credit institutions to announce the 
Annual Percentage Rate82 (APR) and its inﬂuence on the loan supply and de-
mand. This concept is going to be developed in the light of penetration of for-
79 Kleimeier, S., H.Sander, Consumer Credit Rates in the Eurozone: Evidence of Emergence of Single Retail Banking Market, 
ECRI Research Report №2, 2002;
Schüler, M., F. Heinemann, How Integrated are the European Retail Financial Market? A Cointegration Analysis, Center for 
EuropeanEconomic Research, Manheim University, 2002.
80 Dell’Ariccia, G., Competition among Regulators, Working paper №01/73, 2001.
81 Council Directive of 22 December 1986 for the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the 
member states concerning consumer credit.
82 APR (Annual Percentage Rate) is a measure of the total cost of credit to consumers and it includes interest and other charges 
which consumer has to pay on the credit contract. APR is calculated in accordance with a deﬁnite mathematical formula which is
applied by all member states.
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eign banks in Bulgaria and Romania. As the consumer credit directive has a 
considerably long history of almost 20 years, the EU credit institutions are quite 
aware of its application and the calculation of the APR on consumer loans. The 
paper is going to measure the non interest rates component  of the APR, applied 
by the foreign credit institutions in Bulgaria and Romania and we are going to 
investigate how integrated are consumer credit markets in both countries with 
the EU market by using the interest rates on consumer loans. For that reason 
correlation and cointegration techniques are going to be implemented in this 
paper. The correlation analysis has some deﬁciencies and it can not be used
to make conclusions for the integration of the credit market, but it is good to be 
performed for the interest rates time series as it gives information for the type 
(positive or negative) and the degree of relation between the time series. If credit 
markets in Bulgaria and Romania are integrated with the EU credit market, the 
correlation coefﬁcients should be positive and close to 1. The paper is going to
explain the possible differences between the interest rate levels on consumer 
loans in Bulgaria and Romania and the existence or non-existence of integration 
between them and the rest of the EU countries. 
The existence of cointegration of interest rates on consumer loans in Bulgaria and 
Romania with those in the rest of EU countries means that a long-run relationship 
exists among them. It can be argued that as a result of moving away market barri-
ers within the EU, the nonstationary time series of the interest rates on consumer 
loans will be cointegrated, which means that they may be linked in the long run 
in the sense that they tend not to drift apart over time. Considering the cointegra-
tion of interest rates, it should be noted that convergence and cointegration are 
different empirical phenomena. Convergence implies a tendency of two variables 
to move together in a common path, while cointegration implies the existence of 
equilibrium between two non-stationary variables, which means that when two 
variables are converging it is not a prerequisite for cointegration.
The paper is concentrating not only on Bulgaria and Romania, but Croatia, Al-
bania, FYR Macedonia and Serbia despite that these cases are going to be 
analyzed in a different aspect. As these countries are not EU members yet, they 
do not have to comply with the EU regulations and directives, esp. the consumer 
credit directive. Nevertheless, there have been a strong penetration of foreign 
banks in these countries and it is reﬂected in the diversity and types of banking
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products offered to retail clients in Croatia, Albania, Macedonia and Serbia. The 
foreign banks are implementing the know-how as well as the banking products 
and services that are common for the EU countries but these products and serv-
ices are structured according to the development of the banking sector and the 
ﬁnancial market in the country. The paper is going to investigate the existence of
any initiatives by the foreign banks penetrating in Croatia, Albania, Macedonia 
and Serbia to announce the total cost of consumer loans and the inﬂuence of the
foreign banks entrance on the level of interest rates on consumer loans in a way 
that they become more integrated with the EU credit market.
The paper consists of three parts. The ﬁrst part is investigating the existence of
any legal framework that requires credit institutions to calculate the total cost of 
consumer loans, and if it exists how it is applied by the credit institutions in the 
country. The analysis in the ﬁrst part is  concentrated on Bulgaria and Romania
because as EU member states they have to comply with the consumer credit di-
rective and to calculate APR on consumer loans. The aim of the second part is to 
estimate the component of other charges in APR of the foreign credit institutions 
and to investigate how integrated are the credit markets in Bulgaria and Romania 
with the rest of the EU countries. The third part of the paper will be concentrated 
on the inﬂuence of foreign banks, entering the market in Croatia, Albania, Mac-
edonia and Serbia on credit interest rates and if this inﬂuence leads to a higher
integration of the credit market in these countries with the rest of the EU.
I. Review of the legal framework regarding consumer loans and its appli-
cation by the credit institutions
This part is deliberately divided into two sub parts as it is expected to ﬁnd huge dif-
ferences between the new EU member states – Bulgaria and Romania and Croatia, 
Albania, Macedonia and Serbia which are treated as potential candidate countries. 
Having in mind the history of the development of the consumer credit regulation in 
Bulgaria and Romania before the implementation of Consumer Credit Directive we 
can come to the conclusion that we can expect the existence of fragmented legal 
framework regarding the cost of consumer loan in different legal acts, e.g. the Law 
on Banks, Commercial Law or the Law Protecting Consumer Rights in Croatia, 
Albania, Macedonia and Serbia. This kind of regulation is proved to be inefﬁcient,
not strictly kept and debtors are not always aware of its existence. 
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There are several factors that may hold back the expansion of foreign invest-
ments in the countries in South Europe and they are macroeconomic uncer-
tainties, weakness of property rights and legal framework, underdeveloped 
business culture, low transparency of business, inadequate ﬂows of informa-
tion, inefﬁciencies relating to the use of collateral and so on. That’s why we
consider that the introduction of legal framework regulating consumer loans and 
imposing the calculation of an effective interest rate and contracts that provide 
comparison between consumer loans in the different countries in South Europe 
will contribute to the expansion of consumer loans on national level and will also 
foster the cross border consumer lending.
Bulgaria and Romania
Bulgaria and Romania transposed the Consumer Credit Directive in their national 
legislation before 2007 – in Romania this happened in 2004 and in Bulgaria in 
October, 2006. Both countries adopted separate legal acts and transposed en-
tirely the requirements of the consumer credit directive in their national legislation. 
Regarding the total cost of consumer loans and the requirement for the calculation 
of APR in accordance with a single mathematical formula, a negative approach is 
adopted for the other charges (fees and commissions) which should be excluded 
from the calculation of APR. These charges are as follows: charges payable by 
the borrower for non compliance with the commitments in the contract; charges 
other than the purchase price despite the services or goods are paid in cash or 
by consumer credit, charges for transfer of funds and charges for keeping the 
account intended to receive payments on the loan; membership subscription and 
insurances and guarantees which are not obligatory for the client to be approved 
for a consumer loan. In Bulgaria the list of charges is extended to those paid for 
the estimation of collateral and their amount is signiﬁcant.
The aim of the consumer credit directive is to encourage market integration and 
to decrease the overindebtedness of consumers by providing circumstances for 
supplying them with clear information on the total cost of credit. The requirement 
for the banks to announce APR does not have a positive attitude as it will lead to 
increasing the level of the interest rates as it is going to include the cost of other 
charges. When measuring the price of the consumer credit we have to take into 
consideration two elements – the interest rate component and the component 
of other charges. This part of the paper is going to compare the size of the non 
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interest rate component of the APR offered by domestic and foreign credit institu-
tions in Bulgaria and Romania. The indicator for efﬁciency is the size of the non
interest component and the smaller it is, the more efﬁcient a credit institution will
be. When considering this indicator, we also have to explore the level of APR, be-
cause banks may apply small nominal interest rates which will be “compensated” 
by higher charges. The results of the research how credit institutions in Bulgaria 
and Romania announce APR on their web sites is presented in Annex 1.  
The Consumer Credit Directive is transposed in the Bulgarian legislation by 
the Law on Consumer Credit83 that entered into force in October, 1st 2006. 
Before that time there have been existing since December 2005 a gentlemen 
agreement between commercial banks and the Bulgarian Association of Com-
mercial Banks to announce APR on consumer loans, but this agreement was 
on a voluntary basis and it had no binding effect. The Law on Consumer Credit 
sticks to the minimum requirements set in the Directive and those fees and 
commissions that are excluded from the APR calculation are deﬁned in it. Art.
7 of the Law complies entirely with the Directive as it states the requirements 
credit institutions to announce APR in the consumer loan contract, conditions 
for changing fees and commissions on consumer loans, conditions for loan 
repayment, other fees and commissions part of the total cost of consumer loan, 
but not included in the APR calculation. The Law on Consumer Credit follows 
the negative approach set in the Directive as in Division 7 of the Law those fees 
and commissions that are not included in APR calculation are listed. Except for 
the exclusions set in the Directive, it is added that those charges related to the 
collateral valuation should be excluded from APR calculation. 
The Law on Consumer Credit in Bulgaria contains some ﬂaws and they can be
summarized to the following. First of all, the scope of the Law should be over all 
types of loans granted to consumers, including loans for house purchases and 
other loans for business purposes granted to consumers as agricultural loans, 
bridge loans, and loans for education, medical treatment and overdraft. Second, 
consumer loans regulation should foster consumption and economic growth, 
but due to the short period of time since the law is in force its effect could not 
be estimated. Third, conditions set in the consumer credit contract should be 
transparent and understandable by the debtors and the information in the con-
83 Law on Consumer Credit entering into force on the 1st of October 2006, State Gazette №53 as of June, 30th 2006. 
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tracts should be standardized similar to the European Standardized Information 
Sheet84. Leasing contracts for consumer goods should also be included in the 
Law on Consumer Credit as well as loans below 200 EUR because in the ma-
jority of cases loans granted in small amounts are the only accessible loans for 
debtors with a high level of overindebtedness. Loans granted to consumer for 
investment purposes should be also regulated as these consumers are not pro-
fessionals and should have the same access to information as those consumers 
who have been granted a typical consumer loan.
Great deﬁciency of the Bulgarian law is that it doesn’t contain a requirement for
the calculation of APR on loans for house purchases as the practice of the major-
ity of the EU countries is that when transposing the Consumer Credit Directive to 
the national legislation any clauses for the calculation of APR on loans for house 
purchases were foreseen. We consider that loans for house purchases are a 
special type of consumer loans (the house is good with special features and 
the decision of purchasing a house may have a great inﬂuence on person’s life,
incomes and the level of indebtedness) and when making the decision for taking 
such a loan from a deﬁnite credit institution the debtor should be well aware of the
expenses related the loan that was granted as well as to the total price of credit 
whose concentrated expression is APR. It should be also take into consideration 
the tendencies in the development of the Consumer Credit Directive orientated to 
the inclusion of loans for house purchase in the scope of the Directive as well as 
the ECB requirements on interest rate statistics set in the Regulation ECB/2001/
1885 which requires member states central banks to collect statistics on APR on 
consumer loans and loans for house purchases from credit institutions.
The authors performed an investigation on the announcing of APR on con-
sumer loans on the commercial banks web sites in Bulgaria86. The results 
of the investigation are given in details in the Annex 1 and here we sum-
84 Loans for house purchases (home loans) are arranged by the European Agreement on a Voluntary Code of Conduct on 
Pre-contractual Information for Home Loans,  5 March 2001, European Commission which can be signed by the credit institutions 
in member states on a voluntary basis. This agreement sets a standardized form on the contracts for loans for house purchases in 
accordance with the so called European Standardized Information Sheet.
85 Regulation ECB/2001/18 concerning statistics on interest rates applied by MFIs to deposits and loans vis-à-vis households 
and non-ﬁnancial corporations.
86 The research was ﬁnished up to November, 8th 2006. The following banks do not participate in the investigation: National Bank
of Greece, Citibank N.A., T.C. Ziraat Bankasi and Bulgarian American Credit Banks due to the lack of web sites of these banks. After 
reviewing the Quarterly Bulletin of Commercial Banks in Bulgaria it was concluded that these banks do not grant consumer loans 
to individuals or they grant consumer loans only to employees at favorable condition. It means that excluding these banks from the 
research we do not interfere the conclusions of the research. 
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marize the general results. Of all 29 commercial banks participating in the 
investigation only 12 announce APR on consumer loans on their web sites. 
Neither of the banks calculates APR on overdrafts and credit cards and only 
two banks calculate APR on loans for house purchases despite the lack of 
requirement in the Law on Consumer Credit for calculating APR on these 
loans. One of these banks announces APR on loans for house purchases by 
giving an example with deﬁnite parameters regarding loan maturity, amount
and nominal interest rate and the other bank has developed a calculator 
which automatically calculates APR when the client sets the type of loan. 
Only three of all the banks give a legal deﬁnition of APR on their web sites.
Only one bank points out which fees and commissions are not included in 
the APR calculation, and another bank explains why APR is higher than the 
nominal interest rate. The banks announce APR in two different ways – by 
developing an example (in 8 of the cases) by taking into account deﬁnite
parameters of the loan, e.g. nominal interest rate, amount an maturity and by 
developing a calculator (in the rest of the cases), where APR is automatically 
calculated by entering the type of loan. Neither of the banks calculates APR 
on compound consumer loan products, e.g. combined credit (overdraft and 
consumer loan), open credit, etc.
It can be concluded that despite the banks announce APR, there is a lack of 
transparency because in none of the cases there is an indication which fees 
and commissions are included in the APR calculation and which not. Bas-
ing on deﬁnite calculations on consumer loans performed by the authors by
taking into consideration the loan parameters announced on the web sites, it 
was found out that the majority of the banks include only fees and commis-
sions for the loan management in the APR calculation, but they do not include 
those for the loan administration. Regarding the total cost of consumer credit 
the heaviest burden of the total cost of credit belongs to the charges for the 
loan management, but it shouldn’t be underestimate the other charges, which 
according to the law should be included in the APR calculation as the debtor 
should be acquainted with them in order to make unbiased estimation of the 
total cost of the consumer credit product he /she chooses. Few of the con-
sumers understand what APR means and that gives possibility for compar-
ing consumer loans offered by the different credit institutions as none of the 
banks gives any information on the notion of APR.  
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In 2004 Romania had transposed the requirements of the Consumer Credit Di-
rective in a separate legal Act on Consumer Credit87 and due to a Norm on the 
statistics of the interest rates charged by credit institutions adopted in 2006 it 
was required by the credit institutions in Romania to report to the central bans 
APR on newly contracted consumer loans. The authors of the paper made a 
research on how Romanian credit institutions report APR on consumer loans 
on their websites in accordance with the requirement of the legal act. It can be 
concluded that up to 28th of February only a few commercial banks in Romania 
report APR on consumer loans and the general practice is that announce APR 
as an example on certain consumer loans. 
The Romanian law on consumer credit strictly transposes the Consumer Credit 
Directive, e.g. the types of loans that are excluded from the scope of the law, the 
charges that are excluded from the APR calculation,  and it also transposes the 
examples set in the Directive on the APR calculation on the basis of calendar and 
standard year. Similar to Bulgaria the Romanian law excludes loans for house 
purchases, but it strictly transposes the types of charges excluded from the APR 
calculation. Bulgarian law envisages charges payable on collateral on consumer 
loans to be excluded from the APR calculations, which is different than the scope 
of the Directive and is controversial regarding the interests of the consumer. De-
spite the earlier transposition of the Consumer Credit Directive in the Romanian 
law it can be concluded that the law is not effective as only a few credit institutions 
report APR on consumer loans and there are no aggregated data available on 
APR on consumer loans, which can be used for further analyses.
The authors investigated the non interest rate component of consumer loans and 
on this basis they calculated APR88. The results of this investigation are presented 
in Annex 1a. When analyzing the results we must have into consideration that the 
calculations are made for deﬁnite consumer loans offered by the banks and they
do not refer to aggregated levels, which means that when aggregating the data on 
APR for all consumer loans offered by a certain bank, there are going to be differ-
ent results. In order to provide greater comparison of the results, the calculations 
of APR are performed for standard consumer loans, which means that the inﬂu-
ence on the interest rates on speciﬁc loan products on APR is underestimated,
87 Law № 289 of June 24th, 2004 concerning legal arrangements with respect to consumer credit agreements for natural persons, 
Ofﬁcial Gazette № 611 of July 6th, 2004.
88 The investigation is performed up to November 30th 2006.
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e.g. consumer loans on which the repayments are done on irregular intervals or 
loans that are granted at initially very low levels of nominal interest rates, fees and 
commissions. The calculation of APR is performed for consumer loans by taking 
the same parameters regarding the maturity, the amount of loans and the collat-
eral, e.g. 5 year, 15 000 BGN and a collateral in the form of guarantee. 
When making the analyses on the basis of the calculated annual percentage 
rates and the effective interest rates for the different credit institutions in Bul-
garia we argue that if considering the effect of the non interest rate component, 
there should not exist huge differences in the levels of APRs for the different 
credit institutions. We can suppose this by taking into consideration the peculi-
arities in the banking sector in Bulgaria, namely – the lack of market concentra-
tion and the existence of strong competition among banks. As it is evident from 
ﬁg. 1 this assumption is not true. The reasons for this are that there is a weak
elasticity of loan supply to interest rates due to market segmentation and the 
fact that on loan demand different factors inﬂuence as facilitated procedures
for granting consumer loans, relationship bank-client, the supply of additional 
banking products and services, etc.
Fig.1
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The component of other charges on consumer loans varies a lot for the banks, 
dividing them into three groups in accordance to Banking Supervision method-
ology in Bulgaria. For the banks in the ﬁrst group the amount of the non interest
component on consumer loans as a part of the total cost of credit is 6,58% 
compared to that on loans for house purchases where it amounts to 9,17%. 
The component for other charges on consumer loans for the banks from the 
second and third group amounts to 8,08% compared to this amount on loans 
for house purchases which is 6,84%.
The competition of credit institutions on the market is due the strategic positions 
they take. Market positions of credit institutions points out the speciﬁc beneﬁts
for consumers regarding the products offered by the banks, e.g. some banks in 
Bulgaria offer combined products that consist of loan and insurance. Holding up 
a deﬁnite market position by the bank, it is reﬂected on its marketing, it develop-
ment and the products it offers as well as ability to make innovations. The more 
freedom the banks have, the stronger the competition among them is. If the legal 
framework limits banks’ opportunities to create unique products and to offer then 
in the most appropriate way, it will reduce competition among them, which will 
have a negative effect on consumers.
The Romanian banking system is characterized with a high level of specializa-
tion of credit institutions and the majority of foreign banks that have entered the 
market do not grant consumer loans. Such banks that have been specialized 
in granting loans to non ﬁnancial corporations, car loans, loans for supporting
export commerce are Bankca, Italo Romana, Anglo-Romanian Bank Limited, 
Banca Comerciala Carpatica, Romanian International Bank, Banca di Roma, 
Citibank Romania, Garanti Bank International, etc. In Annex I are presented the 
calculated values of APR on consumer loans granted by the banks in Romania, 
and we have to take into consideration that these results are not exhaustive, as 
we based our calculations only on the data published on the web site of the Ro-
manian banks and many of them have a scarce information regarding consumer 
loans or even do not have translated English versions.
Similar to Bulgarian credit institutions, commercial banks Romania also tend not 
to announce the values of APR on consumer loans on their web site despite the 
early transposition of the Consumer Credit Directive in the national legislation. 
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Contrary to the practice of Bulgarian credit institutions neither of the Romanian 
banks developed a calculator for automatic calculation of APR on consumer 
loans and all the banks calculate APR by developing an example with deﬁnite
parameters of the loan, e.g. amount, maturity, nominal interest rates. 
Croatia, Albania, Macedonia and Serbia
For Croatia, Albania, Macedonia and Serbia it is hardly to be expected that any 
legal framework regarding total cost of consumer credit exists but we are going 
to compare the initiatives (if any) undertaken by the domestic and foreign banks 
in these countries to announce the total cost of consumer loans.
According to the development plan of the central bank of Albania for the period of 
2006-2008 the stress is put on the development of the legal framework regarding 
the implementation of BASEL II and the EU Directives, e.g. European Directive 
2000/12/EC89, European Directive 94/19/EC90 and European Directive 83/349/
EЕC91. It is also envisaged for the next two years to be developed draft regulation 
on consumer credit aiming at regulating the activity of the consumer and hous-
ing credit by specifying the regulatory framework of this activity pursuant to the 
European Consumer Credit Directive and the best practices in this ﬁeld.
In 2005 Macedonia has implemented a Decision on calculating and publishing 
the effective interest rate on credits and deposits92 which enters into force from 
June, 2006. This Decision sets out an uniform manner of calculating publish-
ing an effective interest rate to loans granted and its aim is to provide com-
parison between the interest rates on loans offered by the different commercial 
and saving banks. This Decision stipulates some of the requirements set in the 
Consumer Credit Directive as the requirement to inform the client on the fees 
and other commissions charged by the bank when the credit agreement is con-
cluded, but it does not require the banks to calculate APR on consumer loans. 
After studying93 the public information on the web sites of commercial and sav-
89 Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 relating to the taking up and pursuit of 
the business of credit institutions.
90 European Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit-guarantee schemes.
91 European Directive 83/349/EЕC as of 13 June 1983 on consolidated accounts.
92 Decision on Calculating and Publishing the Effective Interest Rate on Credits and Deposits pursuant to Article 31 of the Law 
on National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia published in the Ofﬁcial Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, №3/2002, 51/2003,
85/2003, 40/2004, 61/2004.
93 The research was concluded up to 15.03.2007.
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ing banks about the terms and conditions on consumer loans in Macedonia 
we came to the conclusion that neither of the banks in Macedonia announces 
APR on consumer loans, which means that there is a lack of initiatives from the 
central banks and commercial banks, esp. foreign banks that have entered the 
banking market in Macedonia to implement the requirements of the Directive 
concerning consumer loans without the existence of certain legal framework. 
Up to the beginning of 2007 there exists no legal framework in Croatia that trans-
poses the requirements of the Directive 87/102/EEC and neither of the com-
mercial banks calculates APR on consumer loans. According to the instructions 
given by the Statistical Department94 to the commercial banks regarding the 
reporting of interest rates on newly contracted loans, the banks should report 
effective interest rates but the formula which should be used is not given and 
there is no reference given to the Consumer Credit Directive.
In 2005 the central bank in Serbia adopted a Decision95 similar to that in Macedo-
nia according to which a common method of calculation of an effective interest 
rate on loans was implemented. This Decision imposed the calculation of an ef-
fective interest rate on an annual basis by applying the compound interest calcu-
lation method. According to this Decision loan contracts should include fees and 
commissions charged by the bank to the client in the process of loan approval as 
well as those known by the bank on the calculation date and which are charged 
in the course of loan execution. This condition is consistent with the requirements 
with the Consumer Credit Directive and it refers to all kinds of loans. It also does 
not stipulate the calculation of APR and neither bank in Serbia calculates it.
Regarding the implementation of the Consumer Credit Directive and the cal-
culation of APR it can be concluded about Albania, Macedonia, Croatia and 
Serbia that there exist fragmented legal framework on consumer loans, there 
is no transposition of the Directive and neither of the commercial banks an-
nounces APR on consumer loans. There are no initiatives taken by the foreign 
banks operating on the market to announce APR on consumer loans but there 
are some efforts for increasing consumers’ understanding on the component 
94 For more information see www.hnb.hr, Instruction for the Compilation of the Report on Interest rates on Loans and Deposits, 
Croatian National Bank, Statistics Department.
95 Decision on the Uniform Manner of Calculating and Disclosing the Effective Interest Rate on Loans and Deposits, RS Ofﬁcial
Gazette, №11/2005 and 108/2005.
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of other charges on consumer loans that is reﬂected in the number of Deci-
sions adopted by the central banks in these countries that require speciﬁc
information on fee and commissions to be included in the loan contracts.
II. Estimation of the element of non interest charges in the total cost of 
consumer loans and analysis of the integration of consumer loan markets 
in Bulgaria and Romania with the EU market
The second part of the paper is concentrated on analysis of the different charg-
es applied by the credit institutions in Bulgaria and Romania and the accent is 
put on the comparison between domestic and foreign credit institutions. As the 
majority of the consumer loans in Bulgaria and Romania are granted by foreign 
banks we can consider the aggregated interest rates on consumer loans as an 
indicator for measuring market integration with the EU. 
a. Calculation and analysis of the non interest component of the to-
tal cost of consumer loans
The calculation of the non interested rate component of APR is estimated for the 
domestic and foreign banks in Bulgaria and Romania and the weights of the dif-
ferent parts of charges in the total cost of credit is calculated. Credit institutions 
apply different types of fees and commissions on consumer loans, which partici-
pate with different weights in the total cost of credit. The most typical fees and 
commissions that are collected by credit institutions in Bulgaria on consumer 
loans are fees and commissions for loan management, for documentation, for 
repaying the loan in advance and for opening and keeping an account. There are 
no administrative charges for reviewing the loan application, life insurance, credit 
analyses, for keeping the account intended, estimating the collateral, mortgage 
fees and for cash drawing. 
The amount of non interest charges as a part of APR is different regarding the 
different types of loans offered to consumers in Bulgaria and Romania. The 
amount of the non interest expenses as a part of APR regarding the banks in the 
ﬁrst group in Bulgaria is as follows96:
96 The calculations are made the authors.
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● Fees and commissions for managing consumer loans vary between 
2,47% and 13,86% of the total cost of credit, expressed by APR;
● Administration fees vary between 0,12% and 4,21% of the total cost of 
credit, expressed by APR;
● Fees and commission for credit analysis of the client vary between 
0,41% and 0,85% of the total cost of credit, expressed by APR;
● Other fees and commissions, e.g. for consultations and for documenta-
tion are respectively 0,79% and 0,06% of the total cost of credit, ex-
pressed by APR.
The amount of the non interest expenses as a part of APR regarding the banks 
in the second and third groups in Bulgaria is as follows:
● Fees and commissions for managing consumer loans vary between 
1,87% and 12,36% of the total cost of credit, expressed by APR;
● Fees and commission for credit analysis of the client vary between 
0,36% and 2,52% of the total cost of credit, expressed by APR;
● Fees and commission for reviewing loan application vary between 
0,24% and 1,33% of the total cost of credit, expressed by APR;
● Other fees and commissions, e.g. for granting a loan, for documenta-
tion, for preliminary negotiation for the loan conditions are respectively 
3,56%, 0,31% and 1,41% of the total cost of credit, expressed by APR.
The component of other charges constitutes a huge share of the total cost of credit 
expressed by APR when taking into consideration consumer loans with a short 
maturity and small amounts. The Laws on Consumer Credit in Bulgaria and Ro-
mania require the creditors to provide detailed information on the consumer credit 
contract, as well as in the advertisements of credit products as each change in the 
terms and conditions should be signed by both parties (the debtor and the creditor). 
The implementation by the laws require credit institutions to perform additional ex-
penses in order to provide the necessary information on credit contracts, to develop 
their IT systems and to provide specialized training to the staff. It is also impossible 
a common approach to be applied for all consumer credit products as there exist a 
number of compound products offered by the banks to the consumers. 
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The calculated values of APR and the annual effective interest rate on consumer 
loans in Romania are presented in a table in Annex I. The non interest rate com-
ponent of APR on consumer loans granted by Romanian banks tends to vary 
more compared to Bulgarian banks and the difference between APR and the ef-
fective interest rate is higher. The parameters on consumer loans in Romania for 
which APR is calculated are amount of the loan 5 000 EUR, maturity of 5 years 
and collateral in the form of a guarantee. There is no evidence from these data 
the banks with foreign capital tend to calculate and announce APR on consumer 
loans compared to the local banks.
Announcing APR on consumer loans may cause confusion among the debtor as 
it is higher than the nominal interest rate. Credit institutions should explain very 
clearly the existence of this difference and they have to point out that APR gives 
possibility to the debtors to compare the real cost on identical consumer loans 
offered by different credit institutions. It is very probable that not all consumers 
are going to understand adequately the information on the total cost on consumer 
loans and it may worsen the competition among the banks. Announcing APR on 
consumer loans may lead to an increase or a decrease of nominal interest rates 
on consumer loans, but this effect couldn’t be forecasted at this stage for Bulgaria 
and Romania due the lack of ofﬁcial statistical data on APR on consumer loans.
It can be forecasted that the implementation of the Laws on Consumer Credit 
for Bulgaria and Romania may lead to higher expenses on consumer loans 
and it may reﬂect in an increase in offering mortgage loans not intended for
house purchase, or bridging loans, student loans, etc. Consumers choose on a 
daily basis what amount of their income to spend by taking into consideration 
the level of their incomes and their wealth in the form of non cash assets, the 
alternative price of the expenses when buying a TV set or making a deposit in 
the bank at a deﬁnite level of the interest rate, and the price of the consumer
loan, e.g. when buying a TV set by a loan instead of cash. The main factors 
which deﬁne the priorities of credit institutions when granting a consumer loan
in Bulgaria are the collateral, the risk of the client, the level of the interest rates, 
fees and commissions and the demand of loans by customers. The most impor-
tant factors for supplying consumer loans are the lower level of the consumer’s 
risk and the collateral, while the level of the level of the interest rate, fees and 
commission are not of high signiﬁcance.
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b. Cointegration analysis on the interest rates on consumer loans
In this section of the paper we are going to estimate the existence of cointe-
gration between interest rate time series on consumer loans in Bulgaria and 
Romania and the rest of the EU countries. The integration of ﬁnancial markets
in the EU assumes convergence on interest rates on consumer loans. There are 
a number of investigations on the convergence of interest rates within the euro 
area and the authors apply different cointegration techniques97. Pigott notes that 
when market integration increases the behavior of interest rates could be in-
ﬂuenced by two main factors98. The increase of market integration leads to an 
increase of the arbitrage potentials on the markets, which leads to an increase in 
the convergence of interest rates on similar assets despite they are issued and 
traded on different markets. Pigott also considers the possibility for standard-
izing the conditions on loans as a result of an increase in capital ﬂows.
Despite the fact that the Consumer Credit Directive sets the minimum require-
ments for harmonization on laws on consumer credit in Europe, full harmoniza-
tion is difﬁcult to be achieved as the consumer loan market in Europe is very het-
erogeneous. The importance of consumer loans and loans for house purchases 
is different in the member states which can be seen from ﬁg. № 2-4 which
represent the amounts of consumer loans and loans for house purchases in the 
total amount of loans to the household sector in the member states. The con-
sumer credit market in Europe shows huge differences regarding the loan size 
and structure. For the period of 2004 – 2006 the amount of consumer loans for 
the old member states vary between 5% and 33% as a part of the total amount 
of loans to households and for the new member states they vary between 7% 
and 48%. As it can be seen from ﬁg. №4, consumer loans prevail in Bulgaria
and 2005 and 2006 there is tendency the amount of loans for house purchase 
to increase as a part of the total amount of credit to households. 
97 For more information see Kleimeier, S., H. Sander, Consumer Credit Rates in the Eurozone, ECRI Research Report №2, Janu-
ary 2002; Devine, M., The Cointegration of International Interest Rates: A Review, technical paper, Central Bank of Ireland, 1997; 
Heinemann, F., M. Schüler, Integration Beneﬁts on EU Retail Retail Credit Markets – Evidence from the Interest Rate Pass-Trough,
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim, 2002.
98 Pigott, C., International Interest Rate Convergence: A Survey for the Issues and Evidences, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
Quarterly Review, pp.24-37, 1994.
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Consumer loans as part of loans to the household sector for the old EU member states99
ﬁg.2
Consumer loans as part of loans to the household sector for the old EU member states100
ﬁg.3
99 The authors use the data available on the member states web sites. Consumer loans are calculated as a percentages of the 
total amount of loans to the household sector up to 31.12.2004, 31.12.2005 and 30.06.2006 for the old member states – Belgium, 
Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Great Britain and Den-
mark. Due to the lack of harmonized data for Sweden, it does not participate in the country comparison shown on ﬁg.2. The amount
of consumer loans in Sweden as a part of total amount of loans to the household sector up to 30.06.2006 is 6.70%. The calculations 
are made by the authors.
100 The authors use the data available on the member states web sites. Consumer loans are calculated as a percentages of the 
total amount of loans to the household sector up to 31.12.2004, 31.12.2005 and 30.06.2006 for the new member states – Hungary, 
Lithuania, Litva, Slovenia, Slovakia, Poland, Estonia and Czech Republic. Cyprus, Malta, Romania and Bulgaria do not participate in 
the comparison due to the lack of harmonized data. The calculations are made by the authors.
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Amount of consumer loans and loans for house purchase as a part of total amounts of loans to household 
in Bulgaria101
ﬁg.4
 The authors argue that interest rates on consumer loans in the EU are 
going to converge in the near future. Оn ﬁg.6 are presented the data for Ro-
mania as they are not entirely harmonized with the ECB requirements. Despite 
the harmonization of interest rates on consumer loans in the member states 
assumed by the Consumer Credit Directive it continues to exist huge differences 
due to the different features of the products included in consumer loans, require-
ments for the collateral, the period of initial rate ﬁxation, competition among
credit institutions on a national level, peculiarities of the market environment, 
e.g. the existence bank of bank concentration in supplying consumer loans, ac-
cess to funding, estimation of credit and interest rate risk, transaction costs, the 
existence of information asymmetry between credit institutions and their clients 
and the type of relationship between banks and their clients. Despite the exist-
ing differences, the efforts for harmonization of interest rates on consumer loans 
provide more comparability and opportunities for analysis as the interest rates 
can be interpreted more precisely and reliably. 
101 Total amounts of loans to the household sector in Bulgaria include consumer loans, loans for house purchases, overdraft and 
other loans. The calculations are made by the authors by using the data available on the BNB web site.
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Nominal interest rates on loans to individuals in Romania
ﬁg.6
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In the tables in the Annex III are presented correlation coefﬁcients for the time
series of the monthly effective interest rates on consumer loans for the EU 
member states, incl. Bulgaria and Romania. Correlation coefﬁcients measure
the relation between the effective interest rates on consumer loans in a deﬁnite
member state with those of the rest of the EU countries. Correlation coefﬁcients
are calculated in EViews 3.1. by the formula:
, where R is the correlation coefﬁcient,  is the ex-
plained dispersion of Y (time series on the interest rates on consumer loans in a 
deﬁnite member state country) and is the dispersion of Y. The correlation 
coefﬁcient varies in the limit . The interest rates for the rest of the 
member states are calculated as average weighted values for the member state 
countries, e.g. , where  is the average weighted interest 
rate for the rest of the EU member states by excluding the times series of the 
country which is a dependent variable, is the interest rate for a deﬁnite coun-
try and is the amount of consumer loans for this country. The correlation co-
efﬁcients show the type of the relationship between time series of interest rates
on consumer loans, e.g. if it is positive or negative. Before investigating correla-
tion coefﬁcients, we should test the time series for the existence of autocorrela-
tion and in the table are given the results of Durbin-Watson statistics at which 
the hypothesis for the existence of autocorrelation is rejected. The assumption 
for the existence of autocorrelation means that correlation coefﬁcients are close
1. Correlation coefﬁcients are not enough to make conclusions for the integra-
tion of consumer loan market in the EU, due to the deﬁciencies in the correlation
analyses. However, correlation coefﬁcients can be used on a preliminary stage
for analyzing the type of relations between variables. 
APR consists of two components – interest component and component of other 
charges. The differences in the levels of APR on consumer loans for the member 
states can be due to the interest rate component, on the one hand, and the com-
ponent of other charges, on the other hand. The differences in the interest rate 
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component may arise from the above mentioned reasons, as the differences in the 
component of other charges are due to the different transposition in the Consumer 
Credit Directive, esp. the charges that are not included in the APR calculation. 
In order to estimate the inﬂuence of Consumer Credit Directive on consumer
credit market in the EU, a cointegration analysis on the effective interest rates 
and APR on consumer loans can be performed. In order to prove the state-
ment that APR contributes to the increase of trans border consumer lending, we 
should prove the hypothesis for cointegration in more cases for the time series 
of APRs on consumer loans compared to the time series of effective interest 
rates on consumer loans. As the aim of this research is to include in the analy-
ses Bulgaria and Romania, which still do not have harmonized data on APR 
on consumer loans, we performed the analysis by taking into consideration the 
time series of effective interest rates on consumer loans. In the analysis we are 
using monthly effective interest rates on consumer loans for the period of Janu-
ary, 2003 – September, 2006. The effective interest rates on consumer loans 
are harmonized with the requirements with the Regulation ECB/2001/18, which 
means that these interest rates are comparable as the methodology for their 
compilation and the scope of instruments is the same. Romania is excluded from 
the analysis due to the lack harmonized time series on consumer loans.
The time series on effective interest rates on newly contracted loans refer to 
consumer loans on new business. It should be taken into consideration that 
data for effective interest rates on consumer loans for Bulgaria are not entirely 
harmonized with the requirements of the Regulation ECB/2001/18 regarding the 
methodology of calculation the effective interest rates and the coverage of con-
sumer loans. The cointegration equation that is estimated in this paper is:
, where  denotes the time series of 
effective interest rates on consumer loans for a deﬁnite member state for the 
period January, 2003 – September, 2006 and  are the average weighted 
effective interest rates on consumer loans for the rest of the member states for 
the same period. 
The cointegration analysis is performed in three stages. First, we test the time 
series for the existence of non stationarity, which is a necessary condition for 
the existence of a long run relationship between the time series. The tests for 
275
nonstationarity are performed by the ADF Unit Root Test in EViews 3.1. and the 
results of the ADF test are presented in the Annex. After testing the dependant 
variables for the existence of cointegration, we analyze the speed of adjustment 
of the interest rates to the long-run equilibrium level, by using the Vector Error 
Correction Model (VEC), which is a type of the VAR models. VEC gives pos-
sibility for estimating the short-run adjustment of interest rates to the long-run 
equilibrium level, which is performed by a number of partial adjustments of the 
short term interest rates102. In this case we estimate the regression
, where
 indicates the difference of the effective interest rates for a deﬁnite mem-
ber state,  indicates the difference of the effective interest rates for the 
rest of the member states,  denotes the residuals, and  is the VEC coefﬁ-
cient which measures the speed of adjustment for the cointegrated interest rates.
and  are included as endogenous variables and the results for  
are presented in the Annex. Summarizing the results in the tables we can con-
clude that integrated consumer loan market in the EU still not exist and despite 
the efforts in this ﬁeld the integration of the consumer loan market happens in a
very low pace. 
III. Analysis of the integration of credit market interest rates in Croatia, 
Albania, Macedonia and Serbia resulting from the penetration of foreign 
banks on the local market.
Despite the fact that the legal framework in the ﬁeld of consumer credit in
Croatia, Albania, Macedonia and Serbia is not harmonized with the EU require-
ments we are trying to prove the thesis that the penetration of foreign banks on 
the local market may lead to integration of the local interest rates on consumer 
loans with the rest of the EU countries. This conclusion is based  on the fact that 
when entering the local market foreign banks are going to implement the speciﬁc
know-how as well as the retail products and services which are typical for the 
market where the headquarters of the credit institution are. It is considered that 
this will encourage the development of the consumer credit market by bringing 
102 For more information see Sorensen, C., T. Werner, Bank Interest Rate Pass-Through in the Euro Area: A Cross Country 
Comparison, ECB Working Paper, 2006, pp. 16-19.
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new products and increasing bank competition which is expected to decrease 
the amount of the interest and non interest rate component on loans. 
The arguments supporting the entry of foreign banks in Croatia, Macedonia, 
Albania and Serbia can be summarized as products and services innovation, 
economies of scale (e.g. foreign banks offer new technology which is very nec-
essary for the main domestic banks to generate proﬁt from the economy of
scale), increase of competition, ﬁnancial market development due to the expan-
sion of interbanking market, introduction of appropriate banking practices and 
expertise through the staff and the implementation of banking practices that are 
typical for the bank of origin and attraction of foreign investment. When discuss-
ing the beneﬁts of penetration of foreign banks in these countries, we should
take into consideration the existence of regulatory differences, differences in 
banking culture and the level of development of the banking industry, and that 
banks are subject to special protection from the government. 
The levels of interest rates on consumer loans in Macedonia are comparatively 
high, which is due to the same factor that determine the high level of nominal 
interest rates on all type of loans in Macedonia, e.g. high level of inﬂation, ex-
change rate risk, poor quality of bank placements and lack of ﬁnancial discipline,
inefﬁcient judicial procedure and high operational costs for the Macedonian
banks in the period of 1996-1997 and during the political crisis in 1999 and 2000. 
After the political stabilization after 2001 and the intensive penetration of foreign 
banks in the country, the levels on interest rates on consumer loans started to 
decrease slowly. After the severe banking crisis in 1998-2000 in Croatia written 
lending policies were implemented by the banks and they included the require-
ment for the loan contracts the inclusion of explanation of interest charges and 
additional fees relevant to all categories of loans offered. After political stabiliza-
tion in 2001 consumer credit tend to increase rapidly in these countries, which 
is accompanied with a decrease in the level of interest rates. The decrease in 
the interest rates is rather due to the international tendencies for decrease in the 
levels of interest rates that the penetration of foreign banks on the market and 
the implementation of new banking products and practices.
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Conclusions 
The issue of the penetration of foreign banks deserves special attention as well 
as their inﬂuence on the effectiveness of loans and non interest expenses on
consumer loans and in a broader aspect both countries Bulgaria and Romania, 
after January, 2007 when they became full members of the EU. This issue is not 
developed in the current investigation, as up to now there is not enough empiri-
cal data to be analysed. Nevertheless, some general conclusions can be drawn 
and some forecasts for a development in this ﬁeld can be made.
In the ﬁrst days of 2007 a number of banking and non banking institutions stated
their desire to work in both countries by taking the advantage of the simple pro-
cedure of the single pass. At the end of the ﬁrst quarter of 2007 many banking
and non banking ﬁnancial institutions from the EU member states notiﬁed the
Bulgarian banking and ﬁnancial supervision on the basis of direct providing of
services on the Bulgarian market. The EU regulation allows one member state 
ﬁnancial institution to work in the host country by opening a branch or when it
directly provides ﬁnancial services in the host country without opening a branch.
Currently, all member states ﬁnancial institutions have declared their desire to
work in Bulgaria without opening a branch.  
We should specify that the banks that have declared their desire to work in 
Bulgaria are mainly one the biggest investment banks on a world wide level. 
That’s why they will compete the local investment intermediaries in Bulgaria. But 
as investment intermediaries work all commercial banks in Bulgaria and that’s 
why they will be also inﬂuenced by this competition. Except for this there is also
declared desire for work in the ﬁeld of commercial banking.
The above mentioned objectives create an entirely different situation in Bulgaria 
compared to that before the beginning of 2007. Currently, the foreign competition 
is still latent but it can be expected that some of the foreign institutions will start 
work, attentively at the beginning, trying to feel the market, but their aims may be 
modiﬁed and they can start creating branches and ofﬁces instead direct provid-
ing of services. The inﬂuence of the competition of foreign banks will be evident
in the future. Regarding the issues analysed in this paper it can be expected that 
the conditions for consumers on products and services provided on the local 
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market will be better in the aspect of their diversity and smaller expenses. How-
ever, similar forecasts should be carefully done taking into consideration the pe-
riod after which the effect of competition will appear as we have already pointed 
out that the amount of cross border ﬁnancial services in the EU member states
is still small. Regarding the new member states, esp. Bulgaria and Romania it 
should be taken into consideration the high levels of interest rate margins, e.g. 
the return on banking operations in Bulgaria, calculated as a return on assets to 
the capital still remains higher than the average EU return.
As a result of the investigations in the paper the following conclusions can be 
done regarding the penetration of foreign banks on the market in Bulgaria, Ro-
mania, Serbia, Albania, Croatia and Macedonia and the implementation of the 
Consumer Credit Directive and information of the real price of consumer loan 
granted to the consumers:
First, Bulgaria and Romania implemented the Consumer Credit Directive before 
their membership in the EU, but the majority of credit institutions in these coun-
tries do not calculate and announce APR on consumer loans which is their legal 
obligation. In Croatia, Albania, Macedonia and Serbia there initiatives from the 
central banks an effective interest rate on loan to be calculated and the debtors 
to be acquainted when signing the credit agreement with the additional fees and 
commissions which should be paid;
 Second, the component of other charges included in the APR calculations var-
ies signiﬁcantly when comparing Bulgaria and Romania and it depends on the
type and size of the consumer loans. It was proved that the amount of the non 
interest component is signiﬁcant, esp. for Romania, which points out the impor-
tance of the correct calculation of APR as well as the amount of other charges 
when making a decision to take consumer loan from a deﬁnite credit institution;
 Third, different types of charges are applied on consumer loans by the credit 
institutions in Bulgaria and Romania, e.g. analysis fees, valuation fees, grant-
ing fees, arrangement fees, management fees, charges for loan administration, 
documentation fees, etc. These fees are applied by the banks when the credit is 
granted or during the loan maturity, which is reﬂected on the APR level.
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Forth, despite the aims of the Directive to encourage the trans border consumer 
lending and integration of the credit market in the EU, such integration is still 
lacking and the adjustment of interest rates on consumer loans is very slow. This 
refers also for Bulgaria as a new member state where correlation coefﬁcients of
the time series of effective interest rates on consumer loan with the rest of the 
EU countries are close to 0 and despite the evidence of cointegration the adjust-
ment of interest rates is very sluggish;
Fifth, there is necessity for expanding the analysis further by using harmonized 
data on APR on consumer loans for Bulgaria and Romania which still do not 
exist in order to estimate the inﬂuence of the implementation of the Consumer
Credit Directive on loan supply. 
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Annex I
APR on the web site of credit institutions in Bulgaria
№ Bank Consumer loans Is APR announced? Remarks
1 Alpha Bank - Soﬁa Branch” YES NO -
2 DSK Bank” EAD YES NO -
3 Piraeus Bank Bulgaria” AD YES NO -
4 BNP-Paribas S. A. - Soﬁa Branch” NO NO -
5 Bulbank” AD YES NO -
6 Bulgarian Post Bank” AD YES YES
APR is calculated on consumer 
loans and loans for house pur-
chases. On the bank’s website 
there is deﬁnition of APR and
there is a calculator where the 
clients by entering the loan pa-
rameters, e.g. nominal interest 
rate, maturity and amount, he 
can calculate the level of APR. 
7 DZI Bank” AD YES YES
APR is calculated only for con-
sumer loans. The consumer 
may use a calculator where by 
entering the loan parameters, 
he can calculate the level of 
APR. A deﬁnition of APR is not
giver, as well as the fees and 
commissions that are included 
at its calculation. 
8 HVB Bank Biochim” AD YES YES
APR is calculated on consumer 
loans and an example of APR 
calculation is developed for deﬁ-
nite parameters of the loan. There 
is no deﬁnition of APR as well as
the fees and commission that are 
included at its calculation.
9 Emporiki Bank – Bugaria” EAD YES NO -
10 CB “Investbank” AD YES NO -
11 International Asset Bank” AD YES NO -
12 ING Bank - Soﬁa brnch YES NO -
13 Corporate Commercial Bank” AD YES NO -
14 Encouragement Bank” AD YES NO -
15 NLB West-East Bank” AD YES NO -
16 United Bulgarian Bank” AD YES YES
APR on consumer loans is 
calculated. A calculator is de-
veloped by which the consumer 
can automatically calculate the 
level of APR. A deﬁnition of
APR is not given as well as the 
fees and commissions that are 
included at its calculation. 
17 Municipal Bank” AD, Soﬁa YES YES
The bank has developed an ex-
ample of APR calculation with a 
loan with deﬁnite parameters. A
deﬁnition of APR is not given as
well as the fees and commissions 
that are included at its calculation. 
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18 ProCredit Bank (Bulgaria)” AD YES YES
The bank has developed an ex-
ample of APR calculation with a 
loan with deﬁnite parameters.
There is a deﬁnition of APR as
well as the fees and commis-
sions that are included at its 
calculation.
19 First Investment Bank” AD YES YES
The bank has developed an ex-
ample of APR calculation with a 
loan with deﬁnite parameters. A
deﬁnition of APR is not given as
well as the fees and commis-
sions that are included at its 
calculation. 
20 Raiffeisenbank (Bulgaria)” EAD YES NO -
21
Societe Generale Expressbank” 
AD YES YES
APR on consumer loans and 
loans for house purchases is 
calculated. A calculator is de-
veloped by which the consumer 
can automatically calculate the 
level of APR. A deﬁnition of
APR is not given as well as the 
fees and commissions that are 
included at its calculation. 
22
Economic and Investment Bank” 
AD (EIBANK) YES NO -
23
Commercial Bank Allianz Bulgaria” 
AD YES NO -
24 CB “MKB Unionbank” AD YES YES
The bank has developed an ex-
ample of APR calculation with a 
loan with deﬁnite parameters.
There is a deﬁnition of APR as
well as the fees and commis-
sions that are included at its 
calculation.
25 Hebrosbank” AD YES YES
The bank has developed an ex-
ample of APR calculation with a 
loan with deﬁnite parameters.
There is a deﬁnition of APR as
well as the fees and commis-
sions that are included at its 
calculation.
26 Teximbank YES NO -
27 Tokuda Bank” AD YES NO -
28 D Commerce Bank” AD YES YES
The bank has developed an ex-
ample of APR calculation with a 
loan with deﬁnite parameters.
There is a deﬁnition of APR as
well as the fees and commis-
sions that are included at its 
calculation.
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Annex Ia
APR calculated on consumer loans for 
the credit institutions in Bulgaria
№ Bank APR
Annnual 
Effective Inter-
est Rate103 Difference
1 Bulbank” AD 14.57% 13.58% 1.00%
2 DSK Bank” EAD 14.68% 13.80% 0.88%
3 United Bulgarian Bank” AD 14.57% 13.52% 1.05%
4 HVB Bank Biochim” AD 15.24% 13.92% 1.32%
5 First Investment Bank” AD 16.31% 15.23% 1.08%
6 Raiffeisenbank (Bulgaria)” EAD 13.81% 13.24% 0.57%
7 Bulgarian Post Bank” AD 14.27% 12.98% 1.29%
8 Societe Generale Expressbank” AD 15.27% 14.65% 0.62%
9
Economic and Investment Bank” AD 
(EIBANK) 14.62% 13.80% 0.82%
10 DZI Bank” AD 14.64% 13.52% 1.12%
11 Hebrosbank” AD 11.64% 10.43% 1.21%
12 Municipal Bank” AD, Soﬁa 13.29% 12.97% 0.31%
13 Central Cooperative Bank 14.81% 13.24% 1.56%
14 Commercial Bank Allianz Bulgaria” AD 11.99% 11.02% 0.97%
15 Piraeus Bank Bulgaria” AD 16.18% 14.88% 1.30%
16 CB “MKB Unionbank” AD 13.63% 12.63% 1.00%
17 ProCredit Bank (Bulgaria)” AD 17.13% 16.08% 1.06%
18 International Asset Bank” AD 15.18% 14.32% 0.85%
19 CB “Investbank” AD 14.05% 13.24% 0.80%
20 Emporiki Bank – Bugaria” EAD 16.16% 15.23% 0.93%
21 D Commerce Bank” AD 13.91% 12.57% 1.34%
22 Tokuda Bank” AD 12.77% 11.02% 1.75%
23 NLB West-East Bank” AD 9.87% 8.30% 1.57%
24 Teximbank 16.15% 14.93% 1.22%
103 The annual interest rate is calculated by the formula , where P indicates the principal of the loan, CF – the 
loan repayments, n is the sequence of loan repayment, i is the effective annual interest rate, Dn is the time for loan repayments.
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Annex Ib
APR on the web site of credit institutions in Romania
№ Bank
Consumer
loans
Is APR
announced? Remarks
1 Alpha Bank YES NO -
2 Banca Transilvania YES NO -
3 Egnatia Bank YES NO -
4 Banca Romaneska YES YES
APR on typical consumer loans is announced. It is cal-
culated as deﬁnite parameters on the loan, e.g. maturity,
amount and nominal interest rate are accepted.
5 Credit Europe Bank YES YES
APR on typical consumer loans is announced. It is cal-
culated as deﬁnite parameters on the loan, e.g. maturity,
amount and nominal interest rate are accepted.
6 HVB Tiriac Bank YES YES
APR on typical consumer loans is announced. It is cal-
culated as deﬁnite parameters on the loan, e.g. maturity,
amount and nominal interest rate are accepted.
7 Postbank YES YES
APR on typical consumer loans is announced. It is cal-
culated as deﬁnite parameters on the loan, e.g. maturity,
amount and nominal interest rate are accepted.
8 Bancpost YES NO -
9
BRD Cruppe Soci-
ete Generale YES NO -
10 Credit Europe Bank YES YES
APR on typical consumer loans is announced. It is cal-
culated as deﬁnite parameters on the loan, e.g. maturity,
amount and nominal interest rate are accepted.
11 Mindbank S.A. YES NO -
12 Procredit Bank YES NO -
13 Reiffeisen Bank YES NO -
14
Top of Form
UniCredit Romania
Bottom of Form
YES YES
APR on typical consumer loans is announced. It is cal-
culated as deﬁnite parameters on the loan, e.g. maturity,
amount and nominal interest rate are accepted.
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Annex Ic
APR calculated on consumer loans for the credit institutions in Romania
№ Bank APR
Annual Effective 
Interest Rate104 Difference
1 Banca Transilvania 13.12% 12.12% 0.99%
2 Egnatia Bank 10.08% 8.19% 1.89%
3 Banca Romaneska 17.79% 12.12% 5.67%
4 Credit Europe Bank 12.82% 9.90% 2.92%
5 HVB Tiriac Bank 9.52% 5.59% 3.93%
6 Bancpost 11.49% 7.66% 3.84%
7 Credit Europe Bank 12.82% 9.90% 2.92%
8 Postbank 17.25% 8.50% 8.75%
9 UniCredit Romania 9.52% 5.45% 4.07%
104 The annual interest rate is calculated by the formula , where P indicates the principal of the loan, CF – the 
loan repayments, n is the sequence of loan repayment, i is the effective annual interest rate, Dn is the time for loan repayments.
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Annex II
Non interest expenses on consumer loans granted by the banks from the ﬁrst group
Bank Fees and commissions included in the APR calcula-tion
Calculated as a part of 
the total cost of credit
Bulbank” AD
• Commissions charged for loan management-1% for the 
ﬁrst year and 0.25% for the next years. 0,79%
• Fees for a review of loan application-min. 60 лв. 0,21%
DSK Bank” EAD
• Fees for a review of loan application - 30 BGN (for loans 
up to 1 000 BGN), 40 BGN (for loans up to 5 000 BGN) и 
60 BGN (for loans up to 25 000 BGN)
0,20%
• Commissions charged for loan management -40 BGN 
per year. 0,68%
United Bulgarian Bank” AD • Commissions charged for loan management - 2%
1,01%
• Fees for loan application - 10 лв. 0,03%
HVB Bank Biochim” AD
• Fees for loan valuation-2.5% on the total amount of loan. 
It is in the form of a single payment and it is paid by the 
debtor when the loan is granted. 
1,28%
• Fees for administration - 10 BGN. 0,04%
First Investment Bank” AD
• Fees for analysis and investigation of the applicants - 10 
BGN. 0,04%
• Single commission for loan management - 2% of the 
amount of the granted loan. 1,04%
Raiffeisenbank (Bulgaria)” 
EAD
• Administration fee - 20 BGN. 0,07%
• Single commission for loan management - 1% of the 
amount of the granted loan. 0,50%
Bulgarian Post Bank” AD
• Commission for loan management - 2.5% a single pay-
ment on the amount of the loan granted. 1,26%
• Administration fee – 10 BGN. It is due when the con-
sumer applies for a loan. 0,03%
Societe Generale Express-
bank” AD
• Single commission for granting a loan - 182 BGN (for 
consumer loans up to 20 000 BGN) 0,62%
Economic and Investment 
Bank” AD (EIBANK)
• Charges for documents – 2 BGN. 0,008%
• Fees for a review of loan applications – 15 BGN. 0,05%
• Single fee for loan management - 1,5 % on the total 
amount of the loan granted. 0,76%
DZI Bank” AD
• Fees for a review of loan applications - 30 BGN. 0,10%
• Single fee for loan management - 2 % on the total amount 
of the loan granted. 1,01%
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Bank
Fees and commissions included in the APR calcula-
tion
Calculated as a 
part of the total 
cost of credit
Hebrosbank” AD
• Fees for analysis and investigation of the ﬁnancial
state of the debtor - 30 BGN. 0,09%
• Single fee for loan management – 2.3 % on the total 
amount of the loan granted. 1,11%
Municipal Bank” AD, Soﬁa
• Fees for loan management -0.5% per year, but not 
less than  20  BGN (10 EUR) but not more than 500 
BGN (250 EUR) 0,25%
• Fees for analysis and investigation of the ﬁnancial
state of the debtor - 0.1% on the total amount of loan 
but not less than 20 BGN (10 EUR) и не and not more 
than 150 BGN (75 EUR). 0,07%
Central Cooperative Bank
• Fees for a review of loan applications – 10 BGN. 0,03%
• Fees for managing loans with a maturity of 3 years 
(2%) and for loans with a maturity over 3 years (3%). 1,53%
Commercial Bank Allianz Bulgaria” AD • Administrative fee - 2% of the amount of the loan granted. 0,97%
Piraeus Bank Bulgaria” AD • Single fee for loan management - 2.5% on the amount of the loan granted. 1,17%
CB “MKB Unionbank” AD
• Fees for a review of loan application - 30 BGN for 
loans up to  5 000 BGN; 50 BGN for loans over 5 
001 BGN. 0,16%
• Fees for loan management - 20 BGN per year for 
loans up to 3 000 BGN, 35 BGN per year for loan up 
to  5 000 BGN and 50 per year BGN for loans over 5 
001 BGN. 0,84%
ProCredit Bank (Bulgaria)” AD • Single fee for loan management - 2%. 1,06%
International Asset Bank” AD • Fees for a review of loan application – 25 BGN. 0,09%
• Single fee for loan management – 1,5%. 0,77%
CB “Investbank” AD
•  Fees for analysis and investigation of the ﬁnancial
state of the debtor - 0,1% of the amount of the loan 
granted. 0,05%
• Single fee for loan management - 1,5%. 0,75%
Emporiki Bank – Bugaria” EAD
• Fees for loan managemen-1% for the ﬁrst year and
0,2% for each next year. 0,76%
• Fees for loan application for loans up to 50 000 
евро-50 BGN. 0,18%
D Commerce Bank” AD
• Fees for analysis and investigation of the ﬁnancial
state of the debtor - 0.05% (min.100 EUR and max. 
300 EUR). 0,35%
• Fees for granting a loan - 1%. 0,49%
• Management fee - 1%. 0,49%
Tokuda Bank” AD
• Fees for a review of loan application - 50 BGN, paid 
at the time when the loan is granted. 0,17%
• Management fee – 1,0% per year; 1,58%
NLB West-East Bank” AD
• Fees for granting a loan - 1% - 1.5% on the amount 
of the agreed loan. 0,60%
• Management fee - 0.2% paid each quarter. 0,98%
Teximbank
• Fees for documentation - 10 BGN. 0,05%
• Fees for negotiating the parameters of the loan - 55 
BGN for loans from 5 001 to 50 000 BGN. 0,23%
• Management fees - 1,5% on the loan granted. 0,94%
Annex IIa
Non interest expenses on consumer loans granted by the banks from the second and third group
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Annex IIIb
Cointegration equations – times series on annual effective interest rates on consumer loans
Country Cointegration equation Error Correction Term108
 Austria D(AUS(-1))  1.000000  D(BEZ_AUS(-1)) -1.367590   C -4.67E-05(0.29862)
-1.634361 
(-5.16658)
Belgium D(BELG(-1))  1.000000  D(BEZ_BELG(-1)) -0.165667  C -0.000167(-0.54116)
-1.724394 
(-4.99738)
Finland No evidence of cointegration. -
France D(FRANCE(-1))  1.000000  D(BEZ_FR(-1))  -1.898047  C 7.24E-05(-4.52964)
-0.244669 
(-0.76098)
Germany D(GER(-1))  1.000000  D(BEZ_GER(-1),2) -105.2056  C  0.009973(-0.08061)
-0.001014 
(-0.25625)
Greece D(GR(-1))  1.000000  D(BEZ_GR(-1)) -0.405768   C   0.000224(-0.87842)
-1.421655 
(-4.28639)
Ireland No evidence of cointegration. -
Italy D(ITA(-1))  1.000000  D(BEZ_ITA(-1)) -0.635170  C  -0.000183(-3.12818)
-1.972489 
(-5.32449)
Netherlands D(HOL(-1))  1.000000  D(BEZ_HOL(-1)) -0.569202  C -2.61E-05(-0.89527)
-1.244985 
(-3.98393)
 Portugal D(PORT(-1))  1.000000  D(BEZ_PORT(-1)) -3.387234  C  -0.000544(-3.53796)
-1.361601 
(-4.67294)
Spain D(SPAIN(-1))  1.000000  D(BEZ_SPAIN(-1)) -0.796876  C  -0.000362(-3.37722)
-2.391090 
(-6.20466)
Czech Rep. D(CZ(-1))  1.000000  D(BEZ_CZ(-1))  0.900774  C  0.000956(0.61002)
-1.444201 
(-4.18700)
Lithuania D(LITVA(-1))  1.000000  D(BEZ_LITVA(-1)) -0.207216  C 0.000210(-0.24972)
-1.844822 
(-3.24259)
Bulgaria D(BG(-1))  1.000000  D(BEZ_BG(-1)) -0.245781  C  0.001360(-0.33836)
-2.190595 
(-5.55693)
Estonia D(EST(-1))  1.000000  D(BEZ_EST(-1))  1.675251  C -0.000644(0.97801) 
-0.978905 
(-3.19452)
Hungary D(HUN(-1))  1.000000  D(BEZ_HUN(-1)) -10.53172  C 0.000813(-1.76106)
-0.693238 
(-2.81059)
Luxembourg D(LUX(-1))  1.000000  D(BEZ_LUX(-1)) -0.137390  C  -2.86E-05(-0.42473)
-1.403702 
(-4.47932)
Poland D(POL(-1))  1.000000  D(BEZ_POL(-1)) -1.016216  C -0.000102(-1.15063)
-2.825890 
(-4.61093)
Slovakia D(SK(-1))  1.000000  D(BEZ_SK(-1)) -3.806290  C -0.000644(-3.37376)
-2.104996 
(-5.34471)
Slovenia D(SL(-1))  1.000000  D(BEZ_SL(-1))      -0.837476  C 0.000719(-1.58116)
-1.406618 
(-4.10274)
108 Figures in the brackets are t-statistics of cointegration equations.
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CHAPTER V
MANAGEMENT
Management Practices 
Generated by Foreign Banks Entry
Irina Kazandjieva 109
Introduction
The strong competition on the international ﬁnancial markets makes the con-
temporary banking very dynamic. In order to widen their market positions banks 
have to use every advantage of the computer technologies, information systems 
and model. In every country exists strict legal framework regarding the banking 
system aiming at limiting the risks, which decreases banks’ proﬁtability. After
years of discussions on the existing Basel I based on applying identical risk 
weights without considering the particularities of each debtor which distorts the 
adequate risk evaluation. BASEL II gives possibility for the banks to apply well 
developed information systems and methodology in order to measure and con-
trol the clients’ risk and to report the supervisory authorities the actual existing 
risk and to keep adequate capital adequacy ratio. 
The main principle on which BASEL II is based on the internal clients’ rating which 
a bank should apply after considering the possibility not to collect its claims. The 
implementation of BASEL II requires when developing the data warehouse to 
be clear what kind of data, how and where they are stored and in case the bank 
dos not have the necessary information for its clients to collect additional data 
in order to create a good working rating system. It means that the bank should 
have at its disposal elaborate data for the client’s ﬁnancial state as well as data
about the market on which the client is acting. For that reason the data should 
be centralized and this confronts the banks in front of the necessity to develop 
their existing IT systems or to develop entirely new ones. 
109 The author thanks Desislava Sergieva for his dedicated research assistance
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This paper analyses the existing banking system in six countries on the Balkans 
– Albania, Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria, the inﬂuence of
the penetration of foreign capital in the banking system as well as the changes 
in their structure, activities and bank products as a result of this, banks’ prepar-
edness for the implementation of BASEL II, the development of the IT system, 
application of different management techniques and development of new prod-
ucts. It should be noted that Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria are acceding for 
their future membership in the European Union which means that they have to 
apply the European Directives regarding the payment system, preparation for 
the implementation of BASEL II and they have the develop banking products 
and services in line with those applied in the European Union. The other three 
countries – Albania, Macedonia and Serbia – have not applied for the EU mem-
bership yet and they still bear the stigma of the war in 1999. Although, Albania is 
going through economic boom (it is the only country on the Balkans that reached 
the levels of GDP of 1989) we should bear in mind the lower levels from which 
this country started the economic reforms and that for years it was considered 
as being the poorest country in Europe.
The paper is structured as presentations of the development of the banking 
system country by country for the period of 1995-2005. The focus is put on 
the penetration of foreign bank capital, development of the IT system and bank 
products and services, application of different management techniques and the 
implementation of BASEL II. All this points are developed in the light of the 
economic development of the country as the dynamics of basic macroeconomic 
indicators (GDP, inﬂation, unemployment, current account and money supply)
are presented in tables. As for some countries the data are lacking for backward 
periods the time series includes years after 1995. At the end of the paper con-
clusions are summarized as the stress is put on the differences and similarities 
existing among the six countries.
Albania
During the period of 1995-1996 the structure of the Albanian banking system was 
entirely changed by the appearance of private and branches of foreign banks. 
The expansion of the banking system led to increase in the number and diversity 
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of products and services provided by the banks to their clients. In 1997 the priva-
tization of state-owned banks in Albania started which was a natural result from 
the number of failures in the previous years. In 1999, the Governors of the Bank 
of Albania and the Bank of Greece signed an agreement for Cooperative Banking 
Supervision. Similar agreement was discussed with the Central bank of Bulgaria 
and there are draft agreements with the Bank of Poland and the Bank of Turkey.
Table 1. Basic Indicators for Albania
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
GDR per capita (in USD) * 1092,00 772,00 906,00 1143,00 1212,00 1338,00 1456,00 1884,00 2414,00 *
Real GDP Growth Rate * 0,10 -0,10 0,13 0,10 0,08 0,07 0,03 0,06 0,06 *
Unemplyment rate * 0,12 0,15 0,18 0,18 0,17 0,16 0,16 0,15 0,14 *
Inﬂation rate * * * * * 4,20 3,50 2,10 3,30 2,20 *
Current account balance 
(in million USD) * * * -193,00 -270,00 -274,00 -263,00 -435,00 -469,00 -528,00 -625,00
Banks assets as a share 
of GDP * 0,37 0,47 0,49 0,52 0,51 0,54 0,54 0,52 0,55 *
Loans (inmillion Leke) * * * 17745 19890 23242 27941 38652 50683 69973 *
Deposits as a share of 
GDP  28.52   37.98   36.82   37.12   40.42   43.73  * * * * *
Broad money lek bn * * *  239.5   292.9   328.1   394.3   416.7   450  506,70 553,80
Number of ATM * * * * * 1 * * 74 222 *
Source: National Bank of Albania, International Monetary Fund, Eurostat.
Since 2000 the Albanian banking system has been implementing the quantitative 
assessments of banks’ ﬁnancial conditions based on CAMELS rating and banks’
classiﬁcation matrices which were associated with the development of on-site 
and off-site manuals. The assessment of bank ﬁnancial conditions according to
CAMELS rating, includes the capital and capital adequacy assessment, asset 
quality, management, earnings, liquidity and sensibility to market risk.
In 2004, the Albanian banking system experienced a boom which was seen in 
the larger amount of assets acquired, the increased lending, diversity of banking 
products offered and in the spreading out of the banks’ network. In 2004, total 
assets for the entire banking system were increased to 52.8 billion Leke, or 14.1% 
more than in 2003. This boom was apparent in the increased lending activities, 
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the larger amount of total assets and the expansion of banks’ network beyond 
the locations in 2003.Another important development was in the customer 
service area with the presence of electronic terminals and increased number 
of cash cards. This progress in the banking system and the increased num-
ber of branches and agencies caused a considerable increase in the number 
of employees. In the end of 2004 the number of employees reached 2,816, 
compared to 2,236 in the previous year(26% increase) which demonstrates that 
banks are actively participating in the development of personnel capacities, as a 
needed requirement for the future growth. 
In 1999 the Bank of Albania was aware of the necessity that the implementation 
of the regulator function of the banking system, the transparency in the ﬁnancial
operations and the informing of the public on the banking system played an 
important role in the bank-customer relations and for the stability of the bank-
ing system. In 1999, the Supervision Department accomplished a signiﬁcant
amount of work to improve existing regulations and to introduce new ones. 
These regulations were totally in line with Basle Committee’s principles for an 
effective banking supervision. 
The year of 2001 was marked by signiﬁcant asset increase in some banks,
which showed an elevated attractiveness to the clients and a more aggressive 
policy adopted by the banks. This increase resulted of the banks’ expansion 
with new branches or agencies due to enhanced minimum paid capital to the 
amount of 700 million. Leke by all the banks which guaranteed the soundness 
of the banking system at periods of banks expansion. Another reason for the 
banks’ increase was the change in asset structure of some banks because of 
the increased loan portfolio. 
This step showed that the banks were moving from their observer and passive 
role to a more active role on the economic growth which was possible due to the 
good situation of liquidity, mainly resulting from highly liquid investments such as 
placements in other banks and treasury bills. The banks succeeded in keeping 
interest rate risk under control relevant to their operations, size and services, as 
well as foreign exchange risk and also kept the spread to the optimum level and 
the gap to the lowest level possible. Albanian banks have made signiﬁcant im-
provements in asset-liability management compared to the previous year which 
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led in general to a positive income and an increased proﬁt compared to the
previous year. This comes as the result of their expansion, the amortization of 
opening expenses and the improvement of asset structure with investments in 
more proﬁtable activities. At that period of time senior managers of the banks
should pay attention to the improve of the policies and procedures of bank‘s 
activity, completion of the regulative framework of banks’ activities as well as 
keeping to the banks’ business plans. 
The capital adequacy ratio is a reliable indicator of the ability of banks to withstand 
losses. The minimum ratio in Albania of capital to risk-adjusted assets is12% and 
it is applied for each bank of the system. This ratio, calculated in an aggregate 
manner for the system, was 35.3% at year-end 2001, compared to 42% calcu-
lated at the end of 2000. The reduction was due to the increase of risk-adjusted 
assets (17.2%), and of the decrease of regulatory capital (1.5%). Even though the 
system is extended more in risky assets, the movements toward this direction are 
very limited. This fact is conﬁrmed by the very high levels of capital adequacy
ratios for some banks of the system. At the end of 2001 the capital adequacy ratio 
of the banking system in Albania was 35.3% and it was signiﬁcantly high com-
pared to Romania and Croatia where it was respectively 23.7% and 21.3%. So, it 
can be concluded that the Albanian banking system is well capitalized, because 
of its very limited extension in risky assets, which means an adequate capital 
level to cope with risks that the banking system could be faced with. 
In 2002 the changes in the Albanian economy structure were signiﬁcant due to the
decrease of the agriculture and animal farming weight in the economy and the in-
crease of those to trade and service sector. The Albanian economy was growing for 
the ﬁfth consecutive year, which inﬂuenced the increase of per capita incomes, cal-
culated as a proportion of GDP. At that period of time banks expanded their activity 
network by means of new branches, some of which presented new products, such as 
ATM services, credit cards, deposit certiﬁcates, consumer credit, forward contracts,
and so on. The analysis of banking system sensitivity to market risks it can face up, 
considers credit loss and market risks. A signiﬁcant element of this analysis, known
as stress tests, is used for evaluating risk gravity, preventing the deterioration of 
banking system macro-prudent indicators. This considers macro-prudent sensibility 
to considerable macro-economic shocks. Stress tests objective is to make risks more 
disclosed, by assessing possible losses in the worst situation ever imagined. In this 
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way, a considerable economic decline is supposed as a shock for credit risking which 
has to do with debtors and liabilities risk in meeting their contracting demands. 
In 2003 the Albanian banks made a positive development in enhancing banking 
services and introducing new products. Banking system earnings were growing 
up as their sources were quite stable at that period. Banking system assets were 
increasing and this was an indicator of the public approach and banks’ability to 
ﬁnd new ﬁnancial sources. This growth was underpinned also by an aggressive
marketing policy from banks, by expansion with new branches and agencies, 
and by technical, regulative and human infrastructure. The capital adequacy 
ratio was above the minimum level required by the Bank of Albania. However, 
in some banks this indicator was very high, indicating a conservatory policy and 
lack of efﬁciency in banking activity. The bank management provided a deeper
insight to shareholders on the respective regulative framework and the impor-
tance of its comprehensive enforcement. 
Despite the positive measures that were implemented in the Albanian banking 
system in 2003 there were still some problems encountered and they were re-
lated to implementation of the Law on banks regarding audit committee and its 
well-functioning, classiﬁcation of bad loans in conformation with the regulation
as well as providing the appropriate provisions, improvement of bank policies 
and procedures, effective functioning of internal control and strengthening its 
independence, enhancement of security elements in the technology information 
systems, increasing security measures to prevent outside interventions, application 
of encryption on information not only during transmission, but also back-ups at 
adequate frequency, design and implementation of a recovery plan in emergency 
situations and sometimes inadequate reactions and weakness in diligent fulﬁlling
the recommendations of the banking supervision by the banks’ employees. 
The year of 2004 was characterized by the expansion of banking loans (up to 
34%) and increase in their maturity which was a signal for macroeconomic sta-
bility and credibility in the banking system in Albania. During this year there was 
improvement in the information and communication technology utilized by the 
banking system. Banks advanced some of their existing programs or acquired new 
ones. These programs enabled a more efﬁcient use of the banking accounting
methods and initiate new services, such as e-banking. Special attention was 
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also dedicated to the communication technology. With the extension of the 
banks’ network, consideration has been given to the on-line connection of new 
branches, their quality, speed and security. Banks are paying more attention to 
the conﬁdent information of their clients, by adding new security features and
by applying new policies. By this way banks are inclined to protect their clients’ 
information, and to continue functioning even in the extraordinary situations. 
But there were still some weak points related to the securization of the programs 
by some banks as well as providing the existing programs with other modules 
required for the normal operation of banks. Another weak point was related to 
the operation of the SWIFT system. It was necessary a better administration 
for the users by respecting the three main steps, creation, veriﬁcation, and
authorization. In addition, there was a necessity for the separation of duties 
of the security ofﬁcers (left and right ofﬁcer) from the operational duties in the
SWIFT. It was also necessary the internal auditor of the banks to fully inspect 
the information technology as well as the auditing was only limited to the proﬁles
of the users and their rights of access to the system in relation to their job titles. 
ATM started to become popular in Albania in 2003-2004 when banks started 
to install ATMs in Tirana and other main cities. In 2004, the number of ATMs 
increased from 74 to 222, while the number of debit and credit cards increased 
from 7,260 to 34,090. ATMs utilized debit cards, but credit cards were in 
circulations as well. Both, “Visa” and “MasterCard” are present in Albania, and 
most of the banks are members of one or the other group. However, the use 
of electronic cards is still limited due to the lack of acceptance of electronic 
payments from different services, due to the mentality which still favors the use 
of cash, and due to the greater necessity for higher income for a speciﬁc group
of users. It is foreseen that debit and credit cards will continue to be used more 
for withdrawing cash from ATMs rather than for electronic payments. However, 
cards played an important role in the consolidation of relationships between 
banks and clients, and they might serve as an incentive for future introductions 
of other sophisticated products. 
In 2004 the amount of outstanding loans for the whole banking system increased 
by 19.3 billion Leke, which is about 38%, compared to the year of 2003. The weight 
of short-term loans to total outstanding loans decreased to 26.7% compared to 
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40.3% by the end of 2003, while medium-term loans and long-term loans increased, 
respectively by 5.7% and 6.1% to the total amount of outstanding loans of the 
banking system. Loans in foreign currency-USD and EUR were much more pre-
ferred due to lower interest rates for loans in foreign currency and the appreciation 
of the domestic currency exchange rate toward foreign currency exchange rate.
The increased amount of foreign currency loans could lead to the increase of the 
currency risk in the Albanian banking system. The foreign exchange rate risk is one 
of the market risk types toward which the banks in the Albanian banking system 
are exposed. This is due to the fact that a huge amount of the banking transactions 
are conducted in foreign currency. However, the presence of items denominated 
in foreign currency on both sides of the balance-sheet of the banking system, and 
the regulative limitations in such direction, offer the banks the opportunity to limit 
their exposure to foreign exchange rate risk and to manage it. Despite of this, for 
some of the banks it was implemented regulatory limits for a single currency or for 
all other currencies, potentially increasing their exposure in case of unfavorable 
movements of foreign exchange rate to domestic exchange rate. 
The problems that were confronted by the Albanian banking system at that time were 
related to the high management, e.g. board of directors, audit committee, executive 
management. It was considered by the Albanian banking supervision that the high 
managers should raise their responsibilities and to emphasize the crucial problems 
that affect the safety and soundness of the banking activities. Regarding the audit 
committees, it was required a closer cooperation with the internal audit structures, 
increased responsibilities for the problems put forward, increased independence 
and reporting as well as performance of veriﬁcations within the banks.�
Another main problem is related to the high costs that accompany necessary 
changes in the information systems of the banks, which makes them resist 
to changes or they make the necessary changes very slowly. The evidenced 
problems are related to the automatic generation of the information needed, the 
modules used for different ﬁelds of activity, the separation of rights for the data
downloading and authorization of operations. The bank examiners in charge 
have paid special attention to this element during the establishment of the 
supervisory strategies.
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Macedonia
The Banking system in the Republic of Macedonia confronted with the prob-
lems of capital increase and banking system modernization in 1997. After the 
devaluation of the denar against the Deutsche mark, in the second half of 1997 
the monetary growth was normalized, global liquidity was improved and the 
money demand from the enterprises was revived, which led to the evolution of 
the reproduction process, that enabled a moderate real gross domestic product 
growth rate of 1.4%. Despite of this the level of investment in Macedonia at that 
period of time was pretty low which was due to insufﬁcient accumulation deter-
mined by the poor ﬁnancial results of the enterprises, discouraging inﬂuence of
banks’ high interest rates, emerging from the extremely low domestic savings 
in the banking sector, inefﬁcient operation of the judicial system, lack of ﬁnan-
cial discipline, high operational costs of the banks. The regulative framework for 
functioning of the banking system in the Republic of Macedonia promotes the 
universal character of banking, which means performing the traditional banking 
activities, such as deposit collection from legal entities and individuals, lending 
and borrowing credits, as well as the possibility for participation on the capital 
market through issuing own securities or acting as an intermediary in the trade 
with securities of other entities.
Table 2. Basic Indicators for Macedonia
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
GDR per capita (in EUR) * * * *  1709   1921   1887   1981   2025   2130   2280  
Real GDP Growth Rate -1,10% 1,20% 1,40% 3,40% 4,30% 4,50% -4,50% 0,90% 2,80% 2,90% 3,60%
Unemplyment rate * * * * 32,4% 32,3% 30,5% 31,9% 36,7% 37,2% 37,5%
Inﬂation rate  15.9%  3.0%  4.4%  0.8%  -1.1%  5.8%  5.5%  1.8%  1.2%  -0.4% *
Current account 
balance (in billion USD)  -0.30   -0.34   -0.29   -0.27   -0.03   -0.07   -0.24   -0.36   -0.15   -0.41  *
Banks assets as a share 
of GDP * * * * 37% 38,20% 44,50% 39% 41,40% 44,60% *
Loans as a shae of GDP * * * * 10,3% 12,10% 12,20% 13% 17,80% 21,70% *
Deposits as a share 
of GDP * * * * 19,9% 21,80% 30,10% 25% 27,70% 31,10% *
Number of foreign 
banks * * * *  7 (21) 8 (21) 7 (20) 8 (21) 9 (21) *
Broad money 
(percentage change) * *  15.8   14.9  29,7 25,6 56,7 -8,6 14,7 9,4 *
Source: National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, International Monetary Fund, Eurostat.
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In 1997 banks in Macedonia could be divided into several groups according to 
their ownership structure, e.g. banks with dispersed equity structure, where the 
highest inﬂuence in managing of the bank comes from a large number of share-
holders; banks with oligopolistic ownership structure, where there are several 
founders who have the managing control and banks formed by foreign capital. 
The banking system of the Republic of Macedonia disposes with a relatively 
poor quality of assets. The problem concerning the quality of assets is the high 
credit concentrations to single clients, which exceeds the prescribed legal limits 
of 30.0%, and 10.0% in relation to the guarantee capital.
The capital adequacy ratio at that period was 28.3% and was much higher than 
the minimum prescribed limit of 8.0%. It is considered that this size of the capital 
adequacy ration was not the real one as it should be decreased by the loss loan 
provisions in several banks, but despite of this its size for the whole banking 
system would be higher than the prescribed limit. 
The process of banks’ privatization in Macedonia continued also in 1998. At that 
year the saving house accounted only for 1.9% of the total own potential of the 
banking system. The quality of the assets can be determined as being consider-
ably poor. As of December 31, 1998, banks’ and savings houses’ own assets 
were 15.1 billion Denar equal to 487.4 million DEM. If banks’ and savings houses’ 
own assets are compared to the total amount of assets of the banking sector, the 
average level of capitalization of the banking sector on December 31, 1998, was 
25.2% which means that more than one quarter of total activities of banks and 
savings houses are ﬁnanced by their own assets.
In 1999 the Macedonian economy was faced with a strong external shock 
caused by the escalation of the crisis and the consequent was in Yugoslavia. 
The regulatory framework of banking supervision in Macedonia is based on the 
International Supervisory Standards and Basic principles for efﬁcient banking
supervision established by the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision. In 
October 1999, upon the request of National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, 
experts from the IMF and the World Bank made an assessment of the harmo-
nization of the banking supervision in Macedonia in accordance with the Basel 
principles. After a close examination the experts gave a very high assessment 
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on the harmonization of the banking supervision in the Republic of Macedonia 
with the main principles of efﬁcient banking supervision. The character and state
of the banking system in the Republic of Macedonia is based on regulatory 
framework established by the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia Act 
and the Banks and Savings Houses Act. In accordance with the existing legisla-
tive framework, the banking system can be deﬁned as having a universal char-
acter. Besides the classical function of collecting deposits and granting credits, 
the banks can also participate in the capital market by issuing their own securi-
ties and intermediating in trading with securities between other entities. 
The assets quality of the banks at that period of time was previously one of the 
main problems of the banking system in the Republic of Macedonia. The high 
share of risky placements in the total credit exposure, the low level of collection, 
high interest rate margins, problems in the realization of mortgages that cover 
banking placements were the main problems that inﬂuenced on the perform-
ances of the operations of the Macedonian banks. In 1999, asset quality ratios 
registered a signiﬁcant deterioration due to the strong external shock that hit
the Macedonian economy in the ﬁrst half of 1999. It resulted in loss of foreign
markets, increase in the transportation costs for exporting Macedonian goods, 
decline in output, deterioration in the liquidity of the economy. Such conditions in 
the real sector of Macedonian economy were transmitted to the banking sector 
with negative implications both on the quality of the placements and on the banks 
and savings houses proﬁtability indicators. The economic agents reduced their
ability to service their own liabilities toward the banks, their risk ratings increased 
and banks were forced to have high levels of reservations for potential losses, 
which increased their expenses. At that period of time the annual statement of 
the banks showed that their net proﬁt was 502.9 million Denars which compared
to the net proﬁt realized in 1998 declined with 597.1 million Denars or 54.3%.
The year of 2000 was characterized with accelerated economic growth, initi-
ated by the maintained relative price exchange rate stability, as well as in the 
increased liquidity in the banking sector, which enabled intensiﬁed credit activity
of the banks. In 2000, the reforms of banking sector in Macedonia continued in 
direction of establishing sound, stable and effective banking system, as a pre-
condition for stable and sustainable development of the Macedonian economy. 
In this context, of special importance was put on the enforcement of Banking 
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Law, which represents further approximation of regulatory framework with the 
European Directives on banking. At the end of 2000 the banking system in Mac-
edonia consisted of 22 banks and 19 saving houses. Seventeen banks were 
the so-called full licensed for conducting foreign payment operations, credit and 
guarantee operations abroad, while the other 5 banks have only a domestic 
operations license. The entrance of foreign strategic investors in some Macedo-
nian banks was very important as the total amount of the foreign capital invested 
at that time was 44.9% from all investments.
The basic factors, which increased the banks’ assets in the Republic of Mac-
edonia in 2000, are the growth of deposits and capital, primarily due to several 
signiﬁcant foreign investments. The increase in deposits contributed to the in-
crease of lending in 2000 as short-term loans continued to have the highest 
share (39.6% of the total amount of loans). Overdue loans and non-performing 
loans increased their share and they accounted for 7.6% and 20.42% respec-
tively, in the structure of gross credits. The base of banks’ stability and safety at 
that period of time was the appropriate capitalization which could be used for ab-
sorbing potential losses in case of eventual materialization of risks of operation. 
This is very important from the aspect of debtors’ protection or the depositors in 
banks and increased the public conﬁdence in banking system. The upward trend
of the total capital in 2000 resulted in increase in the level of capitalization and 
capital adequacy ratio of the banking institutions. Namely, the bank capitalization 
ratio in December 31, 2000 amounted 23.3%, which is by 2.6 percentage points 
higher compared to December 31, 1999. According to Basel Standards, the ratio 
of capital adequacy is the most relevant indicator for the level of capitalization 
of banking institutions, as it reﬂects the capital position of the bank in the best
manner, taking into consideration the level of risk undertaken in operations.
In that light of the macroeconomic stabilization in 2000, special attention was 
paid to the adoption of the new Banking Law which led to further compliance of 
the Macedonian legislation with the European Directives in the area of banking 
and so-called 25 Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. The imple-
mentation of this law resulted in increased attractiveness of the banking system 
of Macedonia for foreign investments, stronger prudent standards and practices 
in the banks operations, stronger corporate governance in banks and improved 
efﬁciency in the banking operations, more effective banking supervision, espe-
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cially in the area of corrective actions undertaken against banks with identiﬁed
problems in their operations. In the second half of 2000, based on the adopted 
Banking Law, intensive activities were undertaken to revise the laws with the 
Basel supervisory standards. Additionally, in the area of the legal framework of 
overall banking and ﬁnancial system, attention should be paid to the adoption
of several laws. The new Banking Law together with the other laws in this area 
created a solid basis for improvement of the banking and overall ﬁnancial system
of Macedonia due to increased conﬁdence in the domestic savings.
The increase in the GDP that started in 2000 was terminated in 2001 due to 
the deteriorated security in the country and worsened working conditions which 
caused a decline in the total economic activity and macroeconomic perform-
ances. In 2001 the number of banks that consisted the dominant segment of 
the banking system was reduced because of the process of concentration and 
consolidation of the banking system that started at that time. This trend was 
due to the increased competition in the banking system which resulted from the 
entrance of foreign direct investments in part of larger banks in the Republic of 
Macedonia in 2000, as well as the reforms in the payment system and its trans-
fer to commercial banks.
The credit risk has the most important role in the deﬁnition of risk proﬁle of banks
in Macedonia due to the domination of the classical banking intermediary func-
tions and the low level of development of ﬁnancial markets and instruments. In
2001 the credit risk of banks increased as a consequence of the political security 
crises in Macedonia. In 2001 the banking system faced with serious challenges 
regarding the liquidity risk management. As a result of this during the ﬁrst three
quarters, the trend of strengthening the deposit potential was stopped. 
Besides the credit risk, other risks as liquidity and operational risk signiﬁcantly af-
fect the performances of the banks and the savings houses, and there is one spe-
cial problem regarding the insufﬁcient transparency of the shareholder structures
in some banks in Macedonia. These risks occur as a result of the weak corporate 
governance systems in some banks, inadequate internal control systems, inap-
propriate functioning of the internal audit departments, unsuitable written policies 
and procedures for managing the risks involved in the operations of the banks 
and the savings houses, as well as their improper implementation. Alongside 
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the supervision of the banks and the savings houses, the National Bank of the 
Republic of Macedonia conducts inspection of the application of the regulations 
in the area of foreign exchange and Denar operations. Most frequently, the en-
forcement of the regulations setting forth the manner of conducting the payment 
operations and the international credit operations, the daily foreign exchange po-
sition, fulﬁllment of the terms and the manner of conducting exchange operations,
were subject to partial inspections in the banks. The analysis of the placements 
from the aspect of the maturity, the sector structure and the currency structure 
in 2003 indicated certain qualitative movements towards further intensiﬁcation
of the long-term credit activity, which is especially evident in the sector house-
holds in comparison with the sector enterprises, as well as towards a moderate 
increase in the foreign exchange credit operations of the enterprises. 
In 2003 the Law on the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia was amend-
ed and it provided a legal ground for cooperation and exchange of information 
between the National Bank and the domestic supervisory bodies. All legal imped-
iments for achieving full compliance with the Principle 1 (6) of the Basle Princi-
ples for Effective Banking Supervision. were eliminated. At this time the National 
banks signed Memorandum of Understanding with the Bank of Slovenia and with 
the Central Bank of the Russian Federation as well as with the Bulgarian National 
Bank. A Decision on identifying, assessing and managing the banks’ liquidity risk 
was adopted, which deﬁned the liquidity risk management method, by prescribing
an obligation for the banks to prepare and adopt written policy and procedures for 
liquidity risk management, for establishing an adequate organizational structure 
for liquidity risk management which includes the deﬁnition of the responsibilities of
the respective management bodies (board of directors, risk management board, 
executive body). According to this Decision banks were also obliged to create 
adequate IT system which has to generate on a daily, 10-day and monthly basis 
reports on liquidity risk monitoring and management, to identify a stable level of 
deposits, and to calculate various liquidity indicators. Banks were also obliged to 
prepare a Liquidity Risk Management Plan in the event of emergency as well as 
monthly reports on the maturity structure of the bank’s assets and liabilities and 
a report of the concentration of the sources of funds. 
An integral component of the banking supervision is the supervision of the 
banks’ IT systems, which became increasingly relevant from the aspect of the 
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application of the New Capital Accord and the operation risk identiﬁcation and
monitoring, as well as from the aspect of the reputation risk management the 
bank might be exposed to in the case of insufﬁcient protection of the data. For
that reason the National Bank of Macedonia adopted a Decision on deﬁning
the standards for ensuring the banks’ information security. It was arranged in 
this Decision the establishment and implementation of the information security 
policy, risk management and control from the aspect of information security, 
deﬁnition of the role of the management bodies, establishment of a reporting
system to provide timely risk identiﬁcation and undertaking adequate measures.
Considering the fact that the aforementioned regulation stipulates introduction of 
new and complex standards, it was ﬁxed a deadline for complying with the provi-
sions of this Decision, within which the banks have to undertake all necessary 
activities for implementation of the stipulated information security standards. 
In regard to the analyses and the assessment of banks’ IT system, the National 
Bank of Macedonia submitted questionnaires. These questionnaires aimed to 
assess how the banks’ IT system was implementing the requirements for ISO/
IEC 17799 and the Basle standards for operational risk management. The re-
sults of the questionnaire showed that most of the banks were in the stage of 
implementing sophisticated solutions for detection and prevention of unauthor-
ized activities by the users but the accent was placed on the ability of the IT 
systems to operate, rather than on their security. The process of introduction 
of new systems mainly lacks high-quality analysis and efﬁcient organization,
as well as larger involvement of the banks’ management bodies with respect to 
risk management. The process of developing, testing and verifying the quality of 
the banks’ programs was not satisfactory as the internal audit of the IT systems 
security in most of the banks was unsuitable and needed to be improved, par-
ticularly by employing experts and experienced staff.  
Liquidity risk occurs when the bank is not able to provide sufﬁcient amount of funds
to repay its short-term liabilities at the moment of their maturity or provides the 
necessary funds at extremely high costs. The stability of the banking system pri-
marily depends on the liquidity risk management quality, from both the aspect of 
providing favorable structure of the sources of funds, as well as from the aspect 
of maintaining certain level of liquid assets as a protection from the liquidity risk. 
Therefore the favorable trend of the general situation in Macedonia in 2003 meant 
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more efﬁcient liquidity forecasting and management for the banks by maintaining a
satisfactory liquidity position. Within the overall social and economic environment 
in the country, the credibility of the banking system has been strengthened which 
was proved by the trend of continuous increment in the deposit base in this period. 
The permanent enhancing of the propensity to save in the banks, at the end of 
2003 resulted in a volume of the banks’ deposit base over the level registered at 
the end of 2001 when the euro was implemented in the European Union. On the 
other hand, the unfavorable maturity structure of deposits and the trends, primarily 
in the households’ deposits (which were a dominant category representing an aver-
age monthly share of 59% in 2003 and 56.8% in 2002), indicate a high degree of 
sensitiveness depending on the level of political and economic stability in both the 
country and the near surrounding, which, for the banks, means a need of further 
maintenance of prudential approach towards the liquidity risk management. One of 
the most important aspects in the liquidity management is matching of the maturity 
between the funds and the sources of funds. In 2003, the national bank estab-
lished the terms and conditions and the elements necessary for the banks’ liquidity 
risk identiﬁcation, assessment and management with a Decision. The Decision
requires minimum necessary standards for prudential liquidity management. In the 
process of liquidity risk management, the Decision stipulates an establishment and 
maintenance of an adequate maturity structure of the assets and the liabilities from 
the aspect of harmonization of the assets and liabilities items according to their 
residual maturity, as well as planning and managing the inﬂows and the outﬂows of
funds in line with the expectations based on historical data. The banks are required 
to prepare monthly reports on the maturity structure of the assets and the liabilities 
(agreed and expected) in Denars, foreign exchange and at an aggregate level and 
to submit them to the National Bank of Macedonia. The analysis of the ﬁnancial
result for 2003 by individual groups of banks indicated that it was primarily due 
to the group of large banks, accounting for 51.4% of the total income at a level of 
overall banking system. At that period of time the national bank also started with 
prescribing a methodology for determining the banks’ capital. 
The most distinguished differences between the banking regulations of the Eu-
ropean Union and Macedonia primarily arise from the absence of regulation for 
incorporating the market risk in the methodology for determining the banks’ capi-
tal adequacy ratio. The incorporation of the market risk in the capital adequacy 
regulation is rather required for achieving compliance with the European direc-
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tives and the Basel Capital Accord than it is actually imposed by the current situ-
ation in the banking system of the country. Although the banks are not exposed 
to the market risk as the involvement of the banks in market transactions in 
securities and other ﬁnancial instruments is low, it is recommended to start with
the preparatory activities for establishing a legal framework for regulation of the 
market risk. - the performance of a ﬁnancial activity of international payment op-
erations and providing custodian services, and the settlement of ﬁnancial activi-
ties such as trade in securities for its account and for the account of customers, 
trade in foreign assets and execution of foreign exchange transactions and trade 
in ﬁnancial derivatives, requires connection to S.W.I.F.T. The National Bank of
Macedonia deﬁned the following as a priority for the development of the banking
sector, namely - deﬁnition of the basic elements of the liquidity risk management
policy; deﬁnition of the role of the bank’s management bodies, particularly the
Board of Directors, the Risk Management Board, the body in charge of liquidity 
risk management, as well as the competencies of the Internal Audit Department, 
establishment of an adequate information system which will provide timely and 
permanent liquidity risk measurement, monitoring and control, as well as report-
ing to the bodies in charge of the liquidity risk management. It is also foreseen 
to be implemented planning and managing the inﬂows and outﬂows of funds by
determining the degree of probability for execution of each individual transaction 
of the bank, development and monitoring of an adequate maturity structure of 
the banks’ balance sheets, determination and monitoring of the concentration 
of the sources of funds, especially from the aspect of determining the degree 
of stability, liquidity testing - stress scenarios for the purpose of determining the 
effect of the different circumstances on the bank’s liquidity position, as well as 
on the possibility for adhering to the set limits. 
The Banking Supervision Department directed its efforts to ongoing monitoring 
of the banks, particularly from the aspect of the degree of implementation of the 
information security policy During the examinations the focus was put on the 
degree of support and involvement of the banks’ management bodies in the ap-
plication of the IT system security standards, the level of managing the activities 
in the process of switching from the old to the new information system, the con-
trol and measurement of the operational risk which might arise from inadequate 
information systems. 
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In 2004 the banking system of the Republic of Macedonia consists of banks 
and savings houses. At the end of the year there were 21 banks and 15 savings 
houses operated on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia. Private capi-
tal dominated the ownership structure of the banking system. As of December, 
2004 the degree of privatization of the banking system in the country equaled 
91.0%. At the end of the year the foreign capital was present in 15 banks and 
comprised 47.5% of the total capital of the banking system. There was also an 
increase in the total deposits being the most signiﬁcant source of funds of the
banks. During 2004, banks’ lending activity intensiﬁed, which was primarily gen-
erated by the expanded deposit potential, improved creditworthiness of clients, 
broadened range of loans and their reduced price as well as the liberalization of 
the foreign exchange operations. According to the systemic and the institutional 
design speciﬁed by the Banking Law, the banking system in the Republic of
Macedonia could be deﬁned as a banking system of a universal nature. The
Central Bank concentrated on improving the regulatory package in the ﬁeld of
the IT supplement of the banking system. After the adoption of the Decision 
on deﬁning the standards for ensuring the banks’ information systems security,
the Central Bank started developing detailed methodology for identiﬁcation, as-
sessment and management of the risk of insecure and inadequate information 
systems and establishing the fundaments for managing this type of operational 
risk. At the end of 2004 the bank developed a Draft Supervisory Circular for 
information systems security, which aimed at providing guidelines for effective 
implementation of the risk management process which might result from inad-
equate and insecure information systems and to provide an integrated review of 
all aspects related to this process.
Serbia
The year of 2000 was crucial for the Serb economy because of the change in 
the government, which stopped the country isolation and gave a start to the 
reforms in the banking sector. Actually, the revitalization of the banking sector 
was initiated with the implementation of two laws – “Law Governing the Relation 
between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia within the Territory of the Federal 
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Republic of Yugoslavia” and “Law on the Settlement of the Public Debt of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from the Citizens’ Foreign Exchange Savings”, 
which provided the legal basis for solving the problem of non-performing loans 
and providing compensation for private individuals whose foreign currency de-
posits were conﬁscated.
Table 3. Basic Indicators for Serbia
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
GDR per capita
(in USD) * * * * *  882   1540   2016   2236   2400   2600  
Real GDP Growth 
Rate 6,10% 7,80% 10,10% 1,90% -21% 5,20% 5,10% 4,50% 2,40% 9,30% 5,90%
Unemplyment rate 24,20% 25,40% 24,10% 24,60% 25,50% 25,60% 26,80% 29% 31,70% 31,70% *
Inﬂation rate * * 10% 51,80% 64,60% 112,90% 20,50% 4,40% 6,10% 11% 14,50%
Current account 
balance (in million 
USD)
* * * * *  -167   -354   -1348   -1362   -2233   -1800  
Loans as a share 
of GDP * * * * 29.6%  56.6%  31.7%   17.2%   16.0%   21.5% *
Deposits as a share 
of GDP * * * *  9.7%   14.7%  13.4%  15.5%   17.7%   20.7%  *
Number of foreign 
banks * * * * 3 (75)  3 (81)   8 (54)   12 (50) 16 (47) 13 (43)  *
Broad money (as a 
percentage of GDP) * * * * * * 104,90% 52,70% 27,50% 30,30% 22,40%
Source: National Bank of Serbia, International Monetary Fund, Eurostat.
The years of 2001 and 2002 were characterized with changes in the banking 
sector related to the closure of insolvent banks – 19 small banks in 2000 and 4 
largest banks in 2002. The Serbian government also took the obligations of the 
ailing Serbian banks to Paris and London Club creditors and in return got involved 
in these banks. These restructuring measures were also followed by the initiation 
of the privatization process. The restructuring of the banks was supported by well 
developed legal framework giving priority to higher capital adequacy which was a 
challenge for the small banks. As a result it is expected that the Serbian banking 
system will follow a process of mergers and acquisitions due to the stronger com-
pletion among the banks in the recent years. In that period the level of ﬁnancial
intermediation dropped signiﬁcantly (38.8%) due to the restructuring measures
and the total assets of the banking system amounted up to 6.5 billion EUR.
In late July, 2002 qualitative and quantitative criteria for classiﬁcation of assets
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were tightened, the items deductible from the accounting base for speciﬁc provi-
sions were established, and the rates for allocation of speciﬁc provisions were
changed. Nearly one third of the total income reported by banks in this period re-
sulted from reversed provisions, mostly based on indirectly written-off loans and 
long-term risk provisions, as well as speciﬁc provisions. One bank alone reported
9,606 million Dinars of income generated in this manner, or 61.8% of the ag-
gregate income of the banking sector resulting from unused reversed provisions. 
The amount accounted for 83.9% of the total income reported by this bank.
The lending provided by foreign owned banks in Serbia is comparatively low 
due to the lack of collateral and problems at reinforcement of claims. For that 
reason foreign banks concentrate on granting short term loans which account 
for 90% of the total amount of loans for the year of 2004. The growing presence 
of foreign banks in Serbia increases the households’ marginal propensity to 
save but still there is much work to be done in order to regain the conﬁdence of
depositors and to mobilize their savings. The majority of the Serbian population 
still holds much of their savings under the mattresses, in short-term deposits 
or in foreign currency deposits, which are placed by the banks in the Central 
Bank in order to provide enough liquidity. The credit boom that started in the 
2004 was accompanied by a number of measures taken by the national bank, 
e.g. the borrower’s monthly repayment should be not more than 30% of his net 
income as well as the obligation that when paying goods with a loan the bor-
rower should provide at least 20% of the price. 
In the years of 2003-2005 the focus was put on the improvement of banks’ capi-
talization and due to restructuring-related debt equity swaps and higher capital 
requirements which resulted in the signiﬁcant increase in the capital adequacy
ratio from 0.7% in 2000 to 31.3% in 2003. The interest rate spreads started to nar-
row in 2003 because of the increased price stability and banks’ efﬁciency, reduced
provisioning of claims and growing competition among the banks. The Banking 
Supervision implemented new requirements for banking capital of 10 mln. EUR 
which should be fulﬁlled by the banks up to the end of 2003 and a new capital
adequacy ratio of 10% from 2005. The regulations for loan classiﬁcations and pro-
visioning tightened in 2002 in terms of quality and quantity. The main criterion for 
provisioning loans is based on their default probability measured by the duration of 
time the loans are overdue. Five categories of provisioning are implemented – A, 
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B, C, D and E with a loss provisioning of 2%, 5%, 25%, 50% and 100%. Similar 
to Croatia the banking sector in Serbia is over banked but under serviced and 
there is necessity of optimizing not only the quantity but also the quality of banking 
services by going from mainly basic banking products to more complex ones. 
In 2005 there were 41 operating in Serbia and in this year there was no merging 
of banks or revoking of bank’s license compared to 2004. The greatest part of 
bank assets about 72.1% were claims on approved credits and loans to banks 
and clients, followed by cash and cash equivalents, deposits with the Central 
Bank and reﬁnancing by securities.  Household, corporate and bank deposits
had the greatest share in external sources - 62.2% out of total liabilities. Banks. 
Regarding the liquidity risk in the 2005 the liquidity indicator ranged between 
0.96 and 11.07 and no bank used daily liquidity loans. The foreign exchange risk 
indicator was prescribed as a control measure of banks foreign exchange risk. 
It was deﬁned that a bank’s total daily net risk foreign exchange position should
not exceed 30% of the bank’s capital.
The adoption of the Decision on Amendments and Supplements to the Deci-
sion on Criteria for Classiﬁcation of On-balance Sheet Assets and Off-balance
Sheet Items the National Bank of Serbia aims at monitoring of banks exposure 
to the potential credit risk which stems from the calculation of loans in foreign 
currency or loans indexed by the currency clause. In line with the amendments 
and supplements to the abovementioned regulations, banks are obliged to adopt 
methodology which keeps record of the exposure of an individual debtor to the 
risk of change in the dinar exchange rate. The banks are obliged to analyze 
continuously the credit risk arising from the inﬂuence of the change in the dinar
exchange rate on the debtor’s ﬁnancial standing, given that the possibilities of
loan repayment depend on the debtor’s dinar cash ﬂows. The adoption of new
legal framework pertaining to the performance of exchange transactions aims 
to modify the provisions which represented a hindrance to the performance of 
exchange transactions in practice, as well as the improvement of the existing 
regulations with a view to raising the quality of rendered services. In the second 
quarter of 2005, the National Bank of Serbia embarked on the preparation on a 
new Law on Banks aiming for further development of the regulatory framework 
for banks’ operations and strengthening of the banking services market, in ac-
cordance with the needs of economic development.
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In the ﬁrst half of 2001 the new management of the National Bank of Serbia
carried out a comprehensive assessment of the banking sector and drew up a 
bank restructuring strategy. The Central Bank assessment focused on the fol-
lowing deﬁciencies of the banking system - high level of bad assets and low level
of real interest-bearing assets, resulting in low level of real reserve for potential 
loss provisions, real undercapitalisation and inability of capital and reserves to 
absorb undertaken risks insolvency of the largest banks accounting for the ma-
jority of total bank assets, non-existence of adequate internal control and audit, 
as well as inadequate risk management system.
The process of bank restructuring itself was carried out in several phases since 
2003 included the classiﬁcation of the credit rating of banks into four catego-
ries, liquidation of insolvent banks, regulations governing credit rating of banks 
adjusted to the international standards, formulation of privatisation strategies 
for of state-owned banks, stronger capital requirements for commercial banks, 
measures for encouraging new foreign exchange savings,  establishment of the 
Central Credit Regisry that enables the banks to obtain higher-quality informa-
tion on potential borrowers, replacement of the old payment system by a bank 
based  settlement system.
In 2003 two major breakthroughs were made – the implementation of interna-
tional accounting standards by amendments in the Law on Accounting and the 
development of possibility for the banks to start operating local payments for 
their corporate clients after implementation of the Law on payment systems. 
The Law on banks and other ﬁnancial organizations has implemented the Basel
Accord on Capital principles (Basel I) as well as the Capital Adequacy Directive 
and Own Funds Directive. In that respect Serbian banks are obliged to have on 
ongoing basis the risk assets covered by minimum capital of 10%. Preparations 
for the implementation of Basel II are under way already with the National Bank 
of Serbia and the Association of Serbian Banks. It seems also important to be 
pointed out that banks in Serbia organize their activities through the business 
lines and offer banking products to their clients, making their approach to the 
market competition based.
Banking sector in Serbia started a new phase in its development in 2004. The 
continuation of positive trends from 2003 created an environment characterized 
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by monetary stability, successful transfer of payments operations into the banks 
as well as the gradual restoring of conﬁdence in banking system evidenced by
the growth of households savings. The whole process received strong impulse 
from the intensive privatization that entered its ﬁnal stage in 2004.
Serbian banks are traditionally engaged in banking operations such as deposit 
operations, lending, foreign currency operations and foreign exchange, issuing 
of payment cards, custody operations, purchase and sale of securities, guaran-
tees, broker’s operations and others. In March 2005, the Payment System De-
partment of the National Bank of Serbia held a meeting with the representatives 
of commercial banks, Public Payments Administration and Central Securities 
Registry, Depository and Clearing, in which they discussed the characteristics 
of the payment system operations in 2004, experience with MT 102 messages 
in the RTGS system, as well as ideas and suggestions regarding the function-
ing of the payment system and mutual cooperation. In 2005, the Central Banks 
also provided a new service within the RTGS system, enabling commercial 
banks and Public Payment Administration at the Ministry of Finance of the Re-
public of Serbia to effect small-value payments in real time. This is an option 
enabling high-quality and high-liquidity banks to offer their clients a signiﬁcantly
upgraded level of service quality and velocity.
Croatia
Foreign banks started to enter relatively late in Croatia, only after the Dayton 
peace agreement in 1995 by which was put the end of the hostilities between 
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1996 three commercial banks were granted 
loans by the Croatian national bank and the bad loans in their balance sheets 
were removed. This led to a decrease in interbank interest rates below the rates 
on the retail and wholesale lending which made the commercial banks to give 
priority to lending which was at that period of time a main source to make proﬁt.
The credit expansion that resulted from this process was accompanied by poor 
risk management and in some cases banks didn’t have lending policies. Insider 
lending was prospering and it was a very common case newly established pri-
vate banks to give loans to the corporate groups that had founded them. The 
bank crisis that occurred in 1998-2000 was resolved by a number of bankruptcy 
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procedures, lending of last resort to six commercial banks in order to survive 
liquidity problems and the government decision to sell the rehabilitated banks 
to strategic foreign investor in order to stop further banking instability and to 
promote knowledge and expertise transfer. 
Table 4. Basic Indicators for Croatia 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
GDR per capita (in 
EUR) * * * 4284 4102 4560 4998 5507 5906 6397 6972
Real GDP Growth 
Rate 6,80% 5,90% 6,80% 2,50% -0,90% 2,90% 4,40% 5,20% 4,30% 3,80% 4,30%
Unemplyment rate * 10,00% 9,90% 11,40% 13,60% 16,10% 15,80% 14,80% 14,30% 13,80% 13,10%
Inﬂation rate * 3,40% 3,80% 6,00% 3,90% 5,50% 2,40% 1,80% 1,66% 2,70% 3,60%
Current account 
balance (in million 
EUR)
-1012 -755 -2192 -1305 -1313 -490 -818 -2097 -1866 -1458 -1964
Bank assets (in 
bln.kuna) * * 88,87 96,78 93,52 111,84 148,43 174,14 204,12 229,31 245,88
Loans (in million 
kuna) 27 231,33 29 699,62 44 107,01 54 388,28 50 589,30 54 910,40 68 462,90 90 089 104 428,20118 648,70 140 635,13
Deposits (in mil-
lion kuna) 20 143,59 30 600,73 43 683,85 49 614,19 47 997,26 63 476,25 92 723,20
100 
341,70 111 854,60122 195,80130 943,67
Money supply (in 
bln.kuna) 8,23 11,37 13,73 13,53 13,86 18,03 23,70 30,87 33,89 34,56 38,82
Number of foreign 
banks 1 (54) 5 (58) 7 (60) 10 (60) 13 (53) 20 (43) 24 (43) 23 (46) 19 (41) 15 (37) 13 (34)
Number of ATM * * * * * * * 1330 1611 1913 2043
Source: National Bank of Croatia, Ministry of Finance, Statistical Institute of Croatia, Eurostat.
A research done by Igor Jemric and Boris Vujcic110 investigates the efﬁciency
and the managerial performance of the banking system in Croatia for the period 
of 1995-2000 by the help of CCR and BCC models111. The authors came to the 
conclusion that the Croatian ﬁnancial system in 1995 was characterized by large
asymmetry between banks regarding their technical efﬁciency. In 1995 only 4
of 39 commercial banks were efﬁcient and they were small, newly established
private banks. In the coming years, and esp. in the period of 1999-2000 the 
number of efﬁcient banks rose which was due to the increasing competition and
the exit of a number of bad banks from the market after 1998. The authors show 
that up to 1999 the most efﬁcient banks were the smallest ones. At that period
110 “Efﬁciency of Banks in Croatia: A DEA Approach”, Jemric, I., B. Vujcic, Croatian National Bank Discussion Papers, 2001.
111 The CCR-model (after Charnes, Cooper, Rhodes, 1978) and the BCC-model (after Banker, Charnes and Cooper, 1984) are 
non-parametric models that aim at determining the relatively efﬁcient production frontier, based on empirical data on chosen inputs
and outputs of a number of entities called Decision Making Units. Tha main difference between the two models is the treatment of 
returns to scale.
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the largest banks were overstaffed and burdened with non-performing loans 
inherited from the socialist system. However, the main reason for successful 
growth of smaller banks was the high interest rate spread which combined with 
the lack of burden of old debts for the new private banks brought exceptional 
proﬁt to these banks. The main reasons for the high spreads were the risky
lending owning to lack of ﬁnancial discipline and effective supervision as well
as substantial structural problems in the banks related to operating and staff 
efﬁciency. When the spreads started to come down and after the rehabilitation
of the three largest banks and their subsequent sell to foreign institutions, the 
situations changed a lot.
Jemric and Vujcic proved in their research that the most efﬁcient in their speciﬁca-
tion are both the smallest and the largest banks contrary to the middle sized banks 
which inefﬁciency in most cases is due to the fact that most of them are regional
banks and the inefﬁciency problems arise mainly from the environment in which
they are working. The analysis also suggests that the most signiﬁcant cause for
inefﬁciency among state-owned and old banks (those that are established before
1989-1990) compared to foreign-owned and new banks is the number of employ-
ees and ﬁxed assets. This leads to the conclusion that the decision to privatize and
to sell Croatian banks to foreign institutions was the right one as the new owners 
introduce new working methods, technology, knowledge and experience which 
resulted in increased competition and narrower interest rate spreads.
The expansion of foreign banks on the Croatian market can be estimated as a 
positive in terms of risk diversiﬁcation having in mind that the foreign market’s
business cycle is not highly positively correlated with the domestic market’s busi-
ness cycle. . The Croatian economy in 2001 and 2002 continued to grow stead-
ily, providing risk diversiﬁcation for those EU banks operating
in Croatia while the European Union countries were experiencing a slowdown. 
The motives of the foreign banks to enter the Croatian market were the high 
interest rate margins, the search for new clients and the unused credit potential 
of the Croatian households and non-ﬁnancial corporations. Most foreign banks in
Croatia tend to have native Croatians as their managers who know very well the 
local conditions. During the period of 2000-2002 the technology transfer from the 
foreign banks seem to grow in importance. The largest number of banks report 
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that they have adopted marketing knowledge and techniques, but also new prod-
ucts and services, wholesale knowledge and techniques, risk management proc-
esses, internal control processes as well as management skills and methods.
Some of the privatized foreign banks spent a great deal of time and effort on 
inward focused activities such as upgrading information systems, changing in-
ternal procedures and reclassifying their credit portfolios. Actually, foreign banks 
in Croatia contributed to the increase of quality of the products and services but 
regarding their diversity they didn’t do much work. The foreign banks concen-
trated on expending loans to the household sector which was due to the fact 
that default on consumer loans in Croatia was much lower compared to default 
rates on loans to non-ﬁnancial corporations. Another reason was the successful
usage of co-debtors, guarantors and collateral in consumer loans as well as the 
fact the consumer market in Croatia was very undeveloped and it left space for 
the development of new products. Compared to the EU market where lending to 
consumers in 1995 totaled to 50% of GDP in Croatia the consumer lending in 
1995 was only 6% of GDP, which showed the depth of that market.
After the second banking crisis112 (1998-2000) there were a number of obstacles 
and challenges which had to be faced by banks that survived the second bank-
ing crisis. The main obstacle to safety and price efﬁciency of lending, as the
basic bank activity, the bankers themselves saw in the slowness of the courts in 
large communities, “loopholes” in laws that enable endless delays in legal pro-
ceedings and the debtor orientated culture in smaller communities. Researcher 
working for the Croatian National Bank deﬁned as main problems unavailability
of historical data on potential debtors’ quality, the non-existence and out-of-dat-
ed of credit scoring systems in many banks after the period of  the banking crisis. 
The issues indicated as main strategic challenges confronted by the banking 
system in Croatia are related to size, specialization and competitiveness as the 
main strategic challenges facing banks in the forthcoming period.
In 2000-2002 the banking system is characterized by a fall in the total number of 
112 This deﬁnition is given by Kraft in 1999.
The crisis occurred in a year of signiﬁcantly increased ﬁscal revenues owing to the introduction of a value-added tax. The in-
creased ﬁscal revenues drastically increased the consumption appetites of the government and led to a revision
Of the budget, by which the ﬁscal expenditures were increased. In late 1998, the government announced a small budget deﬁcit
which was due to not including many unsettled expenditures. The bank crisis occurred simultaneously with narrowing foreign bor-
rowing opportunities as a result of the Asian and Russian crises. The reduced borrowing opportunities led to a reduction in the deﬁcit
of the current account.
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banks, disappearance of savings banks, strong decrease in the number of do-
mestic banks, increase in the number of banks owned by foreign institutions and 
gradual decrease in banking sector concentration due to growth of medium-sized 
banks. At the same time looking at the data the number of non-performing loans 
decreased signiﬁcantly in the year of 2002 compared to 1999 when they are esti-
mated to 45% while in 1999 they were 160%. These ﬁgures resulted from the over
optimistic estimations of the banks that reclassiﬁed most of their loans in less riskier
groups and because of the banking crisis and severe economic conditions in 1999 
when the bankers were quite pessimistic about their asset portfolio. 
The major changes in credit risk management that occurred in the Croatian 
banking system that started in 2002 and that continue to develop is that almost 
all the banks are introducing automated credit scoring for physical persons.  At 
the same time some banks are also
introducing automated credit scoring for legal persons as well which makes them 
really advanced part of the banking sector in Croatia. Larger banks started to 
introduce limits on all exposures on the lending side, including also the limits on 
exposure to the Croatian National Bank. Regarding the protection against fraud 
in foreign exchange and securities trading, the separation of the front, middle 
and back ofﬁce operations within the treasury department are implemented in
all large banks. Complete automation of treasury operations via the IT system 
exists in only a few banks. Bankers in Croatia consider that a complete separa-
tion of the treasury department and its partial computerization provide sufﬁcient
protection against events similar to those in Rijeĉka banka113.
The uneasiness about the future implementation of the new Basel Accord on 
risk management in banking comes from the procedures for operational risks 
monitoring. These risks increase strongly because of exceptional growth in debit 
and credit card and electronic products and services in recent years. Bankers 
also believe that these risks do not receive enough attention, which is proved by 
the fact that rumors spread in the banking community, when domestic hackers 
cause losses in card operations to the bank. Regarding measurement and con-
trol of credit risk according to Basel II most large Croatian banks opt to implement 
113 Rijeĉka banka was saddled with hidden losses of around 100 mln. euro by a rogue trader in March 2002. In order to provide 
enough liquidity on the market the government bought purchased a 60% of the bank from its owner Bayerische Landesbank. Finally, 
the majority of the shares of Rijeĉka banka were sold to Erste Bank (Austria).
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internal ratings-based approach, whereas banks with an international ownership 
develop systems for measurement and control of credit risk at the bank group 
level. The deadline for the implementation of the Basel Accord in Croatia is the 
end of 2006 and currently the banks are at different stage of implementation. 
The new internal ratings-based approach is based on the IAS 39, which pre-
scribes that the expected future collections of receivables to be valued by taking 
account of the time dimension of money. In 2003 when the ﬁnal version of the
Basel Accord was completed the banks were not satisﬁed with the short-time
limit, which the CNB imposed to them for the adjustment of their existing internal 
ratings-based approaches to IAS 39 without taking into account its complexity 
and the consequent delays in its implementation, even in the Western countries. 
The application of IAS 39 at the individual loan level, instead of at the portfolio 
level, considerably increases the price of this standard’s application for banks 
with huge portfolios of small household loans. 
The legal framework of Croatian banking law does not support the existence of 
universal banking. In July 2002, the Croatian Parliament adopted a new Banking 
Act that speciﬁcally allows banks to add additional non-banking products to their
offer. The Securities Market Act, which was enacted in July 2002, speciﬁcally
allows banks to be engaged in securities trading, which is subject to strict and 
precise provisions of the Croatian Securities and Exchange Commission.  
The new products and services that Croatian banks offer are related to card and 
electronic operations. Banks also focus on their own technological development 
to improve existing or acquire new information systems. In this sense Croatian 
banks can be classiﬁed into three groups, namely - banks where IT upgrading
or renovation is in progress, banks that view their IT upgrading as a continu-
ous process, and banks that plan IT upgrading. Currently, the process of banks 
concentration in Croatia is already ﬁnished and banks direct their policy to the
spread of branch network and more intensive advertising. 
According to a research done by experts from Bank Austria Creditanstalt114 
Croatian banking market can be seen as “over-banked” but “under-serviced”. 
The large number of branches and increasing staff of the banks show that the 
banking sector in Croatia has a potential for development. The credit boom in 
114 Banking in CEE, April 2004, extra report.
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the years of 2002 and 2003 was the reason for credit institutions to reduce their 
liquid assets. The public growing conﬁdence in the banking system in the last
years resulted in the improvement of the banks’ ability to concentrate household 
savings which increased from 20.5% of GDP in 1995 to 60% of GDP in 2003. 
The progress in restructuring the banking system in Croatia, the improvement in 
banks’ efﬁciency in accessing loans as well as the more developed regulatory
framework contributed to the decrease of the number of non performing loans. 
According to the Banking Act active since 25 of July 2002 the minimum capital 
base for establishing a bank in Croatia is 40 mln. kuna which equals to ap-
proximately 5.4 mln. euro. This requirement for the capital bases should be per-
formed by the banks till the end of 2006. Large exposures of banks are limited 
to 25% of the bank’s capital in order to be provided suitable diversiﬁcation of
the risks with a total amount of all large exposures limited to 600% of the bank’s 
capital. Loans granted to connected parties are limited to 10% of the bank’s own 
funds and to 20% of the total amount. The bank’s open currency position should 
not exceed more than 10% of the bank’s own funds. The loan classiﬁcation and
provisioning that has been entered into force since 2004 take into account the 
borrower’s rating, the duration of default on payment and the security on loans. 
The provisions are divided into A (enforceable claims) amounting to 1.2%, B-B1, 
B2 and B3 amounting respectively to 10%, 30% and 70% (partially enforceable 
claims) and C (unenforceable claims) amounting to 100%.
After the banking reform in 2000 Croatian banks’ managers consider that they 
put much effort in terms of technical and technological changes than in terms 
of staff adjustments. The banks had to develop new technological solutions and 
invest in information technology, while staff adjustments in the majority of banks 
mainly involved new organizational solutions rather than new recruitments. The 
necessary development of IT infrastructure prompted by changes in the pay-
ment system led to a development of a range of new services for clients, such 
as for instance e-banking, standing orders, ATM networks etc.
According to a research “Review of the Results of the National Payment System 
Survey”, performed by the Croatian National Bank in 2004 a high percentage of 
banks (75%) offer Internet payments to their customers. The beginning of busi-
ness entities’ account management by banks contributed to the boost in the devel-
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opment of this type of payments. Internet payments contribute to lower payment 
transaction costs as fees for electronic payment orders are much lower than those 
for classical payment orders in paper form. Around 60% of the commercial banks 
in Croatia have their ATMs where clients can withdraw cash and thus reduce the 
need for the provision of this type of service through bank counters. Most banks’ 
clients may also use ATMs of other banks and around 50% of banks have their 
own POS devices installed. Internet banking is not popular among small compa-
nies in Croatia which can be explained by the fact small companies perform a 
smaller number of payments as well as the lack of technological preconditions.
The usage of credit cards prevails that of debit cards in Croatia. Regarding the us-
age of ATMs by large and medium companies it can be concluded that it is quite 
limited contrary to their usage by small companies and sole entrepreneurs. The 
use of ATMs is proportionate to their distribution and the banks, in their efforts 
to reduce the costs in payments by achieving a higher level of banking services 
automation, will increase the use of ATMs in their activities in the near future. The 
increase in the number of ATMs owned by the banks was signiﬁcant and it was
typical for all bank groups115. In 2001 the total number of ATMs was 999, in 2002 
– 1330, in 2003 – 1611 and in 2004 it totaled to 1787. Banks in Group I held 81.1% 
of all the ATMs in Croatia. At the end of June 2004 sixteen banks in Croatia still 
do not have any ATMs while ten banks did not change their numbers. 
Romania
Romania survived a recession and ﬁnancial crisis in the period of 1997-1999,
during which the Romanian National Bank passed the Law No. 83/1997 on the 
privatisation of banks and the major state-owned Romanian banks were privatized 
in 1998. At the same time the Central Bank implemented a rapid bank purging pro-
gram that continued for three years starting from 1999 to 2002. As a result tough 
measures were taken, including the merger of the largest state-owned bank Banc-
orex through absorption with another large bank Banca Comerciala Româna, and 
the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings for other smaller privately-owned banks.
The Romanian banking system is currently developing and the number of spe-
115 According to the Banking Supervision in Croatia banks are classiﬁed into four groups. Group I consists of banks with assets
exceeding 5 billion kuna, Group II of banks with assets between 1 billion and 5 billion kuna, Group III of banks with assets between 
500 million and 1 billion kuna, and Group IV of banks with assets below 500 million kuna.
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cialized ﬁnancial institutions such as Raiffeisen Banca pentru Locuinte, HVB
Banca pentru Locuinte specialized in saving and loans for households and 
Porche Bank Romania specialized for motorcar purchases appeared. At the 
end of July 2005 there are 33 domestic commercial banks in Romania and six 
branches of foreign banks. The banks with fully or majority privately-owned capi-
tal constitute 94.1% of the total amount of bank assets and 95.5% of the share 
capital of all commercial banks in Romania. Foreign owned banks held 64% of 
total assets and 72.6% of the share capital of the banks.
Table 5. Basic Indicators for Romania
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
GDR per capita 
(in thousand 
ROL)
3 180,40 4 817,80 11 218,20 16 611,20 24 300 35 826,40 52 109,40 69 500,60 87 576,70 110 179,20 *
Real GDP Growth 
Rate 7,10% 3,90% -6,10% 4,80% -1,20% 2,10% 5,70% 5,10% 5,20% 8,40% 4,10%
Unemplyment 
rate 9,50% 6,60% 8,90% 10,40% 11.8% 10,50% 8,80% 8,40% 7,40% 6,20% *
Inﬂation rate 32,30% 38,80% 154,80% 59,10% 45,80% 45,70% 34,50% 0,23 15,30% 11,90% 9,10%
Current account 
balance (in 
million EUR)
-1368 -2051 -1858 -2575 -1355 -1494 -2488 -1623 -3060 -4460 *
Non-government 
credit (in billion 
ROL)
16 435,40 26 841,40 35 900,70 59 086,50 57 719,50 75 007,10 118 254,50 178 728,50 302 879,40 417 623,50 *
Deposits (in 
million ROL) 14 514 925 24 933 269 52 950 348 81 004 864 * 159 318 296 234 876 529 328 134 185 402 762 836 569 971 158 *
Money supply (in 
billion ROL) 18 278,10 30 334,60 62 150,40 92 529,90 134 122,50 185 060,00 270 512,00 373 712,50 460 741,30 644 617,30 *
Source: National Bank of Romania, Eurostat.
At the end of 2003 the amount of loans granted to the non-government sec-
tor was 14.5% which compared to other Central European countries is pretty 
low. This can be attributed to the fact that banks are very cautious in granting 
loans because of the difﬁculties that creditors have when they have to reinforce
their rights, uncertainties in obtaining information and hesitant reforms in the 
corporate sector. Having in mind these peculiarities low risk operations as in-
terbank transactions, foreign exchange and the repurchase f government bonds 
are preferred which not only leads to crowding out effect for the private sector 
but makes the banks much more susceptible to the unexpected exchange rate 
changes. The capital adequacy improves in the last years due to privatization 
of the state-owned banks and the continuous increase in the minimum capital 
322
requirements. The Romanian banking regulations comply mostly with the EU 
standards and the BASEL II requirements, even Romanian regulatory frame-
work can be estimated as being more strict. The minimum capital to establish a 
bank in Romania is 320 billion ROL which equals to 8.5 million EUR and up to 
May, 2004 there was a gradual increase and the required capital to start a credit 
institution in Romania became 320 billion ROL which is equal to 9.2 million EUR 
compared to the European requirements that stipulate a norm of 5 million EUR. 
The capital adequacy ratio in Romania is set to 12% compared to the BASEL II 
requirements where the capital adequacy ratio is set to 8%. The ceiling for large 
exposures in Romania comes to 20% of banks’ own funds and the same rule is 
in force for the lending to connected parties. In 2001 a liquidity indicator equal 
to the ratio of actual liquidity and prescribed liquidity was introduced as well as 
a regulation limiting open foreign exchange position to 10%. The new loan clas-
siﬁcation regulation was put into force in January 2003 and it was implemented
a provision of 5% for special provisions, 20% for substandard provisions, 50% 
for doubtful provisions and 100% for bad claims. 
Regarding the implementation of BASEL II two departments were created within 
the National Bank of Romania – Banking Supervision and Department for Regula-
tion and Licensing of Banks with clearly deﬁned functions. In 2005 the International
Accounting Standards were fully implemented and the national bank is currently 
working on the implementation of the standardized rating and early warning system 
CAMEL and its adjustment to the peculiarities of the Romanian banking sector.  
The Romanian banks demonstrate their ambition to enlarge the distribution of 
their products and to enlarge the number of their branches. The recent sale 
of BCR, one of the Romanian banks with the most developed branch system, 
biggest client portfolio and highest share in lending, to Erste Bank heighten the 
competition in the Romanian banking sector. 
During the period of 2003-2005 the Romanian economic environment is charac-
terized by stability, decreasing inﬂation, increasing average salaries, increased
business opportunities as well as decrease of ofﬁcial interest rates which was
a signal for the banks that they should turn to operations aiming at providing 
ﬁnance to the real economy. Although, most of the banks work as universal
banks, there can be distinguished some specialization, e.g. Raiffeisen Bank 
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developed an aggressive corporate and retail acquisition strategy, Tiriac Bank 
managed a successful shift from the SMEs focus to a strong retailer, OTP and 
CEC are mostly oriented towards the retail segment while ABN-AMRO Bank’s 
traditional focus is on the corporate segment. Porsche Bank, Raiffeisen Banca 
pentru Locuinte and ProCredit focus mainly on specialized products distributed 
via different channels. Regarding the banking products the changes in the bank-
ing system also put their reﬂection. Romanian banks started to have more real-
istic approach to their customers and they started to offer products and services 
that approaching those on international level with a high degree of diversity. 
Currently, the Romanian banks open accounts in national and foreign currency, 
receive demand and time deposits as well as deposits redeemable at notice, 
grant short-term, medium and long-term loans and credit lines, collect receipts 
and make payments for commercial and non-commercial transactions, receive 
and sell travelers’ cheques and payment documents in foreign currency, perform 
foreign exchange transactions on foreign money markets, discount commercial 
papers, buy and sell securities and bonds, issue and operate debit and credit 
cards, carry out any domestic and foreign banking operations, offer electronic 
banking services and grant technical assistance for its customers. 
In 2002-2003 the number of Internet users in Romania was pretty low, but de-
spite of this a series of services started to be implemented. The introduction by 
some banks in Romania of virtual cards were used for payments on the Internet 
to foreign on-line stores as Taifun card issued by BancPost which has an as-
sociated virtual card– Taifun. Five months since its creation 5,400 cards were is-
sued. Banca Romaneasca started to issue VISA Virtual which was used mainly 
for Internet payments. But due to multiple frauds originated in Romania, at the 
very beginning these cards were sometimes not accepted by the foreign traders. 
The major concern related to these type of payments at their creation was the 
high costs for making transfers as well as the accounting problems. 
Considering the development of e-commerce in Romania we should take into 
account several issues. Since January, 2003 Romania has fully completely 
liberalized electronic communication market which contributes to the wider us-
age of Internet and which is crucial for the development of e-commerce in the 
country. The second step for the development of e-commerce in Romania 
was the acceptance of Electronic Signature Law in 2001 and Electronic Com-
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merce Law in 2002 that allow the creation of legal framework for recognition 
of electronic contracts, the allowance of electronic proof and the acceptance 
of sending electronic documents. The Law of Distance Contracts adopted in 
2000 and the the Electronic Commerce Law provide for the right of withdrawal 
for consumers, the performance of the distance contract within 30 days and 
the protection against fraudulent charges. 
The challenges in establishing an operational electronic commerce regime is 
to identify a payment mechanism that can safely be used on the Internet. The 
development of on-line payment system implies a series of complex problems 
related to security, liability and taxation. The most extended on-line payment in 
Romania are those executed by debit/credit card but even in this area the ﬁgures
impressing although on the market there are about 4 million cards. Debit cards 
prevail in on-line transactions covering 85 % of them, but most of their owners 
use them only to withdraw money from ATMs. Also a large number of cards is 
primarily an effect of the government decision obliging the public institutions 
to pay wages on debit cards. The number of shops accepting payments with 
debit and credit cards is not signiﬁcant. An Ordinance from 2002 obliges the
companies providing public utility services as well as the public institutions col-
lecting taxes, charges, ﬁnes, penalties and other payment obligations to accept
payment also done by means of debit or credit cards. 
Romanian banks invest much in the development of the branch network. Aim-
ing at making the customers’ service more effective banks also invest much 
money in developing the ATM network. There was an increase of 17% in ATM 
network in 2005 compared to 2004 which total number came to 3 737. The 
main challenge that is confronted by the Romanian banks is that they have to 
reach different geographical regions adequately, which means that they have to 
develop channels such as i-banking, m-banking, e-banking. These alternatives 
will make the expansion and operational costs of the banks lower. In last two 
years the Romanian banks started to develop different strategies for distribution 
of their products. ING Bank started the “self-banking” concept in 2004, ABN-
AMRO Bank pioneered the practice of mobile banking agents, Citybank started 
the implementation of CityFinacial by developing a network of retail agencies. 
Cross-selling is currently practiced mainly by banks that are part of ﬁnancial
groups where scale and synergies is much important. 
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The total number of card transactions grew in 2005 by 140% in Romania, 
although the card transactions are mostly linked to salary cash withdrawals 
and less to payments via Internet or ATMs for utility bills. The card penetration 
ratio shows considerable potential for growth in Romania where it is achieved 
the modest 217 cards per 1,000 inhabitants in 2004, which was far from 493, 
the average CEE 3 (Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary), and a very long 
distance from 1,280 for the EU average. In 2005, it increased to 315 cards/ 
1,000 inhabitants, fuelled partly by a rise in the  demand for EUR and USD-
denominated cards116. Credit cards less used compared to debit cards and 
generally, the usage of cards for international transactions is quite limited. 
Co-branded cards have been issued by banks in partnership with retailers as 
telecom companies and oil companies.
In the year of 2004-2005 the greatest growth in the Romanian banking sector 
was related to retail credit lending but in absolute terms the majority of loans 
were to the corporate sector although the higher possibilities for getting proﬁt
from the retail sector. Out of the forty Romanian banks in 2005 23 offer 31 direct 
banking products – 15 banks have Internet banking systems, 14 phone banking 
systems and only 2 GSM banking systems. The Romanian market of on-line 
commerce recorded a signiﬁcant increase after the introduction of a security
payment system through payment cards. This system is called 3D Secure and it 
is used by the Visa and Master card branded cards. Mobile phone owners and 
Internet users can obtain direct information about their banks accounts, execute 
bank transfers and pay phone or utility bills through their mobile phones, Internet 
or ATM. The volume of loans for house purposes and mortgage loans experi-
ence a high increase in the last years. The most important players on the hous-
ing and mortgage credit market are Romanian Commercial Bank and Romanian 
Bank for Development-Societe Generale. 
Up to the year of 2005 the Romanian interbanks clearing system was not work-
ing quite efﬁciently as the clearing took ﬁve working days to be performed. The
lack of real time system makes the interbank payments rather difﬁcult, large
commissions were implied and the banks were rather disadvantaged in accept-
ing cards from other banks in their ATM or POS terminals. The same was valid 
even for the use of Internet payments where additional security and authentica-
116 Romanian Banking Overview, Berger, R. Strategy Consultant.
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tion problems could occur. For the administration of the national payment sys-
tem, starting in 2000, the Romanian Central Bank created the National Society 
for Fund and Clearing Transfer - TransFond where the central bank owns 33% 
of the its shares, and 28 commercial banks own 67% of the shares. The new 
system allows the clearing of amounts below 500 million lei in real time and for 
the rest in maximum 1 working day, thus eliminating the current delays and the 
excessive transaction costs.
The management of the credit risk reﬂects the policy of reducing credit risk as
concentration and big exposures, classiﬁcation of assets and provisions. Banks
should have efﬁcient systems of revision and accounting policy that enables the
Board of Directors to be informed about the implementation of the credit policy 
by observation of credit portfolio which reﬂects the demand of credit on the mar-
ket, business and risk strategy as well as the capacity of banks to grant loans. 
The management of the interest rate risk should be concentrated on obtaining 
as high as possible margin and keeping the proﬁtability and the value of bank
capital as less modiﬁed as possible in cases of unexpected variations of the in-
terest rates. The management of liquidity risk in Romania is associated with the 
estimation of the necessary amount of liquid assets that does not disturb bank’s 
proﬁtability for a deﬁnite period of time.
In the early months of 2005 it was implemented the Electronic Payment Sys-
tem in Romania, which consists of three main components - real time gross 
settlement system (RTGS), automated clearing house (ACH), and government 
securities registration and settlement system (GSRS). By the implementation 
of the new payments system it was achieved reduction in the transaction and 
settlement costs and favorable conditions for connection to the Trans-European 
automated real-time gross settlement express transfer system after the Roma-
nian accession to the EU was created. 
Bulgaria
After the banking crisis in Bulgaria 1996-1997, the Bulgarian banking system 
started to recover very quickly. In 1997 the number of commercial banks fell 
down drastically to 35 compared to 81 in 1992 which was mainly a result of bank 
failures and consolidation. Currently, the number of the banks in Bulgaria comes 
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34 of which 28 fully-licensed commercial banks117 and six branches of foreign 
institutions. As a result of the decrease of the number of the banks there was 
a drop in the number of bank employees and branch network. According to a 
research done in 2001118 there is one branch for 10 850 people compared to the 
EU countries where one branch services 2 150 inhabitants on average which 
means that is a necessity for developing the banks’ branch network in Bulgaria. 
Table 6. Basic Indicators for Bulgaria
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
GDR per capita (in 
USD) 1553 1240 1227 1542 1577 1542 1705 1978 2538 3101 3396
Real GDP Growth 
Rate 37,65% -20,58% -1,64% 24,88% 1,66% -2,70% 7,62% 14,80% 27,60% 21,52% 9,36%
Unemplyment rate 11,08% 12,52% 13,69% 12,16% 15,96% 17,96% 17,88% 16,27% 13,52% 12,16% 10,73%
Inﬂation rate 32,66% 311,57% 547,68% 1,63% 6,96% 11,26% 4,82% 3,81% 5,64% 3,98% 6,45%
Current account 
balance (in million 
EUR)
-198,00 163,70 1 046,30 -28,50 -586,90 -761,40 -855,20 -402,50 -972,30 -1 131,30 -2 530,60
Banks assets (in 
thousands BGN) * * * * 8 223 428 9 773 520 12 220 529 14 557 124 16 362 925 23 901 461 28 626 797
Loans (in 
thousands BGN) 176 790 449 647 1 125 165 1 690 862 2 160 519 2 586 639 3 580 356 5 246 122 7 893 393 11 623 964 15 283 076
Deposits (in 
thousands BGN) 511 309 1 154 756 4 271 493 4 494 295 5 067 771 5 996 326 8 025 180 9 180 562 10 688 648 13 669 706 17 893 518
Number of ATM * * * * 279 420 642 829 1 222 1 753 2 279
Broad money (in 
thousand BGN) 588 429 1 317 429 5 947 515 6 646 713 7 535 621 9 856 616 12 400 512 13 857 326 16 566 457 20 394 366 25 259 580
Source: Bulgarian National Bank, National Statistical Institute, Agency of Employment, BORICA
The Bulgarian banking system is comparatively concentrated. The four main 
banks operating on the Bulgarian market are Bulbank Unicredit Group which 
holds 15,07% of the total assets of the banking system, DSK Bank OTP Group 
which holds 13,62%, United Bulgarian Bank with 9,21% and HVB Bank Bio-
chim with 8,18%119. The branches of foreign banks started to appear in Bul-
garia in 1994-1995 but their functions were very limited. After the economic 
and banking crisis the negative attitude towards the foreign banks changed as 
they were recognized as institutions transferring human capital and resources 
117 In 2005 the BNB revoked the license of International Bank for Commerce and Development, a small Bulgarian bank operating 
on the market since 1990.
118 Banking in CEE, April 2004, extra report.
119 The data are calculated based on banks balance sheets published up to December, 2004 in the Quarterly Bulletin of Com-
mercial Banks.
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as well as IT technology which were crucial for the process of reconstructur-
ing and consolidation of the banking system. As a result of the privatization 
of the state-owned Bulgarian banks, the current Bulgarian banking market is 
prevailed by foreign banks. There are only two small state banks – Encourage-
ment Bank and Municipal Bank which assets account to the end of 2005 to 
2,37% of the total number of assets. 
Currently, the Bulgarian banking products are orientated to the retail segment 
which offers a high potential for growth and wider interest rate margins com-
pared to the corporate sector products. The regulations regarding the electronic 
signature and on-line payments are implemented in Bulgaria for several years. 
However, comparatively low usage of Internet and unsatisfactory quality of com-
munication infrastructure hinter the wide penetration of e-Banking and e-Com-
merce as a whole. In the year of 2003 the number of banks that have implement-
ed e-Banking increased. At present there are about 25 commercial banks that 
are offering at least one form of direct banking e.g. e-Banking, phone banking, 
GSM banking and ATM banking services. ATM banking services are the most 
popular direct banking services in Bulgaria. In 2003 there were 120 000 transac-
tions made via ATM and the total amount of money was about 3,7 million BGN. 
Telephone banking via the electronic system eVoice is less developed. The main 
concerns confronted by the wide spread of e-Banking in Bulgaria are related to 
the high initial costs and security concerns. 
In the period of 1995-1996 Bulgarian state-owned banks were orientated to 
granting loans to loss-making state owned enterprises, urged by the government 
which led to extreme increase in the percentage of non-performing loans in the 
banks loan portfolio. Private banks were also lacking knowledge and experience 
to develop new products and their managers and shareholders used them as a 
possibility to take money for themselves. Household sector was mainly seen as 
provider for deposits but not as a target for being granted consumer loans. After 
the banking crisis started intensive process for privatization and restructuring of 
the banks, which left apart the development of the household credit, debit and 
credit cards. At that time banks orientated their policy to holding foreign deposits 
and to corporate loans. The banks’ afﬁliation to corporate loans can be explained
by the fact that new foreign owners of the banks were much more willing to lend to 
foreign companies that invested in Bulgaria at that period of time. Foreign banks 
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and the appearance of foreign companies on the Bulgarian market was the rea-
son for the quick development of banking products in Bulgaria as the managers 
and employees of these companies expected to get the same range of services 
and products that were offered by the mother banks in their own countries. The 
development of retail products after bank privatization can be also explained by 
the know-how that was gained from the foreign banks, more funds and already 
done distribution of corporate clients on the credit market. As a result of this new 
policy in banks’ marketing corporate lending decreased from 42,71% to 36,98% 
in the period of 2001-2005 and the amount of consumer loans and loans for 
house purchases increased respectively from 10,71% and 2,45% to 15,2% and 
8,06%. Decrease of interest rates and alleviated conditions for getting consumer 
loans and loans for house purchases brought to the signiﬁcant increase in the
loans for house purchases. Currently, the main products offered by commercial 
banks in Bulgaria are working capital ﬁnancing with revolving credit lines and
overdrafts, mid-term and long-term investment ﬁnancing, subsidized credit lines
under contracts with EBRD,  EIB, KfW, State Agricultural Fund and others, de-
posits and current accounts, letters of credit and guarantees, electronic banking, 
treasury products focusing on hedging interest rate and currency risks, Visa and 
Master cards and ATM and POS services. 
By March 1997 the overall size of the banking system had shrunk dramatically 
both in number and in terms of deposits. The adoption of the Law on Banks after 
the introduction of Currency Board Arrangement imposed much stricter require-
ment for the initial capital, capital adequacy, liquidity, accounting, auditing and 
reporting activity as well as the supervision by the BNB. 
During the period of 2000 – 2005 Bulgaria recorded average economic growth 
of 4.9% despite the weak global economy, with growth even accelerating to a 
real 5.6% in 2004. Inﬂation was reduced to single-digit ﬁgures by 2001 with price
stability prevailing since that period. The main current problems are the large 
current account deﬁcit and still high unemployment rate. The credit boom that
started in 2003 led to increase of staff levels and upgrade of the branch network 
in commercial banks. At year-end of 2004 the number of bank employees and 
branches had climbed to some 22 500 and 727 respectively, thus reaching the 
levels of 2001. In 2004 and 2005 there was an increase in bank concentration 
that was due to the acquisition of Hebros Bank by HVB Bank Biochim at the end 
330
of 2004 and the purchase of Eurobank by the Greek Pireus Bank. There was 
also a merger of the operations of the United Bulgarian Bank with those of the 
branch of National Bank of Greece in the second half of 2005. 
Looking at the banking market in 2004-2005 it is obvious the increased risk 
appetites of the banks as well as the improvement of their risk assessment ca-
pabilities which are reﬂected in the loans portfolio maturity structure. In 2004
only 25% of total loans to the private sector were short-term compared to 52.5 
% ten years ago, which reﬂects the increasing conﬁdence of both creditors and
borrowers. The share of foreign currency loans for the private sector climbed to 
47.8 % in 2004 because of the lower interest rates, as well as the banks’ strate-
gies to take debt from abroad in order to reﬁnance credit growth. This tendency
however implies a currency risk, which if it is unhedged, raises the possibility of 
an increase in the level of non-performing loans.
The capital adequacy ratio in 2004 was 16.1 % and it reﬂects the adequate capi-
talization on the sectoral level. As a consequence of the expansive lending policy 
individual banks are already rapidly approaching the ofﬁcial 12 % minimum re-
quirement. This fact should not cast doubt on the general soundness of the bank-
ing market, as the BNB has already responded by tightening capital adequacy 
requirements. In compliance with EU law banks in Bulgaria must also adhere to 
a number of regulations to ensure adequate risk diversiﬁcation. Limits on large
exposures and loans are put to 10 % of a bank’s own funds, exposures to con-
nected parties should not exceed 25 % of the own funds and there is a limit 800 
% on total large exposures. An open foreign exchange position in a single cur-
rency (excluding euro) is limited to 15 % of a bank’s own funds, with the aggregate 
position not to surpass 30 %. According to the loan classiﬁcation and provisioning
scheme, which was tightened in April 2004 by decreasing the number of risk cat-
egories from ﬁve to four and raising provisioning requirements in order to prevent
a deterioration in loan portfolio quality as a result of the credit boom, banks now 
are required to make provisions, based on the duration of default, namely - watch 
exposures by 10 %, substandard by 50 % and non-performing loans by 100 %.
Financial intermediation in Bulgaria currently is still considerably low, despite 
the deepening in recent years, indicating signiﬁcant upward potential. A cau-
tious approach and a preference for low-risk investments eventually gave way to 
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brisk lending activity in the corporate and households segments, driven by sharp 
competition on the banking market, strong economic growth, buoyant invest-
ment activity and robust private consumption. At the same time, the upturn in 
lending resolved the issues of excess liquidity and overcapitalization. Currently, 
the Bulgarian banking system should concentrate on enhancing creditors’ rights, 
improving the legal framework related to insolvency, fully harmonizing the coun-
try’s banking regulations with EU standards with an eye to EU accession in 2007 
and the preparations for Basel II.
A full system for e-payments using Internet banking cards was launched in Bulgaria. 
The system ePay.bg allows credit and debit cards owners to pay for services and 
purchases on the Internet. With the launch of the provision of digital certiﬁcates by
the Bulgarian Industrial Association and the entry into force of the Law on electronic 
document and electronic signature 2001, e-commerce is growing in Bulgaria but not 
with the highest speed by which it was expected when the law was adopted. 
E-banking services in Bulgaria are adapted to different technological tools for 
communication with clients like GSM, phone banking, Internet banking. The e-
signature may be saved and used on various technical carriers as diskettes, 
smart cards, and CDs . Bulgarian banks need to invest in order to apply these 
eservices. The main applications of e-services in banking are related to informa-
tion for the balance and movements on account, status of bank operations, rate 
of exchange, codes of Bulgarian banks, currency transfer, budget transfer, and 
encashment processing. A big percentage of e-payments for Bulgarian citizen 
are payments of public services as central heating, electricity, telephone, GSM. 
In 2001 11 Bulgarian banks uses the system ePay for payments with debit cards 
via Internet and 18 Bulgarian banks offered smart card payments using system 
Borika. Bulgarian citizens use debit cards mainly for cash. In January 2001 they 
used e-banking services via 434 ATM terminals in 81 towns and 1119 POS ter-
minals. Currently, the usage of credit cards is considerably limited. 
The main problems that are confronted by e-services in Bulgaria are related to 
the lack of punitive measures for computer crimes like discovering personal data 
and use them for different purposes, comparatively low computer literacy to the 
average Bulgarian, low quality of Internet access and comparatively high costs 
related to  this services. 
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The issue of real credit cards in Bulgaria happened relatively late – in 2001-2002 
and up to that period of time banks didn’t have any strategies for issuing and 
developing credit cards as they were considered as being a part of the whole 
package that was offered to the corporate clients and their managers. The main 
reasons for a less developed credit card market in Bulgaria in the early years 
of transition were related to the political and economic instability, lack adequate 
legislation, unstable banking system, restructuring of banks after the crisis and 
their preference to hold less riskier assets as foreign deposits and corporate 
loans. The growing economy and income as well as the prospective for the fu-
ture joining in the European Union in 2001 were a prerequisite of the credit card 
market in Bulgaria. The lack of information and relatively low volume of credit 
cards in Bulgaria explains the fact that currently only one bank in Bulgaria uses 
credit scoring for credit cards. 
The increase of retail products in Bulgaria is to high extent due to the fact that 
certain companies were working with certain banks. The possibility for banks to 
estimate the work and the development of the company decreased signiﬁcantly
the uncertainty related to the creditworthiness of their retail clients who were 
working in this company. First banks were issuing credit cards to the managers 
of these companies and then overdrafts and debit cards to the employees who 
after proving their ability to repay their overdrafts were offered credit cards. Also 
in the process of restructuring public ﬁnance, the salaries of employees were
transferred via their debit cards which at ﬁrst did not have a positive attitude
because of the commissions that were applied on the cards and the employees 
often withdrew their salaries at full amount. 
Regarding the development of credit and debit cards in Bulgaria a uniﬁed system
called Borica Ltd. was implemented in 1995 and it was owned 100% by the BNB 
at that period of time and it had a monopole position in cards’ payments. For a 
certain period of time the advantages to have one operator, one clearing house 
and one system of POS and ATM was notable. In 1996-1998 Borica gradually 
joined the networks of Mastercard, Visa and American Express and foreign cards 
became compatible with the POS and ATM. Despite, these efforts the usage of 
credit and debit cards had a slow development. In 1999 there 300 ATM and 500 
POS terminals, mostly concentrated in Soﬁa and less than 300 000 users.
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The Banking Supervision in Bulgaria deﬁnes the risk proﬁle of the banking sys-
tem and that of the individual banks by using the CAMELS and CAEL valua-
tion system. Complex CAMELS ratings are assigned as part of full supervisory 
inspections120 and ratings on four of the components - capital, asset quality, 
earnings and liquidity. CAEL ratings indicate current ﬂuctuations in the ﬁnancial
position and risk proﬁle of individual banks. Early full supervisory inspections are
initiated where serious indications of negative trends emerge. Major risks form-
ing the system’s proﬁle underwent no signiﬁcant changes in 2005. The system
retained its ﬁnancial indicators involving good asset quality, good current proﬁt-
ability, capital position adequate to the risk in operations and stable liquidity lev-
els. With a few exceptions, these indicators are typical for most Bulgarian banks.
Even in the cases of increased risk appetite, good capital position and liquidity 
levels are retained. At the same time, negative trends in credit risk of individual 
loans intensiﬁed further in the second semester of 2005.This reﬂected the direct
correlation between the risk and the aggressive behaviour of several systemati-
cally important banks aimed at preserving and expanding market positions in 
particular market niches as household loans and bank cards.
In terms of harmonizing the Bulgarian banking legislation with the EU legisla-
tion, the implementation of the future directives and adoption of the New Capital 
Accord of the Basel Committee is a medium-term objective confronted by the 
Bulgarian National bank and commercial banks in Bulgaria. In 2005 the BNB 
continued training bank supervision experts in the content of the New Capital 
Accord, carried out current analyses on the results of implementation of the 
new standards, started to prepare legal and regulatory texts regarding the legal 
framework for the implementation of the New Capital Accord, continued adjust-
ing the supervisory reporting systems and prepared commercial banks to design 
programs for staff, technical and procedural support for the implementation of 
the New Basel Accord.
Another important task confronted by the Banking supervision in Bulgaria is the 
maintenance of a high degree of banking system stability adequate to the in-
creasing bank intermediation and free competition with EU credit institutions. The 
efforts are concentrated in accomplishing several major tasks, e.g. effective su-
pervision over commercial bank lending activities and improvement of the meth-
120 Supervisory inspections are done at every 12 to 18 months.
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odology and techniques of the Early Warning System. The Bulgarian legislation 
was brought fully in line with the EU Directives on the capital adequacy of banks. 
In December 2004 the Governing Council of the BNB approved a new Regulation 
N 8 on the capital adequacy of banks, which was put into effect in July 2005. The 
changes in measuring and reporting banks’ capital adequacy with regard to mar-
ket risks are orientated towards banks which form considerable trading portfolios 
of ﬁnancial instruments intended for trade. The new Regulation N 8 on the capital
adequacy of banks will make possible the more accurate measurement and re-
porting of the risks arising from bank activities and the need of capital charges for 
these risks, while keeping the current credit risk capital requirements. As regards 
credit risk, the current risk weights remain valid, and an additional restriction is 
introduced for mortgage loans which are treated with 50% risk weight, i.e. the 
loan amount must not exceed 70% of the value of mortgage. 
Conclusions 
Generally, the banking sector in Albania, Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, Romania 
and Bulgaria is characterized by a high share of foreign owned banks, but their 
contribution in the total growth of output is considerably modest. The banks tend 
more to ﬁnance consumption rather than investments. Regarding the bank sec-
tor the above mentioned countries can be separated into two groups – acceding 
countries (Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria) and countries that are not going to 
join the European Union in the near future. 
The banking sector in Albania, Macedonia and Serbia started to be privatized 
considerably late, there is necessity for further development of banking services 
and products, the information systems of the banks need to be modernized (but 
much efforts are directed in this ﬁeld) and the Basel II requirements are on their
way of being implemented. Privatization of the state-owned banks in Albania 
started in the late 1997 and as a consequence of it a number of new products 
and services, e.g. ATMs, credit cards, deposits certiﬁcates, consumer credit and
forward contracts were implemented. After 1997 there was a quick increase in 
the branch network of banks and improvement of information and communica-
tion technology. Despite, the high level of capital adequacy of the banking sys-
tem in Albania there exist a possibility for currency risk due to the huge amount 
335
of bank transactions that are performed in foreign currency and for that reason 
some measures should be taken in this direction. Similar to Albania the year of 
1997 was also crucial for Macedonia when the banking system confronted the 
problems of capital increase and system modernization. The challenges for the 
banking system were related to the bad quality of assets, high credit concen-
tration to one client and inadequate loan provisions. A negative effect for the 
business climate of the country had the strong external shocks that the country 
survived in 1999 due to the crisis in Serbia and the deteriorated security in the 
country in 2001 which increased the credit and liquidity risks and stopped the 
deposit growth. Although, Serbia started the transition from much more market 
orientated economy, the conﬂicts which she went through had a very negative
effect on its ﬁnancial system. With the government change of 2000 the reforms
in the banking system started. The country made some positive changed to 
strengthening the criteria for classiﬁcation of assets, increasing the capital ade-
quacy of the banking system which was very low in 2000 as well as decrease the 
amount of bad assets in the banks’ portfolios and low interest bearing deposits.
The group of acceding countries also showed some similarities in the develop-
ment of the banking sector but also a number of differences were evident. In the 
period of 1998-2000 Croatia survived a bank crisis which was accompanied by 
a number of bankruptcy procedures, lending of last resort and rehabilitation of 
several banks. The crisis urged the privatization and the penetration of foreign 
banks in the country. The foreign banks brought new working methods, tech-
nology, knowledge and experience but this caused large technical efﬁciency
asymmetry among the banks. The problems that the Croatian banking system 
confronts are related the implementation of Basel II, internal rating of the clients 
and operational risk monitoring and the related changes in the IT systems. Ro-
mania survived ﬁnancial crisis a bit earlier than Croatia (1997-1999) and after the
crisis the major state owned Romanian banks were privatized and strict regula-
tory framework in compliance with EU Directives and Basel II started to be im-
plemented. This led to strengthening the macroeconomic stability of the country 
and development of new bank services and products. Bulgarian banking crisis 
happened earlier that the crisis in Croatia and Romania but its consequencies 
were much more severe and led to the implementation of the Currency Board 
Arrangements. As a result state owned banks were privatized, despite the low 
pace of the process and new products and services and IT improvements were 
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made. After the year of 2003 the risk appetites by the banks increased but the 
risk assessment that was applied by them was improved.
Despite, the differences in the stage of development of the banking sector in Al-
bania, Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria there are some simi-
larities related to the banking concentration and consolidation resulting from the 
stronger bank competition and credit expansion in the period of 2003-2005 es-
pecially in the retail business. The credit expansion in these countries should not 
cause anxiety as this market is underdeveloped but as much as the credit boom 
is accompanied by careful risk assessment. The major problems that banks 
in these countries confront are related to the future implementation of Basel 
II, improvement of the IT systems and their level of security, diversity of banks 
products and services compared to the EU countries and improvement of the 
applied management techniques. Although, much in this ﬁeld was done after the
banks’ privatization by the foreign banks, there is still much to be done in order 
to achieve banking sector comparable to that existing in the EU countries. 
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Credit Portfolio Management: 
The Case of Albania, FYR Macedonia and Serbia
Kalin Marinov 121
Introduction
Countries in South Eastern Europe122 became major recipients of ﬁnancial sector
foreign direct investment (FSFDI), when the privatization of their banking sys-
tems and preparations for EU membership took place in the second half of the 
1990s. In some instances the unsatisfactory results of early domestic privatiza-
tion schemes led the authorities to rely on foreign resources to recapitalize their 
banking sector and permit foreign ownership. While the beneﬁts of heightened
ﬁnancial sector efﬁciency and better risk management are widely acknowledged,
foreign ownership poses challenges for host countries due to the migration of 
decision-making and the incongruence of the organizational structures of foreign-
owned banks as well as the pulling the trigger of massive credit expansion. Such 
circumstances may lead to a particular instability in the local banking systems. 
Foreign-owned banks in Albania and Macedonia are already the major players in 
the ﬁnancial sectors of the two states. On the other hand, in Serbia the govern-
ment is still an owner of around 50% of the commercial banks`  assets.
Credit Expansion – Current Trends
Credit risk is the most important type of risk for banks. Although the type of products 
banks offer change continuously, they generally include a credit risk component. 
Tools and techniques used for measuring and managing credit risk have also been 
improved by the entering of FSFDI. Because of its importance, credit risk is the ﬁrst
type of risk that is subject to strict regulatory oversight. Backed by extensive policy 
debate, the approach for regulation and supervision of credit risk has also evolved. 
Especially, after the issuance of Basel II on 2004 (BCBS 2004) the debate on credit 
risk has accelerated. The second pillar of Basel II requires performing stress tests 
121 Author thanks  Ms. Monika Panayotova for her dedicated research assistance.
122 In this paper as SEE states will be included: Bulgaria, Serbia, Croatia, Romania, Albania, and FYR Macedonia
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for different risk types. Therefore, after the issuance of Basel II, one of the main ar-
eas that regulators focus is stress testing. Additionally, the initiation of the Financial 
Sector Assessment Programs (FSAP) by the IMF and World Bank to identify the 
vulnerabilities in the ﬁnancial systems of their member countries.
The factors leading to the appearance of fundamentally unjustiﬁed credit booms
can be divided according to whether they facilitate the “excessive ” growth of 
banks ’ supply of loans or the demand for loans by the private sector. On the 
supply side, deregulation accompanied by reduction in banks ’ reserve require-
ments and poorly regulated capital account liberalisation as well as the sharp 
increase of capital inﬂows due to external factors (e.g.low international interest
rates) could lead to excessive credit expansion.
From the perspective of banks ’ behaviour increasing competition among banks 
could also contribute to a credit boom. Intense competition causes the narrowing 
of margins and banks try to counterbalance this negative impact on proﬁtability
by increasing the volume of loans. This could lead to excessive credit expansion 
if sharper competition is coupled with a signiﬁcant increase in banks ’ willingness
to take risks. An excessive growth in the private sector ’s credit demand can be 
caused by positive shocks (related to technology,etc.) if the output elasticity of 
credit demand is strongly pro-cyclical. Excessively optimistic expectations relat-
ing to economic prospects could strengthen both credit demand and supply.
Empirical studies of credit growth focus more on the identiﬁcation of the boom
component: trying to distinguish between equilibrium movements in credit (trend 
deepening and normal cyclical pattern) and a potentially risky credit boom (ex-
cessive growth of credit demand and/or supply). It is especially challenging in 
the case of transition economies, where credit ratios have grown from very low 
levels. The main problem is that relying solely on past observations of credit 
stock in catching-up countries can lead to misleading results as in these cases a 
low level of equilibrium is estimated and credit boom at the end of the sample is 
detected. Some methods cannot take into consideration the adjustment process 
through which a faster-than-average credit growth may be justiﬁed.
One of the important variables to consider for the estimation is the credit aggre-
gateq resulting in credit growth rate. Domestic private sector credit in an open 
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economy can be grouped both by the origin of the loan (foreign vs.domestic banks) 
and by currency. In the economy-wide aggregate estimation, thus excluding direct 
borrowing from foreign banks. In case of the sectoral estimations, we use national 
accounts, where foreign loans are also included. It is important to emphasize that 
both domestic-and foreign-currency loans are included in the credit aggregate.
In theory the potential for credit risk diversiﬁcation for banks can be considerable.
Insofar as different industries or sectors are more or less pro-cyclical, banks can 
alter their lending policy and capital allocation across those sectors. Similarly, in-
ternationally active banks are able to apply analogous changes across countries. 
In addition to such passive credit portfolio management, ﬁnancial engineering,
using instruments such as credit derivatives, enables banks (and other ﬁnancial
institutions) to engage in active credit portfolio management by buying and selling 
credit risk (or credit protection) across sectors and countries. It is also widely con-
sidered that global market for credit exposures can export or import credit risk.
Key Risks Associated with Credit Growth
The speed and depth of foreign bank entry has potentially important implications for 
ﬁnancial and macroeconomic stability in recipient countries, and arguments have
been made in both directions. On the one hand, it has been argued that foreign 
banks could play a stabilizing role on the supply of credit and deposits through up-
stream ﬁnancing from their mother companies and reputation effects, particularly
during periods of ﬁnancial distress. On the other, foreign banks might be quick to pull
out from emerging markets and could transmit external shocks into host countries.
The results indicate that domestic and foreign banks behave roughly similarly along 
the dimensions considered, providing only weak support to the existence of sup-
ply-side effects in credit markets. In particular, loan and deposit growth are highly 
sensitive to economic activity, in a manner that does not differ signiﬁcantly across
domestic and foreign banks. At the same time, periods of tighter monetary condi-
tions are associated with lower loan and deposit growth, with foreign banks display-
ing a somewhat lower sensitivity. This ﬁnding is driven by banks with relatively less
liquid assets and/or lower capitalization, suggesting that it is not entirely attributable 
to potential differences in the characteristics of the borrowers and depositors of for-
eign banks. The results also show slight differences in the cross-sectional behavior 
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of interest rates. Lending and deposit rates of foreign banks tend to react less dur-
ing periods of ﬁnancial distress. Taken together, these results indicate that foreign
bank participation in emerging economies has not lead to increased instability in 
credit markets, and may have even played a beneﬁcial effect.
There are two aspects of credit growth worth mentioning. The ﬁrst one is the
speed of credit growth. This aspect may contain two major types of risk:
● Credit (from inappropriate loan assessments, strain on ability to monitor 
and assess risks)
● Macro risks
The second one concerns the main providers of credit (foreign versus 
domestic banks, etc.)
● Credit risk (from aggressive lending strategies)
● Macro risks
The third one concentrates on the main borrowers (households, corporate 
sector, etc.)
● Credit risk (greater sensitivity of repayment capacity of corporate loans 
to the economic situation, that of consumer loans to collateral values)
● Macro risks (likely impact of loans on the current account)
● Market risks (sensitivity to economic activity and price changes)
The fourth aspect envisages the sectoral loan concentration/composition of 
credit (mortgages, durable consumer goods, investments, etc.)
● Credit risk (from concentration, collateral values for mortgages, etc.)
● Macro risks (impact on the current account in the case of consumer/in-
vestment loans, etc.)
● Market risks (e.g., sensitivity to real estate prices)
The ﬁfth covers the currency composition of loans: direct (through banks’ net 
open positions) and indirect (via borrowers’) exposure to foreign exchange risk. 
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The maturity of loans can be viewed as the sixth aspect: maturity/liquidity risks 
(longer-term loans ﬁnanced through shorter-term borrowing by banks).
The seventh aspect can be considered the sources of credit:
 Foreign exchange risk (loans funded by bank borrowing)
● Maturity risks (when liabilities short-term, assets longer term)
● Macro risks (from exposure to market sentiment)
Characteristic of the Banking Sector’s Credit Activity (Serbia)123
The national defense and maintaining the country’s economic stability were the 
main targets of the monetary policy in the wartime (1999). Therefore, banks were 
obliged to channel their credits primarily into these purposes. The recovery and 
reconstruction of the state were the main priority in the post-war period, so that 
the adopted supplements to the Law on the National Bank of Yugoslavia (NBS) 
and the amendments and supplements to the Law on Banks and Other Finan-
cial Organizations, authorized the NBY (NBS), exceptionally in 1999, to limit the 
volume and growth rate of bank lending, to prescribe the obligation of channeling 
bank credits, as well as to prescribe the highest and lowest interest rates of bank. 
Banks were obliged to collect on the due date at least 50% of the Dinar credits 
granted and disbursed before March 30, 1999, for the purposes other than those 
speciﬁed in the Decision on the Obligatory Channeling of Dinar Bank Credits in
1999 and to channel these funds to the purposes prescribed by the Decision.124
The changes that took place in October, 2000, affected both the banking sys-
tem and the credit activity of banks. The credit activity of the NBY (NBS) was 
stopped, primarily lending to the government, and banks were recommended to 
do the same125. This policy deﬁnes more clearly the two level banking system
in the state which fully separates the NBY from the commercial banks. It also 
strengthened the regulatory and supervision function of the NBY.
In the course of 2001, with the consent of the governor, the activities of the Super-
vision Division in the Central Bank were oriented at setting-up of a Central Credit 
123 See Annex Table 1
124 National Bank of Yugoslavia – Annual Report 1999 – currently National Bank of Serbia
125 National Bank of Yugoslavia – Annual Report 2000 – currently National Bank of Serbia
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Registry, and/or preparation of regulations (Decision and Instruction), as well as 
to the organizational and technical equipment for the performance of these tasks. 
Namely, the basic function of a central credit registry is to offer to banks and other 
ﬁnancial organizations additional information about the indebtedness of certain
economic entities, which they would use on the occasion of deciding about a credit 
to such entities, and which could have an impact on the lowering of credit and mar-
ket risks in their operation, and/or on the quality of assets and the level of capital.
In the recent years the fragile ﬁnancial stability in the state is seriously threatened
by the credit growth. There is clear tendency for the foreign-owned banks to have 
a predominant share in their credit portfolio in euro. However, the earnings of 
most borrowers are in Dinar. This combination leaves borrowers, and indirectly the 
banks, vulnerable to an unexpected depreciation. Further, the NPLs of the foreign 
banks seem to be on an upward trend. A decline in the proﬁtability of foreign banks
striving to gain market share, coupled with an adverse shock—especially a de-
preciation, could ultimately result in a credit crunch. Separately, the weak balance 
sheets and poor governance of the remaining large state-controlled banks leaves 
them vulnerable in the run up to their privatization. Credit growth is being driven 
by high demand from a low base and by the foreign banks’ quest to gain market 
share. Credit demand is driven by strong real growth and the still low level of bank 
intermediation. Banks are ﬁnancing credit from steady increases in euro-denomi-
nated deposits, reﬂecting improved conﬁdence in the banking system, as well as
borrowings from headquarters of foreign banks. Foreign banks with relatively easy 
access to capital and experience in the region have ambitious plans for expansion 
in the context of high interest rate margins and the potential for further growth. 
Rapid credit growth from a low base is in line with that of other Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries. Overall, banks have a healthy amount of capital but 
NPLs seem to have been on the rise during 2003-2005 period.
Table 1: NPLs to Total Loans
2003 2004 2005
State-controlled banks 32.1 39.9 32.9
Domestic banks 17.8 25.2 48.5
Foreign-owned banks 3.9 5.9 10.7
Total 24.1 22.3 19.8
Source: National Bank of Serbia
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Tendencies
The following tendencies can be discovered: 
● The state-controlled banks are operating on non-market principle. Most 
of them are already or will be soon in a procedure of privatization or 
merger. This is a prerequisite for low ﬁnancial results and poor level of
control of credit lending.
● The competition for market share with foreign-owned banks forces the 
domestic commercial banks to be more aggressive in the providing of 
loans to their clients. The rising of NPLs`  share in this group is the most 
signiﬁcant since the domestic banks usually do not have such a strong
ﬁnancial background as the foreign-owned.
● The rapacious approach of foreign-owned banks also provides growing 
share of NPLs. But in contrast with domestic commercial banks this 
almost certainly will not be dangerous for their survival since their head-
quarters are their backbones.
Implementing Regression Model
The Regression Model is used to estimate Credit Growth (CG) using data over 
the period 2000 – 2006. 
Table 1.1 Basic banking system indexes and economic indicators in Serbia (1999-2006)
Year Asset shareof foreign-owned banks Credit growth (%) ROA ROE GDP growth (%)
1999 0.4 N.a. N.a N.a. -23.2
2000 0.5 15.5 -6.2 -2.7 5.2
2001 13.2 18.26 -3.6 2.2 5.1
2002 27 -65.19 -8.7 -60.6 4.5
2003 38.4 32.90 -0.3 -1.2 2.4
2004 34.7 46.58 -1 -5.3 9.3
2005 49.6 52.12 1 -3.2 6.8
2006 60.1 16.67 1.3 1.1126 5.8
Source: National Bank of Serbia, International Monetary Fund, EBRD
126 Provisional data
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Asset Share of 
foreign-owned 
banks (%)
ROE ROA GDP growth (%)
Credit growth 
(%)
 Mean  32.35714 -9.957143 -2.500000  5.585714  14.49143
 Median  37.70000 -2.700000 -1.000000  5.200000  18.26000
 Maximum  60.10000  2.200000  1.300000  9.300000  52.12000
 Minimum  0.500000 -60.60000 -8.700000  2.400000 -65.19000
 Std. Dev.  20.58566  22.47761  3.810512  2.122442  39.49610
 Skewness -0.261314 -1.985752 -0.580915  0.362624 -1.216273
 Kurtosis  2.001410  5.046912  1.893972  2.845524  3.478656
 Jarque-Bera  0.370510  5.822453  0.750501  0.160372  1.792699
 Probability  0.830892  0.054409  0.687117  0.922944  0.408057
 Observations 7 7 7 7 7
Author’s calculations
Correlation Matrix
Asset share of 
foreign-owned 
banks (%)
ROE ROA GDP growth (%) Credit growth (%)
Asset share of for-
eign-owned banks 
(%)
1.000000 0.111041 0.763282 0.209367 0.370022
ROE 0.111041 1.000000 0.711568 0.161590 0.857134
ROA 0.763282 0.711568 1.000000 0.253887 0.854636
GDP growth (%) 0.209367 0.161590 0.253887 1.000000 0.391539
Credit growth (%) 0.370022 0.857134 0.854636 0.391539 1.000000
Author’s calculations 
l o g ( C G t)  =  R O A t +  R O E t +  G D P g r t +  d l o g ( AS H t) ,
where CG – Credit Growth; GDPgr – growth; ASH – Asset Share of foreign-owned banks (%) 
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Variable Coefﬁcient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
ROE -0.390741 0.765900 -0.510172 0.6997
ROA 0.775507 1.305268 0.594136 0.6587
DLOG(Asset share of foreign-owned banks) 1.599425 2.395071 0.667799 0.6252
GDP growth 0.295032 0.400597 0.736482 0.5959
Author’s calculations 
Foreign banks are providing important beneﬁts to the Serbian banking sector by:
● Attracting funds from households who may be reluctant to deposit with 
domestic banks after the foreign exchange deposit freeze and pyramid 
schemes of the 1990s;
● Providing new sources of funding for domestic credit growth via capital 
and ﬁnancing from headquarters;
● Introducing new ﬁnancial products and credit instruments;
● Reducing the inﬂuence of vested interests;
● Enhancing competition by buying state banks and increasing the number 
of players (bank interest margins are declining in Serbia).
Foreign banks also change the proﬁle of shocks to which the banking system is
vulnerable.
The foreign banks in principle have easy access to capital because they account 
for a small share of the assets of their entire group. Still, the following adverse 
shocks could lead to lower proﬁtability, less willingness on the part of the bank-
ing group to provide capital, and, ultimately, generate a credit crunch:
External shocks
● A rise in funding costs from higher eurozone interest rates.
● An adverse shock to one or more of the countries of origin of the foreign 
banks.
● Contagion from an adverse shock elsewhere in the CEE region, which 
could lead to a deterioration of investor perceptions regarding Serbia.
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Domestic shocks
● Declining margins from foreign banks ﬁghting to gain market share.
● A ﬂight to quality induced by a weakening economy or an unexpected
domestic political event.
Measures to Slow Credit Growth
A package of measures are applied to slow the credit growth:
● Tightening of monetary policy by raising the required reserve ratio on 
all dinar and enterprise FX deposits by 3 percentage points to 21% 
and stepping up open market operations (August 2004) as a result of 
a strong growth in bank credit to non-government sector (25.8% real 
growth year on year in July 2004).
● Introduced new guidelines on commercial bank consumer lending 
(maximum 30 percent monthly payment to net income ratio and a mini-
mum 20 percent down payment to loan ratio) (December 2004).
● Increasing the capital adequacy ratio to 10 percent (effective March 2005) 
and broadened the reservable base to include commercial banks' foreign 
borrowing (effective January 2005). Speciﬁcally, the reservable base now
includes the stock of all foreign borrowing with a maturity of up to 4 years 
and all new foreign borrowing independent if the maturity. In addition, they 
are currently preparing a regulation on monitoring and managing credit 
risk resulting from borrowers' exposure to exchange rate risk.
● Eliminated remuneration on required reserves on enterprises’ foreign 
currency deposits (June 2005).
● Uniﬁed SRRs on enterprises and household foreign currency deposits
in banks and commercial banks’ foreign borrowing at 38 percent127. This 
uniﬁcation at the level of 38 percent implies some overall tightening
compared to the previous SRRs.
● Broadened the reservable base to include commercial banks' foreign 
127 Previously, the effective SRR on households’ foreign currency deposits had been 47 percent, the SRR on enterprise deposits 
had been 14 percent and commercial bank foreign borrowing was not subject to SRRs.
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borrowing. This measure was effective on January 1, 2005 for all new 
borrowing, while the entire stock of banks’ foreign borrowing was includ-
ed in three steps during the period September 2005–November 2005.
● Taken over the authority for regulating and supervising the leasing in-
dustry (September 2005) and subjected leasing companies to a 10 per-
cent reserve requirement on foreign borrowing (February 2006).
● Obliged banks to make clear in their advertising the denomination of 
loan payments (December 2005).
Characteristic of the Banking Sector128
Albania
While the Albanian banking sector has demonstrated relatively good perform-
ance in recent years, with high levels of earnings and capitalization and a low 
level of classiﬁed or non-performing assets, accelerating credit growth may be-
come a drag on performance in the future. With the removal of bad loans from 
state banks, aggregate NPL ratios have declined substantially over the years 
from over 33 percent in 2000 to less than 5 percent, with about half of bad loans 
concentrated in one lender. The three largest lending banks, which account for 
about half of the loan market, have sustained good loan quality.
Most banks in Albania were expecting that the entrance of Raiffeisen Bank129 
will put downward pressure on lending spreads as banks attempt to compete 
for borrowers. Admittedly, from the customers’ view, increased competition will 
mean lower fees and borrowing costs and, in principle, a more efﬁcient banking
sector. However, if a spurt in credit growth were associated with lower lending 
standards it could lead to higher non-performing loans and a consequent effect 
on proﬁtability. Following the privatization of Savings Bank, ﬁnancial deepening
in Albania began to take hold. The degree of competition increased, and credit 
to the private sector accelerated markedly—growing by 67 percent in the year 
to April 2006, an increase of 6.1 percent of GDP. Growth of lending to both the 
corporate sector and households was high during this period, with growth of 
128 See Annex Table 2
129 Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG (RZB) and the Albanian Government signed the ﬁrst closing regarding the purchase of
Banka e Kursimeve e Shqipërisë (BK), the Savings Bank of Albania, on 15 April 2004 in Tirana. RZB won a tender and then received all 
necessary approvals from the Austrian and Albanian authorities. The purchase price is USD 126 million for a 100 per cent share in BK.
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domestic currency lending—historically less important in Albania —particularly 
rapid at 109 percent. The stock of credit reached almost 17 percent of GDP at 
end-April 2006, up from 9 percent at the beginning of 2005.
The structure of lending is changing. Credit to individuals is gaining market share 
over credit to ﬁrms, while the share of lek-denominated lending and the average
maturity of loans are both increasing. Corporate lending still accounts for the 
bulk of private sector credit, but loans to households are grow at a faster pace. 
As the corporate sector has been actively approached by commercial banks in 
the past, new creditworthy borrowers are expected to emerge more gradually. 
Many banks are therefore now marketing more aggressively toward the retail 
market. Households have access to salary overdrafts (equivalent to a multiple 
of monthly salary if the salary is deposited in the bank), consumer loans (up to 
around Euro 5,000), and mortgages.
The traditional preference for foreign exchange denominated credit is diminish-
ing. The degree of dollarization/euroization of the banking system has tradition-
ally been moderately high, but asset dollarization is now on a downward trend. 
Sustained macroeconomic stability over the last years, combined with low Euro 
and dollar interest rates, have resulted in relatively low and stable inﬂation, which
brought down domestic interest rates as risk premiums declined. At the same 
time, banks are ﬂush with lek deposits, and are eager to seek appropriate hedg-
es for their clients, matching lek income to lek loans. As a consequence, loans 
that were historically predominantly in foreign currency, are now increasingly. At 
end-March 2006, foreign exchange denominated loans constituted 73 percent 
of total loans, down from 79 percent at end-2004.
Implementing Regression Model
The Regression Model is used to estimate Credit Growth (CG) using data over 
the period 2000 – 2006. 
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Table 2.1 Basic banking system indexes and economic indicators in Albania (1998-2005)
Year
Asset share of 
foreign-owned 
banks(%)
Credit growth 
(%) ROA GDP growth (%) ROE
1998 5.6 -10.9 -1.7 7.9 -77.6
1999 18.9 11.3 0.6 8.9 15.7
2000 35.2 33.9 2.1 7.7 20.6
2001 40.8 38.9 1.5 6.5 21.6
2002 45.9 25.6 1.2 4.7 19.2
2003 47.1 23 1.24 6.0 19.5
2004 52.1 28.5 1.28 6.0 21.1
2005 58.3 30.1 1.4 5.5 22.5
Source: National Bank of Albania, International Monetary Fund, EBRD
Asset share of 
foreign-owned 
banks (%)
ROE ROA GDP growth (%)
Credit growth 
(%)
 Mean  37.98750  7.825000  0.952500  6.650000  22.55000
 Median  43.35000  20.05000  1.260000  6.250000  27.05000
 Maximum  58.30000  22.50000  2.100000  8.900000  38.90000
 Minimum  5.600000 -77.60000 -1.700000  4.700000 -10.90000
 Std. Dev.  17.67310  34.57843  1.148163  1.400000  15.78209
 Skewness -0.788031 -2.251908 -1.701903  0.279005 -1.256789
 Kurtosis  2.433158  6.101998  4.829138  1.948650  3.580706
 Jarque-Bera  0.935094  9.968915  4.977215  0.472237  2.218433
 Probability  0.626537  0.006843  0.083025  0.789687  0.329817
 Observations 8 8 8 8 8
Author’s calculations
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Correlation Matrix
Asset share of 
foreign-owned 
banks (%)
ROE ROA GDP growth (%)
Credit growth 
(%)
Asset share of 
foreign-owned 
banks (%)
 1.000000  0.771746  0.769264 -0.812171  0.808227
ROE  0.771746  1.000000  0.946709 -0.392453  0.881881
ROA  0.769264  0.946709  1.000000 -0.389531  0.952982
GDP growth (%) -0.812171 -0.392453 -0.389531  1.000000 -0.494296
Credit growth (%)  0.808227  0.881881  0.952982 -0.494296  1.000000
Author’s calculations
log(CGt) = ROAt + ROEt + GDPgrt + dlog(ASHt),
where CG – Credit Growth; GDPgr – growth; ASH – Asset Share of foreign-owned banks (%)
Variable Coefﬁcient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
ROE 0.131190 0.034148 3.841833 0.0311
ROA 0.289005 0.197042 1.466715 0.2387
GDP growth 0.044936 0.121480 0.369907 0.7360
DLOG(Asset share of 
foreign-owned banks) -0.171570 0.502286 -0.341579 0.7552
Author’s calculations 
Characteristic of the Banking Sector’s Credit Activity130
(FYR Macedonia)
In 2000, the credit activity of the banks in the Macedonia registered trend of stabil-
ity. Due to the political and security crisis in the country, in 2001 the banks refrained 
from extending credits. Although the political and security and economic situation 
in the country in the last quarter of the year gradually normalized, the banks, how-
ever, continued to restrain from making new loans, up until the end of 2001.
In 2003, the degree of rigidity of the banks`  interest rate policy gradually miti-
gated. It was a result of the effect of several factors:
130 See Annex Table 3
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● Lower risk – lower credit risk;
● High level of liquidity in the banking system;
● Further increase in the banks`  deposit potential;
● Change in the monetary policy design;
● Larger competition among banks;
● Developments on the Money Market.
The comparison of the position as of December 31, 2004 and that as of De-
cember 31, 2003 shows that the increase in the lending activity of banks implies 
certain movements in the structure of the total assets of the banks in the Mac-
edonia. Such movements primarily pertain to the fact that the loans to the non-
ﬁnancial entities became dominant category, instead of the placements to other
banks, which was registered as early as in the ﬁrst half of 2004.
During 2004, banks`  lending activity intensiﬁed, which was primarily generated
by the expanded deposit potential, improved creditworthiness of clients, broad-
ened range loans, reduces price of loans, as well as the liberalization of the 
foreign exchange operations.
In 2005, the lending activity of banks shows substantial growth rates. The amount 
of gross-credits increased in 2005 by 19.9% compared to 2004. The share of 
bank loans to non- ﬁnancial institutions in total loans reached 84.3% in 2005,
mainly due to the increase of bank loans granted by the large banks group, tak-
ing 25.4% of total loans. The group of medium-size banks is presented with the 
smallest share (11.6%) in total loans, but shows a faster growth rate of credits 
(40.5%) and thus contributing to the increase of total loans by 20.0%. Consider-
ably low is the contribution of the group of small-size banks to the increase of 
total loans (3.1%) in 2005, to some extent because of changes in the content of 
the group of these banks. 
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Implementing Regression Model
The Regression Model is used to estimate Credit Growth (CG) using data over 
the period 2000 – 2006. 
Table 1.1 Basic banking system indexes and economic indicators in Macedonia (1998-2005)
Year Asset share of foreign-owned banks
Credit growth 
(%) ROA
GDP growth 
(%) ROE
1998 4.3 -15.3 2 3.6 -3.5
1999 11.5 -9.8 0.8 4.1 -1.2
2000 53.4 -9 0.8 4.5 3.8
2001 51.1 -7.3 -0.66 -4.5 -3.24
2002 44 2.3 0.4 0.7 2.06
2003 47 14 0.5 2.0 2.3
2004 47.3 24 1.1 4.1 6.2
2005 51.3 18.1 1.3 4.0 8.1
Source: National Bank of Albania, International Monetary Fund, EBRD
SH ROE ROA GDP CG
 Mean  38.73750  1.815000  0.655000  2.312500  2.750000
 Median  47.15000  2.180000  0.800000  3.800000 -2.500000
 Maximum  53.40000  8.100000  1.300000  4.500000  24.00000
 Minimum  4.300000 -3.500000 -0.660000 -4.500000 -10.30000
 Std. Dev.  19.35657  4.240239  0.608675  3.042291  14.04493
 Skewness -1.109451  0.067726 -1.280397 -1.581348  0.429957
 Kurtosis  2.398260  1.757194  3.832886  4.221184  1.504271
 Jarque-Bera  1.761872  0.520971  2.417120  3.831311  0.992218
 Probability  0.414395  0.770677  0.298627  0.147245  0.608895
 Observations 8 8 8 8 8
Author’s calculations 
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Correlation Matrix
Asset share of 
foreign-owned 
banks (%)
ROE ROA GDP growth (%)
Credit 
growth (%)
Asset share of for-
eign-owned banks 
(%)
 1.000000  0.615397 -0.250633 -0.290462  0.504503
ROE  0.615397  1.000000  0.582946  0.492186  0.790833
ROA -0.250633  0.582946  1.000000  0.950636  0.382978
GDP growth (%) -0.290462  0.492186  0.950636  1.000000  0.216064
Credit growth (%)  0.504503  0.790833  0.382978  0.216064  1.000000
Author’s calculations 
log(CGt) = ROAt + ROEt + GDPgrt + dlog(ASHt),
where CG – Credit Growth; GDPgr – growth; ASH – Asset Share of foreign-owned banks (%)
Variable Coefﬁcient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
ROE -1.654883 0.080357 -20.59425 0.0309
GDP growth 2.145321 0.532498 15.12597 0.0675
ROA 12.23704 0.468033 26.14570 0.0243
DLOG(Asset share of 
foreign-owned banks) 4.524039 0.399258 11.33111 0.0560
Author’s calculations 
Conclusions
Rapid growth in credit to the private sector continues to be a key challenge for 
most of the SEE (especially for Serbia, Albania and Macedonia) countries. The 
rapid pace of credit expansion in these countries, generally from a low base, 
is driven by a “catching up” process. It is supported by an upward revision in 
income expectations due to improving economic prospects, often related to the 
prospect of EU accession. On the supply side, foreign ﬁnancial institutions enter-
ing these markets with the objective of rapidly gaining market share have often 
facilitated funding the rapid expansion of credit. 
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For these foreign institutions, the exposure to any particular country is often still 
limited. All this, however, does not mean that the process is without danger, and 
in fact the pattern shows similarities to experiences of other countries where 
(over)optimism about future earnings led to a boost in asset valuations and a surge 
in capital inﬂows that allowed ﬁrms and households to borrow and spend. Key mac-
roeconomic implications of rapid credit growth include inﬂation and a weakening
of the current account; in the SEE countries, the latter has been more prominent. 
Continued deterioration in external balances of the targeted SEE countries may 
increase the risk of speculation against the currencies under the prevailing ﬁxed ex-
change rate regimes. The low savings rates in most of the countries imply that they 
are highly dependent on the willingness of foreign investors to fund these deﬁcits.
Using differences in bank ownership as a proxy for ﬁnancial constraints on banks,
the paper ﬁnds weak evidence that foreign banks have a lower sensitivity of credit
to monetary conditions relative to their domestic competitors, with the differences 
driven by banks with lower asset liquidity and/or capitalization. At the same time, 
the lending and deposit rates of foreign banks tend to be smoother during periods 
of ﬁnancial distress, albeit the differences with domestic banks do not appear to
be strong. These results provide weak support to the existence of supply-side 
effects in credit markets and suggest that foreign bank entry in emerging econo-
mies may have contributed somewhat to stability in credit markets.
From a microeconomic perspective, it is not clear whether the credit risk systems 
of banks in the targeted SEE markets will be able to cope with a potential lend-
ing boom. In most of the SEE countries, the prudential indicators do not signal a 
signiﬁcant vulnerability of the banking system, but many of these are lagging and
not leading indicators. Moreover, there have been some indications of a decline 
in capital adequacy and some increase in credit risks in many of the countries in 
the group. In these countries rapid credit growth—in particular in cases where 
the number of credit applications grows rapidly—has started to put a strain on 
banks’ and bank supervisors’ capacity to assess risks. Furthermore, a sharper-
than-expected decline in interest margins, due to increased competition, may 
decrease the proﬁtability of the banking system and increase its vulnerability.
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Annex Table 1
Groups of Banks in Serbia131
(Based on their asset size, as of September 30, 2006)
Group Amount of Assets
Number of 
Banks
31.12.2004
Number of 
Banks
31.12.2005
Number of 
Banks
30.09.2006
Group I Assets< CSD 5 billion 19 10 7
Kosovsko Metohijska banka a.d. Zvečan
Niška banka a.d. Niš
“A banka” a.d. Beograd
Privredna banka a.d. Pančevo
JUBMES banka a.d. Beograd
Čačanska banka a.d. Čačak
Credy banka a.d. Kragujevac
Group II
CSD 5 billion 
<Assets< CSD 
10 billion
10 9 8
Findomestic banka a.d. Beograd
Privredna banka Beograd a.d. Beograd
Akcionarsko društvo “Zepter banka” Beograd
“Jugobanka Jugbanka” a.d. Kosovska Mitrovica
“Srpska banka” a.d. Beograd
Laiki Bank A.D. Beograd
“Metals-banka” a.d. Novi Sad
Univerzal banka a.d. Beograd
131 In the table banks are separated in different groups according to the last available year
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Group III
CSD 10 billion 
<Assets< CSD 
20 billion
8 11 9
NLB LHB banka a.d. Beograd
Panonska banka a.d. Novi Sad
“Banka Poštanska štedionica a.d. Beograd”
Nacionalna štedionica-banka a.d. Beograd
Poljoprivredna banka Agrobanka a.d. Beograd
Piraeus Bank a.d. Beograd
ERSTE Bank A.D. Novi Sad
Meridian banka Credit Agricole group a.d. Novi Sad
“Kulska banka” A.D. Novi Sad
Group IV
CSD 20 billion 
<Assets< CSD 
45 billion
3 5 8
NLB Continental banka a.d. Novi Sad
National Bank of Greece S.A. - Filijala Beograd
“Volksbank” a.d. Beograd
Agroindustrijska komercijalna banka “AIK banka” a.d. 
Niš
Eurobank EFG štedionica a.d. Beograd
ProCredit Bank a.d. Beograd
Alpha Bank Srbija a.d. Beograd
Vojvođanska banka a.d. Novi Sad
Group V CSD 45 billion <Assets 3 5 6
Societe Generale Yugoslav Bank a.d. Beograd
HVB banka Srbija i Crna Gora a.d. Beograd
Komercijalna banka a.d. Beograd
Hypo Alpe-Adria-Bank a.d. Beograd
Banca Intesa a.d. Beograd
Raiffeisen banka a.d. Beograd
TOTAL 43 40 38
Source: National Bank of Serbia
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Annex Table 2
Groups of Banks in Albania132
(Based on their asset size, as of December 31, 2005)
Group Amount of Assets
Number of 
banks
31.12.2004
Number of 
banks
31.12.2005
Group I Volume of Assets < 2 % of  Total Assets 8 7
Emporiki Bank (EB)
United Bank of Albania (UBA)
First Investment Bank (Tirana Branch) 
(FIB)
International Commercial Bank (ICB)
Credit Bank of Albania (CBA)
Popular Bank (PB)
Italian Development Bank (IDB)13
Group II
2% of Total Assets < 
Volume of Assets > 
7% of Total Assets
5 5
ALPHA Bank (Tirana Branch) (AB)
Italian-Albania Bank (IAB)
Procredit Bank (PB)
National Bank of Greece (Tirana 
Branch) (NBG)
Credins Bank (CB)
Group III 7% of Total Assets > Volume of Assets 4 4
Raiffeisen Bank (RZB)
Tirana Bank (TB)
American Bank of Albania (ABA)
National Commercial Bank (NCB)
Total 17 16
Source: National bank of Albania
132 In the table banks are separated in different groups according to the last available year
133 In June 2005 100% of Dardania Bank was sold to Italian investors (currently )
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Annex Table 3
Groups of Banks in FYR Macedonia134
(Based on their asset size, as of December 31, 2005)
Group Amount of Assets
Number of 
banks
31.12.2004
Number of 
banks
31.12.2005
I Group Assets > Denar 15 billion 3 3
Komercijalna banka AD Skopje
Stopanska banka AD Skopje
Tutunska banka AD Skopje
II Group135 4,5 billion < Assets>15 billion 2 3
Ohridska banka AD Ohrid
ProCredit banka AD Skopje
Stopanska banka AD Bitola
III group Assets < Denar 4.5 billion 16 14
Alpha banka AD Skopje
Eurostandard banka AD Skopje
Investbanka AD Skopje
Internacionalna Privatna banka 
AD Skopje
Export and Credit Bank AD Skopje
 Komercijalno Investiciona banka 
AD Kumanovo
Makedonska banka AD Skopje136
Macedonian Bank for Develop-
ment Promotion AD Skopje
Post Bank AD Skopje
 Silex Bank AD Skopje
T.X. Ziraat Bankasi AD Skopje
Teteks Kreditna Banka AD Skopje
Tetovska banka AD Tetovo
UNI banka ADSkopje
Total 21 20
Source: National bank of FYR Macedonia
134 In the table banks are separated in different groups according to the last available year
135 The minimum required amount of assets for the medium-size group has been changed from Denar 2.5 billion to Denar 4.5 billion.
136 The Macedonian Bank for Development Promotion, A.D, Skopje  performs speciﬁc ﬁnancial activities in accordance with a separate law.
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Credit Risk Management
Practices in Bulgaria and Romania
Georgi Georgiev
Introduction
The aim of the presented paper is to analyze the effects of the foreign banks`  
entering into the management practices in six SEE countries - Albania, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Romania and Serbia. The entering of foreign capi-
tals into the banking sector and the rapid private credit growth has faced risk 
management with serious challenges in the region. This gives the opportunity 
for the researchers to explore the developments in the credit risk management 
practices in different countries in transition. The bank management approaches 
and practices are related directly to the proﬁtability of the institution and the bank
competition. For that reason any information concerning the bank management 
in details is conﬁdential and usually there is a lack of relevant statistical informa-
tion. To overcome this obstacle and to gather actual information directly from 
the bank managers, questionnaires were prepared, which have been sent to 
all Bulgarian and Romanian banks. The focus of our inquiry was concentrated 
mainly on the applied credit risk management practices and the readiness for 
the implementation of Basel II standards.
Section 1 makes cross-country comparisons and analyzes some indicators relat-
ed to credit performance in the six SEE countries.  Section 2 concentrates on the 
applied systems for credit risk management in Bulgaria and Romania. Section 3 
analyzes the existing database of bank management in Bulgaria and Romania. In 
Section 4 based on data submitted by an anonymous Bulgarian bank a scoring 
model was constructed and comparisons were made on a bank level.
1. Bank management cross countries comparisons
During the last 10 years the bank reform in all of the six transition countries 
underwent dramatic changes – from bank failures through ﬁnancial stabilization,
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privatization to merger and acquisitions. The process of mergers and acquisi-
tions resulted in ﬁnancial transformation of the bigger part of the domestic bank-
ing sector to foreign shareholders. In some countries the process of ownership 
transformation has almost ﬁnished (Croatia, Albania, and Bulgaria), but in others
it is still continuing (Serbia, Macedonia and Romania. The last decade has been 
characterized by high levels of foreign bank penetration in the Balkan region. At 
the end of 2005 the average asset share of foreign-owned banks in the bank 
systems of Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania and Serbia was over 
72%. The leading countries in this respect were Albania and Croatia where the 
asset share of foreign-owned banks reached respectively 92,3% and 91,2%.
Figure 1.1: The asset share of foreign-owned banks (in per cent) in SEE
The entering of foreign banks has been accompanied by high levels of credit 
growth, which have forced the national banks to take a number of restrictive 
measures to slow down the process. It is representative for the region that over 
68% of the commercial banks use mainly loan ofﬁcers` human judgment for
credit risk estimation. The luck of precise, quantitive measure forced banks to 
require additional collaterals and warrantors, which make the credits inacces-
sible to the part of population.
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This section analyzes the impact of foreign bank entering on the credit perform-
ance during 1995-2005 in six SEE countries - Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Mac-
edonia, Romania and Serbia. 
During the last decade the banking system of Albania has gone through critical 
changes aimed at ﬁnancial stabilization and management quality improvement.
Despite the fact that as early as 1998 approximately 80 % of the banks were for-
eign-owned, the share of foreign-owned banks did not exceed 50 % as of 2003, 
and the portion of non-performing loans was inadmissibly high /35.4 %/
Table 1.1: Foreign banks penetration and credit performance in Albania
Albania 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Number of banks (for-
eign-owned)  
6
 (3)
8
 (3)
9
 (3)
10
 (8)
13 
(11)
13 
(12)
13 
(12)
13 
(12)
15 
(13)
16 
(14)
16 
(14)
Asset share of state-
owned banks (in per cent) 94,5 93,7 89,9 85,6 81,1 64,8 59,2 54,1 51,9 6,7 7,7
Asset share of foreign-
owned banks (in per 
cent)  
na na na 14,4 18,9 35,2 40,8 45,9 47,1 93,3 92,3
Non-performing loans (in 
per cent of total loans)  34,9 40,1 91,2 35,4 32,7 42,6 6,9 5,6 4,6 4,2 2,3
Domestic credit to 
private sector (in per 
cent of GDP)  
3,6 3,5 4,0 0,6 2,2 3,0 4,0 5,0 5,4 6,2 10,3
Domestic credit to 
households (in per cent 
of GDP)   
na na na na na na na na na 2,8 4,6
Source: EBRD, Transition report 2006: Finance in transition, November 2006
The year 2004 was crucial for the incursion of foreign ﬁnancial capital into the
banking system of Albania. During this year the asset share of foreign-owned 
banks doubled and by the turn of 2005 Albania already had the highest share 
among the other SEE countries. This led to an abrupt increase of the amount 
of credits for the private sector and the households, but notwithstanding, their 
respective share in view of GDP remained the lowest in Europe.  
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Figure 1.2: Asset share of foreign-owned banks versus non-performing loans in Albania
During the period 1995 – 2000 Albania featured inadequate credit management 
and a bad credit performance, correspondingly. The envisaged six-year span 
was marked by an average amount of non-performing loans (in per cent of total 
loans) of 46,15% reaching its highest point in 1997 г. with the absurd 91,2%. 
During the last ﬁve years though, the banking sector has been marked by quali-
tative improvement of its credit management practices and there is a tendency 
towards decreasing the amount of non-performing loans in the credit portfolios 
of commercial banks.
Table 1.2: Foreign banks penetration and credit performance in Bulgaria
Bulgaria 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Number of banks 
(foreign-owned)  
41 
(3)
42 
(3)
28 
(7)
34 
(17)
34 
(22)
35 
(25)
35 
(26)
34 
(26)
35 
(25)
35 
(24)
34 
(23)
Asset share of state-
owned banks (in %)  na 82,2 66,0 56,4 50,5 19,8 19,9 14,1 2,5 2,3 1,7
Asset share of foreign-
owned banks (in %t)  na na na 32,5 42,8 75,3 72,7 75,2 82,7 81,6 74,5
Non-performing loans (in 
% of total loans) 12,5 15,2 13,0 11,8 17,5 10,9 7,9 5,6 4,4 3,7 3,8
Domestic credit to private 
sector (in % of GDP)  21,1 35,3 12,3 12,2 14,0 11,7 14,5 18,0 18,4 23,2 26,0
Domestic credit to house-
holds (in % of GDP)   na na na 2,0 2,1 2,1 2,8 3,7 7,1 10,0 14,7
Source: EBRD, Transition report 2006: Finance in transition, November 2006 
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In 1989 in Bulgaria, following the fall of the “developed socialist society”, political 
instability and economic chaos established themselves. The foreign debts made 
in the last decade of socialism amounted to 140 % of the Gross Domestic Prod-
uct. The Central Bank did not gain political independence and readily turned into 
an instrument of political and economic interests. 
Figure 1.3: Asset share of foreign-owned banks versus non-performing loans in Bulgaria
The monetary policy, which was being carried out was not aimed at providing 
stability in the banking system and in the national currency, but at indirect fund-
ing of private interests and political parties through certain commercial banks. 
The uncontrolled making of insecure loans and the lack of a feasible bank super-
vision led to a number of bank and currency crises. By the end of 1996 almost 
one-third of the Bulgarian banking sector declared bankruptcy though the ofﬁcial
statistics for 1996 reported only just 15,2% non-performing loans (in % of total 
loans), which raises strong doubts on the authenticity of the data provided by the 
statistical department of the Bulgarian National Bank.
Unlike Albania, the changes in the Bulgarian banking sector were smoothly ac-
complished and there are no typical clear-cut lines with regard to the penetration 
of foreign capital in the banking sector and credit performance. During the in-
vestigated 11-year period the average percentage of non-performing loans was 
9,66%, and during 2005 it fell to 3,8%. In this regard the commercial banks 
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performing on the territory of Bulgaria took a leading position with credit portfo-
lio management. As concerns private sector crediting and households Bulgaria 
ranked second after Croatia.
Table 1.3: Foreign banks penetration and credit performance in Croatia
Croatia 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Number of banks (foreign-
owned)  
54
 (1)
58
 (4)
61
 (7)
60 
(10)
53 
(13)
43 
(21)
43 
(24)
46 
(23)
41 
(19)
37 
(15)
34 
(13)
Asset share of state-
owned banks (in per cent) 51,9 36,2 32,6 37,5 39,8 5,7 5,0 4,0 3,4 3,3 3,4
Asset share of foreign-
owned banks (in per cent) 0,2 0,9 3,0 6,6 40,3 84,1 89,3 90,2 91,0 91,2 91,2
Non-performing loans (in 
per cent of total loans)  12,9 11,2 8,2 12,6 20,6 19,8 15,1 11,0 9,7 8,6 7,2
Domestic credit to private 
sector (in per cent of GDP) 22,9 21,4 25,3 26,6 22,1 36,0 41,3 49,7 52,6 55,8 55,6
Domestic credit to house-
holds (in per cent of GDP)  4,8 6,1 10,3 12,9 13,6 15,3 18,2 23,8 27,7 30,7 34,3
Source: EBRD, Transition report 2006: Finance in transition, November 2006
Croatia undoubtedly surpasses the other 5 countries based on a comprehensive 
estimate as per the criteria selected. Like Bulgaria, the development of its bank-
ing sector is not characterized by abrupt changes and it is a smooth and sustain-
able process of development. The average percentage of non-performing loans 
for the above period was 12,44%, while in 2005 it fell to 7,2%. With regard to 
the crediting of private sector and households Croatia exceeds in times the other 
5 countries  SEE. The domestic credit to private sector (in per cent of GDP) in 
2005 reached 55,6% with 115% for EU. During the same year the domestic 
credit to households in per cent of GDP amounted to 34,3% with a 7,16% aver-
age rate for the other 5 countries and an average level of 53% for EU.
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Figure 1.4: Asset share of foreign-owned banks versus non-performing loans in Croatia
The banking sector reform process in Macedonia has not concluded yet and 
at present it is characterized by a lower degree of foreign banks`  incursion into 
this country. By the end of 2005 foreign banks represented barely one-third of 
all banks in Macedonia, and the asset share of state-owned banks amounted to 
51.3% by the end of 2005.
Table 1.4: Foreign banks penetration and credit performance in Macedonia
Macedonia 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Number of banks (foreign-
owned)  
6
 (3)
22
 (5)
22
 (5)
24
 (6)
23
 (5)
22
 (7) 21 (8)
20
 (7)
21
 (8)
21
 (8)
20
 (8)
Asset share of state-
owned banks (in per cent)  na 0,0 0,0 1,4 2,5 1,1 1,3 2,0 1,8 1,9 1,6
Asset share of foreign-
owned banks (in per cent)  na 9,4 11,8 11,4 11,5 53,4 51,1 44,0 47,0 47,3 51,3
Non-performing loans (in 
per cent of total loans)  na 66,1 59,5 50,3 62,6 46,5 44,4 35,7 34,9 27,5 22,2
Domestic credit to private 
sector (in per cent of GDP)  23,1 26,5 27,3 17,7 10,4 10,5 12,7 14,6 16,0 19,4 21,7
Domestic credit to house-
holds (in per cent of GDP)   1,1 1,0 1,3 1,2 1,2 1,6 1,7 2,4 4,0 6,3 8,8
Source: EBRD, Transition report 2006: Finance in transition, November 2006
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The average amount of non-performing loans for the 11-year period under exami-
nation amounts to 44,97%, while for the last 5 years there has been a trend of de-
crease, but notwithstanding, at present the banks performing in Macedonia have 
one of the worst credit managements commensurable with that of Serbia only.
Figure 1.5: Asset share of foreign-owned banks versus non-performing loans in Macedonia
The Romanian banking sector is characterized by relatively low levels of foreign 
banks’ penetration. By the end of 2005 foreign banks represented 72,72% of 
all banks in Romania and the аsset share of foreign-owned banks amounted to 
59,2%. With regard to the examined period the Romanian banks`  credit manage-
ment showed a qualitative change following the year 1999, when the percentage 
of non-performing loans diminished repeatedly. For the period 1995-1999 the 
average amount of non-performing loans was 47,26%, while for the last 6 years 
it has amounted to 5,3%, which indicates good credit management perform-
ance. However, during the above period the funding of the private sector and the 
households remains very low and almost without any change.
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Table 1.5: Foreign banks penetration and credit performance in Romania
Romania 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Number of banks (foreign-
owned)  
24 
(8)
31 
(10)
33 
(13)
36 
(16)
34 
(19)
33 
(21)
33 
(24)
31 
(24)
30 
(21)
32 
(23)
33 
(24)
Asset share of state-
owned banks (in per cent)  84,3 80,9 80,0 75,3 50,3 50,0 45,4 43,6 40,6 7,5 6,5
Asset share of foreign-
owned banks (in per cent)  na na 11,5 15,1 43,6 46,7 51,4 52,9 54,8 58,5 59,2
Non-performing loans (in 
per cent of total loans) 37,9 48,0 56,5 58,5 35,4 6,4 4,1 2,7 5,7 6,8 6,1
Domestic credit to private 
sector (in per cent of GDP) 7,8 11,5 8,4 11,6 8,1 7,2 7,7 8,3 9,1 9,7 10,2
Domestic credit to house-
holds (in per cent of GDP)   na na na na na na na na 3,8 4,8 7,3
Source: EBRD, Transition report 2006: Finance in transition, November 2006
The average amount of domestic credit to private sector (in per cent of GDP)  for the 
11-year period amounts to 9,05%, and the amount of Domestic credit to households 
(in per cent of GDP) for 2005 amounted to 7,3% with 53% for EU. The examined 
period 1995-2005 shows an interesting strong negative linear dependency between 
the asset share of foreign-owned banks and non-performing loans in Romania. 
Figure 1.6: Asset share of foreign-owned banks versus non-performing loans in Romania
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The value coefﬁcient of determination is 0,8898 and the coefﬁcient of correlation
is 0,94. It denotes that during the scrutinized period, when there is an increase 
of the asset share of foreign-owned banks, there is a decrease of the non-per-
forming loans in Romania, i.e. one can make the conclusion that the penetration 
of foreign capital in the banking sector of the country had a substantial positive 
impact on credit management. 
In Serbia, similarly to Macedonia, the banking sector reform process has not 
concluded yet and at present it features a lower degree of penetration of foreign 
banks into the country. By the end of 2005 foreign banks represented 42,5% of 
all the banks in Serbia and the asset share of state-owned banks amounted to 
66%. Unlike the other 5 analyzed SEE countries, the Serbian banking system 
does not show any signs of improvement with regard to its credit management 
performance and the percentage of non-performing loans in the credit portfolios 
of commercial banks continues to be high. The average amount of non-perform-
ing loans for the last 6 years has been 24,63%.
In view of the indicators of the domestic credit to private sector и domestic credit 
to households Serbia has one of the lowest percentages in Europe and it is 
positioned lowest along with Albania
Table 1.6: Foreign banks penetration and credit performance in Serbia
Serbia 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Number of banks (for-
eign-owned)  
112 
(3)
103 
(3)
106 
(3)
104 
(3)
75 
(3)
81 
(3)
54 
(8)
50 
(12)
47 
(16)
43 
(11)
40 
(17)
Asset share of state-
owned banks (in per 
cent)  
94,7 92,0 89,8 90,0 89,0 90,9 68,0 35,6 34,1 23,4 23,9
Asset share of foreign-
owned banks (in per 
cent)  
0,2 0,2 0,6 0,5 0,4 0,5 13,2 27,0 38,4 37,7 66,0
Non-performing loans (in 
per cent of total loans)  na na na na na 24,9 24,4 28,5 23,8 22,4 23,8
Domestic credit to 
private sector (in per cent 
of GDP)  
na 9,2 10,8 11,2 9,8 8,2 6,1 na na na na
Domestic credit to 
households (in per cent 
of GDP)   
na na na na na na na na 2,6 4,9 7,6
Source: EBRD, Transition report 2006: Finance in transition, November 2006
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2. Systems for credit risk management in Bulgaria and Romania
Risk management strengthens its position as one of the dominant ﬁeld of ﬁnancial
management. It comes from the modern reality where the integration of ﬁnancial mar-
kets and the high level of competition require precise measures of losses. It concerns 
to a great extent such important bank activity as the credit portfolio management. 
The rapid credit growth in Bulgaria and Romania during the past years forces banks 
to use quantitative, cheep and unbiased methods for estimating and forecasting 
the credit risk. The credit scoring methodology satisﬁes the above-stated require-
ments. It achieves increasing popularity among the ﬁnancial institutions in the lead-
ing countries. The foreign banks have a long practice in the implementing of such 
advanced systems. The using of credit scoring gives banks certain advantages as 
reducing expenditures for lending, administrating and credit control. It makes the 
loans cheaper and more accessible to individuals and companies. So under equal 
other conditions the scoring systems encourage the solvent demand and raise the 
living standard of the population (Weisman 2003). Credit scoring gains importance 
to the bank management practice in view of implementing the New Basel Capital 
Accord (Basle Committee on Banking Supervision 2001; Komorad 2002). The Ba-
sel II focuses on approaches that allow banks and supervisors to evaluate properly 
the various risks that banks face.  The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision 
recommends that banks use the Internal Ratings-Based Approach (IRB) in the 
credit risk evaluation. Thus in the retail banking credit scoring becomes a basic 
methodology of the internal assessment process of the credit institution.
Figure 2.1: Implementation of the Basle II Standards in Bulgarian banks
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In this paragraph an attempt is made to estimate the current status of the risk 
management practices and readiness for implementation of Basel II standards 
in the banking systems of Bulgaria and Romania based on expert judgment. To 
this end questionnaires were sent to the corresponding departments of all 68 
commercial banks in both countries. Filled in questionnaires were sent back by 
23 Bulgarian (out of a total of 31) and 26 Romanian (out of a total of 37) commer-
cial banks, correspondingly.  Respectively the share of foreign-owned banks is 
82,6% of a total responded banks in Bulgaria and 76,9% out of total responded 
banks in Romania. We must lay stress on the fact that the results of the study 
are based on the self-evaluation of the relevant commercial banks regarding 
speciﬁed criteria related to credit management practices.
Figure 2.2: Implementation of the Basle II Standards in Romanian banks
According to the risk managers`  answers from both countries Bulgarian banks 
seem to be more advanced in the implementation process than the Romanian 
ones. 82,24% of the Bulgarian banks against 46,06% of the Romanian ones 
claim to be already applying in their practices the Basle II Standards. With 
18,38% of the Romanian banks the process is still at an early stage, which 
indicates a certain delay.
The banking sector in Bulgaria and Romania shows much similarity in the meth-
ods used in the process of credit decision making. The prevailing portion of the 
banks in both countries uses as the main credit analysis and decision-making 
method a combination of loan ofﬁcers` judgment and scoring system.
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Figure 2.3: Methods used in credit granting process in Bulgarian banks
The lack of an independent utilization of scoring systems shows the fact that 
the banks are now not capable of creating reliable models having an accept-
able prognostic accuracy. The amount of commercial banks`  credit losses and 
the credit portfolio quality are directly dependent on the accuracy of the scoring 
system implementation.
Figure 2.4: Methods used in credit granting process in Romanian banks
Typically, with the European bank institutions the scoring systems are most 
successfully and independently used in the credit card industry. They are most 
widely used in managing existing accounts, particularly with revolving credits 
to determine: credit limits, renewals, authorizations, collections, fraud potential, 
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cross-selling, etc. (Liu 2001). In this case scoring systems demonstrate an ex-
cellent suitability and allow for an almost complete automation of the process. 
But obviously in both neighboring SEE countries the designers of banking scor-
ing systems have yet to overcome serious technical problems and there is not 
yet an automated system created in either of them.
Figure 2.5: Credit scoring applications in the Bulgarian banks 
Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6 show the degree of utilization of credit scoring tech-
nologies in the banking industry of both countries. Here one can also perceive 
a strong similarity with regard to the ﬁeld of application as well as to the per-
centage of banks using the relevant credit scoring method. Business credit risk, 
consumer industry and credit card management are the key application lines of 
scoring technology in the banking practices of Bulgaria and Romania. 
At present credit scoring technology is implemented mostly in consumer credit 
industry. 69,56% of the Bulgarian banks and 65,38% of the Romanian ones, 
correspondingly utilize scoring systems when managing their consumer credit 
portfolio. When crediting physical bodies credit scoring is most often used for 
evaluating new applicants, post-evaluating risk and forecasting.
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Figure 2.6: Credit scoring applications in the Romanian banks
Business credit management is the second ﬁeld of application frequency, where
the banks in the two neighboring Balkan countries apply the quantitative evalu-
ation of the scoring technology. At the present stage even in countries having 
traditions in the utilization of scoring systems there are technical problems and 
the scoring evaluation accuracy is behind what is aimed for owing to the sub-
stantial heterogeneity of ﬁrms` empirical data (Jalal Akhavein, W. Scott Frame,
and Lawrence J. White 2001).  
In countries with developed banking systems credit cards are the dominant ﬁeld
of scoring technology application (Dunn Lucia F., Tae Hyung Kim 1999; Ko-
morad 2002). However, owing to the still underdeveloped credit card market 
in Bulgaria and Romania the scoring systems in this realm are far from their 
potetial capacity.
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Figure 2.7:  Importance of the risk management for the Bulgarian and Romanian banks prosperity
Figure 2.7 shows the signiﬁcance of risk management for banks` prosperity in Bulgar-
ia and Romania. Personnel appointed by the banks themselves had to point out the 
signiﬁcance of the risk management department. At present risk management is a
leading segment of the banking systems`  ﬁnancial management of developed coun-
tries. The considerable similarity found in the answers of the bank personnel in both 
countries indicates that risk management and forecast is not yet as signiﬁcant for the
banking practices in the above countries as it is with the leading banks worldwide. 
3. Analysis of the bank information database in the Bulgarian and 
Romanian banks
The majority of banks are making substantial investments in improving their 
customer information ﬁles and creating databases. The business of ﬁnancial
data and information is changing drastically in the latest years. New competi-
tors and customer-orientated products are making it more important than ever. 
The bank management takes advantages of data mining techniques to make 
effective business decisions (Mays 2000). 
Information database quality of the Bulgarian and Rumanian banks is still far 
from the standards in the leading countries. Most of the banks are operating in 
an environment where there is shortage or no information for the economical 
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agents. Such an environment is suitable only for a high risk capital. Business 
information has a huge power capable to change the economical environment. 
Availability of a reliable, objective and accessible to all information about the 
customer payment history is extremely valuable for the banks.
In this section we will analyze the existing databases of the Bulgarian and Romani-
an banks in the beginning of EU accession. Currently, both the Bulgarian and Ro-
manian banks maintain some kind of internal information database. The common 
ground between them is the fact, that only for a small percentage of the banks, the 
database available is in line with the new banking challenges and allows for the 
conducting of a quality risk management.  As per risk managers`  estimates barely 
13,04 % of the Bulgarian banks against 11,54% of the Romanian ones have at 
their disposal quantitative sufﬁcient bases with high level of detailed information.
The support of this type of base is the + condition for the creation of models for 
qualitative risk evaluation. As of now the commercial banks in both countries face 
difﬁculties creating such models owing to the lack of relevant empirical data.
Figure 3.1: Quality of the exiting data base in Bulgarian banks
The provision of an internal banking database with all the necessary information 
requires a technological period of a minimum of 2-3 years. In Bulgaria nearly half 
of the banks (47,83%) now possess a qualitatively sufﬁcient database at a low
level of speciﬁcity. This means that the greater part of the Bulgarian commercial
banks have not adjusted their databases to the new conditions and are still using 
obsolete databases, irrelevant to data mining.
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Figure 3.2: Quality of the exiting data base in Romanian banks
The greater part of the Romanian banks is more advanced in the way of reform. 
About 42,31% of the Romanian banks against 21,74% of the Bulgarian ones 
have a database, which is at a higher level of information particularity, but not 
yet sufﬁcient from a quality perspective. This means that approximately half of
the Romanian banks have initiated the creation of a qualitatively new type of 
data capacity, which is suited to credit risk qualitative evaluations, marketing 
goals, etc.
When developing new databases it is necessary for one to overcome certain 
lapses and ﬂaws of the hitherto existing bank organization. The main problems
facing the major part of the banking sector in both neighboring countries could 
be summarized in several directions.
The ﬁrst signiﬁcant defect is related to the particularity and informational value 
of data. In comparison with the developed countries`  banks with a signiﬁcant
percentage of Bulgarian and Romanian banks there is a lack of detailed informa-
tion on the customers regarding the various types of transactions. The lapses 
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are with regard to data characterizing the behavior of the physical person as a 
bank customer /mainly their payment history/ as well as regarding socio-demo-
graphic, ethnic, criminal record, etc. For example, as of now a vast percentage of 
the banks in both countries do not collect information on important predictors such 
as: number of former loans; months since the ﬁrst credit; duration of the longest
arrear; number of arrears; number of months on the last job position; function in 
the ofﬁce hierarchy /promotions, punishments, appointments, inferiors/; education
/type, years, degree/; location of residence /village, small, medium or big town, liv-
ing in the center of town, in the industrial area or in the suburbs/, living in a house 
of their own, renting a house, living with parents or on their own; number of years 
at the last residential address; average balance /remainder/ on savings, deposit 
and other accounts; average balance on credit/debit card; average percentage of 
using a revolving credit, etc. The database degree of detailed contents with certain 
European banks reaches very high informational values /Komorad 2003/.137
Figure 3.3: Operating effectiveness of the existing database in Bulgarian banks
The second critical ﬂaw concerns the completeness and comprehensive-
ness of information. A key issue with developing scoring models for evalu-
ating new customers is the lack of data on refused credit applicants. Banks 
are not normally interested in credit applicants, who were refused credit and, 
correspondingly, for such type of customers no data is collected. At the same 
137 For example, Bundesbank includes approximately 325 000 information units in the initial framework of its scoring models. 
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time those physical persons though unwelcome by the credit institutions repre-
sent a portion of the population residing in the market region, where creditors 
perform.  Owing to the above reason ignoring them has an impact on the rep-
resentative nature   of the sample making it non-representative (Reichert&Cho 
1983; Joanes 1993; Hand& Henley 1993; Thomas 2000) The disrupting of its 
representative character implies that the model would be constructed by using 
only a part of the empirical data. This results in deviations and deformities of its 
ﬁnal parameters and diminishes its forecasting capacity. The lack of data on the
credit applicants, who were turned down makes it impossible for the creation of 
a model for evaluating new applicants.
The third problem is related to the precision and authenticity of the collected 
data. Owing to the lack of institutions analogous to the credit bureaus the ca-
pacities of Bulgarian banks to verify the authenticity of the information provided 
by their customers are gravely restricted.  Provided it is eventually possible the 
veriﬁcation is quite expensive, labor-consuming and taking time. Often potential
credit recipients in view of acquiring the requested credit tend to overstate, di-
minish or hide certain data of the information required from them.
Figure 3.4: Operating effectiveness of the existing database in Rumanian banks
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The fourth ﬂaw is of a temporary nature and presupposes its being overcome
in the near future. At present it originates from the conservative system of part 
of the banks performing on the Bulgarian and Romanian ﬁnancial markets with
regard to the introduction, classiﬁcation and storage of information. A con-
siderable portion of the available data is still stored in the form of hard copies 
and not electronically, which is a crucial lapse of modern banking practices. 
Electronic information has undoubted leverage in view of extensive capacities 
for processing, classifying and applying various methods for analyses and eval-
uations within short time limits. Furthermore, electronic data allow for selecting 
and processing particular data massifs based on relevant criteria, etc… 
The internal database is not always sufﬁcient for the purposes of banking man-
agement. Credit bureaus are of the great signiﬁcance for the information support
of the crediting process. The aim of their establishment is to collect, store and 
provide information regarding the payment and credit history of physical and 
legal bodies located in a deﬁnite geogrphical region.
Figure 3.5: IT investments in Bulgarian and Romanian
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The existence of credit bureaus in SEE was underestimated for a long time basically 
owing to restricted competition among creditors in the segment of consumer credit-
ing, and concentration of credit resources on the big corporate customers. In the last 
years the issue of establishing credit ofﬁces has gained topicality due to increased
crediting and high degree of competition in this sector. Furthermore, with the fund-
ing of private consumption banking monopoly was shattered and a great number of 
leasing companies started to provide products and services by installments.
Table 3.1 The credit bureaus performance in six SEE countries (January 2007)
Country Operational from Data sources and users
Albania Letter of intend, IMFDecember 2007 -
Bulgaria in construction -
Croatia May 2006 all banks
Macedonia - -
Romania March 2004 95% of banks
Serbia November 2004
all banks
all leasing companies
all government agencies and funds
a number of traders.
At present credit bureaus are in the process of being set up in Albania and Bulgar-
ia, and in Croatia, Serbia and Romania the process has been completed. In Mac-
edonia things are at their “embryonic” stage. Unfortunately in Bulgaria the initiative 
being in the hands NGOs, which can only give ideas and make suggestions.138 
The data collected by the credit bureaus have proven to be very powerful predic-
tors with regard to consumer behavior, arrear probability, insolvency, remainders 
on the various types of accounts, potential return of the provided ﬁnancial-credit
services, etc… The credit bureaus`  information has a powerful prognostic capac-
ity due to the lack of subjectivity; it is based on the actual payment behavior of 
economic agents, and it is continually updated. It is also extremely diversiﬁed
owing to the fact that it embraces the available socio-demographic and payment-
credit activity of all of the population groups throughout the country. This allows for 
exploring and modeling customers`  behavior on almost al types of credit lines.
138 At the turn of 2003 the Market Economy Institute and the Bulgarian-American Investment Fund organized a round table on the 
topic of “Opportunities for Establishing a Private Credit Ofﬁce” with the participation of all commercial banks, where representatives
of one of the biggest credit ofﬁces in USA, Experian , were invited.
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The establishing and operating of the credit bureaus is very useful not only for 
creditors but also for economic development of the whole region. The main ad-
vantages of a credit bureau operating for the creditors can be summarize in:
● gather empirical information from credit and collector’s activity of all 
types of creditors: commercial banks, leasing companies,  telecommu-
nication companies, electro-distribution companies and etc.;
● enable quantitative evaluation of credit risk (lower interest rates due to 
lower risk)
● the time of request processing signiﬁcantly reduced and, consequently,
the request processing costs;
● enable forecasting debtor’s and customer’s behavior in different as-
pects;
● more precise control on installment payments and collections;
● citizens’ over-indebtedness prevented;
● enable banks to introduce new products; 
● settled obligations from the past;
● improve bank liquidity by precise cash ﬂow forecasting.
From the point of view of borrowers and clients the advantages are: lower 
rates and charges in crediting; falling of the major part of collaterals; the time 
of credit processing signiﬁcantly reduced; the operating of a credit bureau is in
interest to clients with good credit history.
From the point of view of the ﬁsc and the business: transparent ﬁnancial
and legal identity for the business; preventing the ﬁnancial fraud and tax avoid-
ance; coming out the grey sector of the economics; restricting the illegal busi-
ness of criminal groups.
4. Creating a scoring model using data sample of a Bulgarian bank
The aim of the section 4 is to create a specialized scoring model for credit risk post-
evaluation risk. The created model was built by using real data derived from the 
credit practice of a branch of the Bulgarian Commercial Bank. The sample includes 
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1200 loans repaid in January 2001- December 2002. The lender does not have 
data on the rejected applicants, so it is not possible to model pre-evaluation risk.
Table 4.1: Loan distribution in the samples
Good Bad
Construction sample 807 89,67% 93 10,33%
Validation sample 263 87,67% 37 12,33%
For the purpose of building and validating the scoring model the General sample 
is randomly divided in two parts - Construction sample and Validation sample. 
The Construction sample amounts to 900 credits or 75% of General sample and 
Validation sample -300 credits or 25% of all (Table 4.1).
Table 4.2 - Independent variables included in the Logit model:
Numeric variables Categorical variables
sumc – credit amout propst – property status
termc – term of credit sex - borrower’s sex
anuity - annuity (instalment) torv – resident status
maxan – maximum annuity riskp – risk proﬁle of the ﬁrm
netinc – net income prop – real estate owner
nwarn – number of warrantors etnic – ethnical
memfam – members of family wpay – way of payment
age – borrower’s age storp – economical sector
othc – other credits ocup - occupation
famtat – marital status
Depended variable is deﬁned as a dichotomous in the Logit model framework
because the purpose is the borrowers to be separated in two groups – “good” 
and “bad”. The Binary logistic regression has chosen to construct the scoring 
model because usually the Logit models show best results in predicting credit 
risk (Thomas 2000). The logistic regression uses the maximum likelihood esti-
mation (MLE), which is an iterative process with 14 iterations in this case.
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Table 4.3 - Omnibus Tests of Model Coefﬁcients
Iteration D.f. Sign. 
1 Step 480,8891 30 0,000000
Model 480,8891 30 0,000000
2 Step -0,12611 3 0,988529
Model 480,763 27 0,000000
3 Step -0,00552 1 0,940757
Model 480,7575 26 0,000000
4 Step -0,21124 2 0,899765
Model 480,5463 24 0,000000
5 Step -0,02321 1 0,878925
Model 480,5231 23 0,000000
6 Step -0,05651 1 0,812100
Model 480,4665 22 0,000000
7 Step -0,05407 1 0,816128
Model 480,4125 21 0,000000
8 Step -0,15175 1 0,696864
Model 480,2607 20 0,000000
9 Step -0,33298 1 0,563909
Model 479,9277 19 0,000000
10 Step -0,54717 1 0,459476
Model 479,3806 18 0,000000
11 Step -1,30278 2 0,521320
Model 478,0778 16 0,000000
12 Step -1,25642 1 0,262330
Model 476,8214 15 0,000000
13 Step -5,03778 4 0,283443
Model 471,7836 11 0,000000
14 Step -1,67633 1 0,195412
Model 470,1073 10 0,000000
Backward stepwise logistic regression method utilizes chi-square difference to 
determine automatically which variables to drop from the model. The test 
represents the analog of the F test in multiple regression (Menard 2002). Signiﬁ-
cance value of 470, 1073 at the last iteration means the null hypothesis can be 
rejected and one or more of analyzing factors is differ from null.
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Table 4.4 - Model Summary
Iteration -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R square Nagelkerke R square
1 117,3335 0,413933 0,852472
2 117,4596 0,413851 0,852303
3 117,4652 0,413847 0,852295
4 117,6764 0,413710 0,852012
5 117,6996 0,413695 0,851981
6 117,7561 0,413658 0,851905
7 117,8102 0,413623 0,851833
8 117,9619 0,413524 0,851629
9 118,2949 0,413307 0,851182
10 118,8421 0,412950 0,850447
11 120,1449 0,412099 0,848696
12 121,4013 0,411278 0,847004
13 126,4391 0,407974 0,840199
14 128,1154 0,406870 0,837926
The Model Summary table shows three measures of how well the logistic regres-
sion model ﬁts the data. The - 2LL statistic also called “deviation chi-square” is
used for assessing the signiﬁcance of logistic regression, analogous to the use
of the sum of squared errors in OLS regression. The value of 128, 1154 reﬂects
the error associated with the model i.e. unexplained variance in the dependent.
Nagelkerke’s R-Square is a further modiﬁcation of the Cox and Snell coefﬁcient
to assure that it can vary from 0 to 1 (Nagelkerke 1991). The value of 0,8389 for 
the Nagelkerke R square represents that the Logit model detects about 84% of 
the factors causing arrears of consumer credits.
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Table4.5. - Classiﬁcation table of the validation sample
Observed
frequency
Predicted
frequency Misclassiﬁcation
in percent
Overall
misclassiﬁcation
0 1
0 256 7 2,6616%
in absolute
value 13
1 6 31 16,2162% in percent 4,33%
The classiﬁcation table shows which cases are classiﬁed correctly and incor-
rectly by their predicted values. In a perfect model, all cases will be on the di-
agonal and the overall percent correct will be 100%. In our case the Logit model 
classiﬁed correctly 256 out of total 263 “good” borrowers and only 7 incorrectly.
About “bad” borrowers 31 of 37 are classiﬁed correctly and 6 incorrectly.
Table 4.6: Independent variables remaining in the model framework following the 14th iteration
Variable Logit coefﬁcient (B) S.E>   Wald D.F. Signiﬁcance Exp (B)
RISKP 101,7098 4 0,000000
RISKP(1) 2,820674 0,739935 14,53178 1 0,000138 16,78816
RISKP(2) 3,386351 0,786519 18,53724 1 0,000017 29,55789
RISKP(3) 6,234752 0,852215 53,52293 1 0,000000 510,1741
RISKP(4) 9,29588 0,974609 90,97459 1 0,000000 10893,05
PROP(1) 1,460258 0,615577 5,627221 1 0,017684 4,30707
ETNIC(1) 1,552393 0,886504 3,066494 1 0,079922 4,72276
STORP 4,894481 2 0,086532
STORP(1) 1,031803 0,59556 3,001534 1 0,083186 2,806122
STORP(2) -1,00808 1,130967 0,794497 1 0,372744 0,364918
TERMC1 0,191285 0,072782 6,907444 1 0,008584 1,210805
AGE1 -1,0185 0,330183 9,515063 1 0,002038 0,361137
Constant -3,49372 2,461094 2,015212 1 0,155729 0,030387
The following independent variables remain in the ﬁnal model framework: “enterprise` s
risk proﬁle”, “ownership of real estate”, “ethnic afﬁliation”, “economic sector”, “credit time
limit”, and “ credit recipient s` age”. Those variables represent the risk factors contribut-
ing to about 84% of the dependant variable` s variance. In other words, the alluded to 
six factors in 84 per cent of the cases account for the causes of arrears over 10 days 
on consumer credits. The tow last bars provide an opportunity for analyzing the risk 
factors, and for laying down conclusions regarding their impact on arrear probability. 
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The ﬁnal results of the constructed Logit model represent the very good per-
formance in forecasting consumer credit risk. The overall misclassiﬁcation is only
4,33% which means the constructed model is able to  discriminate correctly be-
tween two groups (bad and good borrowers),  95,67% of all consumer credits.
Conclusion
In the last decades, bank markets in Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania 
and Serbia inﬂuenced by political changes in the region have undergone a dynamic
development. Notwithstanding, they are still far from the indicators of the developing 
bank markets of the countries from the previous wave of accession and they have a 
long way to go in order to reach the degree of penetration, typical of the Euro zone 
countries. The six countries analyzed show an impressive potential for development, 
which is basically related to the increased demand of consumer and mortgage cred-
its. The low degree of penetration of the total ampunt of loans in the region lays out 
the foundations for a vigorous growth of crediting. The main driving forces of this 
credit growth are the incremental levels of income at hand with a greater number of 
people in the region due to the continuing economic growth in SEE.
The foreign banks entering was accompanied by high levels of credit growth, 
which forced the national banks to take a number of restrictive measures to slow 
down the process. So far, banks in Bulgaria and Romania make decisions for 
granting credits based on several comparatively simple rules, the stress being 
laid mainly on the expert judgment of credit specialists.  Such judgments nor-
mally do not imply a precise quantitative evaluation of credit risk. The banking 
sector in Bulgaria and Romania indicates much similarity in the methods used 
in the process of making credit decisions. The prevailing part of the banks in 
both countries uses as a primary credit analysis and decision-making method a 
combination of loan ofﬁcers` judgment and a scoring system.
According to the risk managers`  answers from both countries Bulgarian banks 
seem to be more advanced in the implementation process than Romanian ones.
At present the credit scoring technology ﬁnds its widest application in the 
consumer credit industry. 69,56% of the Bulgarian banks and 65,38% of the 
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Romanian ones, correspondingly, are using scoring systems with consumer 
credit portfolio management.
The quality of the Bulgarian and Rumanian banks is still far from the standards in 
the leading countries. Most of the banks are operating in an environment where 
there is shortage or no information on the economical agents. The internal da-
tabase records are not always sufﬁcient for the purposes of scoring modeling.
When developing new banking databases the overcoming of certain lapses and 
ﬂaws in the existing banking organization of both countries is a must.
In section 4 a specialized scoring model was created for credit risk post-evalua-
tion risk. The created model was built by using real data derived from the credit 
practice of a branch of the Bulgarian Commercial Bank. The ﬁnal results of the
constructed Logit model represent very high level of performance in forecasting 
consumer credit risk. The overall misclassiﬁcation is only 4,33%, which means
the constructed model is able to  discriminate correctly between two groups (bad 
and good borrowers), i.e. 95,67% of all consumer credits.
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Growth of Banks 
and Diversiﬁcation of Bank Services
Stanislav Valkov 139
Introduction
The goal of this paper is to analyze the dynamics of the entry of foreign banks140 
on the banking markets in Bulgaria, Albania, Romania, Serbia, Croatia and Mac-
edonia as well as the increases in the number of ATMs, bank branches and banks 
offering internet-banking. It is also the goal of this work to assess the link between 
the process of foreign banks entering the market in each of the above mentioned 
countries and the improved access of clients to banking services. The entry of 
foreign banks in the banking business gives consumers better opportunities to use 
banking products developed by foreign banks. It results from the efforts of foreign 
banks to enlarge their market shares by offering consumers new services thus 
satisfying their demand for faster and better access to the services offered. This 
goal is achieved by both traditional measures like widening the branch network as 
well as providing access to ATM, banking via the Internet or phone, SMS services 
etc. Different external and internal factors inﬂuence directly and indirectly the entry
of new services in each of the six countries. These factors reﬂect the macroeco-
nomic situation of the country and facilitate or restrict the creation of new services 
and further development of existing ones through which banks give access to the 
products they offer. Every bank starting business in a foreign market brings to it 
its own speciﬁc products and innovations and adapts them to the local market
depending on the speciﬁc economic, political and religious factors that determine
its speciﬁc features. A conclusion can be made that every bank entering a foreign
market aims at to strengthen its inﬂuence on a certain group of clients by providing
and facilitating the access to its range of products and services. 
Foreign banks entering the markets in the above mentioned countries have 
an already developed management strategy for improving the access to their 
139 The author thanks Vladimir Spassov for assisting him in collecting information needed for the research.
140 A bank is classiﬁed as a foreign bank if it is in majority foreign ownership (over 50%).
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services due to previous experience in other markets. This paper is mainly 
aimed at showing the changes leading to better access of clients to banking 
services in Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Serbia, Macedonia and Croatia in 
the period 1995-2005, measuring the relation between the number of for-
eign banks that have entered the banking market and the development of 
the means of accessing banking services in each country. The correlation 
method is used to assess the impact of foreign banks entering the market in 
the above mentioned countries on: 1. The bank branch network expansion in 
the respective country. 2. The growth of the number of ATM. 3. The growth of 
the number of banks offering e-banking.
The present paper compares the evaluated characteristics of each of the 
six countries through the correlation coefﬁcient derived for each of the six
countries in order to determine in which of them the entry of foreign banks 
has inﬂuenced most signiﬁcantly the access of clients to banking services.
Upon entering a foreign market the bank management evaluates the potential 
for economic development of the country. The high correlation between the 
number of foreign banks and the growth of the number of ATM, branch network 
and e-banking expansion would show that the foreign banks have contributed 
to the development of the banking services market. 
Albania
At the beginning of the period covering the study, the bank system changed its 
composition. New private banks incorporated in Albania were introduced. The 
expansion of the bank system with private banks brought several changes on 
the bank operation and services.
In 1996 the number of banks reached 8 – 2 more than in 1995 (33.33%) 
while the number of foreign banks remained unchanged. In 1997 the number 
of banks in the Republic of Albania continued to grow. The number of banks 
reached 9 or one more compared to 1996 (12.50%). 6 banks established 
branches during that period. 
During 1998 the Albanian bank system is characterized by the following. The 
number of foreign banks increased by 5 (166.67%) in comparison with 1997 
395
reaching 8. The number of bank branches reached 39, the increase on the 
previous year being 33 branches (550.00%). As a result of the increase in the 
number of foreign banks and bank branches these start opening not only in 
the capital but in other cities as well.
In 1999, the Supervision Department accomplished a signiﬁcant amount of
work to improve existing regulations and to introduce new ones. All such 
regulations are totally in line with Basle Committee’s principles for an ef-
fective bank supervision. They inﬂuenced the process of increasing of the
number of banks which continued to grow in 1999 and reached 13. At the end 
of 1999 the number of foreign banks reached 11 thus increasing by 2 (5.13%) 
on the preceding year.
The number of banks and branches of foreign banks in Albania continued 
to be 13 during 2000. There were no new banks opened; however, existing 
banks increased their number of branches, expanding their branch network 
all over the country. In 2000 the one bank was privatized and became a 
foreign bank. The same year the ﬁrst ATM was installed following the imple-
mentation of a SWIFT system. 
In 2001 the Albanian bank system remains the largest and the most developed 
segment of the Albanian ﬁnancial market. In spite of little market share compared
with that of other ﬁnancial services regulated by law, it grew during the year 2001.
In the future this market share will move in favor of bank system and as a result 
its impact on the general stability of ﬁnancial markets will be increased.
In 2001, there were no structural changes in the bank system. The banks 
have concentrated their activity mainly in the capital city,  3 private banks 
however extended their network via branches and agencies in other cities. 
The number of branches increased by 21 (46.67%) compared to 2000 year to 
reach 66. Even by the end of 2002, the banking market consists of 13 banks. 
In 2002 banks expand their activity network by means of new branches, some 
of which presented new products, such as: ATM, credit cards, deposit certiﬁ-
cates, consumer credit, forward contracts, etc. During 2002, 8 branches of 
banks were introduced. The number of ATM increased by 23 and reached 26 
at the end of the year (766.67%).
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The banking market presented signiﬁcant developments during 2003, well-sup-
ported by a good macroeconomic environment. The entry of two new banks and 
the one bank was privatizated from a investor.. In 2003 there were already 74 
ATMs, an increase of 184.62% on 2002. The number of bank branches almost 
doubled compared to 2002 to reach 161. The year 2003 has been characterized 
by improved information and communication technology utilized by the bank 
system. Banks have advanced some of their existing programs or have acquired 
new ones. These programs enable a more efﬁcient use of the banking account-
ing methods and initiate new services, such as e-banking.
End of 2004, the Albanian bank system was composed of 16 banks, compared to 
15 banks in 2003. One of the characteristics of the Albanian bank system in 2004 
was the expansion of banks’ network throughout the Republic of Albania. The new 
branches were located not only in the main cities, but also in smaller cities and 
towns. Automated teller machines (ATM-s) were introduced in the market as a 
new banking product 4 years ago. Banks have installed ATM-s in capital city and 
other main cities. Only in 2004, the number of ATM-s increased from 74 to 222, 
while the number of debit and even credit cards increased from 7,260 to 34,090.
In 2005 the number of banks remained the same as in 2004, but the bank sys-
tem underwent a network extension within the territory of the country. A consid-
erable number of branches were opened in small towns, indicating that an ever 
increasing part of the population is being covered by banking services.
Automated teller machines (ATMs) underwent further development over 2005. 
Most of banks installed ATM-s in the capital city and in other main cities. Both the 
number of ATMs and of their users increased from about 34,090 to about 225,900 
users. ATMs utilize debit cards, but credit cards are being largely used as well. 
Both, “Visa” and “MasterCard” are present in Albania, and most of the banks are 
members of one or the other. The service of e-banking transactions as a banking 
product appeared in 2003, but it has not recorded the required level of acknowl-
edgement and use by the public. Until the end of 2005, two banks have offered 
this service for clients (mainly businesses) for carrying out transfers, various pay-
ments, etc. Some other banks have planned to provide this service during 2006.
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1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Number of banks 6 8 9 10 13 13 13 13 15 16 16
Number of foreing banks 3 3 3 8 11 12 12 12 13 14 14
Number of ATMs * * * * * 1 3 26 74 222 266
Number of branches * * 6 39 41 45 66 74 161 188 242
Number of the bank with 
е-banking * * * * * * * * 1 1 2
Source: Bank of Albania
On the basis of this data a regression model describing the increase of the number 
of foreign banks as a function of the number of bank branches can be derived.
Where:
 - number of foreign banks in year t;
 - number of bank branches in year t;
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The link between the variables:
● Number of ATM;
● Number of bank branches;
● Number of banks offering internet-banking;
● Number of foreign banks in the country.
can be described in a correlation model that measures the interaction be-
tween them.
where:
 - correlation coefﬁcient;
 - variable of bank branches, number of ATMs, number of banks offering 
internet banking during year t;
 - average number of bank branches, average number of ATMs, average 
number of banks offering internet-banking;
 - number of foreign banks in year t;
 - average number of foreign banks;.
The entry of foreign banks had least impact on internet-banking services while 
it most strongly inﬂuenced the expansion of the network of bank branches. The
impact of foreign banks on the number of bank branches is obvious from the cor-
relation coefﬁcient – 0.781. Inﬂuence on the development of the internet-banking
services and the number of ATM was substantial as well. The two respective 
correlation coefﬁcients were 0.554 and 0.572.
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Bulgaria
At the beginning of the observed period a tendency towards worsening of the 
situation in the Bulgarian bank system have already been present for several 
years the main expression of which was the growing share of bad loans. De-
spite that Law on Concerning Non-performing Loans was enacted in 1994, the 
expected outcome was not achieved. That is why the CAMEL was tested and 
the bank licensing procedure was modiﬁed towards more restrictions. At that
moment the bank system in Bulgaria consisted of 45 banks. 
In 1996 due to the worsening of the economic climate in the country a bank 
crisis took place. The central bank started reﬁnancing 14 of  already 49
banks. Despite the unfavourable conditions bank branches increased by 168 
(133.33%). The hyperinﬂation of end-1996 and the beginning of 1997 led to a
massive bank crisis and decapitalization of the bank system which became 
a transmission mechanism through which the losses of the real sector were 
transferred to the households. Because of the low effectivness of the bank 
supervision in Bulgaria bad loans were accumulated even in the newly created 
private banks. A decision was found in the introduction of the currency board 
arrangement. The results of this arrangement started being visible at the end 
of 1997. The bank system consisted of 34 banks or 15 less than in the previ-
ous year. However the number of foreign banks increased by 28.57% on the 
previous year reaching 9 banks. Despite the crisis bank branches increased by 
15.56%. There were 118 ATMs. 
In 1998 the bank system was inﬂuenced by two events – the implementation
of the International Accounting Standards and the tightening of the supervision 
and capital requirements. The privatization of the state-owned banks led to an 
88.89% growth of the number of foreign banks. In absolute terms this repre-
sented an increase by 8 foreign banks (of 17 as whole). ATMs grew to 162 and 
bank branches increased to 586.
The speeding of the privatization process led to a substantial increase in for-
eign investments on the banking market. The positive effect of the currency 
board was more and more evident through the increasing number of bank 
branches and ATMs. At the end of 1999 the bank system consisted of 35 
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banks or one more than in the previous year. Foreign banks reached the 
number of 22, which represented a 22.41% growth in comparison to  1998. 
As of end-1999 there were 279 ATMs or 117 (72.22%) more than in 1998. 
Households tended still to refrain from using bank services because of the 
lack of conﬁdence in the stability of banks.
The year 2000 brought a change in the ownership structure of the bank 
system. Three banks were privatized bringing the number of foreign banks 
to 25. additional 141 ATMs (50.54%) became operational, with their total 
number growing rapidly to 420. Bank branches increased to 640 though still 
under the numbers of 1997. One bank offered access to internet-banking, 
however restricted to a few of its corporate clients. In 2001 the number of 
banks in Bulgaria increased to 36 because of the entry of one foreign bank 
(a 4.00% increase). ATMs grew by almost 52.85% (to 642) in comparison 
to the previous year. Bank branches increased by 30 to 670 (by 4.69%) in 
comparison to the previous year. Four banks were offering internet-banking 
targeted towards corporate clients. 
In 2002 the number of foreign banks remained unchanged and the number of 
branches grew by just 11 reaching 681 (an increase by 1.64%). The number of 
ATMs continued to grow , reaching 187 (an increase by 29.12% to the previous 
year) reaching 829 at the end of the year. Some banks started for the ﬁrst time
offering internet-banking as a part of their retail business. At the end of the year 
7 banks in total, 3 more (or an increase by 75.00% than the previous year) had 
internet-banking services.
In 2003 there were no changes in the total number of banks. ATMs grew 
steadily on 2002 and at the end of the year reached 1222 or 47.41% more. 
Bank branches reached their peak since 1998 – 692. Banks offering inter-
net-banking doubled to 14. In 2004 there were still 35 banks – the same 
number as in the previous year. The growth of ATMs kept its pace and at 
the end of the year it reached 2007 which represented a 64.24% increase 
or 785 more ATMs than in 2003. The number of bank branches decreased 
by 40. Banks offering internet-banking increased by 50% to 21. During 2005 
a foreign banks and a branches of a foreign bank merged thus bringing the 
number of banks to 34. Bank branches decreased as well by 7 to 645. ATMs 
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however continued to increase their numbers and as of end-2005 there were 
2279 (13.55%) ATMs. There were already 26 banks offering internet-banking 
or 5 (23.81%) more than in 2004.
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Number of banks 45 49 34 34 35 35 36 35 35 35 34
Number of foreing banks 3 7 9 17 22 25 26 26 25 24 23
Number of ATMs * * 118 162 279 420 642 829 1222 2007 2279
Number of branches 507 675 780 586 593 640 670 681 692 652 645
Number of the bank with 
е-banking * * * * * 1 4 7 14 21 26
Source: BNB, ECB
On the basis of this data a regression model describing the increase of the number 
of foreign banks as a function of the number of bank branches can be derived.
Where:
- number of foreign banks in year t;
- number of bank branches in year t;
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The link between the variables:
● Number of ATM;
● Number of bank branches;
● Number of banks offering internet-banking;
● Number of foreign banks in the country.
can be described in a correlation model that measures the interaction be-
tween them.
- correlation coefﬁcient;
 - variable of bank branches, number of ATMs, number of banks offering 
internet banking during  year t;
 - average number of bank branches, average number of ATMs, average 
number of banks offering internet-banking;
 - number of foreign banks in year t;
 - average number of foreign banks;.
The entry of foreign banks in Bulgaria had least inﬂuence on the number of
branches while it had the strongest impact on the increase of the ATMs. The 
correlation coefﬁcient showed a week link between the number of foreign banks
and the number of bank branches – 0.199. Moderate correlation with the number 
of banks offering internet-banking was measured – 0.484. The correlation with 
the number of ATMs was high – 0.591. 
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Croatia
At the end of 1995 the Croatian bank system consisted of 54 banks of which 
only one was property of non-residents. There were 512 bank branches. In 
1996 the number of banks in Croatia grew by 4 to 58. All four banks were prop-
erty of foreign entities. The branch network expanded signiﬁcantly and the total
number of branches increased by 170 (33.20%) to 682. In 1997 the ﬁrst sta-
tistics on the number of ATMs was collected in Croatia. At the end of the year 
there were 221 ATMs. Two foreign banks stepped on the Croatian market bring-
ing the total number of banks up to 60 and leading to increase in the number of 
bank branches. However the growth rate of the branch network slowed down 
(14.96% compared to 1997) despite the increasing number of banks. 
In 1998 there the total number of banks remained 60. However 3 banks were 
privatized by foreign investors thus bringing the number of foreign banks 
up. The tendency towards slowing of the growth rate of the branch network 
persisted and at the end of the year the number of branches was 813 or 29 
(3.70%) more compared to end 1997. In contrast to this the number of ATMs 
grew by 42.86%.
At the end of 1999 banks in Croatia were reduced to 53 which represent-
ed a decrease of 7 banks on 1998. However the number of foreign banks 
continued to grow despite that and as of end 1999 there were 3 (30.00%) 
more foreign banks than at end 1998. In 1999 the number of ATMs almost 
doubled on the previous year (83.51%) to reach 523. The tendency towards 
slowing the relative growth of the branch network on the previous year was 
retained and there were only 9 branches (1.11%). For the ﬁrst time in 1999
one bank began to offer access to its services via internet-banking. By the 
end of 2000, the banking system of the Republic of Croatia consisted of 44 
commercial banks – 9 less than in the previous year. The number of banks 
was reduced because some banks were bankrupted. However the number 
of banks in foreign ownership increased from 13 to 20.Iin 2000 the number 
of branches was reduced by 66 (8.03 percent). This was the result of the 
reduction in the number of banks. As regards the ATM network, high growth 
rates continued. The number of installed ATMs increased by 213 units, or 
40.73 % in all counties.
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At end of 2001, 43 commercial banks were operating in the Republic of 
Croatia, one less than the end of 2000. One bank exited the banking system 
in 2001 because it failed to increas its share capital in accordance with the 
Banking Law. The number of banks owned predominantly by foreigners in-
creased from 20 to 24. At end of 2001, the number of branches was higher 
by 67 (8.86%) compared to 2000. During this period, 8 banks closed down 
26 branches, and 19 banks established 93 branches. The number of installed 
ATMs increased by 263 units, or 35.73% compared with 2000, which was a 
lower growth rate than in the previous years. In 2001, 18 banks increased the 
number of their ATMs, of which 2 banks installed ATMs for the ﬁrst time. One
bank reduced the number of its ATMs, 6 banks retained the same number of 
ATMs, and 18 banks had no ATMs.
The number of banks operating in Croatia at end of 2002 increased by 3, 
compared with end-2001 so the total number of banks operating in the coun-
try at the end of the year was 46. This was the result of the entry of 6 newly 
licensed banks into the banking system in 2002 and two mergers. Three banks 
transferred its operations onto another new bank in 2002. Two banks merged 
with in a bank that has been operating since under a new name. At end of 
2002, the number of banks owned predominantly by foreigners fell from 24 to 
23, and the number of banks in majority domestic ownership rose from 19 to 
23, compared to the end of -2001. The number of bank branches increased by 
16.16% in 2002. The banking system comprised 956 branches, an increase by 
133 branches. ATM network increased by 33.13%  ( by 331 ATMs) end-2002. 
Newly installed ATMs in 2002 totaled 334, while only three ATMs were perma-
nently put out of use. Of 46 banks, 25 banks did not have ATMs. The remaining 
20 banks increased the number of their ATMs in the observed period, while 
only one bank reduced the number of its ATMs. 
At the end of 2003, there were 41 banking institutions operating in Croatia. The 
reduction was caused mainly by foreign banks. ATMs grew by 281 (21.13%) 
on the previous year. Over that period, 295 ATMs were newly-installed, while 
14 were put out of use. 78 new branches were opened, while 12 branches 
closed down. At the end of 2003 bank branches reached a total of 1022. The 
share of banks offering internet-banking continued to grow and end-2003 it 
reached 59%, which represented an increase of 6 banks (60.00%).
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Compared to the end of 2004, the number of banks was reduced by 4. Two 
banks merged with other banks. Two banks initiated voluntary winding up pro-
ceedings. As two banks that participated in the merger were in foreign owner-
ship and the bank that initiated voluntary winding-up proceedings in domestic 
ownership, the number of banks in foreign ownership fell to 15, and the number 
of banks in domestic ownership to 22. The number of ATMs grew in all banks. 
There were 1037 branches operating in the country end of 2004, an increase 
by 15 compared with end of 2003. 75 new branches were opened, while 60 
branches closed down during the observed year. E-banking services were ex-
tremely well-accepted and its use 111 steadily increasing. Over 90% of banks 
offered Internet banking services. It can be concluded that business entities 
were very quick in recognizing the obvious advantages of this type of payment 
and that their use of Internet banking will increase in the future.
The number of banks continued to decline in 2005. Compared to the end of 
2004, there were three banks less operating in the banking sector. Two banks 
merged with other banks. One bank initiated voluntary winding-up proceed-
ings. The number of banks in foreign ownership went down only by one bank 
because one bank in foreign ownership became the majority owner of a do-
mestic private bank in 2005, which thus indirectly became a bank in foreign 
ownership. Following these changes and the initiation of voluntary winding-up 
proceedings, the number of banks in domestic ownership fell by two. The 
number of branches rose to 1134 or by 97 at end the end of 2005 compared 
with the end of 2004. End of 2005, there were eleven banks that did not have 
any ATMs. The number of ATMs remained unchanged in 3 banks, while 18 
banks with ATMs increased their number by 1 to 31 units. In addition, one 
bank introduced ATM service and one bank reduced the number of ATMs by 
one. Banks owned 2307 ATMs at the end of 2005, which were 394 or 20.6% 
more than at the end of the previous year. In the reference period, 21 banks 
installed new ATMs, including three banks that offered ATM services for the 
ﬁrst time in 2005. Nine banks did not have any ATMs, while four banks chose
to leave the number of ATMs the same as in 2004.
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1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Number of banks 54 58 60 60 53 44 43 46 41 37 34
Number of foreing banks 1 5 7 10 13 20 24 23 19 15 14
Number of ATMs * * 221 285 523 736 999 1330 1611 1913 2307
Number of branches 512 682 784 813 822 756 823 956 1022 1037 1134
Number of the bank with
е-banking * * * * 1 3 7 15 24 33 35
Source: National Bank of Croatia
On the basis of this data a regression model describing the increase of the 
number of foreign banks in Croatia as a function of the number of bank branches 
can be derived.
Where:
- number of foreign banks in year t;
- number of bank branches in year t;
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The link between the variables:
● Number of ATM;
● Number of bank branches;
● Number of banks offering internet-banking;
● Number of foreign banks in the country.
can be described in a correlation model that measures the interaction be-
tween them.
where:
- correlation coefﬁcient;
 - variable of bank branches, number of ATMs, number of banks offering 
internet banking during  year t;
 - average number of bank branches, average number of ATMs, average 
number of banks offering internet-banking;
 - number of foreign banks in year t;
 - average number of foreign banks;.
The entry of foreign banks in Croatia had least strong inﬂuence on the increase
of the number of banks offering internet-banking, while it affected the growth of 
the number of ATMs the most. The inﬂuence of foreign banks on the number
of bank branches was substantial with a correlation coefﬁcient of 0.581. At the
same time the impact on the number of banks offering internet-banking was 
moderate with a correlation coefﬁcient of 0.395. The number of foreign banks
and the number of ATMs were strongly correlated – 0.603. 
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FYR Macedonia
In mid 90-ies international bank supervision standards were introduced for the 
ﬁrst time in Macedonia. The US CAMEL model was implemented and higher
capital requirements were set for acquiring a bank license. As a consequence 
of these measures at the end of 1995 the Macedonian bank systems consisted 
of 21 banks.
The number of banks changed to 22 in 1997 when one new bank (4.76%) 
entered the market. During the period there were 5 foreign banks in Macedo-
nia. At the end of 1998, the banking system of Macedonia was comprised 
of 22 banks, their numbers remaining unchanged compared to the previous 
year. At the end of 1998, banks had a total of 20 branches on the whole ter-
ritory of the country. In 1999, the banking system of Macedonia consisted 
of 22 banks. The number of branches remained unchanged as well. As of 
December 31, 1999, the level of privatization of the banking capital in the 
Republic of Macedonia was 76.8%. From a regional aspect, the structure of 
the banking system in Macedonia conﬁrmed its asymmetry, with a tendency
of further strengthening. At the end of 1999, only 4 banks were located out of 
the capital. However, the disproportion in the supply of ﬁnancial services was
partly being alleviated by the relatively extended network of branches. At the 
end of 1999, Macedonian banks had 20 branches.
At the end of 2000, the banking system of Macedonia consisted of 22 
banks. The on-going process of bank privatization in Macedonia, continued 
in 2000. The level of privatization of the banks in Macedonia at the end of 
December 2000, equaled 83,5%, which was an increase of 6,7 percent-
age points compared to 31.12.1999. At the end of 2000, seven  banks were 
owned by foreign shareholders, by 2 banks more  compared to the end of 
1999. (40,00%). The analysis of the regional aspects of the banking system 
structure of Macedonia confirms its asymmetry and concentration of supply 
of financial services in the capital of the Republic of Macedonia. Out of the 
total number of banking institutions in Macedonia, only 6 banks were located 
outside the capital city. The existing regional structure was to a certain ex-
tent mitigated with the relatively wide network of branches. Thus, at the end 
of the 2000, the banks in Macedonia had 20 branches. ATMs came into 
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exploitation for the first time in 2000 when 3 machines were located in the 
capital. They were the property of 2 banks.
At the end of 2001, the bank system of the Republic of Macedonia consisted 
of 21 banks. The level of privatization of the banking capital in the Republic 
of Macedonia as of December 31, 2001 equaled 84.3%. On December 31, 
2001, the number of banks owned by domestic shareholders equaled 13, 
which compared to the end of the previous year was a decreas of two banks. 
On the other hand, the number of banks owned by foreign shareholders 
equaled 8 at the end of 2001 and compared to the December 31, 2000, it in-
creased by 1 bank. The number of ATMs reached 16 which was an increase 
of 433.33% or 13 ATMs. Out of the total number of banking institutions in the 
Republic of Macedonia, only 4 banks were located outside of the capital of 
Macedonia. The existing regional structure was to a certain extent mitigated 
with the relatively wide network of branches. Thus, as of December 31, 2001, 
the banks in the Republic of Macedonia had 28 branches, 8 more than in the 
previous year (40.00%).
In 2002, there were no changes in the number of banks. As of December 
2002, the degree of privatization of the banking capital in Macedonia equaled 
85.9%. The structural features of the banking system from a regional aspect 
affirmed the already ascertained asymmetry and concentration of the sup-
ply of financial services in the capital city. As of December 31, 2002, only 
4 of the total number of banks were located outside the capital city. There 
was a relatively wide network of branches: 34 branches, which 6 more (an 
increase by 21,43%). In 2002 one bank introduced internet-banking targeted 
to the corporate sector.
At the end of 2003, the banking system consisted of 21 banks. The degree of 
privatization of the banking capital equaled 87.00%. Four banks out of the total 
number of banks in Macedonia were located outside the capital city. On the other 
hand, there was still a relatively wide network of branches: 34 branches. Com-
pared to December 31, 2002, the number of ATMs increased by 50 (102.04%), 
but the relative increase was almost twice smaller than in the previous year. The 
rate of growth of ATMs formed a downward tendency.
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Еnd of 2004, 21 banks operated in Macedonia. The degree of privatization 
of the banking system equaled 91.00%. The effect of high concentration of 
the banks on one location was mitigated by the wide branch network, which 
consisted of 43 branches.It contributed to the improvement of the quality of 
Macedonian banking by strengthening competition, bringing services closer 
to clients, and especially expanding the banks’ operations with clients. The 
number of banks offering internet-banking services (3) remained unchanged. 
The number of ATMs continued to grow though at an almost three times slow-
er rate (32.32% or 32 ATMs) than in 2003.
End of 2005, the banking system of Macedonia comprised of 20 banks, which 
was one bank less relative to the end of 2004. The degree of privatization 
equaled 91.9%. The analysis of the geographic distribution of banks revealed 
that most of them were concentrated in the capital city. Thus, the head ofﬁces
of sixteen banks were located in Skopje, while only 4 banks were located out-
side the capital. This concentration pattern was mitigated to a certain extent 
by the wide branch network, which consisted of 72 branches. Internet-banking 
became especially attractive with 4 banks offering such services. Tthe access 
to a part of banking services was enhanced by using a variety of payment 
cards. End of 2005 there were a hundred and ﬁfty-seven ATMs.
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Number of banks 21 21 22 22 22 22 21 21 21 21 20
Number of foreing banks * * 5 6 5 7 8 7 8 8 8
Number of ATMs * * * * * 3 16 49 99 131 157
Number of branches * * * 20 20 20 28 34 34 43 72
Number of the bank with 
е-banking * * * * * * * 1 3 3 4
Source: National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia 
On the basis of this data a regression model describing the increase of the number 
of foreign banks as a function of the number of bank branches can be derived.
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Where:
 - number of foreign banks in year t;
 - number of bank branches in year t;
The link between the variables:
● Number of ATM;
● Number of bank branches;
● Number of banks offering internet-banking;
● Number of foreign banks in the country.
can be described in a correlation model that measures the interaction 
between them.
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where:
- correlation coefﬁcient;
 - variable of bank branches, number of ATMs, number of banks offering 
internet banking during  year t;
 - average number of bank branches, average number of ATMs, average 
number of banks offering internet-banking;
 - number of foreign banks in year t;
 - average number of foreign banks;.
The biggest impact of the entry of foreign banks in Macedonia is on the increase 
of bank branches and the weakest one on the number of banks offering internet-
banking. High correlation was observed between the number of foreign banks 
and the expansion of the branch network – 0.7509.  Correlations between the 
number of foreign banks and banks offering internet banking as well as correla-
tion with the number of ATMs were substantial. The correlation coefﬁcients were
0.536 and 0.571, respectively. 
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Romania
End of 1995 the Romanian bank system comprised of 31 banks. In 15 of them 
ownership was predominantly of foreign shareholders and the rest owned by 
domestic investors. The average number of branches per bank was 37, the to-
tal being 1159 branches. In 1996, the number of banks increased signiﬁcantly
to 40. This makes a 29.03% rise of the total number of banks. Foreign banks 
increased by 4 or by 26.67%. The number of branches doubled reaching 
2526 or an average of 63 branches per bank. The tendency of the increase 
in the number of banks persisted in 1997 as well. At the end of 1997, , there 
were 43 banks as a result of new foreign banks entering the market. There 
were 23 foreign banks, which is by 4 more (an increase by 21.05%) than in 
1996. In 1997,  in the capital and several big cities 79 ATMs were located.. 
The network of branches continued to broaden though at a lesser pace than 
the previous year. At the end of 1997 there were already 2913 branches. This 
represented a growth by15.32% . 
The trend towards increasing of the number of banks continued in 1998. The 
bank system expanded and at the end of the year consisted of 45 banks, 2 
more than in the previous year (an increase by 4.65%). Foreign banks con-
tributed to 100% of the growth thus reaching the total number of 25 banks. 
As of December 1998 there were 186 ATMs which represented a 135.44% 
growth. The number of bank branches reached 3055 (142 more than in 1997). 
In 1999 the number of banks decreased by 4 to 41, thus breaking the upward 
trend. However foreign banks increased by 1 (4.00%). In December 1999 the 
number of ATMs was 472 more than in 1998 (an increase by 153.76%). As a 
result of the decreased number of banks’ branches went down by 46.
In 2000 there were no changes in the number of banks in Romania. Four 
banks were privatized thus bringing the number of foreign banks up by 
11.54%. At the end of the year the average number of ATMs per bank was 18, 
the total being 747. The number of branches continued to fall and a decrease 
of 115 branches on the previous year was registered. In qualitative terms, the 
modernization of electronic payments was illustrated by the diversiﬁcation of
ﬁnancial products supplied to companies. In 2000 one bank started offering
internet-banking services. 
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In 2001, the great progress made in cleaning up and strengthening the Ro-
manian bank system as well as in enhancing its soundness indicated an 
advance towards international standards. The process was initiated by the 
National Bank of Romania (NBR) through a program in correlation with the 
government’s activity and based on the parameters agreed upon with the in-
ternational institutions. The introduction of international standards stimulated 
foreign banks to search for opportunities to strengthen their presence. As a 
consequence, the number of foreign banks went up to 32 or increased by 
10.34%.  The number of ATMs continued to grow and reached a total number 
of 1290. At the end of 2001, the average number of branches per bank was 67 
due to the decrease by 163 of the total number of branches. Two banks were 
offering internet-banking.
Several changes marked the composition of the Romanian banking system in 
2002. The licenses of three banks were revoked. A newly-established bank 
made its way into the system whereas several others had changed their names 
following the alteration of the majority shareholder. As a result, 39 banks were 
operating in Romania end 2002 (against 41 at the end of 2001) and the weight of 
foreign capital stood at 64.8 percent (from 60.6 percent in the year before). The 
number of ATMs kept on growing. The relative increase was 58.68%. In 2002 
the downward trend in the number of branches was reversed and they grew by 
1161 to 3892. Five banks were offering internet-banking. 
The year 2003 saw good progress in the strengthening of the Romanian bank 
system, as further steps were taken with a view to winding up insolvent banks, 
pushing privatization forward and bringing the banking regulatory framework 
into line with the EU legislation in the ﬁeld. In keeping on with the trend of
developing cashless payment media in 2003, electronic payment instruments 
increased as well, in both absolute and relative terms. The volume of transac-
tions was supported by an infrastructure that was permanently upgraded in 
line with the latest envelopments in the ﬁeld; at the end of 2003, there were
2593 ATMs. The efforts made by banks to diversify the array of products 
met users’ quick response, which was translated into accounts from which 
payments via internet banking can be performed, and the number of which 
increased about 12 times. At the end of 2003, such accounts exceeded the 
number of 19,000. The number of branches decreased by 34 down to 3858.
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In 2004, the Romanian bank system witnessed major structural changes with the 
biggest Romanian bank, entering the group of banks with majority private capital. 
The new entrants and the mergers of foreign bank branches, along with changes 
in some banks’ shareholding reshaped the Romanian bank system. At the end of 
2004, the bank system was made up of 39 banks (38 end of 2003). Majority private 
capital accounted for 94.6 percent, compared with 74.3 percent at the end of 2003 
while foreign capital represented 68% of the bank system (1.7 percentage points 
higher than end of 2003). In 2004 the number of ATMs grew by 697 while bank 
branches decreased by 91. Banks offering internet-banking jumped from 4 to 12.
End of 2005, thirty nine banks were operating , of which 31 were majority or 
fully privately owned, two were state-owned  and six were branches of foreign 
banks. Out of 39 banks in Romania 30 were in foreign ownership. Banks offer-
ing internet-banking grew by 4, to 16. The number of branches increased by 527 
and reached 4294, the number of ATMs grew by 1064 to 4354.
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Number of banks 31 40 43 45 41 41 41 39 38 39 39
Number of foreing banks 15 19 23 25 26 29 32 32 29 30 30
Number of ATMs * * 79 186 472 747 1290 2047 2593 3290 4354
Number of branches 1159 2526 2913 3055 3009 2894 2731 3892 3858 3767 4294
Number of the bank with 
е-banking * * * * * 1 2 5 8 12 16
Source: NBR, ECB
On the basis of this data a regression model describing the increase of the number 
of foreign banks as a function of the number of bank branches can be derived.
Where:
- number of foreign banks in year t;
 - number of bank branches in year t;
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The link between the variables:
● Number of ATM;
● Number of bank branches;
● Number of banks offering internet-banking;
● Number of foreign banks in the country.
can be described in a correlation model that measures the interaction be-
tween them.
where:
- correlation coefﬁcient;
 - variable of bank branches, number of ATMs, number of banks offering 
internet banking during  year t;
 - average number of bank branches, average number of ATMs, average 
number of banks offering internet-banking;
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 - number of foreign banks in year t;
 - average number of foreign banks;.
In Romania the entry of foreign banks inﬂuenced most signiﬁcantly the number of
bank branches while the effect on banks offering internet-banking was the weak-
est. The increased number of foreign banks had serious inﬂuence on the number
of bank branches which is evident from the correlation coefﬁcient – 0.798. The im-
pact on the number of banks offering internet banking and on the number of ATMs 
was substantial. The respective correlation coefﬁcients were 0.534 and 0.664.
Serbia
At the end of 1995 there were 112 banks in Serbia. During this period there were 
3 foreign banks in the country. In 1996 the number of banks decreased by 9 to 
103. In 1997 the number of banks the bank system of Serbia increased by 3 to 
106. In 1998 the number of banks decreased by 2 to 104. 
In 1999 the war had a serious impact on the economy as a whole and the 
bank system in particular. At the end of 1999, the number of banks was re-
duced to 75 with 29 banks closed. During this period there were 3 foreign 
banks in the country. At the end of 2000, tha banking system comprised of 81 
banks. The increase resulted from opening of domestic banks. At the end of 
2001, there were 54 banks in the country, which represented a decrease by 
27. Foreign banks almost tripled their numbers to 8. There were 75 ATMs. In 
2002 there were 50 banks, among which 12 foreign banks, 4 (50%) more than 
in 2001. The number of ATMs climbed up to 166 with an increase of 121.33%. 
There were 89 bank branches.
In 2003 the number of banks in Serbia was reduced to 47 of which 16 were 
considered as foreign, their number continuing to grow. In Serbia there were 
346 ATMs which represented a growth by 180. Branches across the country 
increased to 292, each bank having an average of 6 branches. Two banks be-
gan offering internet-banking services. In 2004 there were already 43 banks 
in Serbia due to a reduction in the number of foreign banks from 16 to 11. In 
contrast with the decreasing number of banks the branch network expanded 
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by 2.74% up to 300 making the average number of branches per bank 7. The 
number of ATMs grew by 104 to 450. Six banks were offering internet-banking 
services (an increase by 200%).
In 2005 the downward trend in the number of banks persisted with  40 banks at 
the end of the year ( 3 less than in 2004). The number of foreign banks however 
grew by 54.55% (by 17 banks ). The trend towards an easier access to banking 
services continued. It was represented by: an increase of  the number of АТМ 
by 86,00% or 837 ATM; by a growth rate of the bank branches of 9% (to 327 
branches); by an increase in the number of banks offering access to internet 
banking by 66.67% ( 10 banks). 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Number of banks 112 103 106 104 75 81 54 50 47 43 40
Number of foreing banks 3 3 3 3 3 3 8 12 16 11 17
Number of ATMs * * * * * * 75 166 346 450 837
Number of branches * * * * * * * 89 292 300 327
Number of the bank with 
е-banking * * * * * * * * 2 6 10
Source: National Bank of Serbia, EBRD
On the basis of these data an auto regression model describing the in-
crease of the number of foreign banks as a function of the number of bank 
branches can be derived.
Where:
 - number of foreign banks in year t;
 - number of bank branches in year t;
- 2.71828182845904;
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The link between the variables:
● Number of ATM;
● Number of bank branches;
● Number of banks offering internet-banking;
● Number of foreign banks in the country.
can be described in a correlation model that measures the interaction be-
tween them.
where:
- correlation coefﬁcient;
 - variable of bank branches, number of ATMs, number of banks offering 
internet banking during  year t;
 - average number of bank branches, average number of ATMs, average 
number of banks offering internet-banking;
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 - number of foreign banks in year t;
 - average number of foreign banks;.
The strongest effect of the entry of foreign banks was experienced by the branch 
network. The weakest was the impact on the number of banks offering internet-
banking. Foreign banks had a strong inﬂuence on the number of branches for
which the correlation coefﬁcient amounted to 0.895. Correlation between the
number of foreign banks and banks offering internet-banking was high as well 
– 0.715. The correlation coefﬁcient between the number of foreign banks and the
number of ATMs suggested high dependence – 0.873.
Conclusion 
During the observed period the developments in the bank sector i.e. the 
entry of foreign banks on the local market, the dynamics of the number of 
ATMs, bank branches and the internet-banking are quite diverse due to the 
speciﬁc economic and social characteristics of each of the countries.
The ﬁnancial crisis in 1996/1997, led to the insolvency of large part of Bul-
garian banks and the introduction of the currency board together with a new 
banking act to stabilize the bank system. After 1998 a growing number of 
foreign banks entered the market through the process of privatization and 
direct acquisition of banking licenses. At the end of 2005 the country had a 
well functioning bank system working in accordance with the requirements of 
the Basel Committee.
The bank system of Albania developed at a steady pace. Even at the begin-
ning of the period the Basel requirements were already implemented. 1997 
was a milestone moment for the privatization of banks. This was also the 
year with the biggest increase in the number of foreign banks. 
The bank system of Croatia went through two stages in its development. 
At the beginning it was characterised by a fast growing number of banks 
reaching its peak in 1998. The second stage up to 2005 was dominated by a 
tendency of a decrease in the number of banks. However this reduction didn’t 
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have a negative impact on customers’ access to banking services, because 
of the compensating effect of the increasing number of branches and ATMs.
At the beginning of mid 90-ies,  banks in Macedonia had already been 
experiencing a massive financial crisis over which the government man-
aged to take control in 1995. The first positive results became evident in 
1996. Following the government measures and the bank act of 1998 the 
economic climate became more attractive for foreign investors interested 
in the local banking market. In 1999-2000 higher requirements were intro-
duced for Macedonian banks which led to fast rise in foreign investments 
in the banking sector and in 2001-2002 the country had an already well 
functioning bank system.
The number of foreign banks in Romania peaked in 2001-2002. Despite the di-
verse dynamics of the entry of foreign banks there was a steady upward trend 
in the number of ATMs during the observed period. After 2000, bank branches 
reached their lowest number. After 2001, all indicators characterizing banks’ 
activity improved, thus attracting an increasing number of banks’ clients.
Banks in Serbia decreased their number through the whole period both be-
cause of the territorial changes and the war in 1999. Despite the unstable po-
litical situation during the war and the economic difﬁculties resulting from the
embargo, the number of foreign banks increased in 2000. All variable indicat-
ing the access to banking services showed a positive development during 
the observed period. Because of the conﬂicts Serbia had the worst starting
values for all indicators. Despite the bad start of opening the bank system 
towards foreign investments and the ease of access to banking services 
Serbia managed to a great extend to catch up with the rest of the countries.
The same foreign owners have a big share of foreign banks on domestic mar-
kets in all of the observed countries. These are banks with have strategies for 
entering the markets in the region. In each of the countries the dynamics of 
foreign banks entering, the increase in the number of ATMs, bank branches 
and banks offering internet-banking showed a different trend. The estimated 
correlation coefﬁcient shows the link between these tendencies. Despite the 
short period covered by the research and the various economic and social 
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turmoil in some of them, the targeted countries did go through the estimated 
correlation and can be used to compare development across the rerion..
 The increase of the number of ATMs was inﬂuenced most substantially by
the entry of foreign banks in Serbia, while Macedonia experienced the least 
impact. Again Serbia was the country in which increases in the numbers of 
foreign banks and bank branches were most strongly correlated. Bulgaria 
showed the weakest correlation. 
Assessing the correlation between the proliferation of foreign banks and the 
number of banks offering internet-banking showed that it was strongest in 
Serbia and weakest in Croatia. As the results show that as a whole foreign 
banks inﬂuenced the bank sector most heavily in Serbia. The strong cor-
relation can be explained by the process of restructuring undergoing in the 
Serbian bank system after the war which together with the increasing number 
of foreign banks began offering a better access to various services via inter-
net-banking, ATMs and the network of branches. Results for Macedonia and 
Albania are similar due to the similar characteristics and developments of the 
indicators. Foreign banks had a similar impact on the growth of ATMs and 
banks offering internet-banking in Bulgaria and Croatia. The two countries 
differ only by the correlation with the number of bank branches. This differ-
ence is explained by the already developed network of branches of the Bul-
garian bank system as of the start of the observed period, while the branch 
network in Croatia has just started its development just a few years earlier.
The values of the correlation coefﬁcients for Romania can not be compared to
the results of any of the other ﬁve countries. However the data shows a strong-
er impact of foreign banks on the number of ATMs than in Croatia while the 
inﬂuence on internet banking services was comparable to that in the Republic
of Macedonia. Romania had the second strongest correlation between the 
number of foreign banks and the number of bank branches after that of Serbia.
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Annex I
Coefﬁcients of correlation
Number of ATMs Number of branches
Number of banks 
with е-banking
Albania 0.572 0.781 0.554
Bulgaria 0.591 0.199 0.484
Croatia 0.603 0.581 0.395
Macedonia 0.571 0.750 0.536
Romania 0.664 0.798 0.534
Serbia 0.873 0.895 0.715
Annex II
Coefﬁcients of determination
Number of ATMs Number of branches
Number of banks 
with е-banking
Albania 0.327 0.610 0.307
Bulgaria 0.349 0.040 0.234
Croatia 0.364 0.338 0.156
Macedonia 0.326 0.563 0.287
Romania 0.441 0.637 0.285
Serbia 0.762 0.801 0.511
Annex III
Durbin-Watson stat
Number of ATMs Number of branches
Number of banks 
with е-banking
Albania 0.333 0.453 0.307
Bulgaria 0.349 0.040 0.289
Croatia 0.418 0.469 0.359
Macedonia 0.598 1.133 0.596
Romania 0.424 0.877 0.363
Serbia 0.900 1.425 0.916
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